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  • Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

    Diplomatic Traffic, DC
    Feb 1 2009

    Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy

    Fariz Ismailzade


    The recent thaw in Russian-Azerbaijani relations seems to be coming to
    a sudden end, as Azerbaijani media outlets circulate news of Russian
    arms deliveries to Armenia in the amount of US$800 million. The news
    sparked huge protests both among the Azerbaijani general public and
    politicians. More importantly, it created a sense of treason among the
    political leadership of Azerbaijan, which had been promised support
    from Russia in the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war. Such
    disappointment could result in grave geopolitical shifts in the region
    and changes in Azerbaijan's foreign policy course towards NATO.

    BACKGROUND: On January 6, Azerbaijani media outlets reported that
    Russian defense officials transferred weapons and other military
    hardware worth US$ 800 million to Armenia in 2008. The evidence
    consisted of a document containing the signature of a Russian defense
    official and a detailed list of the transferred weapons. As becomes
    clear from the document, the weapons used to belong to a Russian
    military bases in Georgia, which was later withdrawn in accordance
    with OSCE requirements and relocated to Armenia. At that time, Russian
    political and military officials responded to Azerbaijani concerns
    about the relocation by stating that the weapons and other military
    equipment in the military base would remain the property of the
    Russian Federation, and would not be transferred to Armenia. `Russia
    promised Azerbaijan that the weapons would not be given to Armenia,'
    says political analyst Rasim Musabekov.

    The current news had the effect of a thunderstorm from a blue
    sky. Azerbaijani officials immediately reacted to the news by harshly
    condemning the Russian actions and citing its negative consequences
    for peace and stability in the region. Various members of Parliament,
    along with renowned public figures and policy analysts, have written
    op-eds and spoken on TV about this incident. For instance, Anar
    Mammadkhanov, a Member of Parliament and close loyalist of President
    Ilham Aliyev, referred to the sale as `unexplainable Kremlin
    boorishness.'

    The Azerbaijani Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense have
    launched an investigation of the issue, which concluded that an
    illegal transfer of weapons from Russia to Armenia has indeed taken
    place. The reaction was very harsh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    summoned the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan and expressed deep
    frustration with the incident. The press release of the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs said, `The transferred weapons strengthen the military
    capacity of Armenia, which occupies 20 percent of Azerbaijan's
    territory. By doing this, Russia violated its own promises and the UN
    General Assembly resolutions.'

    It should be noted that it is not the first instance of Russian
    `donations' of weapons and military equipment to Armenia, its
    strategic ally and military outpost in the South Caucasus, which is a
    the only member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the
    South Caucasus. Back in 1997, a scandal erupted when the head of the
    Defense Committee of the Russian Duma, Lev Rokhlin, discovered and
    announced that Russia had illegally transferred weapons to Armenia in
    the amount of US$1 billion. After Azerbaijan's fierce protests, the
    Russian Defense Ministry launched an investigation, but has to date
    failed to punish the officers responsible. Rokhlin himself was
    subsequently killed in a mysterious accident and the issue was largely
    forgotten.

    After the recent incident, Azerbaijanis again recalled the incident of
    the late 1990s. `Only God knows how many other transfers Russia has
    made to Armenia, both legally and illegally,' says Ilgar Mammadov, a
    Baku-based political analyst, in his blog. It is not clear where all
    these weapons are stored. If they are stored in Armenia, it is
    questionable how this corresponds to the limitations imposed by the
    Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It seems that Armenia
    has previously been exceeding the quotas of this treaty. One way to
    circumvent this problem could be to transfer the weapons to
    Nagorno-Karabakh, which continues to remain an soon after unmonitored
    zone by international organizations. If this would be the case, the
    conflict zone becomes even more militarized, significantly reducing
    chances for a peaceful resolution.

    Most government officials are convinced that despite all the peace
    rhetoric, Russia continues to arm Armenia and remain interested in
    maintaining the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict unresolved. The incident is
    especially damaging since it was reported only one month after
    President Aliyev signed the Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh
    together with Russian President Medvedev and Armenian President Serzh
    Sargsyan. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov phoned his
    Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov to convince him that no such
    transfer has taken place, the Azerbaijan side is convinced otherwise.

    IMPLICATIONS: It is clear that the weapons transfer incident will play
    an extremely damaging role in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. These
    relations have been improving in the past several years, with
    President Ilham Aliyev reaching out to Moscow and downplaying his NATO
    aspirations in favor of accommodating Russian interests and building
    pragmatic relations with the Kremlin. Economic cooperation and trade
    between Russia and Azerbaijan reached its highest levels in
    2008. President Medvedev visited Baku and expressed an interest in
    buying all Azerbaijan's gas. President Aliyev visited Moscow on a
    number of occasions and expressed an interest in building deeper and
    more constructive relations with Moscow.

    On the one hand, this was done to improve the chances for a peaceful
    resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Moscow is one of the
    co-chairs of the Minsk group and an influential partner of
    Armenia). On the other hand, Aliyev sincerely wanted to help Russia
    improve its image on the international arena. For instance, during the
    Georgian-Russian conflict, Aliyev refrained from accusing Russia of
    aggression. He subsequently signed the Moscow Declaration ` not a
    breakthrough in the peace negotiations as sometimes suggested, but
    nevertheless a boost for the Kremlin's image as a peace broker in the
    South Caucasus following its invasion of Georgia. All of these
    gestures were aimed at winning Moscow's favor.

    After this incident, frustration among the political leadership in
    Baku is obvious. It is perhaps a wake-up call for the Azerbaijani
    public and officials, who increasingly believe that Moscow will always
    be guided by zero-sum games and interested in maintaining the
    conflicts in the former Soviet space unresolved, and that Moscow will
    continue to support Armenia despite the fact that it stands to gain
    much more by acting as a neutral player in the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict.

    After the Russian-Georgian war last August, there had been some hope
    in Baku that Moscow might alter its blatant support for Armenia and
    become more cooperative in seeking to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict. In return, Azerbaijan would desist from following Georgia's
    path to NATO membership, and Azerbaijan would deliver its gas to
    Russia rather than to the Nabucco pipeline project. Importantly,
    voices calling for that have now vanished. Indeed, the voices in Baku
    promoting broader security arrangements with NATO and the EU, and
    viewing Euro-Atlantic integration as the only way to ensure stability
    in the South Caucasus are gaining ground. That in turn takes place
    just as the U.S. has signed documents on strategic partnership with
    both Georgia and Ukraine.

    CONCLUSIONS: In the aftermath of the war in Georgia, Azerbaijani
    officials were evidently greatly frustrated with the weak reaction of
    the West and Turkey's submissive attitude to Moscow. (See 3 September
    CACI Analyst) Briefly, Baku flirted with the idea of making a deal
    with Russia on both gas supplies and the Karabakh conflict. Yet the
    discovery of huge Russian arms deliveries to Armenia not only force
    Azerbaijan to purchase more weapons and thus further militarize the
    region ` it deals serious damage to Russian-Azerbaijani relations at a
    personal level. Russia's actions are now interpreted as irrational,
    emotional and unpredictable behavior. Baku's flirt with Moscow seems
    resolutely over, which could rejuvenate its ties with the West ` if
    the West is interested in investing in ties to Baku.

    AUTHOR'S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance analyst in Baku. He has
    been a frequent contributor for Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
    publications since 2002.

    First published in the 01/28/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst:
    http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5021.

    http://www.diplomatictraffic.com/debate.asp?ID=69 8
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