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Turkey's Policy Towards 'Frozen Conflicts' And Ukrainian Crisis - An

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  • Turkey's Policy Towards 'Frozen Conflicts' And Ukrainian Crisis - An

    TURKEY'S POLICY TOWARDS 'FROZEN CONFLICTS' AND UKRAINIAN CRISIS - ANALYSIS

    Eurasia Review
    March 30, 2015 Monday

    By Guner Ozkan*

    Three 'frozen conflicts' areas in the South Caucasus - in Nagorno
    Karabakh (NK), Abkhazia and South Ossetia - are situated near Turkey's
    north-eastern border. Another conflict to its north, in Ukraine,
    typified by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the recent Minsk 2
    Agreement, seems, at best, being presently transformed into another
    'frozen' dispute.

    There are several prominent, and perhaps valid, reasons why old and
    new 'frozen conflicts' are of great importance for Turkey, and why
    Turkey has come to assume a position that simultaneously reflects
    a balanced overall policy and selective engagement approach. It is
    only these mixed policy approaches that will help first to reduce
    the deepening of, and then perhaps to outright resolve, the 'frozen
    conflicts' in the South Caucasus and the Ukrainian crisis.

    A Balanced Overall Policy

    Turkey has always favoured the principles of territorial integrity
    and self-determination as outlined in international law when it comes
    to the 'frozen conflicts' to its north, including Ukraine. Turkey is
    also well aware of the fact that these ethno-territorial disputes
    have never been simple disputes over land among dominant national
    and minority groups in the particular countries where they take place.

    They are also very much integral components of the geopolitical
    visions of great international and regional powers. In this sense,
    the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia and NK in Azerbaijan cannot simply
    be considered with regard to the legitimate demands of the Abkhaz and
    Armenian minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively, but must
    be examined by paying close attention to what Russia has envisaged
    and acted to create with the 'near abroad' policy it has followed
    since the early 1990s.

    A long-time ally of the western security system, and proponent of the
    rule of international law, Turkey has supported the same approach that
    its western allies and Russia have adopted towards 'frozen conflicts',
    both within the OSCE as well as in other international mechanisms.

    Turkey has advocated the maintenance of the territorial integrity
    of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, while also urging that not all
    doors should be closed to the ethnic minorities that find themselves
    in conflict with their parent state. In the same vein, Turkey has
    continued to defend its pursuit of maintaining dialogue and developing
    relations with Russia, which, not just under Putin, has never shied
    away from demonstrating its reactions to the imagined security and
    geopolitical vacuum that the western powers have supposedly tried
    to fill in the post-Soviet area. To better illustrate this point,
    Turkey has developed its relations with Russia similar to the way
    that Germany and France developed their own relations with the country
    under Yeltsin, and later under Putin. On the regional level, despite
    the complaints uttered by the Georgian government, Turkey and the
    EU have tried to find ways to develop constructive and beneficial
    trade relations with Abkhazia after it was recognized as a de facto
    independent state by Russia in August 2008 after the Russo-Georgian
    War. Among other reasons for this course of action, they wanted
    to reduce Abkhazia's dependence on Russia, both economically and
    politically.

    The Selective Nature of Turkish policy

    Turkey seems to have also assumed a selective approach towards these
    'frozen conflicts'. Ankara appears to take the side of certain parties
    involved in the 'frozen conflicts' to its north. Turkey's support of
    Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, the permission it has given to its private
    sector to engage in trade with Abkhazia and its support of Azerbaijan
    over the NK issue may all be seen as the efforts of Turkey to promote
    its regional and international geopolitical interests. Indeed, such
    selective and tendentious positions are much more related to Turkey's
    own internal and external security, as well as to its legitimate
    social and economic interests in its immediate neighbourhood, than
    to its pure geopolitical ambitions.

    Turkey, for instance, promotes a peaceful resolution of the NK dispute
    between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Yet, in doing so, it has kept its
    border with Armenia closed and has not established diplomatic relations
    with Yerevan. Certainly, there are several reasons why Turkey acts
    in this way, or put differently, in support of Azerbaijan.

    Firstly, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 when Armenian
    military forces, in defiance of the UN Security Council (UNSC)
    resolutions, expanded their occupation of Azerbaijani territories.

    Secondly, Armenian military manoeuvres adjacent to the Azerbaijani
    region of Nakhichevan, which borders Turkey, threatened the security
    of Turkey itself. Thirdly, the Turkish public is very sensitive to
    the NK issue as it is characterized by the Armenian occupation of 20
    percent of Azerbaijani territory and has resulted in tens of thousands
    of displaced Azerbaijanis who have the same ethno-cultural identity as
    the Turks. Fourthly, Turkey and Armenia share a long and problematic
    history that spans all the way back to the tragedy experienced by
    Ottoman Armenians in 1915. All this suggests that the 'frozen conflict'
    of NK is as much related to Turkey's security as it is to Azerbaijan's.

    In short, Turkey sees all the 'frozen conflicts' in the South Caucasus
    as part of a particular regional security complex which should be
    considered collectively. Even though they have remained unfulfilled,
    Turkey's efforts to form a Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
    Platform just after the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, as well
    as its drive to push forward the Turkish-Armenian Protocols in 2009,
    have exhibited the objective to resolve these 'frozen conflicts'
    by developing complex economic and social interdependencies between
    all the regional actors involved.

    What about the Ukrainian Crisis?

    Indeed, Turkey sees the Ukraine crisis in general and the Crimea issue
    in particular through the same perspective. Turkey is very sensitive
    towards these disputes because they directly influence its own domestic
    stability and regional security. There are now more Tatar people in
    Turkey than there are in Crimea, just as there are three times more
    ethnic Abkhaz living in Turkey than in Abkhazia itself.

    Therefore, Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to the concerns of the
    Tatar people in Crimea.

    Concerning regional security, Turkey is the central actor in
    maintaining peace and security in the Black Sea. The Montreux
    Convention of 1936 that regulates the passage of war and trade ships
    through the Turkish straights in times of war and peace is the key
    instrument in the region in that respect. Any incident that would
    question and damage the applicability of the Convention, especially in
    sensitive periods, could pose a great security risk for Turkey. Only an
    international legal obligation, imposed by the UNSC, and/or a unanimous
    decision of NATO, would impel Turkey to act. Any other unilateral
    action would be a dangerous undertaking that would drastically worsen
    the security situation in Ukraine and the Black Sea region.

    Therefore, from the Turkish viewpoint, in order avoid turning the
    already difficult security situation into a nightmare, it is better to
    concentrate on the positive outcomes and possible benefits that all
    sides have so far garnered, and have yet to garner, from cooperation
    and dialogue, no matter how hard this may be.

    *Guner Ozkan, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies

    This article was first published at European Leadership Network's
    website on March 23rd, 2015

    The post Turkey's Policy Towards 'Frozen Conflicts' And Ukrainian
    Crisis - Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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