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ANKARA: Why Should Turkey Normalize Her Relations With Armenia?

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  • ANKARA: Why Should Turkey Normalize Her Relations With Armenia?

    WHY SHOULD TURKEY NORMALIZE HER RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA?
    Birsen Goksu

    Journal of Turkish Weekly
    http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2499/why-shoul d-turkey-normalize-her-relations-with-armenia-.htm l
    April 1 2009

    Armenian and Turkish press has been recently talking about the
    rapprochement and possibility of the normalization of relations between
    the two countries. In spite of fifteen-year severed diplomatic ties,
    closed border and tense relations, the winds of change have begun
    blowing between Ankara and Yerevan with the visit paid by Turkish
    President Abdullah Gul to Armenia, upon the invitation of Armenian
    President Serzh Sarkisian, on the occasion of a soccer match. This
    historic visit was followed by a series of gatherings held on several
    occasions, such as the BSEC or Davos meetings, where the parties
    voiced their willingness with respect to the settlement of existing
    disputes between Turkey and Armenia. Considering the lack of dialogue
    between the two states since early 1990s, it is obvious that Turkey
    and Armenia have entered an unprecedented period in their history
    as two independent and sovereign states. It is currently a serious
    point of concern in Turkey and Armenia whether or not these steps
    will enable the parties to come out of the fifteen-year deadlock in
    their relations. However, instead of asking whether parties will be
    able to normalize their relations, a more important point that has
    to be discussed is why parties should normalize their relations.

    The conflicts between Turkey and Armenia gradually emerged when
    newly-independent Armenia attempted to define Eastern Anatolia as
    "Western Armenia" and not to officially recognize the borders it
    has with Turkey. Following this, genocide allegations poisoned the
    relations between the two as they began to be voiced more loudly by the
    Armenian government and as the diaspora intensified its initiatives to
    have the 1915 events recognized as genocide in national parliaments
    all around the world. Nevertheless, the landmark event causing
    Turkey to close her doors completely to Armenia was the conflict
    over Nagorno-Karabakh breaking out between Armenia and Azerbaijan as
    a territorial and administrative dispute from 1988 to 1992 and as a
    full-fledged war from 1992 to 1994. Moreover, even though the term of
    Levon Ter-Petrosian can be considered as more moderate with respect
    to the genocide allegations in particular, the hawkish discourse
    of Robert Kocharian, a Karabakh native and the region's former
    president, sharpened the tone utilized by Armenia from late 1990s
    onwards. Finally, resolution of the disputes, reopening of the borders
    and establishment of diplomatic ties with Armenia have been linked to
    the resolution of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over
    Nagorno-Karabakh, bringing about nothing but turning the situation
    into a "mutually hurting stalemate"[1] for both Turkey and Armenia.

    The nature of the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia is a perfect
    example of hurting stalemate inasmuch as that both sides are damaged
    by the continuation of conflicts to a certain extent. From the Turkish
    side, stalemated conflicts with Armenia means facing the gradually
    increasing international pressure with respect to the recognition of
    genocide allegations, waiting the remarks of US Presidents with a bated
    breath every 24 April and perceiving the threat of being obliged to
    pay compensation and give some parts of Eastern Anatolia to Armenia,
    causing Turkey to suffer from Sèvres Syndrome even 90 years after
    the signing of the treaty, which feeds the "foreign enemies" discourse
    of ultra-nationalists in Turkey.

    >From the Armenian side, on the other hand, insistence on the
    continuation of conflict points with Turkey costs the embargo imposed
    by Turkey and Azerbaijan on this state, including exclusion from
    energy transit routes passing through the region, limited diplomatic
    relations with neighbours and dependence on the money poured into
    the country by the diaspora because of lacking trade relations with
    neighbouring countries, inefficient investments and young population
    leaving the state, which turns Armenia into an old people's home.

    It is unequivocally true to say that associating the conflicts between
    Turkey and Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and pushing the
    resolution of this conflict as a prerequisite for the normalization
    of relations between the two states only increase the severity of
    stalemate both parties suffer from. Given the fact that Azerbaijan
    has lost ground regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and support
    of the third parties has tilted towards Armenia since early 1990s,
    the support extended by Turkey to the Azerbaijani side is beyond
    price and intensely needed. However, for a number of reasons, Turkey
    should normalize her relations with Armenia not despite Azerbaijan,
    but for also Azerbaijan.

    First and foremost, there is no doubt that, in contrast to Turkey's
    expectations, thinking the conflict points with Armenia in the same
    basket with Nagorno-Karabakh issue and confining this state to economic
    and political isolation in the region did not drive her into a corner
    but, instead, caused the hawks to come to power in 1998 and led the
    diaspora to sharpen its tone through intensifying genocide allegations
    and accelerating pro-Armenian campaign regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh
    issue. It is true that Robert Kocharian pursued a totally different
    policy from Ter-Petrosian in that he tried to turn the isolation
    imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on his state into an advantage
    through attracting the attention of diaspora to send more financial
    aid to Armenia and through depending on Russia and Iran further and,
    thereby, constituting a second axis in regional equation vis-a-vis
    the axis consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

    Moreover, with a view that it is the diaspora underscoring the
    genocide allegations much more and taking an irreconcilable stance
    regarding the resolution of existing disputes, Turkey must make a
    clear-cut differentiation between the diaspora Armenians and Armenian
    residents. The main motive pushing the diaspora to put emphasis on
    genocide allegations so intensely is the need for an argument which
    will bring Armenians all over the world together and maintain their
    identity and integrity through serving as cement. What is more,
    compared with the initial years of newly independent Armenia, the
    influence of diaspora on the Armenian state and her foreign policy as a
    whole has become much more decisive from late 1990s onwards. From this
    point of view, it is undoubtedly true to argue that the shared policy
    pursued by Turkey and Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia in the region
    was one of the basic reasons for the hardening of the tone used by
    the diaspora and its increased impact on Armenia. As a result, given
    the fact that it seems impossible to establish an immediate dialogue
    with the diaspora due to its irreconcilable stance and decentralized
    character, normalization of relations with Armenia is in the interests
    of Turkey in that it can find a counterpart to defend her point of
    view and to come to a common point with respect to the disputed issues.

    To put it another way, considering that, in our period, public
    diplomacy does not matter only at the margins any more, Turkey must
    give weight to shaping the lenses through which Armenian people see
    Turkey. Today, public opinion matters in the conduct of foreign policy
    more than ever. For that reason, even if an immediate establishment
    of diplomatic relations cannot be expected in the short and mid-run,
    opening borders with Armenia, increasing the number of direct flights
    to Yerevan and establishing more trade links between the two countries
    would make a substantial increase in the interaction channels between
    two societies and this would have a crucial impact on the point of
    views through which both nations see each other. At the end, this
    would make further dialogue possible between them, making it more
    costly for Armenia to sustain her irreconcilable attitude and leading
    a way to the settlement of conflicts between Turkey and Armenia.

    Furthermore, as of today, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue seems to meet the
    criteria for being called as an intractable conflict, i.e. long-lasting
    conflicts that are protracted in nature and failed to be accommodated
    despite the efforts exerted both by the adversaries themselves and
    by the third parties[2]. What is more, it is difficult to deny that
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is full of failed third party mediation
    attempts, which comprise the attempts of Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan
    and the Minsk Group under the auspices of OSCE (then-CSCE). Needless
    to say that, failure to settle the conflict mostly derives from the
    nature of the conflict itself -inability to integrate the principles
    of self-determination and territorial integrity in a way that both
    parties would accept, identity considerations attributed to the
    conflict by both adversaries and reluctance of the party having
    military advantage to give concessions-[3]. Nevertheless, the role
    of third parties plays an important part in turning Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict into a protracted one. Here, the most significant point
    which has to be stressed is the conflict of interest between Russia
    and the West in asserting their impact in the region. Given the fact
    that a weak Azerbaijan would enable Russia to maintain her role in
    energy markets and a weak Armenia means a loyal supporter of Russian
    interests in the region, Russia, from its very beginning, has been
    quite reluctant to accept Western-sponsored roadmaps for peace, which
    was evident, for example, in Russian objection to the deployment of
    an OSCE-led international peace-keeping force in the region, instead
    of a Russian or CIS force.

    When all these conditions under which the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
    has evolved are taken into consideration, it would be pure optimism
    for Turkey to wait for the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
    in order to normalize her relations with Armenia. Therefore, the
    best thing that should be done on the way to the normalization
    of relations with Armenia is to increase the dialogue with this
    state through turning every occasion, including both official and
    non-official ones, into advantage. Accordingly, the historic visit
    paid by President Abdullah Gul to Armenia and other meetings held
    by some lower-ranking government officials on several occasions,
    like BSEC and Davos meetings, can all be thought as landmark steps
    towards re-establishing relations with Armenia.

    In effect, it should not be forgotten that Russian-Georgian war of
    August 2008 played a part in paving the way for the rapprochement
    between Turkey and Armenia. Indeed, considering severed diplomatic
    and commercial relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia sustains
    her commercial relations with the world via Georgia's Black Sea
    ports, which were paralyzed during the war. This short period of
    deprivation might have made obvious the catastrophic repercussions of
    being depended on only one state and might have urged Armenia not to
    mortgage her future on a controversial part of history, especially
    in a period when the poor Armenian economy began facing the impact
    of global financial crisis.

    Moreover, the Russo-Georgian war was a wake-up call to the states
    in Caucasus inasmuch as that it unveiled the extent to which frozen
    ethnic conflicts in the region and Russian willingness to reassert her
    influence over the region can pose a threat to the peace, security and
    stability in Caucasus when there is no cooperation and coordination
    among the neighbouring states of the region. For that reason, it
    is clear that, since the war in August, Turkey and Armenia have not
    been in a position to turn down the dialogue appeals any more, not
    only for their own sake but also for the maintenance of peace and
    stability in the region.

    Maybe a more important thing, following Russia's war in Georgia, is
    the increasing contacts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. To be more
    precise, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey came together in tripartite
    meetings held in New York in September and, then, in Helsinki in
    December and voiced their willingness for a solution. Moreover,
    Azerbaijan and Armenia signed Moscow Declaration in November 2008,
    following the talks hosted by Russia and under the auspices of Minsk
    Group, OSCE. Although the Declaration was downplayed because of not
    leading to any important result with respect to the resolution of
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it should be labelled as crucial when it
    is considered in conjunction with other recent developments.

    As conclusion, whether Turkey and Armenia will be able to turn these
    steps into an advantage towards normalizing their relations depends on
    the answer of the question to what extent parties are ready and eager
    to move the relations ahead. If these steps are not to be followed by
    additional demarches, then it means that they will be confined to the
    dustbin of history like other steps remaining inconclusive. However,
    if parties sustain their willingness to take the relations further
    ahead and if they feed this willingness with concrete initiatives,
    then, a warming in Turkish-Armenian relations will be righteously
    anticipated in the mid-run.

    Birsen Goksu, Marmara University

    [email protected]

    [1] The concept of "mutually hurting stalemate" was firstly used
    by William Zartman to define a situation in which both sides of
    a conflict end up in such a costly deadlock that there is no use
    escalating the conflict to escape from it. I.W. Zartman, "Ripeness:
    the Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," In Conflict Resolution After the
    Cold War, ed. P.C. Stern and D. Druckman, (Washington, DC: National
    Academy Press), pp. 225-250.

    [2] Louis Kriesberg, "Nature of Intractability," Beyond
    Intractability, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict
    Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, posted: October
    2003. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nature_i ntractability/

    [3] David D. Laitin and Ronald Grogor Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan:
    Thinking a way out of Karabakh," Middle East Policy, vol.7, no.1,
    October 1999, p.158.

    Wednesday, 1 April 2009

    "Statements of facts or opinions appearing in the pages of Journal
    of Turkish Weekly (JTW) are not necessarily by the editors of JTW nor
    do they necessarily reflect the opinions of JTW or ISRO. The opinions
    published here are held by the authors themselves and not necessarily
    those of JTW or ISRO.
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