Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Oskanian answers RFE/RL on Madrid Principles and more

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Oskanian answers RFE/RL on Madrid Principles and more

    PRESS RELEASE
    The Civilitas Foundation
    One Northern Ave. Suite 30
    Yerevan, Armenia
    Telephones: +37494.800754; +37410.500119
    email: [email protected]
    web: www.civilitasfoundation.org


    Vartan Oskanian's interview (translation below) to Radio Free Europe (FM
    102, Yerevan) was aired on Saturday, August 1, 2009

    RFE/RL: On debating members of the Armenian National Congress

    VARTAN OSKANIAN: I have no problem debating anyone. I'm happy to debate
    any issue, but that debate must serve a purpose. Specifically on the topic
    of Nagorno Karabakh, I see no reason to engage in that debate because the
    opposition's issue is not with me, but with the administration. So the
    opposition's invitation to debate should be directed to the administration,
    to those conducting negotiations today. Of course we can sit and talk about
    history, about the past, about the last 17 years. Civilitas convenes such
    discussions. Perhaps in the coming months it will be possible to convene one
    on the topic of Nagorno Karabakh and all those who wish to participate can
    come and do so. But right now, there would be no purpose to my debating the
    opposition. Their fundamental target should be today's government.

    On being responsible for the Madrid Principles

    Each administration is responsible for its period in history. Today, there
    has been a change in administration, there is a new administration, and they
    have decided to continue the negotiations from where we left off. Therefore,
    today, the authorities are responsible and the debate should be between the
    administration and the opposition. I think that for 18 months, the
    opposition hasn't understood this and it continues to try to conduct a
    debate with the past administration. I think it would be more useful if the
    administration and the opposition actually did debate the issues which
    concern our people.

    On the Madrid principles.

    During the whole of the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations process, all
    comprehensive solutions have been based on four fundamental principles.
    Those have never changed. The first is the status of Nagorno Karabakh, the
    second is the return of territories, the third is the return of refugees,
    and the fourth is security guarantees. I want to repeat this: from the
    first day all comprehensive proposals have been based on these principles.
    I
    assure you that it will be the same in the future. In other words, if Madrid
    fails - and we're already talking about the Krakow principles, if they fail
    - and in the future, there are new documents, they too will be based on
    these same principles. If the Armenian side would really rather not see the
    return of territories or the return of refugees in future documents, in
    other words, if we are to be lead by the `not an inch of land' principle
    which, really, of course, would be a great solution, and in that case I have
    nothing to add, then at that time, either Armenia or Nagorno Karabakh or
    both, as the Armenian side in the negotiations, must reject negotiations.
    If, however, we are engaged in negotiations, then these principles will be
    there.

    As for negotiated proposals, the content of the Madrid principles is
    disproportionately advantageous in comparison with that of all previous
    proposals. On this, there is no doubt and no argument. As regards the status
    of Nagorno Karabakh, in the past, the worst proposal was high autonomy
    within Azerbaijan, and the best was a horizontal link between Nagorno
    Karabakh and Azerbaijan within a common state, but the content of the Madrid
    principles specifically offers self-determination for the people of Nagorno
    Karabakh, and this naturally and obviously means Nagorno Karabakh
    independence or reunification with Armenia. So, the Madrid principles in
    comparison with those which came before are disproportionately better,
    without doubt. And I would hope that you would agree with me that I'm one of
    the very few people who is thoroughly familiar with all previous documents
    and can make such a comparison.

    As to the other principles - territories, refugees and security - I can say
    the same. The formulations are such that they offer the opportunity, when
    the details are negotiated prudently, to truly arrive at an outcome that is
    advantageous for us.

    Principles are, of course, important but more important are the details that
    must be negotiated. We did not succeed in arriving at an agreement on the
    details with the Azerbaijani side because Azerbaijan's demands were
    unacceptable for us, and our demands were unacceptable for them. There was
    no common ground. We had our benchmark, based naturally on our national
    interests, and we were unable to arrive at an agreement within range of that
    bar.

    Today, the focus, the debate should be about that benchmark. Today's
    leadership is not the same. Serzh Sargsyan is not Kocharian, Nalbandian is
    not Oskanian. There are clear policy changes. I am frequently blamed for
    criticizing foreign policy just because I was foreign minister for 10 years.
    Yes, I was minister, but the administration has changed. Certain policies
    being implemented today re fundamentally different from the policies we
    implemented, so there is room for criticism. When there are things with
    which I disagree, I criticize. That's why today I will repeat, and in fact I
    call on the opposition as well, that their task today is to clarify what the
    benchmark is. Our bar was high. I have concerns about where the bar is
    today. Azerbaijan says whatever it wants to say, Bryza talks about the
    return of six or seven territories, Aliyev rules out the independence of
    Nagorno Karabakh - and our leadership is silent. This is my concern. This is
    what the opposition should be worried about today, and our public too. And
    we must specifically challenge the authorities, raise questions and ask that
    they clarify where that bar stands today, to quell our concerns. The
    opposition's issue isn't with me, but with the authorities.

    On Matt Bryza's explanation that Nagorno Karabakh's non-participation in
    Nagorno Karabakh talks was the result of a decision by the Armenian side

    Bryza does not appear to be thoroughly informed. He's probably unaware of
    the background. Nagorno Karabakh's participation was interrupted in March
    1997, when the Minsk process itself stopped. In other words, when I was
    appointed foreign minister, Nagorno Karabakh was no longer in the process.
    But there was an ongoing process between presidents, ministers and meetings
    between the advisors of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It's true,
    in those days, we were faced with a choice - to continue the
    Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, or to raise the Nagorno Karabakh
    participation issue. It was decided that we would continue to negotiate,
    because the alternative was that the talks generally would be stalled. So
    the decision was about whether to continue or not, and not whether Nagorno
    Karabakh would participate or not. That's absurd. So the truth is that
    Nagorno Karabakh's participation was interrupted in 1997.

    Today, of course it's desirable that Nagorno Karabakh return; everyone
    understands that without Nagorno Karabakh there cannot be a final agreement.
    So the sooner Nagorno Karabakh enters the process, the more engaged they
    become and their wishes taken into consideration, their consent on a final
    agreement will be more likely. Presenting the Nagorno Karabakh authorities
    and people with a fait accompli will make it much more difficult to bring
    them on board. There's no doubt and Azerbaijan too must realize this - that
    the sooner Nagorno Karabakh enters the process, the more the process will
    benefit.

    On an assessment of the 1998-2008 negotiations period

    In 1996, there was the Lisbon statement by the OSCE Chairman-in-office. It's
    true it's not a binding document, and only a statement, but it was done in
    the name of all OSCE member states, with the exception of Armenia. In
    1997-98, it was very difficult for us to break down that wall because those
    countries were convinced of a Lisbon-based solution. The documents of 1997
    regarding the Nagorno Karabakh resolution, especially the first one which
    was comprehensive and referred to the status, was completely based on the
    Lisbon principles. President Ter-Petrossian categorically rejected that
    proposal. Later, when it was clear that agreement on the status would be
    complicated, they brought forth a step-by-step proposal, about which
    Ter-Petrossian made a public statement, wrote an article, and the rest is
    history. But that the notion of autonomy was reinforced among states was
    unequivocal. When I say we were struggling against that, it was not against
    a document that we were struggling, but against that perception. We did, in
    fact, succeed in changing that perception. I'm not in competition with the
    former administration. I believe that between 1998 to 2008 Armenia's
    diplomacy succeeded to break down that wall on autonomy and reach
    codification of the right of self-determination that we have today.

    I consider that a success. When I hear these arguments which target
    individuals or former administrations, I think sometimes we are blinded by
    these arguments and motivated by revenge and don't think about what we're
    saying and doing. I say this with great conviction - if we lose this one
    principle, the principle of the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to
    self-determination, it will be very difficult to revive it. Indeed, the
    negotiations can go off in a completely other direction and the principle of
    territorial integrity may be reinforced. Today, we are at an advantage over
    Azerbaijan, specifically because of the existence of the self-determination
    principle, and that is why we must be cautious in our statements and
    criticism.

    I want to repeat this - we must understand how far we can go in our
    concessions, because without concessions there will be no resolution, since
    the situation now is more complex than in the past, and this complication is
    the consequence of our miscalculated foreign policy. Today, the
    Armenia-Turkey situation affects the Nagorno Karabakh issue, pressure has
    increased, so all seem to be in a hurry on the Nagorno Karabakh issue, in
    order to make it possible to also resolve the Turkey-Armenia border
    issue. Under
    that pressure, it is possible to take steps that are not necessarily in our
    national interests, especially since during this year and a half this
    administration has taken such steps, that is why there is room for concern.

    On the Turkey-Armenia process and the seeming absence of an Armenian agenda


    In my time, there was a clear agenda. I think there is one today as well.
    But to what extent the Armenian side can bring on discussion of that agenda,
    or impose that agenda, that's another matter. There's always been an agenda,
    I'm sure there is one today. The problem is that Turkey was able to make its
    own agenda more prevalent during this time. In other words, as of today,
    Turkey has gotten what it wanted from this process. I don't know what will
    happen in the future, but the Armenian side has so far gotten nothing. From
    the first day, I said there was clear miscalculation here. And more and
    more, we are convinced of this. The president's last statement does not
    correct the situation. The president continues to leave a window open. I
    believe the president should state more clearly that if the border is not
    open by the time the football game takes place, then I can't go to Turkey.
    But he has still left this window open and that's exactly what Turkey wants.
    They've received what they wanted, they continue to reap dividends, and I
    don't know when our leadership will be convinced that the Turkish side is
    exploiting the situation. They should been convinced of this long ago and so
    long as the process continues the way it's been, the Armenian side will
    continue to lose.

    On the `artificial' and `false' nature of Armenia's democracy

    If government is not formed through free and fair elections, then we will
    never be able to create the right checks and balances within our political
    system. Without such balance, we can't solve our problems, and impose the
    rule of law. Fair and free elections are necessary but not sufficient
    conditions for democracy. There is no doubt about this. I'm not saying
    anything new: this is the international practice and the experience of
    democratic countries. Without normal elections, your democracy is
    incomplete, and not serious. So our focus should be on that and we need to
    find the mechanisms to make that happen.

    On national mobilization in the context of domestic tensions, reciprocal
    distrust and a deficit of legitimacy

    In my statement at the Stepanakert conference in July, I said that the same
    factors that make mobilization imperative also obstruct such mobilization.
    Here the authorities have a huge role to play. I believe they must take
    minimal but specific steps to improve the political environment in the
    country, to inspire hope that something will change and to create clear
    mechanisms to solve problems. Under such circumstances it may be possible to
    collaborate on our most pressing problems.

    There seems to be an impression that independent of everything, however bad
    the situation internally, however much we may be opposed to each other, when
    there are external threats facing the state, we will come together. In
    extreme situations, I am convinced that is indeed the case. But we must also
    recognize that we are also faced with political threats. The situation may
    become such that there will not be war but that there may be efforts to
    impose on us conditions that go counter to our national interest. So we must
    recognize that there are not-so-obvious internal and external political
    threats and dangers around which we must also rally together. The
    authorities must take a leading role in this and recognize that there are
    such issues. Because, at the end of the day, it is the rule of law, a
    healthy political environment and appropriate checks and balances, that will
    make it possible for us to solve our problems.

    Armenia is a very politicized country, everything is politicized and we have
    problems everywhere. And as much as those problems may be social, at the
    end, everything is political. So the solution to these problems must be
    sought in the political arena. We will only succeed in solving them if we
    can create the right political mechanisms. Recently, I proposed creating a
    second political pole, commensurate to the existing power pole. I believe
    that's the right path. Both the administration and the opposition should
    think about that because that is in our national interest. The authorities
    must support this, or at the very least, not obstruct it, in order for such
    a pole to emerge.

    On March 1, 2008 and accusations about willfully re-interpreting that day

    I disagree. That day I had nothing to gain or lose. That day I took upon
    myself a great responsibility, more than could be expected of a foreign
    minister. I sensed the dangers of that day and it was with that awareness
    that I spoke out. It would have been easy to refuse a press conference that
    day, but that would not have been the responsible thing to do. If only other
    political figures, from both sides, who were the key players that day, had
    also demonstrated such responsibility. If each had done what he could, I am
    convinced we might have avoided one of the blackest days in our nation's
    history. My conscience is clear that I did my part. It didn't succeed. But I
    stood before our people and called on the authorities and the opposition to
    sit and talk.

    On entering the political arena

    In my interviews, my statements, I am already perceived as someone who is in
    the political arena. That has not been formalized by a declaration or an
    organization. Nevertheless, I am in politics. I can't be indifferent to the
    events that transpire in Armenia today, and I will do everything to be able
    to have input and become useful, especially to help form a healthy political
    environment in our country, and to work with everyone, to reach at least a
    bi-polar political system - one that would noticeably reinforce our
    democratization processes.
Working...
X