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Mensoian: Artsakh's Independence Before Normalization

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  • Mensoian: Artsakh's Independence Before Normalization

    Mensoian: Artsakh's Independence Before Normalization: Reordering
    Armenia's Priorities
    By Michael Mensoian

    http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/08/0 1/mensoian-artsakhs-independence-before-normalizat ion-reordering-armenias-priorities/
    August 1, 2009

    The following comment is attributed to President Ilham Aliyev of
    Azerbaijan conjecturing on the possibility of Artsakh achieving local
    autonomy when it is returned to Baku's jurisdiction. `It may take a
    year, maybe 10 years, maybe 100 years, or it will never be possible.
    Time will tell.' That mindset that Karabagh will revert to Azerbaijani
    control is given credence by the continuing pressure by the Minsk Group
    representing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
    (OSCE) for Armenia to accept another nuanced Madrid Proposal as the
    basis for negotiating a resolution of the Karabagh conflict. To accept
    these principles places the burden on the Armenian negotiators,
    effectively precluding our brothers and sisters in Artsakh from ever
    achieving a peaceful de jure independence.

    Given that rather ominous outlook, the leadership in Yerevan remains
    hell-bent on implementing an ill-conceived policy that seeks to
    normalize relations with a government in Ankara that continues a
    decades-long national policy of denial, obfuscation, and revisionism
    with respect to the genocide of the Armenian nation that began on April
    24, 1915. It should come as no revelation that the Turkish leaders have
    no20intention of normalizing relations with Yerevan until the Karabagh
    conflict is resolved. The Turkish solution is simple: The liberated
    districts must revert to Azeri control and Karabagh's ultimate status
    to be determined by a vote under conditions and at an indefinite time
    in the future. While Armenia seeks to appease Ankara on its western
    border, for what purpose one might ask, it is being outflanked on its
    eastern border.

    These ongoing negotiations to achieve normalization are part of a
    well-conceived Turkish diplomatic offensive that seeks to force Yerevan
    into accepting compromises that are inimical to its political viability
    and future security. The soccer invitation by Armenian President Serge
    Sarkisian to Turkish President Abdullah Gul was part and parcel of this
    shrewd Turkish offensive. The invitation was anything but spontaneous
    by the Armenian president. The hesitancy by the Turkish president in
    accepting was part of the drama that set the stage for the current
    negotiations. Unwary Yerevan'better that said than to say they were
    party to this subterfuge'has little if anything substantive to gain
    from these negotiations. Yerevan has yet to produce any objective
    evidence as to how normalization will promote its present
    political-economic situation or long-term national security interests.
    An analysis of the limited and conflicting information that is
    available indicates that whatever gains may be anticipated will come
    at an exorbitant cost to Armenia.

    If this is not sufficient reason to end negotiations, perhaps a more
    compelling reason is the need for Yerevan to reorient its priorities
    and view Artsakh's independence rather than normalization as the key to
    its future. The loss of Artsakh would seriously weaken Yerevan's
    position within the south Caucasus and would likely result in the
    disaffection of a significant number of diasporan Armenians. Yerevan
    must develop and enunciate a stratagem supported by the major political
    parties in tandem with Stepanakert that will maintain and strengthen
    the de facto independence of Artsakh as this coalition works toward its
    recognition as a free and independent political entity. Failure to
    develop a broadly supported stratagem creates a vacuum that facilitates
    the ongoing campaign by Ankara and Baku of comments from their leaders
    that seek to create the illusion that negotiations are progressing
    satisfactorily. This causes what they expect: confusion and
    consternation on the part of the Armenian political parties not privy
    to the negotiations, and an erosion of Armenia's position in the
    negotiations. The lack of an effective response by Yerevan makes its
    leaders appear to be the intransigent neighbor while Turkey assumes the
    role of the cooperative negotiator. It is a shrewd gambit by Ankara
    that seems to be resonating with the principal players'the Minsk Group
    representing the OSCE, of which Russia and the United States serve as
    co-chairs with France, and by Russia and the United States as separate
    entities apart from their participation in the Minsk Group'as they
    continue to pressure Armenia to make compromises.

    These nations want an open border'seemingly at Armenia's expense'and a
    peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict'at Karabagh's
    expense'ostensibly to bring political and economic stability to the
    region. Political and economic stability in the south Caucasus is a
    legitimate objective. However, nowhere are provisions suggested to be
    implemented that would improve the economy of Armenia, its active
    participation in the ongoing economic development programs and projects
    in the south Caucasus, guarantees of free access to Black Sea ports in
    Georgia and Turkey or to address the various issues that are an
    outgrowth of the Armenian Genocide. Rather, both Armenia's and
    Karabagh's vital interests are being ignored in preference to those of
    Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is everything to suggest, based on the
    available evidence, that if the present set of circumstances prevail,
    Armenia and Karabagh will be relegated to political and economic
    servitude, their potential forever circumscribed by the interests of
    Ankara and Baku (see `The Roadmap to Normalization is a Roadmap to
    Oblivion for Armenia,' The Armenian Weekly, May 23, 2009).

    The ultimate independence of20Artsakh must be viewed as infinitely more
    compelling than the normalization of relations with Ankara. Failure to
    achieve Artsakh's independence will be the death knell for Hai Tahd,
    which represents the Armenian nation's legitimate demand for justice.
    The first link in that long-sought demand for justice is the
    recognition of Artsakh as an independent entity. Should that fail,
    Yerevan has no hope whatsoever that the normalization of relations with
    Turkey will be either politically or economically beneficial, or that
    its national security interests can be protected. With a defeat in
    Artsakh, what is it that normalization can yield? What incentive would
    there be for Ankara to ever offer no more than token responses to the
    legitimate Armenian claims of restitution, reparation, recognition (of
    the genocide), and rectification (of the boundary)? Whatever
    concessions that were finally made to Armenia would serve solely to
    burnish Turkey's image as a nation willing to overcome its past in
    order to achieve political and economic stability within the south
    Caucasus. Turkish leaders know that this ploy would play well in the
    capitals of the European Union and the United States, whose governments
    are anxious to finally settle the `Armenian Question' redefined in the
    context of their collective 21st century interests. Does anyone expect
    the nations that have recognized the Armenian Genocide to support
    Armenia's cause under these circumstances?

    For Yerevan the issue that must be confronted is not whether Karabagh
    is part of the negotiation process, but the constant pressure to have
    the Madrid Proposals serve as the basis for negotiations. No matter how
    these proposals are nuanced , they are the same proposals that were
    introduced in 2007 and they still speak to the territorial integrity of
    Azerbaijan. Completely ignored is the principle that supports the
    inalienable right of an ethnic minority to seek independence from the
    rule of a despotic government. There is no part of international law
    that precludes Artsakh from being recognized today as an independent
    country. If the principle of territorial integrity was so sacrosanct
    Kosovo could not have been recognized by the United States and Russia's
    recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have occurred (see
    `Is Artsakh's Cause Less Than Kosovo's?' The Armenian Weekly, May 10,
    2009).

    Even a cursory examination of these principles leaves little doubt that
    they are skewed against Karabagh's independence. The first principle
    requires the withdrawal of the Karabagh Defense Force from the
    liberated territories that form Karabagh's security zone. Withdrawal
    from these lands would cause the Line of Contact (LoC) to contract to
    the borders of the Karabagh districts. This would make the defense of
    Karabagh immeasurably more difficult as well as effectively cutting it
    off from both Armenia and Iran. The Lachin Corridor cannot be viewed as
    a dependable link to Armenia if the Kashatagh and Lachin districts
    (Kelbajar) are occupied by Azerbaijan. The Lachin Corridor road under
    the best of conditions is a fragile link to Armenia and can be easily
    severed once the security zone is occupied by the Azerbaijan military.
    An international peacekeeping force under the aegis of the United
    Nations might be an option. However, their effectiveness judged by the
    past performances of such peace-keeping forces in similar situations
    too numerous to mention is not reassuring. They normally have neither
    the capacity nor the mandate to effectively challenge any military
    action that the host nation may decide to take. What is the status of
    the occupied eastern margins of Martakert and Martuni and the district
    of Shahumian? Will they revert to Karabagh's control or continue to
    remain under Azeri occupation?

    A second principle speaks to the return of internally displace persons
    (IDP) to the liberated districts as well as to Karabagh itself. What of
    the Armenian IDP's that are in Karabagh who fled from Baku and Sumgait
    and the districts of Shahumian and the eastern border regions of
    Martakert and Martuni that are presently occupied by Azeri forces. Then
    there are those Armenians that left Azerbaijan for Armenia or Russia.
    These people are the only legitimate refugees of the war to liberate 0D
    Artsakh, although the term is incorrectly used by Baku to identify
    their IDP's.

    This requirement to resettle the IDP's combined with a third principle
    that suggests a future plebiscite to determine the status of Karabagh
    all but insures that the people of Karabagh will never achieve
    independence. When this plebiscite will take place will be determined
    by whom? When will it be held? What geographic regions will be
    included? Karabagh only? Or will the voting include all of Azerbaijan
    as a referendum on whether or not Karabagh should be granted some form
    of local autonomy? Actually none of these questions are relevant simply
    because Karabagh's independence will never be one of the options.
    Possibly Aliyev's off repeated threat of a military solution may be the
    more desirable option (see `The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited,'
    The Armenian Weekly, August 16, 2008).

    The loss of Artsakh would represent a catastrophic political and
    psychological setback for Armenia and for the creditability of the ARF.
    Hai Tahd and the socioeconomic and political reforms that define the
    ideology of the ARF would have been seriously tarnished. That may be a
    harsh assessment, but it is closer to the truth than ignoring the
    consequences of Artsakh's demise.

    Artsakh not only would represent a significant victory in the Armenian
    nation's determination to obtain justice, but it strengthens the count
    ry's strategic position athwart the Russian-Iranian north-south
    axis and the Turkish-Azerbaijani west-east axis. At any moment Russia
    has the capability to occupy Georgia which is Turkey's only land
    connection to Baku and beyond. The neutralization of Armenia and the
    reversion of Karabagh to Azerbaijan would provide Turkey with an
    important alternate route. There can be no doubt that Turkey desires to
    extend its political and economic influence across the Caspian Sea into
    central Asia and beyond. This is the old pan-Turanian (or Pan-Turkic)
    dream resurrected.

    Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's recent charge that the Chinese
    government was committing genocide in Xingtiang (Sinkiang) against the
    ethnic Moslem Uighurs speaks to that objective. The United States,
    Russia, and the European Union should consider that Turkey's
    geostrategic interests will ultimately run counter to their respective
    geostrategic interests. From the Balkans to Chinese Xingtiang and from
    the south Caucasus to the Gulf of Aden, there is no country within this
    vast region that can compete on the ground with Turkey. This includes
    both Israel and Iran.

    No one questions the fact that Yerevan is not dealing from a position
    of power. However, President Sargsyan courts disaster if he continues
    to carry on negotiations without broad based political support and a
    degree of transparency. Allaying suspicions and the need to engender
    support from the diaspora is an absolute necessity. The ARF is well
    positioned to make an important contribution if Yerevan accepts the
    need not only to reposition itself with respect to its objectives, but
    to develop a plan of action that speaks, first and foremost, to the de
    jure independence of Karabagh. If not, then this difficult burden must
    fall on the ARF to represent the people of Karabagh in their epic
    struggle to become a free and independent entity.
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