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  • F18News Summary: China; Nagorno-Karabakh; North Korea; Uzbekistan;

    FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
    http://www.forum18.org/

    The right to believe, to worship and witness
    The right to change one's belief or religion
    The right to join together and express one's belief

    ================================================
    28 September 2004
    CHINA: WHAT YOU CAN'T DO IN A MOSQUE
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_ id=421
    In Xinjiang region, Forum 18 News Service has seen an instructional display
    outlining banned activities. Such instructional displays are normally
    hidden from the public, and are thought to apply in mosques throughout
    China. Among banned activities are: teaching religion "privately"; allowing
    children under 18 to attend a mosque; allowing Islam to influence family
    life and birth planning behaviour; propaganda associated with terrorism and
    separatism; religious professionals acquiring large sums of money; the
    declaration of "holy war" (jihad); and promoting "superstitious thoughts".
    These displays are not compulsory in non-Muslim places of worship and Forum
    18 found no such displays in Xinjiang's two Orthodox churches. Also, the
    mosque's "democratic management committee" must conduct regular sessions
    propounding legal regulations and party policies. Such party-appointed
    committees oversee activities in places of worship and are also known to
    exist in Tibetan Buddhist temples.


    29 September 2004
    CHINA: HOW THE PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM CONTROLS RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=422
    The Chinese police, or Public Security Bureau, is responsible for
    persecuting religious communities, arresting and detaining in the first
    half of 2004 hundreds of religious believers. It is also responsible for
    such normal police activities as apprehending drug traffickers and other
    criminals, directing traffic and patrolling the streets. But despite its
    very prominent role in state control of religious affairs, little is
    understood outside China about the massive monitoring and control system
    maintained by the Public Security Bureau, its very significant impact on
    religious affairs in China, and the nature of the discussions on religion
    and "cults" by members of the public security system. Forum 18 News Service
    here explains the system and its importance, as well as outlining ongoing
    discussions of reform amongst Chinese officials and scholars. But despite
    these discussions, the public security system is highly likely to remain an
    instrument of state repression.
    * See full article below. *


    27 September 2004
    NAGORNO-KARABAKH: WHY CAN'T BAPTIST CHURCH FUNCTION?
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=420
    Masis Mailyan, deputy foreign minister of the unrecognised enclave of
    Nagorno-Karabakh, has insisted to Forum 18 News Service that, despite the
    latest police raid on a Baptist congregation, the enclave follows the
    commitments contained in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
    Rights, telling Forum 18 that "there are no restrictions on believers and
    all confessions are equal." However he contradicted himself by stating,
    contrary to Article 18, that, under the martial law that has operated since
    1992, only registered organisations can exist and that Baptists "cannot
    hold services." Mailyan denied that only the Armenian Apostolic Church is
    allowed to function, but admitted that it is the only registered religious
    community. Other local Protestants have told Forum 18 that pressure on
    their work has eased in recent years and their congregations can function
    quietly, so it is unclear why the Baptists have been singled out for the
    authorities' continuing hostility.


    27 September 2004
    NORTH KOREA: WILL LOCAL ORTHODOX DARE TO REGULARLY ATTEND NEW CHURCH?
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=419
    Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, has two Protestant and one Catholic
    church, which are suspected of being "show churches" for display to
    foreigners, so it remains unclear whether any North Koreans will be able to
    or will dare to regularly attend an Orthodox church under construction. The
    building is funded by the North Korean state, and Forum 18 News Service has
    learnt that it is "65 per cent finished". By the early 1900's, about 10,000
    Koreans had converted to Orthodoxy due to Russian missionaries in the now
    divided Korean peninsula. Dmitry Petrovsky, of the Moscow Patriarchate's
    Department for External Church Relations, expressed the hope to Forum 18
    that links with this past missionary activity remain, as is the case with
    Orthodox churches in South Korea. Four North Koreans are studying at the
    Moscow Theological Seminary, and Petrovsky remarked to Forum 18 that they
    are displaying "zeal and a genuine interest in Orthodoxy".


    30 September 2004
    UZBEKISTAN: POLICE RAIDERS CLAIM THERE'S "NO NEED" FOR CHRISTIANS
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=423
    In the latest of several attacks on Protestants, Police and National
    Security Service (NSS) secret police have raided a prayer meeting of the
    Greater Grace church in Samarkand [Samarqand]. An official claimed to Forum
    18 News Service that religious meetings in private homes are illegal. All
    unregistered religious activity is banned, and those involved face heavy
    penalties. Begzot Kadyrov, an official of the government's religious
    affairs committee, denied to Forum 18 that this violates the right to meet
    freely for worship with fellow believers, as guaranteed under international
    human rights agreements that Uzbekistan has signed. Several police officers
    in the raid identified themselves as Muslims, and told the Christians that
    there is "no need" for any Christians or members of other faiths in
    Uzbekistan. A Hungarian present, Jozsef Marian, who is married to an Uzbek,
    was pressured to write a statement, and threats were made that he would be
    forced to leave Samarkand. 2004 has seen an increase in raids and fines on
    those involved in unregistered religious activity, especially on
    Protestants.


    29 September 2004
    CHINA: HOW THE PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM CONTROLS RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=422
    By Magda Hornemann, Forum 18 News Service

    Among the most shocking television images in recent years are those of
    Chinese police - more commonly known as "public security officers" -
    beating Falun Gong protestors in Beijing's Tiananmen Square before dragging
    them into waiting vans to be taken to detention centres. Several years
    after the height of the state repression of the Falun Gong movement and its
    practitioners, religious believers in China continue to suffer at the hands
    of public security officers.

    In the first half of 2004 alone, hundreds of believers have been arrested
    and detained. In recent incidents, more than 100 house church leaders were
    arrested by public security officers and military police on 6 August in
    Tongxu County, Kaifeng City, Henan Province. The same day, police arrested
    eight Roman Catholic priests and seminarians in Quyang County, Shijiazhuang
    Village, Hebei Province.

    Meanwhile, public security agents throughout China maintain active
    surveillance over Falun Gong practitioners, punctuated by periodic
    crackdowns. According to the Falun Gong, over 100,000 practitioners have
    been sent to reeducation-through-labour (laojiao) camps operated by the
    public security system. In Xinjiang and Tibet, public security officers
    work against individual believers and organisations in the name of
    countering "terrorism", "splittism" and "extremism".

    Despite the public security system's prominent role in the state's
    "management" of religious affairs, little is understood outside China about
    this massive system of state control, its significant impact on how
    religious affairs in China are managed, and the nature of the discussions
    on religion and "cults" by members of this community.

    As its name implies, the public security system - the police - is directly
    responsible for maintaining public order and internal security. Public
    security officers are involved in apprehending drug traffickers, corrupt
    officials and petty criminals. They also guard government and commercial
    office buildings, direct traffic and patrol the streets.

    Yet these visible functions only scratch the surface of the public security
    system's immense powers and jurisdictional responsibilities. In effect, the
    men and women of the public security system are the Communist regime's eyes
    and ears to ensure the state's control over all aspects of China's
    political life, society and economy. Public security agencies hold
    extraordinarily detailed information about their objects of interest. For
    example, they maintain data on the size of each "cultic" group and its
    membership, the extent of its geographical influence and its foreign
    connections.

    Public security agents oversee internal as well as external security. To
    maintain external security, public security agents oversee the foreign
    travel of Chinese citizens and foreigners' entry into the country. The
    People's Armed Police - made up of former People's Liberation Army officers
    and soldiers and managed jointly by the Ministry of Public Security and the
    Central Military Commission - maintain border security. Public security
    agents also have counter-intelligence responsibilities.

    Internally, in addition to preventing and cracking down on major and petty
    crimes, public security officers provide protection for senior Communist
    and government officials. They also manage the household registration
    system (hukou), which maintains an individual file on every citizen.
    Moreover, they regularly police the Internet for undesirable materials. The
    public security system also operates the appeals office (xingfang), which
    is where citizens can file grievances against state officials. Furthermore,
    the public security bureaucracy operates the notorious
    reeducation-through-labour system that imprisons many dissidents, including
    religious believers, without due process.

    The public security system is a massive bureaucracy that extends from the
    Ministry of Public Security - led by a member of the powerful Communist
    Party Politburo - in the central government in Beijing down to police
    stations in the townships and villages of the hinterland. Like other
    government agencies, a public security organ functions at each level of
    government.

    At the level of province or "autonomous region" - such as Tibet and
    Xinjiang - the public security department oversees the entire province,
    most of which have populations numbering in the tens of millions. Henan,
    for example, home to most of China's underground Protestant house churches,
    has over 90 million people, making it the country's most populated
    province. According to the 2000 "Chinese Public Security Encyclopaedia",
    among the chief responsibilities of these provincial public security
    departments are researching and analysing social conditions in their
    provinces or regions; drawing up policies and countermeasures to maintain
    public security; and guiding and coordinating sub-provincial public
    security authorities.

    Each provincial public security department contains numerous offices, each
    of which has clearly delineated responsibilities. These range from
    directing traffic and firefighting to maintaining political and economic
    security. In some cases, religion offices are established within the
    provincial departments to meet the needs of local conditions. Major
    municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing - which are
    equivalent to provinces in their status within the administrative system -
    possess public security bureaus that possess similar functional offices as
    their provincial counterparts. For example, a list of the major
    responsibilities for Beijing's Public Security Bureau is given on its
    website
    http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Organizations/t20030924_1528.htm.

    Subordinate to the provincial public security departments are a myriad of
    public security branches and police stations at the levels of prefecture,
    county, township and village. At each level, the public security offices
    are accountable to the public security offices of the level immediately
    above them, creating a firm chain of command. At the same time, public
    security offices at each administrative level are also subordinated to the
    Communist Party headquarters and the government at that level of
    administration.

    One major effect of this "vertical and horizontal accountability" is that
    public security offices at every level of the administrative hierarchy are
    held liable by their superiors - those within the public security system
    and non-public security officials at their corresponding levels of
    administration - should they fail to maintain effective control over their
    respective areas of responsibilities. This system thereby puts great
    pressure on public security offices at each level to "perform". This system
    can be seen in action simply by examining the state's repression of the
    Falun Gong movement.

    When the central government in Beijing became annoyed with the regular
    influx of Falun Gong protestors from areas outside the capital, it
    threatened provincial governments with punishment if they were unable to
    control their respective populations from making their way to Beijing. This
    threat was then relayed from the provincial governments to their respective
    subordinates at the prefecture, county, township and even village levels.
    These government leaders naturally turned to public security officials at
    corresponding administrative levels for the execution of these directives.
    At the same time, it is clear that public security officials also received
    similar orders from their superiors within the public security system. In
    addition to directives issued within the public security system, public
    security officials were also pressured by government leaders at
    corresponding administrative levels to ensure the effectiveness of
    enforcement. This "systemic" factor partly explains some of the most
    egregious abuses against Falun Gong practitioners as well as adherents of
    other religions and beliefs.

    In theory, the central government's State Administration for Religious
    Affairs (SARA) oversees religious affairs in China. A key function of SARA
    and its subordinate offices is registering religious groups and venues. In
    general, these offices are tasked with ensuring that individual believers
    and groups comply with state regulations. To meet this objective, like most
    Chinese bureaucracies, there are provincial and local SARA offices,
    allowing the agency to keep an eye on all religious organisations,
    individuals and activities throughout the country.

    However, it is important to note that SARA lacks enforcement powers. Once
    SARA has determined that religious groups are either illegal - meaning
    unregistered - or that they or individual believers are conducting illegal
    activities, the matter would then be turned over to the law enforcement
    agency - namely, the Public Security Ministry and its subordinate
    offices.

    Widely held is the view that the Chinese Communist state is deeply
    suspicious of religion and its impact on political life and society. It
    maintains an ambiguous position that religion is likely to endure for a
    long time, but still needs to be closely controlled.

    This ambiguous stance can also be seen in the analysis of religion within
    the Chinese public security community. An entry entitled "religion and
    crime" in the "Chinese Encyclopaedia of Public Security" states that on the
    one hand, "religion has a preventive function with regard to crimes; it can
    reduce crimes." Moreover, "there is no connection between religion and
    criminal behaviour." Religion "can neither reduce crimes nor produce
    crimes." Yet, on the other hand, "under certain conditions, religion can
    cause crimes - for example, crimes caused by religious fanaticism and
    religious wars."

    The encyclopaedia entry concludes that "religious activity can exceed a
    country's legally permissible boundary, such as disrupting public order,
    harm the health of the citizens, obstruct state education system, etc. [It
    can] even be used by political enemy forces to engage in activities that
    counter the current socialist system. This causes the use of religious
    beliefs to commit crimes that possess strong political colourings, and
    generates a stark contrast with using superstitious activity to commit
    financial and sex crimes."

    The Criminal Law has already bestowed on the public security bureaucracy
    the power to crack down on "cults" and "heresies" (see F18 News 28 April
    2004 http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=309). Indeed, the public
    security system gains legal entry into the realm of religious affairs by
    virtue of its legal responsibility to eliminate "cults", which are
    considered socially deviant, anti-Communist, and therefore to be
    eradicated.

    Article 300 of the Criminal Law provides punishments for those who
    "organise or make use of superstitious sects, secret societies or heretical
    organisations, or utilise superstition to disrupt the implementation of
    state laws and administrative rules and regulations". The "Chinese Public
    Security Encyclopaedia" also includes entries about the prohibition of
    "feudal superstitions," "cults," and "secret societies". In addition, the
    state has apparently adopted an unwritten policy that "illegality" is
    synonymous with "cults", providing the public security system with even
    greater latitude to arrest, detain and imprison religious believers without
    due process.

    A review of recent Chinese public security journals reveals a significant
    interest in the issue of religion and "cults" among researchers in the
    public security community. A key theme of these analyses is the alarmist
    emphasis on the rapid growth of "cults" worldwide. Moreover, these analyses
    often go to great lengths to distinguish "cults" from orthodox religions.
    For example, in one article written by a faculty member of the People's
    Public Security University in Beijing, published in the June 2003 issue of
    the Journal of Shanxi Police Academy, "cults" are distinguished from
    religions in the following areas.

    First, whereas religions establish "superhuman" deities as the objects of
    their beliefs, "cults" establish human leaders as deities. Second, whereas
    religions emphasise helping their adherents to focus on the here and now -
    even though religions also possess apocalyptic visions - "cults" advocate
    the impending destruction of the current world. Third, whereas religions
    are organised and possess well-defined rules to regulate the behaviour of
    their adherents, "cults" use deception and other means to force their
    adherents to engage in immoral behaviour, disobey laws and regulations, and
    engage in violence. Fourth, whereas most religions do not advocate the
    overthrow of governments, "cults" see governments as the personification of
    evil and advocate their overthrow. Given this perception of the nature of
    "cults", the writer argued that the state must establish effective
    countermeasures to contain their growth.

    In the June 2003 of the Journal of Hunan Public Security College, a faculty
    member of the college wrote that the state must take six steps to achieve
    this objective. First, various state agencies, including public security
    and religious affairs organs, must cooperate to actively "elevate
    ideological understanding". Second, propaganda and intelligence work must
    be strengthened. Third, the state must accelerate the "construction" of
    "spiritual" and "materialist" "civilisations." In other words, economic
    development must be broadened and accelerated and more people educated.

    Fourth, public security officers need to be careful in their use of weapons
    in their crackdowns against "cults" so as to prevent others from accusing
    the state of using inappropriate force to enforce the law. Fifth, during
    the enforcement of the law, public security officers need to distinguish
    between the criminals and the victims and must follow legal procedures.
    Finally, the writer recommended that the Chinese government increase its
    cooperation with foreign governments, with particular emphasis on adopting
    the procedures and institutions of foreign states, such as France, Malaysia
    and Japan.

    In looking at this list of countermeasures, the lack of imagination is
    striking. The repeated emphasis on improving "ideological understanding"
    and strengthening propaganda smack of Communist thinking. Related to this
    point is the fact that some of the proposed countermeasures reveal a basic
    lack of understanding of the factors that contribute to individuals having
    a religious belief. By suggesting that economic development and high
    educational standards would lead to greater secularisation and thus the
    demise of "cults" (and religions, of course), the writer maintains the
    Marxist materialist position and is thus blind to the fact that many
    religious adherents and "cult" followers are well-educated and economically
    well-off. Indeed in major urban areas in recent years, Christianity has
    grown tremendously among college-educated young professionals.

    However, perhaps the most troubling aspect of this list is its
    recommendation that China follow the examples of foreign states such as
    France and Malaysia. The article made direct reference to the anti-cult
    commission recently set up by the French government and its usefulness in
    controlling the growth of "cults". The article conveniently overlooks the
    many criticisms that were levelled against the French government for
    establishing a mechanism that essentially provides the state with power to
    define what constitutes an orthodox religion and "cult" and the capacity to
    prosecute any groups that are determined to be "cults".

    At the same time, "unorthodox" views on the topic also get an airing within
    the Chinese public security community. For example, an article in the
    February 2003 issue of the Journal of Hunan Public Security College
    criticised Article 300 of the Criminal Law for its lack of "logic" and
    broad "generalisation". The author pointed out that Western countries,
    unlike China, do not have laws that apply specifically to "cults". These
    countries only prosecute adherents to "cults" for activities that violate
    "concrete" laws. He contended that Western practices are more "scientific"
    and more "rational" than their Chinese counterparts. The author concluded
    that it is useless to try to stem the tide of "cults" by prosecuting them
    through criminal laws and advocated either abolishing or significantly
    reforming Article 300.

    Yet, lest we become too engrossed in this "unorthodox" thinking, the author
    of the article reminded us several times that he is not a "cult"
    sympathiser or even one who is agnostic about the nature of organisations
    that have been determined as "cults". He agreed with his peers in the
    public security community on how far the proliferation of "cults" threatens
    Chinese society. He argued that "cults" endanger society because they hold
    beliefs that devalue human life, destroy the balance of social order, and
    endanger the "guiding role" of Marxism in China's "ideological realm" as
    well as the Communist Party's political leadership.

    According to the author, his opposition to Article 300 of the Criminal Law
    and similar criminal laws against "cults" is based on his belief that such
    laws and practices only exacerbate the situation by forcing more "cultic"
    adherents to become martyrs while driving many "cultic" groups
    underground.

    These are without doubt disturbing views, particularly given that public
    security officers are at the frontline of executing state laws and
    government policies. In this regard, Western observers broadly agree that
    the Chinese public security system must undergo serious reforms. Indeed, as
    seen above, many Chinese officials and scholars agree that reforms of the
    current police system are much needed, whatever their political or
    ideological motivations may be.

    For these "reformers", changes must also take place in areas other than
    religion. For example, earlier this year, there were reports that China's
    senior policymakers were considering abolishing the infamous
    reeducation-through-labour system. Murray Scot Tanner, a noted American
    expert on the Chinese public security system, also observed that an intense
    debate has developed within the public security community about the need to
    abolish or reform the use of torture.

    However, in the end, what is surely recognised is that reforming the public
    security system is insufficient to guarantee the protection of religious
    freedom or any other human right. The reason is simple. The public security
    system is merely an "instrument" of state repression. Views held by members
    of that community are simply extensions of those maintained by China's
    senior Communist leaders.

    This is not to say that local officials do not take things into their own
    hands. They certainly do. However, for the most part, they have been able
    to escape prosecution. For example, Article 251 of the Criminal Law states
    that government officials who illegally deprive citizens of their religious
    freedom may be sentenced to up to two years in prison. However, no instance
    has become known of officials prosecuted for this type of violation.
    Without the sympathetic support of their superiors in higher levels of
    government, it is doubtful that these officials could have escaped
    prosecution.

    Unfortunately, it is likely this trend will continue in the foreseeable
    future. In this regard, the arguments of the author of the article
    criticising Article 300 of the Criminal Law contain some truth. He argued
    that the key to resolve the "cult" problem is improving "the social
    structure" and raising the "quality of the principal participants of social
    activities". Similarly, the key to resolving the state's repression of
    "cults" and religious groups that the state deems to be "cultic" is to
    instil in the Chinese official culture - and the population at large - the
    perspective that no one, including the state, has a right to determine
    whether a religion is orthodox. This determination certainly cannot be made
    on political or ideological grounds.

    Furthermore, for the "rule of law" to mean anything, laws must be created -
    to the extent possible - not as instruments of political, social or
    ideological interests. They must instead be "constructed", to use Communist
    parlance, on the understanding that individual rights must be protected
    even as the interests of the majority are respected.

    For more background information see Forum 18's surveys of: the prospects
    for religious freedom in China at
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=292 ; the blocking of
    religious websites at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=366 ;
    and of the Chinese legal system and religious freedom at
    http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=309 .

    A printer-friendly map of China is available from
    http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/atlas/ind ex.html?Parent=asia&Rootmap=china
    (END)

    © Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved.

    You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
    F18News http://www.forum18.org/

    Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at
    http://www.forum18.org/
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