Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

ANKARA: Justin McCarthy: 'The Turkish-Armenian Conflict'

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • ANKARA: Justin McCarthy: 'The Turkish-Armenian Conflict'

    THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN CONFLICT: A BRIEF HISTORY AND AN EVALUATION

    Speech given by Dr. Justin McCarthy
    at the Turkish Grand National Assembly

    http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/mcmarthy.htm

    Ankara
    March 24, 2005

    Turkistan Newsletter Fri, 1 Apr 2005 01:14:52
    Turkistan Bulteni ISSN:1386-6265

    THE HISTORY

    Ottoman Provinces

    Conflict between the Turks and the Armenians was not inevitable. The two
    peoples should have been friends. When World War I began, the Armenians
    and Turks had been living together for 800 years. The Armenians of
    Anatolia and Europe had been Ottoman subjects for nearly 400 years. There
    were problems during those centuries--problems caused especially by those
    who attacked and ultimately destroyed the Ottoman Empire. Everyone in the
    Empire suffered, but it was the Turks and other Muslims who suffered
    most. Judged by all economic and social standards, the Armenians did well
    under Ottoman rule. By the late nineteenth century, in every Ottoman
    province the Armenians were better educated and richer than the Muslims.
    Armenians worked hard, it is true, but their comparative riches were
    largely due to European and American influence and Ottoman tolerance.
    European merchants made Ottoman Christians their agents. European
    merchants gave them their business. European consuls intervened in their
    behalf. The Armenians benefited from the education given to them, and not
    to the Turks, by American missionaries.

    While the lives of the Armenians as a group were improving, Muslims were
    living through some of the worst suffering experienced in modern history:
    In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bosnians were massacred
    by Serbs, Russians killed and exiled the Circassians, Abkhazians, and
    Laz, and Turks were killed and expelled from their homelands by Russians,
    Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs. Yet, in the midst of all this Muslim
    suffering, the political situation of the Ottoman Armenians constantly
    improved. First, equal rights for Christians and Jews were guaranteed in
    law. Equal rights increasingly became a reality, as well. Christians took
    high places in the government. They became ambassadors, treasury
    officials, even foreign ministers. In many ways, in fact, the rights of
    Christians became greater than those of the Muslims, because powerful
    European states intervened in their behalf. The Europeans demanded and
    received special treatment for Christians. Muslims had no such
    advantages.

    That was the environment in which Armenians revolted against the Ottoman
    Empire--hundreds of years of peace, economic superiority, constantly
    improving political conditions. This would not seem to be a cause for
    revolution. Yet the nineteenth century saw the beginning of an Armenian
    revolution that was to culminate in disaster for both. What drove the
    Armenians and the Turks apart?

    RUSSIAN EXPANSION

    The Russians

    First and foremost, there were the Russians. Regions where Christians and
    Muslims had been living together in relative peace were torn asunder when
    the Russians invaded the Caucasian Muslim lands. Most Armenians were
    probably neutral, but a significant number took the side of the Russians.
    Armenians served as spies and even provided armed units of soldiers for
    the Russians. There were significant benefits for the Armenians: The
    Russians took Erivan Province, today's Armenian Republic, in 1828. They
    expelled Turks and gave the Turkish land, tax-free, to Armenians. The
    Russians knew that if the Turks remained they would always be the enemies
    of their conquerors, so they replaced them with a friendly population-the
    Armenians.

    The forced exile of the Muslims continued until the first days of World
    War I: 300,000 Crimean Tatars, 1.2 million Circassians and Abkhazians,
    40,000 Laz, 70,000 Turks. The Russians invaded Anatolia in the war of
    1877-78, and once again many Armenians joined the Russian side. They
    served as scouts and spies. Armenians became the "police" in occupied
    territories, persecuting the Turkish population. The peace treaty of 1878
    gave much of Northeastern Anatolia back to the Ottomans. The Armenians
    who had helped the Russians feared revenge and fled, although the Turks
    did not, in fact, take any revenge.

    Both the Muslims and the Armenians remembered the events of the Russian
    invasions. Armenians could see that they would be more likely to prosper
    if the Russians won. Free land, even if stolen from Muslims, was a
    powerful incentive for Armenian farmers. Rebellious Ottoman Armenians had
    found a powerful protector in Russia. Rebels also had a base in Russia
    from which they could organize rebellion and smuggle men and guns into
    the Ottoman Empire.

    The Muslims knew that if the Russians were guardian angels for the
    Armenians, they were devils for the Muslims. They could see that when the
    Russians triumphed Muslims lost their lands and their lives. They knew
    what would happen if the Russians came again. And they could see that
    Armenians had been on the side of the Russians. Thus did 800 years of
    peaceful coexistence disintegrate.

    The Armenian Revolutionaries

    It was not until Russian Armenians brought their nationalist ideology to
    Eastern Anatolia that Armenian rebellion became a real threat to the
    Ottoman State.

    Although there were others, two parties of nationalists were to lead the
    Armenian rebellion. The first, the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party, called
    the Hunchaks, was founded in Geneva, Switzerland in 1887 by Armenians
    from Russia. The second, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, called
    the Dashnaks, was founded in the Russian Empire, in Tiflis, in 1890. Both
    were Marxist. Their methods were violent. The Hunchak and Dashnak Party
    Manifestos called for armed revolution in the Ottoman Empire. Terrorism,
    including the murder of both Ottoman officials and Armenians who opposed
    them, was part of the party platforms. Although they were Marxists, both
    groups made nationalism the most important part of their philosophy of
    revolution. In this they were much like the nationalist revolutionaries
    of Bulgaria, Macedonia, or Greece.

    POPULATION

    Unlike the Greek or Bulgarian revolutionaries, the Armenians had a
    demographic problem. In Greece, the majority of the population was Greek.
    In Bulgaria, the majority was Bulgarian. In the lands claimed by the
    Armenians, however, Armenians were a fairly small minority. The region
    that was called "Ottoman Armenia," the "Six Vilayets" of Sivas,
    Mam?ret?laziz, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Van, and Erzurum, was only 17%
    Armenian. It was 78% Muslim. This was to have important consequences for
    the Armenian revolution, because the only way to create the "Armenia" the
    revolutionaries wanted was to expel the Muslims who lived there.
    Anyone who doubts the intentions of the revolutionaries need only look at
    their record-actions such as the murder of one governor of Van Province
    and attempted murder of another, murders of police chiefs and other
    officials, the attempted assassination of sultan Abd?lhamid II. These
    were radical nationalists who were at war with the Ottoman State.

    SMUGGLING ROUTES

    Beginning in earnest in the 1890s, the Russian Armenian revolutionaries
    began to infiltrate the Ottoman Empire. They smuggled rifles, cartridges,
    dynamite, and fighters across ill-defended borders into Van, Erzurum, and
    Bitlis provinces along the routes shown on the map. The Ottomans were
    poorly equipped to fight them. The problem was financial. The Ottomans
    still suffered from their terrible losses in the 1877-78 War with Russia.
    They suffered from the Capitulations, from debts, and from predatory
    European bankers. It must also be admitted that the Ottomans were poor
    economists. The result was a lack of money to support the new police and
    military units that were needed to fight the revolutionaries and restrain
    Kurdish tribes. The number of soldiers and gendarmes in the East was
    never sufficient, and they were often not paid for months at a time. It
    was impossible to defeat the rebels with so few resources.

    By far the most successful of the revolutionaries were the Dashnaks.
    Dashnaks from Russia were the leaders of rebellion. They were the
    organizers and the "enforcers" who turned the Armenians of Anatolia into
    rebel soldiers. This was not an easy task, because at first most of the
    Ottoman Armenians had no wish to rebel. They preferred peace and security
    and disapproved of the atheistic, socialist revolutionaries. A feeling of
    separatism and even superiority among the Armenians helped the
    revolutionaries, but the main weapon that turned the Armenians of the
    East into rebels was terrorism. The prime cause that united the Armenians
    against their government was fear.

    Before the Armenians could be turned into rebels their traditional
    loyalty to their Church and their Community leaders had to be destroyed.
    The rebels realized that Armenians felt the most love and respect for
    their Church, not for the revolution. The Dashnak Party therefore
    resolved to take effective control of the Church. Most clergymen,
    however, did not support the atheistic Dashnaks. The Church could only be
    taken over through violence.

    What happened to Armenian clergymen who opposed the Dashnaks? Priests
    were killed in villages and cities. Their crime? They were loyal Ottoman
    subjects. The Armenian bishop of Van, Boghos, was murdered by the
    revolutionaries in his cathedral on Christmas Eve. His crime? He was a
    loyal Ottoman subject. The Dashnaks attempted to kill the Armenian
    Patriarch in Istanbul, Malachia Ormanian. His crime? He opposed the
    revolutionaries. Arsen, the priest in charge of the important Akhtamar
    Church in Van, the religious center of the Armenians in the Ottoman East,
    was murdered by Ishkhan, one of the leaders of Van's Dashnaks. His crime?
    He opposed the Dashnaks. But there was an additional reason to kill him:
    The Dashnaks wanted to take over the Armenian education system that was
    based in Akhtamar. After Father Arsen was killed, the Dashnak Aram
    Manukian, a man without known religious belief, became head of the
    Armenian schools. He closed down religious education and began
    revolutionary education. So-called "religious teachers" spread throughout
    Van Province, teaching revolution, not religion.

    The loyalty of the rebels was to the revolution. Not even their church
    was safe from their attacks.

    The other group that most threatened the power of the rebels was the
    Armenian merchant class. As a group they favored the government. They
    wanted peace and order, so that they could do business. They were the
    traditional secular leaders of the Armenian Community; the rebels wanted
    to lead the Community themselves, so the merchants had to be silenced.
    Those who most publicly supported their government, such as Bedros
    Kapamac?yan, the Mayor of Van, and Armarak, the kaymakam of Geva?, were
    assassinated, as were numerous Armenian policemen, at least one Armenian
    Chief of Police, and Armenian advisors to the Government. Only a very
    brave Armenian would take the side of the Government.

    The Dashnaks looked on the merchants as a source of money. The merchants
    would never donate to the revolution willingly. They had to be forced to
    do so. The first reported case of extortion from merchants came in
    Erzurum in 1895, soon after the Dashnak Party became active in the
    Ottoman domains. The campaign began in earnest in 1901. In that year the
    extortion of funds through threats and assassination became the official
    policy of the Dashnak Party. The campaign was carried out in Russia and
    the Balkans, as well as in the Ottoman Empire. One prominent Armenian
    merchant, Isahag Zhamharian, refused to pay and reported the Dashnaks to
    the police. He was assassinated in the courtyard of an Armenian church.
    Others who did not pay were also killed. The rest of the merchants then
    paid.

    >From 1902 to 1904 the main extortion campaign brought in the equivalent,
    in today's money, of more than eight million dollars. And this was only
    the amount collected by the central Dashnak committee in a short period,
    almost all from outside the Ottoman Empire. It does not include the
    amounts extorted from 1895 to 1914 in many areas of the Ottoman Empire.
    Soon the merchants were paying their taxes to the revolutionaries, not to
    the government. When the government in Van demanded that the merchants
    pay their taxes, the merchants pleaded that they had indeed paid taxes,
    but to the revolutionaries. They said they could only pay the government
    if the government protected them from the rebels. The same condition
    prevailed all over Eastern Anatolia, in Izmir, in Cilicia, and elsewhere.
    The Armenian common people did not escape the extortions of the rebels.
    They were forced to feed and house the revolutionaries. British Consul
    Elliot reported, "They [the Dashnaks] quarter themselves on Christian
    villages, live on the best to be had, exact contributions to their funds,
    and make the younger women and girls submit to their will. Those who
    incur their displeasure are murdered in cold blood."[1]

    The greatest cost to villagers was the forced purchase of guns. The
    villagers were turned into rebel "soldiers," whether they wished to be or
    not. If they were to fight the Turks, they needed weapons. The
    revolutionaries smuggled weapons from Russia and forced the Armenian
    villagers to buy. The methods used to force the villagers to buy were
    very effective, as British consul Seele reported:

    An agent arrived in a certain village and informed a villager that he
    must buy a Mauser pistol. The villager replied that he had no money,
    whereupon the agent retorted, "You must sell your oxen." The wretched
    villager then proceeded to explain that the sowing season would soon
    arrive and asked how a Mauser pistol would enable him to plough his
    fields. For reply the agent proceeded to destroy the poor man's oxen with
    his pistol and then departed."[2]

    The rebels had more than military organization in mind when they forced
    the villagers to buy weapons. The villagers were charged double the
    normal cost of the weapons. A rifle worth ?5 was sold for ?10. Both the
    rebel organization and the rebels themselves did very well from the
    sales.

    It was the peasants who suffered most. The most basic policy of the
    revolutionaries was a callous exploitation of the lives of Armenians:
    Kurdish tribes and their villages were attacked by the rebels, knowing
    that the tribes would take their revenge on innocent Armenian villagers.
    The revolutionaries escaped and left their fellow Armenians to die.
    Even Europeans, friends of the Armenians, could see that the
    revolutionaries were the cause of the curse that had descended on Eastern
    Anatolia. Consul Seele wrote in 1911:

    >From what I have seen in the parts of the country I have visited I have
    become more convinced than ever of the baneful influence of the Taschnak
    Committee on the welfare of the Armenians and generally of this part of
    Turkey. It is impossible to overlook the fact in that in all places where
    there are no Armenian political organisations or where such organisations
    are imperfectly developed, the Armenians live in comparative harmony with
    the Turks and Kurds.[3]

    The Englishman rightly saw that the cause of the unrest in the East was
    the Armenian revolutionaries. If there were no Dashnaks, the Turks and
    Armenians would have lived together in peace. The Ottoman Government knew
    this was true. Why did the Government tolerate so much from the rebels?
    Why did the Government not stamp them out?

    The Ottoman failure to effectively oppose the rebels is indeed hard to
    understand. Imagine a country in which a number of radical
    revolutionaries, most of them from a foreign country, organize a
    rebellion. They infiltrate fighters and guns from this foreign country to
    lead their attack on the government and the people. The radicals openly
    state they wish to create a state in which the majority of the population
    will be excluded from rule. They murder and terrorize their own people to
    force them to join their cause. They murder government officials. They
    deliberately murder members of the majority in the hope that reprisals
    will lead other nations to invade. They store thousands of weapons in
    preparation for revolt. They revolt, are defeated, then revolt again and
    again. The country that gains most from the rebels' actions is the
    country they come from-the country in which they organize, the country in
    which they have their home base.

    What government would tolerate this? Has there ever been a country that
    would not jail, and probably hang such rebels? Has there ever been a
    country that would allow them to continue to operate openly? Yes. That
    country was the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenian rebels
    operated openly, stored thousands of weapons, murdered Muslims and
    Armenians, killed governors and other officials, and rebelled again and
    again. The only one to truly benefit from their actions was Russia-the
    country in which they organized, the country their leaders came from.
    How could this happen? The Ottomans were not cowards. The Ottomans were
    not fools. They knew what the rebels were doing. The Ottomans tolerated
    the Armenian revolutionaries because the Ottomans had no choice.

    It must be remembered that the very existence of the Ottoman Empire was
    at stake. Serbia, Bosnia, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria had already been
    lost because of European intervention. The Europeans had almost divided
    the Empire in 1878 and had planned to do so in the 1890s. Only fear that
    Russia would become too powerful had stopped them. Public opinion in
    Britain and France could easily change that. Indeed, that was exactly
    what the Armenian revolutionaries wanted. They wanted the Ottomans to
    jail and execute Armenian rebels. European newspapers would report that
    as government persecution of innocent Armenians. They wanted the
    government to prosecute Armenian revolutionary parties. The European
    newspapers would report that as denying political freedom to the
    Armenians. They wanted Muslims to react to Armenian provocations and
    attacks by killing Armenians. The European newspapers would report only
    the dead Armenians, not the dead Muslims. Public opinion would force the
    British and French to cooperate with the Russians and dismember the
    Empire.

    Many politicians in Europe, men such as Gladstone, were as prejudiced
    against the Turks as were the press and the public. They were simply
    waiting for the right opportunity to destroy the Ottoman Empire.
    The result was that it was nearly impossible for the Ottomans to properly
    punish the rebels. The Europeans demanded that the Ottomans accept
    actions from the revolutionaries that the Europeans themselves would
    never tolerate in their own possessions. When the Dashnaks occupied the
    Ottoman Bank, Europeans arranged their release. European ambassadors
    forced the Ottomans to grant amnesty to rebels in Zeytun. They arranged
    pardons for those who attempted to kill sultan Abd?lhamid II. The Russian
    consuls would not let Ottoman courts try Dashnak rebels, because they
    were Russian subjects. Many rebels who were successfully tried and
    convicted were released, because the Europeans demanded and received
    pardons for them, in essence threatening the sultan if he did not release
    rebels and murderers. One Russian consul in Van even publicly trained
    Armenian rebels, acting personally as their weapons instructor.
    All the Ottomans could do was try to keep things as quiet as possible.
    That meant not punishing the rebels as they should have been punished.
    One can only pity the Ottomans. They knew that if they governed properly
    the result would be the death of their state.

    World War I

    There were two factors that caused the Ottoman loss in the East in World
    War I:

    The first was Enver Pasha's disastrous attack at Sarikamis. Enver's
    attack on Russia in December of 1914 was in every way a disaster. Of the
    95,000 Turkish troops who attacked Russia, 75,000 died. The second
    factor, the one that concerns us here, was Armenian Revolt.

    DESERTION ZONE

    As World War I threatened and the Ottoman Army mobilized, Armenians who
    should have served their country instead took the side of the Russians.
    The Ottoman Army reported: "From Armenians with conscription obligations
    those in towns and villages East of the Hopa-Erzurum-Hinis-Van line did
    not comply with the call to enlist but have proceeded East to the border
    to join the organization in Russia." The effect of this is obvious: If
    the young Armenian males of the "zone of desertion" had served in the
    Army, they would have provided more than 50,000 troops. If they had
    served, there might never have been a Sarikamis defeat.

    The Armenians from Hopa to Erzurum to Hinis to Van were not the only
    Armenians who did not serve. The 10s of thousands of Armenians of Sivas
    who formed chette bands did not serve. The rebels in Zeytun and elsewhere
    in Cilicia did not serve. The Armenians who fled to the Greek islands or
    to Egypt or Cyprus did not serve. More precisely, many of these Armenian
    young men did serve, but they served in the armies of the Ottomans'
    enemies. They did not protect their homeland, they attacked it.

    In Eastern Anatolia, Armenians formed bands to fight a guerilla war
    against their government. Others fled only to return with the Russian
    Army, serving as scouts and advance units for the Russian invaders. It
    was those who stayed behind who were the greatest danger to the Ottoman
    war effort and the greatest danger to the lives of the Muslims of Eastern
    Anatolia.

    It has often been alleged by Armenian nationalists that the Ottoman order
    to deport Armenians was not caused by Armenian rebellion. As evidence,
    they note the fact that the law of deportation was published in May of
    1915, at approximately the same time that the Armenians seized the City
    of Van. According to this logic, the Ottomans must have planned the
    deportation some time before that date, so the rebellion could not have
    been the cause of the deportations. It is true that the Ottomans began to
    consider the possibility of deportation a few months before May, 1915.
    What is not true is that May, 1915 was the start of the Armenian
    rebellion. It had started long before.

    European observers knew long before 1914 that Armenians would join the
    Russian side in event of war. As early as 1908, British consul Dickson
    had reported:

    The Armenian revolutionaries in Van and Salmas [in Iran] have been
    informed by their Committee in Tiflis that in the event of war they will
    side with the Russians against Turkey. Unaided by the Russians, they
    could mobilize about 3,500 armed sharpshooters to harass the Turks about
    the frontier, and their lines of communication.[4]

    British diplomatic sources reported that in preparation for war, in 1913,
    the Armenian revolutionary groups met and agreed to coordinate their
    efforts against the Ottomans. The British reported that this alliance was
    the result of meetings with "the Russian authorities." The Dashnak leader
    (and member of the Ottoman Parliament) Vramian had gone to Tiflis to
    confer with the Russian authorities. The British also reported that "[The
    Armenians] have thrown off any pretence of loyalty they may once have
    shown, and openly welcome the prospect of a Russian occupation of the
    Armenian Vilayets." [5]

    Even Dashnak leaders admitted the Dashnaks were Russian allies. The
    Dashnak Hovhannes Katchaznouni, prime minister of the Armenian Republic,
    stated that the party plan at the beginning of the war was to ally with
    the Russians.

    Since 1910 the revolutionaries had distributed a pamphlet throughout
    Eastern Anatolia. It demonstrated how Armenian villages were to be
    organized into regional commands, how Muslim villages were to be
    attacked, and specifics of guerilla warfare.

    Before the war began, Ottoman Army Intelligence reported on Dashnak
    plans: They would declare their loyalty to the Ottoman State, but
    increase their arming of their supporters. If war was declared, Armenian
    soldiers would desert to the Russian Army with their arms. The Armenians
    would do nothing if the Ottomans began to defeat the Russians. If the
    Ottomans began to retreat, the Armenians would form armed guerilla bands
    and attack according to plan. The Ottoman intelligence reports were
    correct, for that is exactly what happened.

    WAR

    The Russians gave 2.4 million rubles to the Dashnaks to arm the Ottoman
    Armenians. They began distributing weapons to Armenians in the Caucasus
    and Iran in September of 1914. In that month, seven months before the
    Deportations were ordered, Armenian attacks on Ottoman soldiers and
    officials began. Deserters from the Ottoman Army at first formed into
    what officials called "bandit gangs." They attacked conscription
    officers, tax collectors, gendarmerie outposts, and Muslims on the roads.
    By December a general revolt had erupted in Van Province. Roads and
    telegraph lines were cut, gendarmerie outposts attacked, and Muslim
    villages burned, their inhabitants killed. The revolt soon grew: in
    December, near the Kotur Pass, which the Ottomans had to hold to defend
    against Russian invasion from Iran, a large Armenian battle group
    defeated units of the Ottoman army, killing 400 Ottoman soldiers and
    forcing the army to retreat to Saray. The attacks were not only in Van:
    The governor of Erzurum, Tahsin, cabled that he could not hold off the
    Armenian attacks that were breaking out through the province; soldiers
    would have to be sent from the front.

    By February, reports of attacks began to come in from all over the
    East-a two-hour battle near Mu?, an eight-hour battle in Abaak, 1,000
    Armenians attacking near Timar, Armenian chettes raiding in Sivas,
    Erzurum, Adana, Diyarbak?r, Bitlis, and Van provinces. Telegraph lines to
    the front and from Ottoman cities to the West were cut, repaired, and cut
    again many times. Supply caravans to the army were attacked, as were
    columns of wounded soldiers. Units of gendarmerie and soldiers sent to
    reconnect telegraph lines or protect supply columns themselves came under
    attack. As an example of the enormity of the problem, in the middle of
    April an entire division of gendarmerie troops was ordered from Hakk?ri
    to ?atak to battle a major uprising there, but the division could not
    fight through the Armenian defenses.

    Once careful preparations had been made, Armenians revolted in the City
    of Van. On April 20, well-armed Armenian units, many wearing military
    uniforms, took the city and drove Ottoman forces into the citadel. The
    rebels burned down most of the city, some buildings also being destroyed
    by the two canons the Ottomans had in the citadel. Troops were sent from
    the Erzurum and Iranian Fronts, but they were unable to relieve the city.
    The Russians and Armenians were advancing from the north and the
    southwest. On May 17 the Ottomans evacuated the citadel. Soldiers and
    civilians fought their way southwest around Lake Van. Some took to boats
    on the Lake, but nearly half of these were killed by rebels firing from
    the shore or when their boats ran aground. Some of the Muslims of Van
    survived at least for a while, put in the care of American missionaries.
    Most who did not escape were killed. Villagers were either killed in
    their homes or collected from surrounding areas and sent into the great
    massacre at Zeve.

    The ensuing suffering of the Muslims and Armenians is well known. It was
    a history of bloody warfare between peoples in which all died in great
    numbers. When the Ottomans retook much of the East, the Armenian
    population fled to Russia. There they starved and died of disease. When
    the Russians retook Van and Bitlis Provinces, they did not allow the
    Armenians to return, leaving them to starve in the North. The Russians
    wanted the land for themselves. It is also well known that Armenians who
    remained, those in Erzurum Province, massacred Muslims in great numbers
    at the end of the war.

    My purpose here is not to retell that history. I wish to demonstrate that
    the Ottomans were right in considering the Armenians to be their enemies,
    if further proof is needed. The map shows proof that the Armenian rebels
    in fact were agents of Russia.

    The Armenians of the Ottoman East rebelled in exactly those areas that
    were most important to the Russians. The benefit of the rebellion in Van
    City, the center of Ottoman Administration in the Southeast is obvious.
    The other sites of rebellion were in reality more important: Rebellion in
    Erzurum Province cut the Ottoman Army off from supplies and
    communications. The rebellion was directly in the path of the Russian
    advance from the North. The Armenians rebelled in the Saray and Ba?kale
    regions, at the two major passes that the Russians were to use in their
    invasion from Iran. The Armenians rebelled in the region near ?atak, at
    the mountain passes needed for the Ottomans to bring up troops to the
    Iran frontier, the passes needed for the Ottoman retreat. The Armenians
    rebelled in great numbers in Sivas Province and in ?ebinkarahisar. This
    would seem to be an odd place for a revolt, a region where the Armenians
    were outnumbered by the Muslims ten to one, but Sivas was tactically
    important. It was the railhead from which all supplies and men passed to
    the Front, basically along one road. It was the prefect site for guerilla
    action to harass Ottoman supply lines. The Armenians also rebelled in
    Cilicia, the intended site for a British invasion that would have cut the
    rail links to the South. It was not the fault of the rebels that the
    British preferred to attempt the madness at Gallipoli instead of an
    attack in Cilicia that would surely have been more successful.

    All these regions were the very spots a military planner would choose to
    most damage the Ottoman war effort. It cannot be an accident that they
    were also the spots chosen by the rebels for their revolt. Anyone can see
    that the revolts were a disaster for the Army. The disaster was
    compounded by the fact that the Ottomans were forced to withdraw whole
    divisions from the Front to battle the Armenian rebels. The war might
    have been much different if these divisions had been able to fight the
    Russians, not the rebels. I agree with Field-Marshall Pomiankowski, who
    was the only real European historian of World War I in the Ottoman
    Empire, that the Armenian rebellion was the key to the Ottoman defeat in
    the East.

    Only after seven months of Armenian rebellion did the Ottomans order the
    deportation of Armenians (May 26-30, 1915).

    The Ottoman Record

    How do we know that this analysis is true? It is, after all, very
    different than what is usually called the history of the Armenians. We
    know it is true because it is the product of reasoned historical
    analysis, not ideology.

    To understand this, we must consider the difference between history and
    ideology, the difference between scientific analysis and nationalist
    belief, the difference between the proper historian and the ideologue. To
    the historian what matters is the attempt to find the objective truth. To
    the nationalist ideologue what matters is the triumph of his cause. A
    proper historian first searches for evidence, then make up his mind. An
    ideologue first makes up his mind, then looks for evidence.

    A historian looks for historical context. In particular, he judges the
    reliability of witnesses. He judges if those who gave reports had reason
    to lie. An ideologue takes evidence wherever he can find it, and may
    invent the evidence he cannot find. He does not look too closely at the
    evidence, perhaps because he is afraid of what he will find. As an
    example, the ideologues contend that the trials of Ottoman leaders after
    World War I prove that the Turks were guilty of genocide. They do not
    mention that the so-called trials reached their verdicts when the British
    controlled Istanbul. They do not mention that the courts were in the
    hands of the Quisling Damad Ferid Pa?a government, which had a long
    record of lying about its enemies, the Committee of Union and Progress.
    They do not mention that Damad Ferid would do anything to please the
    British and keep his job. They do not mention that the British, more
    honest than their lackeys, admitted that they could not find evidence of
    any "genocide." They do not mention that the defendants were not
    represented by their own lawyers. They do not mention that crimes against
    Armenians were only a small part of a long list of so-called crimes,
    everything the judges could invent. The ideologues do not mention that
    the courts should best be compared to those convened by Josef Stalin. The
    ideologues do not mention this evidence.

    A historian first discovers what actually happened, then tries to explain
    the reasons. An ideologue forgets the process of discovery. He assumes
    that what he believes is correct, then constructs a theory to explain it.
    The work of Dr. Taner Ak?am is an example of this. He first accepts
    completely the beliefs of the Armenian nationalists. He then constructs
    an elaborate sociological theory, claiming that genocide was the result
    of Turkish history and the Turkish character. This sort of analysis is
    like a house built on a foundation of sand. The house looks good, but the
    first strong wind knocks it down. In this case, the strong wind that
    destroys the theory is the force of the truth.

    A historian knows that one has to look back in history, sometimes far
    back in history, to find the causes of events. An ideologue does not
    bother. Again, he may be afraid of what he will find. Reading the
    Armenian Nationalists one would assume that the Armenian Question began
    in 1894. Very seldom does one find in their work mention of Armenian
    alliances with the Russians against the Turks stretching back to the
    eighteenth century. One never finds recognition that it was the Russians
    and the Armenians themselves who began to dissolve 700 years of peace
    between Turks and Armenians. These are important matters for the
    historian, but they hurt the cause of the ideologue.

    The historian studies. The ideologue wages a political war. From the
    start the Armenian Question has been a political campaign. Materials that
    have been used to write the long-accepted and false history of the
    Armenian Question were written as political documents. They were written
    for political effect. Whether they were articles in the Dashnak newspaper
    or false documents produced by the British Propaganda Office, they were
    propaganda, not sources of accurate history. Historians have examined and
    rejected all these so-called "historical sources." Yet the same
    falsehoods continually appear as "proof" that there was an Armenian
    Genocide. The lies have existed for so long, the lies have been repeated
    so many times, that those who do not know the real history assume that
    the lies are true.

    It is not only Americans and Europeans who have been fooled. Recently I
    read a two-volume work written by a Turkish scholar. Much of what appears
    on the Armenians is absolute nonsense. For example, in 1908 in the City
    of Van, Ottoman officials discovered an arsenal of Dashnak weapons--2,000
    guns, hundreds of thousands of cartridges, 5,000 bombs--all in
    preparation for an Armenian revolt. Armenians rebels fought Ottoman
    troops briefly, then fled. This event is described in all the diplomatic
    literature and books on Van. The author, however, says what occurred was
    a revolt of 1,000 Turks (!) against the government, and mentions no rebel
    weapons. How could such a mistake be made? It was because of the source.
    The author took all information from the Dashnak Party newspaper!
    We must affirm a basic principle: Those who take propaganda as their
    source themselves write propaganda, not history.

    Too many scholars, Turks and non-Turks alike, have accepted the lies of
    groups like the Dashnak Party and not even looked at the internal reports
    of the Ottomans. Scholars have the right to make mistakes, but scholars
    also have a duty to look at all sources of information before they write.
    It is wrong to base writings on political propaganda and to ignore the
    honest reports of the Ottomans. The first place to look for Ottoman
    history should be the records of the Ottomans.

    Why rely on Ottoman archival accounts to write history? Because they are
    the sort of solid data that is the basis of all good history. The
    Ottomans did not write propaganda for today's media. The reports of
    Ottoman soldiers and officials were not political documents or public
    relations exercises. They were secret internal reports in which
    responsible men relayed what they believed to be true to their
    government. They might sometimes have been mistaken, but they were never
    liars. There is no record of deliberate deception in Ottoman documents.
    Compare this to the dismal history of Armenian Nationalist deceptions:
    fake statistics on population, fake statements attributed to Mustafa
    Kemal, fake telegrams of Talat Pasha, fake reports in a Blue Book, misuse
    of court records and, worst of all, no mention of Turks who were killed
    by Armenians.

    I have been asked to make suggestions as to what Turks can do to correct
    false history. I hesitate to do so, because Turks already know what has
    to be done--opposing the lies that are told about their ancestors. You
    are already doing it. It is a hard fight: The prejudices about Turks
    stand in your way, and those who oppose you are politically strong, but
    the truth is on your side. I am very pleased that the Turks, and the
    Turkish Parliament, are uniting to oppose the lies told about the Turks.
    The recent agreement between Prime Minister Erdogan, and Minority Leader
    Baykal, prove that the Turks are taking action. The attempt by the Tarih
    Kurumu to debate and discuss with Armenian scholars proves that the Turks
    are taking action. The many books on this issue now being printed by
    Turkish scholars prove that the Turks are taking action. Men like S?kr?
    Elekdag are fighting for the truth. I and others who have long opposed
    the lies are glad we are not alone.

    In the past, scholars, including myself, have proposed that Turkish and
    Armenian historians, along with others who study this history, should
    meet to research and debate the history of the Turks and Armenians. Prime
    Minister Erdo?an and Dr. Baykal have proposed that all archives be opened
    to a joint commission on the Armenian Question. This is exactly what
    should be done. Most important, they have declared that historians should
    settle this question. They have also shown that Turks have nothing to
    fear from the truth.

    We can only hope that scholarly integrity will triumph over politics and
    the Armenian Nationalists will join in debate. I am not hopeful they will
    do so. I recently gave two talks at the University of Minnesota, a center
    of so-called "Armenian Genocide Studies." Dr. Taner Ak?am teaches there.
    Dr. Ak?am was invited to my lectures, but did not come. In fact, no
    Armenian came. Instead all notices of the lecture were torn down, so that
    others would not know I was speaking.

    This is not a scholarly approach. It is political. The Armenian
    Nationalists have decided that they will win their political fight if no
    one knows there is a scholarly opposition to their ideology. Therefore,
    Armenian Nationalists will only meet with Turks who first state that
    Turks committed genocide. These are described in the American and
    European press as "Turkish scholars." Readers are left with the
    impression, a carefully-cultivated impression, that Turkish scholars
    believe there was a genocide. Readers are left with the impression that
    it is only the Turkish Government that denies there was a genocide.
    We know this is not true. Every year many books and articles are
    published in Turkey that not only deny the "Armenian Genocide" but
    document Armenian persecution of Turks. Conferences are held. Mass graves
    of innocent Turks killed by Armenian Nationalists are found. Museums and
    monuments are opened to commemorate the Turkish dead. Historians who have
    seen the Ottoman archival records or read the Turkish books on the
    Armenian Question do not accept the idea of a genocide. They know that in
    wartime many Armenians were killed by Turks, and that many Turks were
    killed by Armenians. They know that this was war, not genocide.

    Why do so many in my country and Europe believe that the small group of
    Turks who accept the Armenian Nationalists beliefs represent Turkish
    scholarship? Why is it believed that these Turks speak for the real
    beliefs of Turkish professors? Part of the reason is prejudice. Prejudice
    against Turks has existed for so long that it easy for people to believe
    that Turks must have been guilty. Another reason, however, is that few in
    Europe and America know that real Turkish scholarship on this issue
    exists

    Excellent work on the Armenian Question is now being written in Turkey.
    As you know, for too long Turks did not study the history of the Turks
    and Armenians. This has now changed. Anyone who has seen modern Turkish
    work on the Armenian Question must be impressed. The Tarih Kurumu has
    taken the lead in this, as it should. I obviously do not believe that
    Turks should be the only ones who write Turkish history, but Turks should
    be the main historians of Turkey. It is your country and your history.
    The problem lies in bringing the excellent history now being written in
    Turkey and the documents of Turkish history to scholars, politicians, and
    the public in other countries. The problem is that Turkish historians
    naturally write in Turkish, and Europeans and Americans do not read
    Turkish.

    Should those who write the history of Turkey read Turkish? Yes, of course
    they should read Turkish. Should they use the many books on Turkish
    history written in Turkish? Yes, of course they should do so. Should they
    understand all sides of an issue, including the Turkish side, before they
    write? Yes, because that is a scholar's duty. Do they always do so? No.
    In particular, most books on the so-called "Armenian Genocide" do not
    refer to modern Turkish studies. It is no use saying this is wrong. It is
    no use telling scholars to learn Turkish. They will not or cannot do so.
    To be fair, there are few places in my own country where Turkish is
    taught. The only answer is that the Turkish books must be translated into
    other languages, especially English, which is understood all over the
    world.

    A start has been made. Today there are valuable books, originally in
    Turkish, that have been translated. These include Esat Uras' excellent,
    if now outdated, history, the recent publication on the Armenian Question
    by the Turkish Parliament, the history written by the Turkish Foreign
    Office, the late Kamuran G?r?n's Armenian File, Orel and Yuca's Talat
    Pasha Telegrams, and others. The series of Ottoman documents on the
    Armenian Question, translated and published by the General Staff, the
    Ottoman Archives, the Tarih Kurumu, and the Foreign Ministry, are perhaps
    the most valuable of all. But there are so many others that are needed
    There are too many to list here, but I note that even the memoirs of
    Kazim Karabekir and Ahmet Refik have not been translated. All these books
    should be read by the widest possible audience. They should be
    translated.

    And the translations must include books that seem to be on topics other
    than the Armenian Question. There are no accurate and detailed military
    histories of World War I in the Ottoman Empire in any European language.
    What exists is often wrong, and not only wrong on the Armenians. General
    histories of World War I, for example, name the wrong generals, move
    troops to the wrong places, and never seem to understand Ottoman
    strategy. They seldom mention the one most significant factor in the
    war-the incredible strength and endurance of Turkish soldiers. Why is
    this important to the Armenian Question? It is important because the
    danger from the Armenian rebellion and the reason for the Armenian
    deportations cannot be understood unless the military situation is
    understood. The Ottoman sources prove that the Armenian rebellion was an
    essential part of the Russian military plan. The Ottoman sources prove
    that the Armenian rebellion was an important part of the Russian victory.
    The Ottoman sources prove that the Armenian rebels were, in effect,
    soldiers in the Russian Army.

    There is a series of military histories that accurately portray the
    events of the Ottoman wars and the Turkish War of Independence--the
    histories published by the Turkish General Staff--many volumes, filled
    with great detail, many maps, and descriptions of Ottoman plans and
    actions. These books are based on the reports of the Ottoman soldiers
    themselves, not only on the reports of the Ottoman enemies. They should
    be read by every historian of World War I. Yet these books are in
    Turkish. If they are ever to be used in America and Europe, they must be
    in English.

    And there must be many more accurate and honest books on Turkey for
    teachers and students in Europe and America. Only by telling the truth to
    youth can the prejudices against Turks be finally ended. We have made a
    start. The Istanbul Chambers of Commerce have financed the first detailed
    book on Turkey for American teachers. Many more books are needed.
    Finally, I wish to comment on current politics. Some may feel that I
    should not do so. I am not a Turk, and this is surely a Turkish problem.
    Nor am I a political scientist or a politician. I am a historian. I am
    speaking on this problem because it is basically a historical question.
    As a historian, I am infuriated when any group, or any country, is
    ordered to lie about its history. The political problem I am speaking of
    is the growing cry from Europe that Turkey must admit the "Armenian
    Genocide" before it can enter the European Union.

    I am angry that anyone can believe that accepting a lie about Turkish
    history will somehow be a benefit to Europe or to Turkey. I know, and I
    believe you know, that it will make matters much worse.

    Today the Armenian Nationalists are proclaiming in the parliaments of
    Europe and the Congress of the United States that they only want Turkey
    to admit that genocide occurred, then all will be well. I once spoke to
    an American official who told me that the Turks should say, "Yes, we did
    it, sorry," and then forget it. I asked him if he thought the Turks had
    committed genocide. He replied that he did not know and did not care. I
    told him the Turks would never lie like that about their fathers and
    grandfathers. He told me I was na?ve. But he was the one who was na?ve,
    because he believed that the Armenian Nationalists would be satisfied
    with an apology.

    ARMENIAN CLAIMS

    The plan of the Armenian Nationalists has not changed in more than 100
    years. It is to create an Armenia in Eastern Anatolia and the Southern
    Caucasus, regardless of the wishes of the people who live there. The
    Armenian Nationalists have made their plan quite clear. First, the
    Turkish Republic is to state that there was an "Armenian Genocide" and to
    apologize for it. Second, the Turks are to pay reparations. Third, an
    Armenian state is to be created. The Nationalists are very specific on
    the borders of this state. The map you see is based on the program of the
    Dashnak Party and the Armenian Republic. It shows what the Armenian
    Nationalists claim. The map also shows the population of the areas
    claimed in Turkey and the number of Armenians in the world.

    If the Armenians were to be given what they claim, and if every Armenian
    in the world were to come to Eastern Anatolia, their numbers would still
    be only half of the number of those Turkish citizens who live there now.
    Of course, the Armenians of California, Massachusetts, and France would
    never come in great numbers to Eastern Anatolia. The population of the
    new "Armenia" would be less than one-fourth Armenian at best. Could such
    a state long exist? Yes, it could exist, but only if the Turks were
    expelled. That was the policy of the Armenian Nationalists in 1915. It
    would be their policy tomorrow.

    We should be very clear on Armenian claims. Their claims are not based on
    history, because Armenians have not ruled in Eastern Anatolia for more
    than 900 years. Their claims are not based on culture: Before the
    revolutionaries and the Russians destroyed all peace, the Armenians and
    Turks shared the same culture. Armenians were integrated into the Ottoman
    system, and most of the Armenians spoke Turkish. They ate the same food
    as the Turks, shared the same music, and lived in the same sorts of
    houses. The Armenian claims are surely not based on a belief in
    democracy: Armenians have not been a majority in Eastern Anatolia for
    centuries, and they would be a small minority there now. Their claims are
    based on their nationalist ideology. That ideology is unchanging. It was
    the same in 1895 and 1915 as it is in 2005. They believe there should be
    an "Armenia" in Eastern Turkey-no matter the history, no matter the
    rights of the people who live there.

    History teaches that the Armenian Nationalists will not stop their claims
    if the Turks forget the truth and say there was an Armenian Genocide.
    They will not cease to claim Erzurum and Van because the Turks have
    apologized for a crime they did not commit. No. They will increase their
    efforts. They will say, "The Turks have admitted they did it. Now they
    must pay for their crimes." The same critics who now say the Turks should
    admit genocide will say the Turks should pay reparations. Then they will
    demand the Turks give Erzurum and Van and Elazig and Sivas and Bitlis and
    Trabzon to Armenia.

    I know the Turks will not give in to this pressure. The Turks will not
    submit, because they know that to do so would simply be wrong. How can it
    be right to become a member of an organization that demands you lie as
    the price of admission? Would any honest man join an organization that
    said, "You can only join us if you first falsely say that your father was
    a murderer?"

    I hope and trust that the European Union will reject the demands of the
    Armenian Nationalists. I hope they will realize that the Armenian
    Nationalists are not concerned with what is best for Europe. But whatever
    the European Union demands, I have faith in the honor of the Turks. What
    I know of the Turks tells me that they will never falsely say there was
    an Armenian Genocide. I have faith in the honesty of the Turks. I know
    that the Turks will resist demands to confess to a crime they did not
    commit, no matter the price of honesty. I have faith in the integrity of
    the Turks. I know that the Turks will not lie about this history. I know
    that the Turks will never say their fathers were murderers. I have that
    faith in the Turks.


    REFERENCES

    [1] FO 424/196, Elliot to Currie, Tabreez, May 5, 1898.
    [2] FO 195/2949, Molyneux-Seel to Lowther, Van, February 17, 1913.
    [3] FO 195/2375 Molyneux-Seele to Lowther, Van, 9 October 1911.
    [4] FO 195/2283, Dickson to O'Conor, Van, March 15, 1908.
    [5] FO 371/1783 Molyneux-Seele to Lowther, Van, 4 April, 1913.
Working...
X