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TBILISI: August War In Leaked Cables

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  • TBILISI: August War In Leaked Cables

    AUGUST WAR IN LEAKED CABLES

    Civil Georgia
    http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22918
    Dec 2 2010
    Georgia

    ~UCables from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi;
    ~U'Some Allies Parroting Russian Points';
    ~UNATO 'United in Principle, Split on Actions';
    ~UArmenia's Muted 'Exasperation';

    Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, available at the moment, contain about
    116 dispatches related to August, 2008 war in Georgia.

    This bunch of cables involve at least 16 classified dispatches
    originating from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, others are from various
    European capitals and NATO headquarters, as well as from Moscow and
    few of them are from Yerevan and Baku.

    The August war-related cables were first made available on a website
    of the Moscow-based magazine, Russian Reporter, which said it obtained
    the documents from WikiLeaks. Some of those August war-related cable,
    which were posted on the magazine's website, later also appeared on
    WikiLeaks website itself.

    Tbilisi cables detail the U.S. embassy's reporting of events from
    early hours of the war and its aftermath, while the cables from the
    European capitals reveal diplomatic wrangling within the NATO and
    EU over how to react on Georgia crisis and the cables from Yerevan
    are revealing Armenia's muted frustration over, what it felt was,
    "undeserved cold shoulder" from Tbilisi.

    Tbilisi Cables

    The first dispatch from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi, immediately
    after the launch of hostilities, available at the moment, is dated
    with August 7, 2008 in which then U.S. ambassador to Georgia, John
    Tefft, reports to Washington about the start of "intensive fighting"
    previous evening.

    John Tefft, who is now ambassador to Ukraine, was in frequent contact
    with the senior Georgian officials, including President Saakashvili.

    He writes in the August 7 dispatch that he had been told by Grigol
    Vashadze, then Georgian deputy foreign minister and now the foreign
    minister, that "a full-scale South Ossetian attack" was underway
    against Georgian villages, which led to death of one Georgian
    peacekeeper.

    In the same dispatch, the ambassador writes, citing OSCE monitors,
    which were on the ground in the conflict zone at the time, that
    Georgian forces with GRAD multiple rocket launchers were on the move,
    "either as part of a show of force or readiness, or both."

    "Ambassador urged the [Georgian] Foreign Minister and the Deputy
    Minister of Defense to remain calm, not overreact, and to de-escalate
    the situation," the same cable reads.

    The ambassador notes in the dispatch that the recent fighting was
    "atypical" as it did not stop by the daybreak, as it was usually
    the case.

    "From evidence available to us it appears the South Ossetians started
    today's fighting. The Georgians are now reacting by calling up more
    forces and assessing their next move. It is unclear to the Georgians,
    and to us, what the Russian angle is and whether they are supporting
    the South Ossetians or actively trying to help control the situation,"
    the cable reads.

    According to the cable, at mid-day on August 7 the ambassador was
    told by Batu Kutelia, at the time deputy defense minister and after
    that Georgia's ambassador to the U.S., that although the Georgian
    troops were on higher alert, there was no intention to deploy them
    in response to recent attacks.

    But the ambassador also reported in the same cable that the Georgian
    army's 4th brigade was "noticeably absent" from the training on August
    7, which was carried out by the U.S. military instructors at the time.

    He also reported citing OSCE observers, that the Georgian troops were
    on the move on the main east-west highway in direction of Gori, a
    town close to the conflict zone and in addition the embassy observers
    noticed on the highway about 30 city buses carrying uniformed men
    heading from Tbilisi.

    Next day, on August 8, the U.S. ambassador reported in Washington
    that he was told by President Saakashvili that the Georgian forces
    were in control of most of South Ossetia, including Tskhinvali with
    fighting continuing near Java in the north of breakaway region. At the
    time, according to the same cable, it still remained unclear for the
    embassy whether regular Russian army or "North Caucasian irregulars"
    were engaged in those fighting in the north of Tskhinvali.

    The ambassador was also told by Saakashvili, according to the cable,
    that Tbilisi had no intention of getting into this fight, but was
    "provoked by the South Ossetians".

    "All the evidence available to the country team supports Saakashvili's
    statement that this fight was not Georgia's original intention,"
    Ambassador Tefft writes. "Key Georgian officials, who would have had
    responsibility for an attack on South Ossetia, have been on leave
    and the Georgians only began mobilizing August 7 once the attack was
    well underway."

    This part of the cables was widely publicized in Georgia, including
    by the nationwide broadcasters as "yet another evidence" backing
    Georgia's version of events.

    In the same cable, the ambassador writes, citing OSCE observers on
    the ground in Tskhinvali that Georgia's attack on Tskhinvali "began
    at 23:35 on August 7 despite the cease-fire declared at 19:00"
    by President Saakashvili. Georgia said it had to open fire after
    continues attacks on the Georgian villages during the cease-fire
    period, unilaterally announced by Tbilisi.

    "During the night of August 8, four short range ballistic missiles
    were fired from within Russia toward Tskhinvali," the ambassador
    reported in the same cable.

    He also wrote that most in the Georgian government believed the
    fighting had started as "a ploy of de facto [South Ossetian] leader
    [Eduard] Kokoity," but at the time President Saakashvili became
    concerned "that this might have been a Russian pretext and a further
    attack could be expected."

    In a separate dispatch on the same day, the embassy reported that
    situation remained "dangerous; however, there is no indication or
    evidence that Tbilisi is under immediate threat."

    Next morning, August 9, after overnight air strikes by Russia,
    Saakashvili told the ambassador by phone, that Russia was trying to
    take over Georgia and "install a new regime."

    On August 10 Eka Tkeshelashvili, then Georgian foreign minister,
    briefed the diplomatic corps in Tbilisi that "Georgia has suffered
    huge casualties." The U.S. embassy cable on August 10 says that
    Georgian forces have been pushed out of Tskhinvali and the conflict
    zone following a massive Russian attack.

    On August 11 the ambassador was reporting to Washington that it was
    "increasingly difficult to get an accurate analysis of the military
    situation because of the fog of war and the fact that the Georgian
    command and control system has broken down."

    "Senior government officials sometimes give us different reports of
    military action," the August 11 cable reads.

    NATO 'United in Principle, But Difficult to Agree on Action'

    As the hostilities in Georgia were unfolding, several U.S. cables
    from Brussels show, Washington, backed with some Eastern European
    nations, was taking lead in securing "strong statement" by NATO's
    top governing body, North Atlantic Council (NAC), condemning Russia's
    actions in Georgia.

    But those efforts, as seen from these cables, were met with opposition
    from Germany, described in one diplomatic dispatch from Brussels as
    "the standard bearer for pro-Russia camp."

    According to the cables, Germany was also lobbying for canceling
    already scheduled trip of North Atlantic Council to Georgia in
    September.

    One cable said that deputy chief of Russian mission in NATO warned
    that NATO-Russia relationship would be "called into question" if the
    Alliance went ahead with this visit.

    "As the crisis situation in Georgia unfolded on August 8, NATO
    Allies and the International Staff struggled with how to respond,"
    one cable from NATO headquarters reads. "Unfortunately, the crisis also
    revealed the continuing divisions within the Alliance on how to address
    Georgia's desire to join NATO's Membership Action Plan, with Germany
    and Norway arguing that the upcoming NAC trip should be reconsidered.

    On the other hand, Poland--a strong supporter of NATO MAP--had argued
    that the crisis only reinforced the need for the NAC to travel to
    the region."

    According to these cables, Paris was also against of NATO "becoming
    too prominent" in the crisis with one French diplomat, as quoted in
    one dispatch, saying that NATO's August 8 public statement, calling
    on all sides to end violence, had been "enough of a NATO role for now."

    By August 11 Germany the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Turkey seemed
    cautious about NAC trip to Georgia saying that it was too early at
    that stage to decide on the matter. Eventually it was decided to
    proceed with the visit, which took place on September 15.

    On U.S.-proposed strong-worded statement on Russia's actions in
    Georgia, NATO allies failed to reach a consensus. According to one
    cable from Brussels, although all the allies were unanimous in the
    need to immediate halt the hostilities, some argued that adopting
    highly-critical language against Russia was not the best way to
    do that.

    "The Balts, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and the UK also wanted
    a strong statement. Germany countered, hoping for harmony between
    EU, OSCE and NATO messages and cautioning that any statement by the
    NAC should 'help in defusing tensions.' This German perspective was
    backed by France, Turkey, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Italy and
    Slovakia," a cable from the Brussels reads, adding that France was also
    cautious as it thought that NATO statement could have undermined French
    attempts to negotiate a settlement in its capacity of EU Presidency.

    One cable from Brussels, detailing NATO Political Committee meeting on
    August 11, described the situation as NATO being "united in principle,
    but difficult to agree on action."

    'Some Allies Parroting Russian Points on Georgian Culpability'

    According to these cables, some NATO allies' reservations were
    triggered by doubts that it was Tbilisi, which started the recent
    hostilities.

    The August 11 dispatch from NATO headquarters recommends Washington
    that "intelligence releasable to NATO Allies on this point might be
    a useful tool".

    "A number of Allies - especially Germany - are parroting Russian
    points on Georgian culpability for the crisis," this cable reads.

    Notion about Tbilisi's culpability was so widespread that even some
    officials from Georgia's strongest supports were privately questioning
    the Georgian authorities' actions immediately before the launch of
    large-scale hostilities.

    One cable from the U.S. embassy in Warsaw says that Poland took
    "surprisingly forceful leadership" in supporting Georgia. In a separate
    cable, detailing a meeting between U.S. diplomat and late chief of
    staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Gen. Franciszek Gagor, the latter
    is quoted as saying that Saakashvili made "an extremely bad decision
    to move into South Ossetia and played directly into Russia's hands."

    "Poland believes Saakashvili was manipulated by Russian agents -
    possibly even among his advisors - to open the door for military action
    in Georgia with the object of destabilizing the Georgian government,"
    Gen. Gagor, who died in Smolensk plane crash, suggested, according
    the cable.

    Several cables show that the U.S. diplomats were advising Georgian
    authorities to launch "effective public diplomacy" to push for its
    version of events as "Europeans in some countries believe that Georgia
    had started the conflict, that the U.S. is to blame for encouraging
    Georgia."

    Armenia's Muted 'Exasperation'

    One cable from Yerevan details a conversation between Armenia's Deputy
    Foreign Minister and U.S. charge d'affaires on August 11 in which the
    Armenian official asked for assistance in freeing cargo shipments,
    which he said, Georgian authorities were holding up. Armenia's import
    largely depends on commodities shipped via Georgia.

    According to this cable, the Armenian official suggested that Georgian
    authorities were holding cargo, destined for Armenia, for commandeering
    these kinds of critical staple goods for Georgian national needs
    during time of war. According to the cables from Yerevan, Armenia
    was also complaining about "enormous price increase" by two Georgian
    companies, providing shipment services to Armenia, few days before
    the war started (Armenian PM publicly spoke about price hikes and
    complained about it in June, 2009).

    The issue was again raised by Yerevan on August 14, when the U.S.

    charge d'affaires was summoned by Armenian PM Tigran Sargsyan to
    express "urgent concern" about continued problems with shipments.

    "The PM complained that while Georgian authorities denied clearance for
    critical goods already at the Georgia-Armenia border to enter Armenia
    once the conflict was underway, Georgian shipments to Azerbaijan
    continued without disruption," the cable from the U.S.

    embassy in Yerevan reads.

    The U.S. diplomat, according to the cable, responded that the first
    step toward resolving Armenia's supply problem was for the Russians
    to end their military activity in Georgia and urged Yerevan "to use
    its influence in that direction."

    The Armenian PM, according to the cable, also complained that Lado
    Gurgenidze, who at the time was Georgia's PM, was "no longer taking
    my calls" and suggested that Georgia might be punishing Armenia for
    its close relations with Russia.

    "We have not made this into a public issue," the Armenian PM was quoted
    in the cable, "because we are trying to protect the good relationship
    we have with Georgia."

    In a separate cable, detailing developments of August 15, the U.S.

    embassy in Yerevan was reporting to Washington that "top Armenian
    officials are growing increasingly offended by Georgians'
    non-responsiveness to Armenian efforts to reach out."

    "The most discourteous, perhaps, was the Georgian FM's refusal even
    to meet FM Nalbandian for a few minutes in Yerevan airport, as she
    passed through en route overland to Georgia in the early morning of
    August 15," the cable reads and adds that one the Armenian Foreign
    Minister even described Tbilisi's stance as "hostile attitude." He
    said that President Saakashvili had refused to return repeated calls
    from his Armenian counterpart and the Georgian PM had ignored calls
    from his Armenian counterpart.

    According to the cable, the Armenian Foreign Minister told the U.S.

    diplomat that Yerevan was trying to help Georgia by taking in more
    than 4,000 refugees and offering to serve as a humanitarian corridor
    for international relief efforts.

    "What more do they want from us?" the cable quoted Armenian Foreign
    Minister, saying the Armenian authorities were "avoiding any negative
    public statements about Georgia" and warned that were such a statement
    to be made, the reaction of ethnic Armenians in Javakheti region of
    Georgia would be "very dangerous" for Georgia.

    "Despite the obvious threat behind his words, Nalbandian insisted that
    'this is not a card we could play' with Georgia, but 'just a reality',"
    the cable reads.

    According to the same cable, despite mounting exasperation expressed
    privately, the Armenian officials had kept their public statements
    about Georgia "determinedly positive".

    Armenian President, Serzh Sarkisyan, visited Georgia on September 30,
    2008. During the visit the Georgian President thanked Yerevan for
    supporting Georgia's territorial integrity and said that the two
    countries would boost economic cooperation.




    From: A. Papazian
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