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  • While Glossing Over Post-Soviet Conflicts

    WHILE GLOSSING OVER POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS
    Vladimir Socor

    Eurasia Daily Monitor
    DC
    Wednesday, July 2, 2008

    The unresolved conflicts, conducted or underwritten by Russia in
    ex-Soviet territories, were glossed over in Khanty-Mansiisk. EU High
    Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier
    Solana had informally assured Georgian leaders ahead of the summit
    that he would "forcefully" take issue with Russia's forcible seizure
    of Abkhazia. Such a step would have signified a major departure from
    Solana's indifferent track record on this and related issues.

    By all accounts from Khanty-Mansiisk, however, Solana and the other
    EU leaders shied away from any substantive discussion of Abkhazia
    and the other post-Soviet conflicts. They also failed to raise the
    issue of transforming Russia's "peace-keeping" operation to conform
    to international standards. Solana and several other top figures had
    given those informal assurances to Georgia on the understanding that
    Tbilisi would in turn refrain from declaring Russia's "peace-keeping"
    troops illegal. These EU leaders' authority in that regard will not
    be the same in Georgia after Khanty-Mansiisk.

    According to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov,
    one item on the summit agenda was the "five conflicts: Kosovo,
    Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh, and Transnistria" [in that order]
    (RIA-Novosti, June 27). If so, Moscow succeeded for the first time
    to link the conflict in Kosovo with the four post-Soviet conflicts
    at this summit. Initial post-summit briefings in Brussels seem to
    confirm that the five conflicts were discussed as a package at
    Khanty-Mansiisk. Linking conflict resolution in the post-Soviet
    territories to that in Kosovo, so as to complicate all solutions
    even further, became Russia's policy during the final stages of
    negotiations leading to Kosovo's independence. It seems to have
    re-emerged in Khanty-Mansiisk in a modified form.

    According to Russia's envoy to the EU, Valery Chizhov, on the eve
    of the Khanty-Mansiisk summit (RIA-Novosti, June 23; Eurasia Home,
    June 25), Moscow opposes the sending of an EU civil mission to Kosovo,
    unless the mission is officially endorsed by Serbia and approved by
    a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. This clearly
    implies an offer to bargain with Russia. Lavrov, and presumably
    President Dmitry Medvedev in the background, reiterated this position
    in Khanty-Mansiisk (Itar-Tass, June 27). They seemed to suggest that
    Russia did not need Georgian consent to the "peace-keeping" operation
    in Abkhazia, as long as the EU and NATO feel that they did not need
    Serbian consent to their ongoing or planned missions in Kosovo.

    That logic fails on multiple counts, however. Georgia is the lawful and
    recognized holder of sovereignty in Abkhazia, which Serbia is not in
    Kosovo. The Russian seizure of Abkhazia is based on ethnic cleansing,
    whereas the political resolution in Kosovo is based on reversing the
    ethnic cleansing. The ongoing or planned Western missions in Kosovo
    conform to international standards for such operations, whereas
    Russia's operation in Abkhazia violates the most basic accepted
    standards. And no operation or country pursues annexation goals in
    Kosovo, whereas Russia does so in Abkhazia. Such stark differences
    between the two situations notwithstanding, Moscow again attempted
    to equate them. Moscow seems to hint that it might not block an EU
    mission in Kosovo, if the EU and other Western chancelleries continue
    to tolerate Russia's military "peace-keeping" and de facto annexation
    of Abkhazia.

    Summing up the discussion on the conflicts for the Russian media
    after Khanty-Mansiisk, Lavrov declared that Russia would consider the
    possibility of some EU participation in conflict-resolution processes
    on post-Soviet territories. Any EU involvement should not, however,
    change "the existing formats" for peace-keeping and negotiations,
    he cautioned. Russia and the EU could cooperate in seeking solutions,
    but "the main task is to promote direct contacts between the parties
    to the conflicts" (Interfax, Itar-Tass, June 27).

    Lavrov's remarks express the familiar goal to maintain the formats
    created in the early 1990s without significant changes in the future,
    while accepting some minor EU involvement on economic reconstruction
    issues. Ostensibly promoting direct contacts between the local parties
    and placing the onus for political resolution on them is also a
    familiar tactic. It obscures Moscow's role as the main party to the
    conflict, equates its secessionist protégés with the recognized
    state on the opposite side, and seeks a step-by-step acceptance and de
    facto recognition of Russia's local clients. Moreover, Moscow insists
    on vetting de facto authorities' direct contacts with the legitimate
    governments and has thus far been successful in controlling the agenda
    of such contacts.

    While Russia essentially stonewalled on these issues at
    Khanty-Mansiisk, the EU and the United States are increasingly
    promoting a new concept of direct contacts and confidence-building
    measures, outside Russian control. Georgia supports and initiates such
    steps as parts of a three-track diplomatic effort: internationally,
    bilaterally with Russia, and locally with secessionist authorities
    (see EDM, June 30). Success depends, however, on active EU and
    U.S. involvement on all three levels, not just in the ancillary role
    to which Russia would restrict them.

    --Boundary_(ID_0qpN9/RMPgmez2nfnlWSHA)--
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