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Turkish Elections Could Open Window of Opp in Turkish-Armenian Rel'n

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  • Turkish Elections Could Open Window of Opp in Turkish-Armenian Rel'n

    TURKISH ELECTIONS COULD OPEN WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

    By Armen Grigoryan (04/27/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

    The upcoming parliamentary elections in Turkey should clarify whether
    Turkish-Armenian relations may improve in a short-term perspective,
    opening for a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional
    cooperation in the South Caucasus. Regardless of the outcome of the
    elections, it will clarify the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols
    signed in October 2009. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP
    party seems capable of securing a majority in the newly elected
    parliament and to form a new government. After the elections, the AKP
    will not be under the threat of instantly losing the support of voters
    due to opposition criticism, so its leadership may consider the
    ratification of the protocols safer.

    Such a decisive move followed by an opening of the border, without
    explicitly linking the normalization of relations with the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, would change the
    regional situation radically. The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan's
    government, which have opposed normalization, do not believe that
    Armenia will become more willing to make concessions if
    Turkish-Armenian relations are normalized. However, such thinking does
    not take into account that Armenia's excessive dependence on Russia is
    the main issue requiring a solution.

    When the normalization process came to a standstill, Russia easily
    persuaded Armenia to extend its basing rights. An agreement was signed
    in August 2010, during President Medvedev's visit to Yerevan. In
    general, events during recent years have shown that the policy of
    isolating Armenia and the militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijani
    officials will not bring about progress in the conflict resolution
    process on Nagorno-Karabakh through unilateral concessions from the
    Armenian side. Instead, Russia's and to a certain extent Iran's
    influence has been growing continuously.

    At the same time, the internal political situation in Armenia, where
    the opposition has been organizing mass demonstrations demanding
    extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as a
    complete failure of the financial and economic policy of the Armenian
    government should be taken into account. The weak legitimacy of
    President Sargsyan's administration may induce him to seek
    international support and financial assistance. An opening of the
    Turkish-Armenian border would allow Sargsyan to save face and avoid
    criticism from the opposition and Armenian Diaspora for being
    `defeatist'. Before the standstill, Sargsyan had enjoyed the image of
    a realistic politician trying to put an end to a decades-long enmity
    and could make use of it again. It is telling that although the
    ratification of the protocols by Armenia's National Assembly was
    suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not called off his signature despite
    the opposition urging him to do so by.

    An opening of the border would reduce internal political tension in
    Armenia, as it would partly relieve the economic hardship that the
    country's population is experiencing. Besides, the possibility of
    transport communication via Turkish territory would reduce Armenia's
    dependence on Russia and promote mutual trust. Therefore, it would
    ultimately benefit also Azerbaijan and Georgia. Better opportunities
    to maneuver independently from Russia and seeking further
    international assistance for legitimating his rule would stimulate
    Sargsyan and the ruling coalition to be more flexible on the
    Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

    At the same time, Sargsyan should not be considered a politician with
    truly progressive views. His approach is rather opportunistic. If the
    newly formed Turkish government refuses to ratify the protocols,
    Sargsyan will most probably seek legitimacy by playing to nationalist
    sentiments. By denouncing the protocols and actively exploiting the
    genocide issue politically, Sargsyan could secure the support of all
    factions of the National Assembly and mobilize the active support of
    the Diaspora.

    In summary, the window of opportunity for normalizing Turkish-Armenian
    relations and stimulating regional cooperation in the South Caucasus
    will be open for quite a short time after the elections in Turkey. If
    the issue is not solved promptly, pressure by the opposition will very
    soon motivate Sargsyan to start advocating more hardcore nationalist
    policies. In fact, the 20th anniversary of independence in September
    could become a convenient starting point. It should also be remembered
    that sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election
    periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections in
    Armenia will begin shortly and will be followed by campaigning for the
    February 2013 presidential elections. Growing sentiments will also
    induce both government and opposition to compete for a more
    `patriotic' image while moving towards 2015 - the 100th anniversary of
    the genocide. Therefore, even the small opportunity to normalize
    Turkish-Armenian relations and advance the resolution of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be lost, and that would benefit neither
    Turkey, nor Armenia, nor Azerbaijan.

    http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5550




    From: A. Papazian
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