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Georgia, Russia, The United States

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  • Georgia, Russia, The United States

    GEORGIA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES
    by Nikolai Zlobin
    Director of Russian Programs at the World Security Institute (Washington)

    Source: Izvestia, November 1, 2006, p. 6
    Translated by Elena Leonova
    Agency WPS
    What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
    November 1, 2006 Wednesday

    Russia's American-style treatment of Georgia; The crackdown on
    Georgians seems to be an example of the Kremlin practising techniques
    and methods for using a new array of tools in Russia's foreign policy
    arsenal. America has taught the current Russian leadership how to
    operate in the international arena from a position of open cynicism.

    One of Armenia's leading politicians recently explained to me that
    neither America nor Russia should delude themselves about their
    influence on Armenia's internal evolution, since its priorities
    are largely determined by the attitudes and demands of the Armenian
    diaspora worldwide. According to this politician, the diaspora will
    never permit Armenia to be turned into a totalitarian state, since
    money sent to Armenia from the diaspora (equivalent to Azerbaijan's
    entire energy export revenues) is the deciding factor in ensuring
    the Armenian economy's survival. Naturally, the money coming into
    Armenia from abroad is accompanied by political messages which the
    Armenian government cannot ignore if it wants to remain in power.

    Apparently, Moscow has decided to take a similar approach to Georgia
    - in reverse. A sweeping Russian-style crackdown on the Georgian
    diaspora in Russia; luckily, this diaspora does indeed include
    some crime bosses, illegal immigrants, and business owners whose
    activities have nothing to do with morality and enlightenment. This
    was supposed to result in Mikhail Saakashvili losing the support of
    the Georgian community in Russia, and demonstrating to the rest of
    the world, including Washington, that he's completely incapable of
    defending the interests of Georgian citizens. Naturally, this would
    only provide further confirmation that Saakashvili's regime is against
    the Georgian people's interests and Saakashvili himself is deficient
    in personal ethics.

    The crackdown on Georgians seems to be an example of the Kremlin
    practising techniques and methods for using a new array of tools in
    Russia's foreign policy arsenal. As well as the power to cut off oil
    and gas supplies, Moscow now has another way of putting pressure
    on unsatisfactory regimes in the CIS: by using their diasporas in
    Russia. It's no secret that this form of leverage wasn't invented
    in Moscow; Washington has often used it in the past, and continues
    to do so. America has taught the current Russian leadership how to
    operate in the international arena from a position of open cynicism,
    without indulging in melancholy reflections about morality and ethics,
    using nothing but the vague term "realism in politics" as a cover.

    The fact that the crackdown has only targeted Georgians shows that
    the Kremlin has mastered another element from the arsenals of the US
    elite: the ability to openly use double or triple standards in its
    policies. This multi-standard approach in Putin's foreign policy -
    described as "multilateral," or even "flexible," by some embarrassed
    Kremlin officials - actually does Vladimir Putin credit. Under his
    influence, the Kremlin's managers are gradually coming to realize
    that any country aspiring to be a serious international player in
    the world today must take a sophisticated (morally uninhibited, so
    to speak) approach to foreign policy, in order to defend itself more
    effectively while also separating other countries or bringing them
    together. The more levels of standards foreign policy includes, the
    more successful it will be. For a long time, Moscow didn't understand
    this. Now it's Tbilisi that doesn't understand it.

    The irony is that Saakashvili has run up against exactly what the
    White House taught the Kremlin in the process of supporting Georgia:
    if anyone offends you, just beat them over the head with no hesitation
    or regrets - rather than "clacking your beak to no purpose," to
    borrow the elegant expression used recently by Putin, who is said
    to have a personal dislike for Saakashvili. Russia has adopted a
    purely American style of behavior towards Georgia; meanwhile, the
    Russia-Georgia relationship has taken on an even closer resemblance
    to the decades-old relationship between the United States and small,
    impoverished Cuba, which continually accuses Washington of having
    aggressive intentions and uses any pretext to escalate tension and
    point the finger at its large northern neighbor's imperial ambitions.

    However, it's not all that simple. Russia certainly had a good
    chance of not only emerging victorious from the current conflict with
    Georgia, but also reinforcing its image as a country that thinks and
    acts strategically and is capable of participating effectively in
    solving important international problems. Some experts in Washington
    even suspected Russia of provoking Georgia into this escalation,
    in order to get the chance to demonstrate its own wise and tolerant
    statesmanship. But then, as the world watched, Moscow got into a
    dither over trivialities and lost the game - regardless of the actual
    outcome of the conflict as such.

    In order to operate like the Americans do, Russia either needs to
    be equally strong or to use a much smarter and more sophisticated
    approach. Gun control opponents in the US have a slogan: "Guns don't
    kill people - people kill people." The same applies to politics. The
    fact that Moscow wants to crack down on Georgians in Russia, and is
    capable of doing so, doesn't mean that it necessarily should do so.

    Specific political methods are chosen by people, and these people
    presumably calculate the potential effects. Actually, that's what
    they and their advisers are paid to do, with the money coming
    from tax-payers. And that accounts for the widespread notion that a
    government's actions ought to benefit a country and its people. But in
    this case, our country has shown itself to be extremly inhospitable
    and the people have been taught another lesson in xenophobia and
    intolerance.

    But Moscow's political recklessness is only partly to blame. The
    primary cause concerns the fact that Saakashvili's Dream Team has
    turned into the region's Nightmare Team. The Georgian president
    continues to substantially - and groundlessly - exaggerate the
    political support he has in the United States.

    Two years ago, that support was almost absolute. Back then, Georgia
    became the favorite country of ordinary Americans and President
    George W. Bush. These days, however, that affection persists only
    in the White House and the offices of a few senators, influential
    as they may be. Bush has only two years left, and he won't have time
    for Georgia. The US political establishment is already showing signs
    of skepticism and disillusionment, or even irritation, with regard
    to the Saakashvili regime. America does indeed need Georgia - but
    only as a democratic, stable, predictable country. In the event of a
    serious conflict in Asia, Georgia could become an American airfield
    or hospital, a workshop for repairing military hardware, a recreation
    and redeployment base for the US Armed Forces, and so on. But will it?

    The opinion in Washington is that the Georgian government's major
    mistake isn't really its intention to reclaim the breakaway provinces
    by means of armed force; rather, it's Georgia's demonstrative
    reluctance or inability to work out a civilized relationship with
    Russia. America won't do that for Tbilisi. In the event of a military
    conflict with Moscow, not a single American soldier would ever
    be sent in to defend Georgia. NATO already has plenty of problems,
    including problems with Russia, even without the addition of Georgia,
    which is frantically trying to join NATO. As a result, Washington
    is increasingly coming to doubt whether Saakashvili can deliver the
    kind of Georgia that the United States needs. Consequently, unless
    the situation in Georgia changes, Washington will have to choose
    between withdrawing from Georgia, parting company with Saakashvili,
    or a full-scale quarrel with Russia. It's no exaggeration to say that
    no one is seriously considering the last option.
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