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Eurasia Daily Monitor - 12/02/2004

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  • Eurasia Daily Monitor - 12/02/2004

    The Jamestown Foundation
    Thursday, December 2 -- Volume 1, Issue 138

    IN THIS ISSUE:
    *Moscow slaps economic sanctions on Abkhazia
    *Will Ukraine crisis make Moscow tighten its grasp on Central Asia?
    *Kazakh election monitors found no problems with Ukrainian vote
    *Baku asks UN to rule on Armenian settlements in Karabakh
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------



    RUSSIA BLOCKADING ABKHAZIA TO OVERTURN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

    On December 1, Russia's government introduced a set of blockade
    measures against Abkhazia for the declared purpose of preventing the
    inauguration of president-elect Sergei Bagapsh, victor over the
    Moscow-backed candidate Raul Khajimba in Abkhazia's October 3
    presidential election. Gennady Bukayev, an aide to Russian Prime
    Minister Mikhail Fradkov, announced the sanctions at a news briefing
    in Moscow.

    The measures, mainly economic but also apparently entailing some
    military aspects, include: cutting off the railway connection between
    Abkhazia and Russia; severely restricting cross-border passage for
    Abkhaz residents and transport at checkpoints manned by Russian border
    troops on the so-called "Russian-Abkhaz border" (legally a section of
    the Russia-Georgia border); quarantining the transport of Abkhaz-grown
    citrus fruit to Russia at that border; placing Russia's coastal navy
    on alert along that border's maritime sector; and preparing for a
    complete blockade, "If further unlawful actions by Bagapsh result in a
    further deterioration of the situation in Abkhazia."

    Bukayev was explicit about the sanctions' political purpose: "The
    Russian leadership supports the legitimate Abkhaz president Vladislav
    Ardzinba's decision to stage a new election for Abkhazia's
    presidency. Bagapsh and the criminal organizations that back him are
    trying to seize power by force of arms. The Russian leadership has
    made its earnest decision in order to prevent the escalation of
    violence and ensure the safety of Russia's citizens. These measures
    are not directed at the people of Abkhazia and will be lifted as soon
    as the situation stabilizes" (Interfax, NTV Mir, December 1).

    It was apparently on November 25 that the Kremlin decided to step in
    forcefully and reverse the momentum in Abkhazia toward recognition of
    Bagapsh as winner and his scheduled inauguration on December
    6. Consequently, and characteristically, Moscow's rhetoric is now
    "criminalizing" the president-elect, notwithstanding the fact that he
    has been declared winner by Abkhazia's electoral commission,
    legislature, high court, and other bodies that Moscow itself had all
    along touted as Abkhazia's lawful bodies. The invocation of "Russia's
    citizens" is key to the above-referenced statement. Having conferred
    its citizenship en masse to Abkhazia's residents, Russia has until now
    used this fait accompli to claim rights of protection over them. Now,
    however, Moscow uses the same argument in claiming a right to impose
    sanctions on "its" citizens. In sum, Russia reserves the right to deal
    with "its" citizens as it sees fit. The message to Abkhazia is that
    "stabilizing the situation" means overturning the election of Bagapsh
    as a condition for lifting the Russian sanctions.

    The sanctions' impact could be devastating. Employment in Russia
    (often in the shadow economy) and cross-border shuttle trading are
    survival matters for Abkhazia's residents. In winter, citrus fruit
    exports to Russia are the main source of revenue. The "temporary"
    sanctions are timed precisely to the citrus harvest in Abkhazia and
    the pre-Christmas peak of Abkhaz citrus sales in Russian cities.

    Governor Alexander Tkachov of Krasnodar Krai (adjacent to Abkhazia)
    had called for the imposition of sanctions on November 22-23, publicly
    urging that the border be closed in response to the political
    situation in Abkhazia. He added a call for stopping the payment of
    pensions to Abkhazia's freshly baked Russian citizens, unless Bagapsh
    yields ahead of December 6 (Itar-Tass, Interfax, November
    22-23). Tkachov's statements often seem out of line because he belongs
    to the establishment's ultra-nationalist fringe. However, it sometimes
    turns out that he heralds government decisions shortly before these
    are officially announced. For example, in August 2003 he urged the
    construction of the dam in the Kerch Strait toward Tuzla Island,
    encroaching on Ukraine's territory -- a move that soon turned out to
    be Russian government policy. In June 2004, Tkachov threatened that
    Cossack and other "volunteers" would be sent to South Ossetia against
    Georgia; they were indeed sent and advertised by Russia's authorities
    shortly afterward.

    The economic sanctions are clearly designed to pressure Bagapsh's
    supporters into withdrawing their support and accepting Ardzinba's
    decision to stage a new presidential election. But even the Russian
    government functionary Nodar Khashba, a native Abkhaz recently
    installed as prime minister in Sukhumi to support Ardzinba and
    Khajimba, opposes the sanctions. Within hours of the Russian
    government's announcement, Khashba told Russian media, "Ordinary
    inhabitants, an overwhelming majority of whom are Russia's citizens,
    must not be made to suffer." Khashba announced that he would appeal to
    the Russian government to rescind the sanctions, implying at the same
    time that Moscow's political demands should be met (Itar-Tass,
    December 1).

    In Sukhumi, the outgoing and deeply ailing president Ardzinba -- or
    those acting in his name -- and hard-line pro-Moscow groups are using
    the argument that a Bagapsh presidency would irreparably damage
    Abkhazia's relations with Russia (the sanctions are cited as evidence)
    and conversely, overturning the election result and staging a new
    election are prerequisites to restoring relations with
    Russia. Ardzinba's November 29 proclamation, and an accompanying
    statement by paramilitary groups supporting him, vows to stop Bagapsh
    supporters from duplicating in Abkhazia the current events in Ukraine
    or the earlier ones in Tbilisi, Ajaria, and Serbia that led to regime
    change (Apsnypress, November 29).

    --Vladimir Socor



    RUSSIA'S SECURITY INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA INCREASES AS UKRAINE
    CRISIS UNFOLDS

    Central Asian political leaders are watching events in Kyiv closely,
    as the Ukrainian crisis may affect the future foreign policy choices
    they make between the West and Russia. Meetings of the CIS Defense
    Ministers Council, at the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation
    in Moscow on November 25, indicated a strong desire for further
    strengthening the existing CSTO security mechanisms within Central
    Asia. Indeed, these meetings, partly under the umbrella of the
    Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), appear to pave the way
    for the future expansion of the CSTO Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF),
    to as much as 10,000 personnel (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 26).

    Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of the CSTO, confirmed the
    interest in enhanced levels of CSTO military cooperation, as member
    states examined a model concept for forming a joint group of troops in
    the Central Asian region. In his words, the document approved at the
    meeting provides for creating a large joint group of troops including
    formations from the armed forces of CSTO states (Russia, Kazakhstan,
    Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This potentially numbers a total of
    10,000 personnel. The group could therefore become up to four times
    the current strength of the CRDF, currently tasked with operating in
    Central Asia during a security crisis. Moscow's foothold in this
    mechanism is secure, since it has guaranteed the main striking force
    of the group will be elements drawn from the Russian military base in
    Tajikistan and its air force base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.

    Of course, attempts to strengthen Russia's security influence within
    Central Asia are not new, and have been a recurring theme in the
    region since the deployment of U.S. and Western military forces into
    the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. But
    recent developments within Central Asian capitals seem to present a
    window of opportunity for Moscow to reclaim lost ground in the region.

    Kazakhstan has been the only Central Asian member of the CSTO that has
    espoused clearly autonomous and pro-Western military cooperation
    policies. While the others have more readily accepted
    collective-security arrangements with Russia as the linchpin in this
    system, Kazakhstan, for instance, has advanced its plans to forge
    ahead with reforming and building its Navy in the Caspian Sea by 2007
    with U.S. support. However, as the situation in Ukraine is played out,
    there will be clear lessons for those pursuing pro-Western policies in
    Kazakhstan, which may favor Moscow's efforts to stem the westward
    drift of the former Soviet republics along its borders.

    On November 25 in Moscow, a protocol was finally ratified that creates
    the legal basis for increasing and offering supplies of military
    hardware to CSTO countries at preferential financial rates. Valery
    Loshchinin, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, believes that the
    agreement will facilitate further military integration among CSTO
    member states and compel greater levels of security cooperation.

    Kazakhstan's military reform priorities, announced on November 26,
    included a commitment to raise the level of defense spending from one
    percent of GDP to 1.2 percent by 2007. The Kazakhstani Ministry of
    Defense also defined a set of priority investment projects, which will
    be implemented in the next three years. These include constructing
    housing in Astana, military facilities in the country's south and
    west, improving the facilities of military airfields, and building a
    national defense university, as well as developing modernized
    communications systems. All these plans, from the Caspian-orientated
    military facilities in Kazakhstan's western region to procurement of
    communications equipment, demand closer cooperation with the United
    States and Western countries in order to be effective.

    Kozy-Korpesh Dzhanburchin, Deputy Defense Minister for Economy and
    Finance, commented that Kazakhstan is determined to tailor its
    military development to its security needs: "In accordance with
    national security priorities, close attention is currently being paid
    to the southern and western directions, where military and other
    facilities are planned to be built actively as well,"
    (Interfax-Kazakhstan, November 25).

    The uncertain political situation in Ukraine, a key state for the
    future transportation of Central Asian energy into European markets,
    has raised fears among the governing elites in Central Asia
    considering overtly pursuing close relations with the United
    States. The impetus towards democracy, notoriously slow in these
    states, is a risk that each has weighed carefully in recent years,
    while recognizing that similar pressures do not attend close relations
    with Moscow. Elections looming in Uzbekistan later in December and
    those in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, coupled with the recent bombings of Otan
    offices in Almaty, (see EDM, November 30) magnify still further the
    concerns in the regions' capitals. For the Soviet-bred autocrats
    running these states, democracy may be coming too close to the
    region. In security terms at least, Moscow has prepared the ground for
    improved levels of security integration, should its uncertain allies
    in Central Asia choose this option.

    --Roger N. McDermott



    KAZAKHSTAN'S OPPOSITION TAKING NOTES ON YUSHCHENKO'S STRATEGY

    With their own presidential election drawing nearer, officials in
    Astana might prefer to turn off all television channels broadcasting
    the contentious presidential election events in Ukraine. Instead,
    state-run media in Kazakhstan have done little more than re-broadcast
    a few images of the street demonstrations in Kyiv every day.

    In contrast to the seeming indifference of state officials toward the
    Ukrainian elections, a group of opposition leaders flew to Kyiv to
    observe the November 21 runoff. On returning home, one observer,
    Marzhan Aspandiyarova, a leader of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
    (DCK), said that she was impressed by the transparency of election
    procedures at the polling stations she visited in Ukraine. She said
    there were fewer cases of vote stealing and fraud than in
    Kazakhstan. Unlike Kazakhs, Aspandiyarova speculated that Ukrainians
    did not tolerate any pressure from the authorities. She also admitted
    that the opposition movement in Kazakhstan failed to rally people for
    mass protests after the September parliamentary elections, which the
    opposition declared to be unfair and illegitimate. According to
    Aspandiyarova, the roots of the Kazakh opposition's weakness lie in
    the fact that many of its leaders come from government or business
    circles (navi.kz, December 1).

    Indeed, the popular support enjoyed by the opposition after the
    creation of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan has waned since the
    September elections. One explanation for that appears to be the
    relative social and economic stability and much-publicized government
    programs to reduce the rate of unemployment, solve housing problems,
    and raise pensions. These steps, however belated, are helping the
    state to disarm the opposition ahead of the 2006 presidential
    elections. However, Tolen Tokhtasynov, a member of the Coordinating
    Council of Opposition Forces in Kazakhstan who also observed the
    Ukrainian elections, believes that the main reason for the dwindling
    popularity of the opposition in Kazakhstan is the inability of its
    ambitious leaders to work out a common strategy. Nevertheless, he is
    convinced that in the upcoming elections, the main opposition groups
    -- the DCK, the pro-democratic Ak Zhol party, and the Communist Party
    of Kazakhstan -- will join forces and put up a single candidate for
    the presidency. Paradoxically, Tokhtasynov, a prominent opposition
    figure and irreconcilable critic of the regime, thinks that Dariga
    Nazarbayeva, the daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbayev would be
    the best choice for this position (navi.kz, December 1).

    The assertions that the opposition in Kazakhstan is not as active as
    it is in Ukraine or Georgia may be only partly true. Protests over the
    controversial September parliamentary elections are ongoing. The
    co-chairman of Ak Zhol, Alikhan Baimenov won a seat on the party-list
    ballot but has refused to work in the newly elected parliament,
    alleging that the elections were undemocratic and unfair and that it
    is unethical to be part of the "illegitimate" parliament. But such
    isolated protests go almost unnoticed by the general public, which was
    greatly influenced by the observers who overwhelmingly recognized the
    parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan as democratic and free of
    serious violations. In this situation, the opposition is largely seen
    as a power-hungry political force without any clearly defined and
    socially important objectives. "Our opposition would like to pose as
    staunch fighters like the Ukrainian ranks. But three major political
    organizations [international observers] could not convincingly show
    the world the shortcomings of the parliamentary elections in
    Kazakhstan. The Ukrainian elections revealed how immature and weak are
    our democratic groups, which are incapable of consistently defending
    the interests of the people who follow them," writes the independent
    weekly Altyn Orda (Altyn Orda, November 26).

    It is hard to imagine the Ukrainian scenario playing out in
    Kazakhstan's presidential elections, although the alignment of
    political forces and the authoritarian system inherited from the
    totalitarian Soviet system display some similarity. Political analyst
    Dos Koshim, an observer in Ukraine, argues that Ukrainian-style
    standoffs between the opposition and the ruling elite cannot take
    place in Kazakhstan, where the society is split into Kazakh- and
    Russian- speaking populations, rather than united for a common
    political goal. Any political action not supported by Kazakhs is
    doomed to failure. But if the state does not make an effort to improve
    the current course of social and political development, it may lead to
    a crisis of Ukrainian proportions in the next decade (Ak Zhol
    Kazakhstan, November 26).

    Some analysts hold the view that the outcome of the Ukrainian election
    crisis may have palpable geopolitical consequences for Kazakhstan,
    rather than an impact on its internal policy. If Russia loses Ukraine,
    then it will probably strengthen its military and political presence
    in Kazakhstan, using such instruments as the Eurasian Economic
    Community. The director of the Kazakh Institute of Socio-Economic
    Analysis and Forecasting, Sabit Zusupov, warns that by openly
    interfering with the election process in Ukraine, Russia revealed its
    geopolitical intentions and resorted to a hard-line policy reminiscent
    of the Cold War era (Epoha, November 26). Official sources in
    Kazakhstan, unlike opposition media and independent analysts, are too
    circumspect to express their views on the Ukrainian elections. Perhaps
    this wait-and-see attitude is the best policy for the Nazarbayev
    regime in this unpredictable and precarious situation.

    --Marat Yermukanov



    AZERBAIJAN TAKES KARABAKH CASE TO THE UN: A STEP BACK OR FORWARD?

    Perhaps for the first time in the past ten years, Azerbaijan has
    departed from the traditional path of peace negotiation on the
    Karabakh conflict and taken its case to the UN General Assembly. On
    November 23, the plenary meeting of the 59th session of the General
    Assembly began discussing an Azerbaijan-sponsored resolution entitled,
    "The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan." Since 1993
    the Karabakh peace process has been under the patronage of the OSCE's
    Minsk group, co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France. This
    latest action taken by Azerbaijan's political leadership shows Baku's
    desire to seek alternative ways to break the deadlocked process.

    Speaking at the session, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister, Elmar
    Mammadyarov, noted that for the past ten years Azerbaijan had remained
    committed to the 1994 cease-fire, which indicated the country's desire
    to solve the conflict through negotiation. At the same time,
    Mammadyarov expressed Azerbaijan's concern over Armenia's growing
    settlement programs in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. "While
    the negotiations are being held, the Armenian side is conducting a
    mass settlement of the occupied territories . . . This program is
    implemented by the Department of Refugees and IDPs [internally
    displaced persons] of the Armenian government and is called 'Return to
    Karabakh.' It is financed by a special fund in Armenia in violation of
    UN General Assembly resolutions, international humanitarian law, and
    the Geneva Convention of 1949," he noted (Turan Info, November 24).

    The Azerbaijani side claims that thousands of Armenian families have
    been settled in Lachin, Kelbadjar, and other occupied regions of
    Azerbaijan, with the aim of increasing the Armenian population in
    Karabakh to 300,000 by 2010. Armenia vigorously denies this. Armen
    Martirosyan, Armenia's representative to the UN, has noted that the
    Armenian government was not supporting this process and that there was
    no need for the UN to interfere in this issue, the Azerbaijani daily
    Zerkalo reported on November 25. "Nagorno-Karabakh has never been and
    will never become part of Azerbaijan," Martirosyan added.

    Meanwhile, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian warned that
    discussing the Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly could put
    an end to the ongoing "Prague talks" between the foreign ministers of
    Armenia and Azerbaijan. "Should Azerbaijan choose the latter approach
    [taking the issue to other venues, seeking separate solutions], the
    Azerbaijani authorities will have to negotiate with the
    Nagorno-Karabakh leadership" (RFE/RL Newsline, November
    10). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, while attending the 55th
    anniversary of the "Oil Rocks" city on the Caspian Sea on November 22,
    said that these statements cause him only a "smile," and he noted that
    it was Armenia who is behind the occupation of the Azerbaijani
    territories, not Karabakh (Turan Info, November 22).

    Interestingly enough, the Azerbaijani government initiative has
    sparked opposition even among the co-chairs of the Minsk group.
    Speaking on behalf of the three co-chairs, U.S. representative Susan
    Moore noted that Azerbaijani concerns could have been addressed by the
    OSCE and that she supported the idea of a fact-finding mission within
    the framework of the Minsk group (Echo, November 24). The three
    co-chairs have asked the UN General Assembly not to take any action
    that could negatively affect their efforts.

    The Azerbaijani leadership has tried to convince the interested
    parties that their initiative with the UN is not an effort to derail
    the existing Minsk process. "Azerbaijan does not put the solution of
    the conflict within the UN as a goal" said Deputy Foreign Minister
    Araz Azimov (525-ci Gazet, November 27). Yet, perceiving the draft
    resolution as Azerbaijan's attempt to seek alternative ways to solve
    the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia and the co-chairs of the Minsk
    group became fearful of opening Pandora's box. Armenian Diaspora
    groups in the United States have launched a broad campaign against the
    draft resolution. A press release from the Armenian National Committee
    of America reported that Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ), known for
    his strong support of Armenia, was urging U.S. Secretary of State
    Colin Powell and U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Danforth to vote "no"
    on the "destructive resolution" (www.anca.org, November 23).

    Azerbaijan, meanwhile, sees no concrete results from the ten years of
    activity by the Minsk group and therefore feels pressured to knock on
    other doors. Recently, the Council of Europe's political committee
    began discussing a report on the Karabakh conflict prepared by British
    deputies David Atkinson and Terry Davis.

    --Fariz Ismailzade


    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Eurasia Daily Monitor is a publication of the Jamestown
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