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KARABAKH A "NON-ISSUE" FOR US, RUSSIA - US ANALYST
news.az
Feb 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Thomas Ambrosio News.Az interviews Thomas Ambrosio, an associate
professor of political science at North Dakota State University.
What do you think are the prospects for a Karabakh settlement?
I believe that a Karabakh settlement is highly unlikely. Despite
all of the chatter about a breakthrough being "imminent" (and we
have heard this talk for one-and-a-half decades) the fundamentals
which gave rise to the conflict remain the same: the tensions between
territory and ethnicity, between sovereignty and self-determination,
and between the two sides' perceptions of the past, present and future
of Nagorno-Karabakh. These are the broader issues that continue to
divide the two sides. The specific issues, too, remain unresolved:
the process for determining the ultimate status of Nagorno-Karabakh;
the sequencing of events which will lead to the return of other
territories to Azerbaijan; the possibility and form of a physical
link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia-proper; and, finally, the de
jure and de facto relationships between Nagorno-Karabakh, on the one
hand, and Baku and Yerevan on the other. Without progress on either
the broader or more specific issues, and barring a complete military
solution by one side over the other, it is unlikely that there will
be any substantive progress.
Are the views of the USA and Russia on Karabakh the same or is there
a difference of opinion between the two mediators?
To be quite frank about it, neither side (in my opinion) actually
cares about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in-and-of-itself. Despite the
calls for a settlement, the numerous mediation efforts, and pledges to
"support" the two sides as they reach an accommodation, Karabakh is
a non-issue for both the US and Russia. Let me take each in turn. For
Russia, Karabakh fits into their broader interests in restoring their
domination of the South Caucasus: a continuation of the status quo
means that Armenia remains dependent upon Moscow for the threat of
Russian intervention to stay the hand of the wealthier (and better
armed) Azerbaijani government from affecting a military solution;
similarly, Azerbaijan's ability to have a truly independent foreign
policy is stunted by the fact that Armenia occupies some 15% of its
territory. Karabakh is a tool for Russia's larger aims of restoring
itself to great power status. The status quo suits it just fine. For
the United States, Karabakh is simply not a priority. With the Obama
administration dealing with an economic crisis at home and more
pressing issues abroad (at least to perceived American interests),
it has little time and even less inclination to get substantively
involved in the Caucasus. Moreover, the administration's strategy of
"engaging" with countries which are actual or potential rivals/enemies
to the US (in this case, symbolized by the "reset" button given by
Secretary of State Clinton to her Russian counterpart) means that
it has effectively ceded the former Soviet Union (minus the Baltic
states) to the Russian sphere of influence. Finally, the government
in Baku was seen as a strategic ally of the Bush administration. The
Obama administration has gone out of its way to be the "un-Bush" and,
in many cases, has blindly reversed Bush-era practices and policies.
This may turn around eventually, but in the short-term it hurts
America's commitment to Azerbaijan.
Is Turkey really able to help Karabakh go forward?
I do not believe so. The much vaunted "peace" between Ankara and
Yerevan still has to be ratified by the Turkish parliament and it
does not look like this will happen soon. Some have argued that
the agreement would make it easier for a settlement - the notion
that peace was contagious was very much in vogue when the agreement
was signed in October. However, this has rarely been the case and
even less so when the differences between the parties are so well
entrenched. The only real hope would have been for a "package deal"
in which the issues that separate Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the one
side, from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, on the other, were resolved
all at once. For the record, I do not believe that such a comprehensive
settlement were or would be possible.
You are going to attend an event to mark the massacre at Khojaly
during the Karabakh war. What should be done to inform the wider
American community about the tragedy?
A good, but tough, question. I would argue that three things need to
be done. First, the Azeri community must become better organized in
order to present a consistent and persistent message to the American
people. The Armenian-American lobby is far stronger because the
Armenian population is larger, better organized and more strategically
located (California, Massachusetts and New Jersey) than their Azeri
counterparts. It will be tough to overcome this. Second, the Azeri
community must do a better job at educating the American people about
the existence of Karabakh and the fact that there was a conflict
there. Everyone has heard of Bosnia and Rwanda, but very few even
know Nagorno-Karabakh exists. This conference is a good step, but far
more needs to be done. Finally, the Azeri community (and Azerbaijan,
generally) must do a better job tying the events to larger issues,
such as human rights and war crimes. The Armenian-American lobby
has done a good job tying its history to the well-established (and
hot-button) issue of the Holocaust. By adopting such a rhetorical
strategy, they have been able to utilize the language of "genocide"
(and the accompanying sympathies that it inspires) to argue their
case and assert their interests.
The Armenian lobby in the US Congress is well-known. How dependent
is the US administration on the Armenian lobby and diaspora on the
Karabakh issue and relations with Azerbaijan?
Far less than in the past. However, the early victories (the 907
sanctions banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, for example)
created an overarching institutional, legal, and perceptual structure
which still continues to benefit the arguments of the Armenian-American
lobby. The Obama administration is perfectly willing to allow the
current trajectory to remain in place. To paraphrase Newton's first
law of motion: A body in motion will stay in motion unless acted
upon by an external force. Absent some substantive reason, event,
or national security interest, and American policy prejudices the
status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Thomas Ambrosio is an associate professor of political science in
the Criminal Justice and Political Science Department at North Dakota
State University and director of NDSU's International Studies Major.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
news.az
Feb 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Thomas Ambrosio News.Az interviews Thomas Ambrosio, an associate
professor of political science at North Dakota State University.
What do you think are the prospects for a Karabakh settlement?
I believe that a Karabakh settlement is highly unlikely. Despite
all of the chatter about a breakthrough being "imminent" (and we
have heard this talk for one-and-a-half decades) the fundamentals
which gave rise to the conflict remain the same: the tensions between
territory and ethnicity, between sovereignty and self-determination,
and between the two sides' perceptions of the past, present and future
of Nagorno-Karabakh. These are the broader issues that continue to
divide the two sides. The specific issues, too, remain unresolved:
the process for determining the ultimate status of Nagorno-Karabakh;
the sequencing of events which will lead to the return of other
territories to Azerbaijan; the possibility and form of a physical
link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia-proper; and, finally, the de
jure and de facto relationships between Nagorno-Karabakh, on the one
hand, and Baku and Yerevan on the other. Without progress on either
the broader or more specific issues, and barring a complete military
solution by one side over the other, it is unlikely that there will
be any substantive progress.
Are the views of the USA and Russia on Karabakh the same or is there
a difference of opinion between the two mediators?
To be quite frank about it, neither side (in my opinion) actually
cares about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in-and-of-itself. Despite the
calls for a settlement, the numerous mediation efforts, and pledges to
"support" the two sides as they reach an accommodation, Karabakh is
a non-issue for both the US and Russia. Let me take each in turn. For
Russia, Karabakh fits into their broader interests in restoring their
domination of the South Caucasus: a continuation of the status quo
means that Armenia remains dependent upon Moscow for the threat of
Russian intervention to stay the hand of the wealthier (and better
armed) Azerbaijani government from affecting a military solution;
similarly, Azerbaijan's ability to have a truly independent foreign
policy is stunted by the fact that Armenia occupies some 15% of its
territory. Karabakh is a tool for Russia's larger aims of restoring
itself to great power status. The status quo suits it just fine. For
the United States, Karabakh is simply not a priority. With the Obama
administration dealing with an economic crisis at home and more
pressing issues abroad (at least to perceived American interests),
it has little time and even less inclination to get substantively
involved in the Caucasus. Moreover, the administration's strategy of
"engaging" with countries which are actual or potential rivals/enemies
to the US (in this case, symbolized by the "reset" button given by
Secretary of State Clinton to her Russian counterpart) means that
it has effectively ceded the former Soviet Union (minus the Baltic
states) to the Russian sphere of influence. Finally, the government
in Baku was seen as a strategic ally of the Bush administration. The
Obama administration has gone out of its way to be the "un-Bush" and,
in many cases, has blindly reversed Bush-era practices and policies.
This may turn around eventually, but in the short-term it hurts
America's commitment to Azerbaijan.
Is Turkey really able to help Karabakh go forward?
I do not believe so. The much vaunted "peace" between Ankara and
Yerevan still has to be ratified by the Turkish parliament and it
does not look like this will happen soon. Some have argued that
the agreement would make it easier for a settlement - the notion
that peace was contagious was very much in vogue when the agreement
was signed in October. However, this has rarely been the case and
even less so when the differences between the parties are so well
entrenched. The only real hope would have been for a "package deal"
in which the issues that separate Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the one
side, from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, on the other, were resolved
all at once. For the record, I do not believe that such a comprehensive
settlement were or would be possible.
You are going to attend an event to mark the massacre at Khojaly
during the Karabakh war. What should be done to inform the wider
American community about the tragedy?
A good, but tough, question. I would argue that three things need to
be done. First, the Azeri community must become better organized in
order to present a consistent and persistent message to the American
people. The Armenian-American lobby is far stronger because the
Armenian population is larger, better organized and more strategically
located (California, Massachusetts and New Jersey) than their Azeri
counterparts. It will be tough to overcome this. Second, the Azeri
community must do a better job at educating the American people about
the existence of Karabakh and the fact that there was a conflict
there. Everyone has heard of Bosnia and Rwanda, but very few even
know Nagorno-Karabakh exists. This conference is a good step, but far
more needs to be done. Finally, the Azeri community (and Azerbaijan,
generally) must do a better job tying the events to larger issues,
such as human rights and war crimes. The Armenian-American lobby
has done a good job tying its history to the well-established (and
hot-button) issue of the Holocaust. By adopting such a rhetorical
strategy, they have been able to utilize the language of "genocide"
(and the accompanying sympathies that it inspires) to argue their
case and assert their interests.
The Armenian lobby in the US Congress is well-known. How dependent
is the US administration on the Armenian lobby and diaspora on the
Karabakh issue and relations with Azerbaijan?
Far less than in the past. However, the early victories (the 907
sanctions banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, for example)
created an overarching institutional, legal, and perceptual structure
which still continues to benefit the arguments of the Armenian-American
lobby. The Obama administration is perfectly willing to allow the
current trajectory to remain in place. To paraphrase Newton's first
law of motion: A body in motion will stay in motion unless acted
upon by an external force. Absent some substantive reason, event,
or national security interest, and American policy prejudices the
status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Thomas Ambrosio is an associate professor of political science in
the Criminal Justice and Political Science Department at North Dakota
State University and director of NDSU's International Studies Major.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress