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Positive And Negative Aspects Of The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settl

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  • Positive And Negative Aspects Of The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settl

    POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT ROADMAP AT CURRENT STAGE
    Mikhail Aghajanyan

    Noyan Tapan
    www.nt.am
    18.02.2011

    The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement has recently shown some
    kind of stalling and absence of any significant dynamics of positive
    development. Such a tendency has been boldly outlined after the
    well-known meeting of three presidents in Sochi on January 25, 2010.

    It became even more prominent after the meeting of three presidents
    in Saint-Petersburg on June 17. 2010 and, at last, the meeting in
    the same format in Astrakhan finally convinced even the most fervent
    optimists of the fact that the stances of two conflicting parties did
    not reproach. Besides, according to estimations of some persons who
    are aware of the details of the discussions in triangular format,
    there is even no dynamics to rapprochement between the stances of
    the parties. After the meeting in Astrakhan, many expectations were
    connected with the meeting at the OSCE summit in Astana on December
    1-2.

    Probably, the only novelty, which is to support the process of the
    settlement in the respectable shape and to prolong the international
    mediatory efforts, is the discussion of the issue of adoption of some
    "roadmap" within the process of the settlement. For the first time the
    later was actively discussed in 2009-2010 on both political and expert
    levels. Thus, at the end of 2009 and at the beginning on 2010 it had
    been often mentioned that Kazakhstan, the OSCE presiding country, is
    ready to offer Armenia and Azerbaijan a draft of conflict settlement
    document in the form of a "roadmap". It was mentioned that "the
    Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Kanat Saudabayev announced
    the creation of a "roadmap" directed to the settlement of the Karabakh
    conflict. Prior to that he visited Azerbaijan and Armenia and made
    sure that there are positive shifts in the stances of the parties" 1.

    Back in October 2010, several days before the meeting of three
    presidents in Astrakhan, the US envoy to the OSCE Ian Kelly, mentioning
    the anxious situation on the cease-fire front line in the zone of
    the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, stated that at current stage the most
    important was that the parties keep talking to each other in order to
    provide diplomatic process. As for the expectations of the American
    diplomacy from the upcoming OSCE Summit in Astana, Kelly mentioned
    about the possibility of a "roadmap" in the process of the Karabakh
    settlement in the context of inviting the parties to agree at least
    on a definite "roadmap" for the settlement of the conflict2.

    Drafting and implementation of a "roadmap" for the settlement
    of the old interstate conflicts is not an innovation3. One can
    remember an attempt to breathe a new life into the settlement of
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict just with the help of the adoption of a
    "roadmap". The "roadmap" of Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement4,
    which was approved on the highest international level, formulated
    in a form of a written document, to which the leaders of Israel and
    Palestinian administration set a seal, was not implemented and under
    the current realities of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement a few or
    none remembers about it. The "roadmap" of the Israeli-Palestinian
    settlement was formulated as a step-by-step process with definite
    stages when each subsequent stage logically ensues from the realization
    of the previous one. The "roadmap" of the settlement of any process of
    interstate conflict is a plan to obtain definite political goals and
    this means that it is first of all a plan of political settlement,
    which included, to varying degree, judicial and other aspects of
    settlement, but in its essence and general trend it still remains a
    political plan. Taking this into consideration, any "roadmap" should
    be ready for swing in its effectiveness; as anything political in
    modern world, here the effect is also most often twofold - either
    actual breakthrough (which by the way, has never been observed in
    international practice) or full stopping which can be seen in the most
    of the cases. There is no middle way if the "roadmap" is meant for the
    settlement of a complicated interstate conflict which takes place out
    of the immediate European space, because conflicting parties are not
    ready for the compromise in the sense as it is taken in the European
    political thought. Most often the parties approach the situation from
    the position of de-facto situation, i.e. "if I get something then it
    is mine, and I will not give it to anyone "for the hell of it". The
    western meaning of compromise assumes that "for the hell of it"
    (i.e. to give for nothing or for something which is absolutely not
    commensurable with what you receive in return), and at the same time
    they make reference to a highly developed culture of compromise. Of
    course it is easy to achieve compromise in quite Europe as compared
    with the South Caucasus which is in fact divided by confrontations.

    The logical step-by-step constructions can hardly promote
    implementation of the "roadmap" of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement
    and the "roadmap" of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, because
    Israelis will never leave Eastern Jerusalem "just for the hell of
    it", and Armenians will never renounce their legitimate claims for
    the compensation for the Genocide of the Armenians in Western Armenia.

    The "roadmap" of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its logic. Thus,
    the first step stipulated the stage of "ending of terror and violence,
    normalization of the living conditions of the Palestinians, formation
    of the Palestine institutions", which had to be carried out just
    within several weeks from the moment of the adoption of the "roadmap".

    The second stage of the "roadmap" implied definite measures which
    "concentrate their efforts on the creation of an independent
    Palestinian state within provisional borders and with the attributes
    of sovereignty based on a new constitution and as an intermediate
    stage on its way to a constant settlement". And finally, the third
    stage had to bring to "an agreement on the constant status and final
    settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict".

    The main purpose of the Israeli-Palestinian "roadmap" was formulated as
    obtaining final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
    conflict till 2005. This purpose was sounded in the speech of the US
    president G. Bush on June 24, 2002 and approved by the European Union,
    Russia and UN in the statements made after the meeting of the ministers
    of foreign affairs on July 16 and September 17, 2002. More than 5 years
    has passed since "the time-frame of the final settlement". According
    to some initiated experts "the fact of mismatch of the plan of the
    "roadmap" to the real situation was mentioned by the official Russian
    diplomacy. "By the end of this year we had had to begin creation of
    the Palestinian state. But in fact we are still just at the beginning
    of the first stage of the "roadmap".

    The time-frame is unrealizable. Let's not put a brave face on a
    sorry business, - said Alexander Kalugin, the special envoy of the
    RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Middle East settlement, on August
    18, 2005, - Ever since Israeli-Palestinian relations has only become
    strained and the time-frame of the "roadmap" has expired" 5.

    There was a kind of logic in two well-known Armenian-Turkish protocols
    where a definite sequence of stages within the specified time frame
    of their realization was set. There are following references to
    the time-frame of implementation of separate steps by the parties
    in two Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October 10,
    2009, and this can be considered as stages of the "roadmap" of
    the normalization of the relations between two countries: - The
    establishment of diplomatic relations between two countries on the
    day when The Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
    Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; - Opening of the borders within
    two months after The Protocol on Development of the Relations between
    Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; - Both Protocols come into
    effect on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month which
    follows the interchange of the ratification documents by the parties; -
    The last part of The Protocol on Development of the Relations between
    Armenia and Turkey includes the terms of formation and beginning of
    work of the intergovernmental commissions and sub-commissions.

    But everybody knows the difficulties the given logic faced; everybody
    knows that the world leading powers sounded the support of the process
    of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and concrete realization of
    the provisions of two protocols. The logic of the western political
    thought, based on an axiom of compromise with regard to the conflict
    settlement, was beaten by the logic of the direct participants of
    the conflict. With regard to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement the
    logic of the only power which torpedoed the process, i.e. Turkey,
    consisted in the fact that in return for its "concession" in the
    form of opening of the border with Armenia, Ankara was ready to
    accept only "commensurate" concession - renouncing of the process of
    international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and withdrawal of
    the Armenian forces from the Lowland Karabakh. What fate is in store
    for the "roadmap" of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement if it
    is formulated in a written form?

    We can mention several positive, in our opinion, moments, in case
    of practical implementation of such an initiative, i.e. elaboration
    of the stage-by-stage lan of the Karabakh conflict settlement in the
    form of "roadmap". But we should also mention aspects which may have
    negative effect on the process of the Karabakh conflict settlement.

    Let us only specify that one of the main goals of possible "roadmap"
    of the Karabakh conflict settlement, on which the external powers rely
    for achieving progress, may consist in the fact that the "roadmap"
    by itself may become a definite "compromise" between two traditionally
    dominating discrepant approaches - Armenian and Azerbaijani approaches
    to the conflict settlement, i.e., correspondingly, the "package" or
    "stage-by-stage" settlement. At first sight the "roadmap" is obviously
    "stage-by-stage" approach which gives preference to Baku. But it
    is not so. Each stage of this "roadmap" is a "package" of steps,
    the whole of set of definite actions. The combination of these two
    approaches is a well-known aspiration of the external powers which
    play mediatory role in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
    settlement. Then why not to try to make this dream come true in the
    form of "stage-by-stage and package" approach in this "roadmap"?

    The positive effect of the "roadmap" may also manifest itself in the
    continuation of consultations and negotiations round the Karabakh
    settlement and this will preserve the current status quo in the
    region, will not allow this shaky stability turn into hostilities in
    the zone of conflict. The "roadmap" will become a kind of compromise
    between the main mediators represented by Russia, USA and France,
    as the trilateral format of meetings initiated by Russia makes many
    believe that the Minsk group is a kind of burden for Moscow and
    it wants to get rid of it. The "roadmap" will not allow the Minsk
    group fading from the scene but, at the same time, it will even
    more sideline the institution of the Minsk group. Because signing
    of any document between parties can become reality only by active
    diplomatic work of Moscow. For the later the way from the November
    2008 Meindorf declaration to the October 2010 Joint Statement is a
    way of a certain "diplomatic regress" as in November 2008 something
    was signed, two years later only statement was made. In a situation
    like that Moscow needs to sign any document and it is desirable that
    it will be a significant document on the Karabakh conflict settlement.

    Then, the positive aspects of the "roadmap" are that it allows
    predicting further steps by two of the three conflicting parties,
    a kind of schedule of events, definite actions, which have to be
    implemented by a specific date. If this does not happen it would be
    easy to find out who does not stick to his liabilities stipulated in
    the "roadmap".

    The "roadmap of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement" may also
    have a positive effect on stability in the region in general. From this
    point of view, if we compare it with the "roadmap" of Armenian-Turkish
    normalization, we can state that the only positive effect of the
    unfinished process of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is a greater
    degree of distinctness in the relations between Ankara and Yerevan,
    and such distinctness between regional rivals means greater degree of
    stability. It also implies that the external actors will follow the
    deviations to the negative sides and try to suppress those deviations
    because they are more interested in the stability in the region. So
    the "roadmap" puts the process within some frames, even if it is not
    brought to the logical end. Thus, since the adoption of the "roadmap"
    in 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not gone beyond definite
    borders of the disputed territories (e.g. to Syria, though there
    were some "encounters" on the Lebanese territory); Armenian-Turkish
    relations have not been deteriorated after the conclusion of the
    "Zurich protocols" but they obtained more distinct character. So
    one can hope that the availability of the "roadmap" in the Karabakh
    conflict settlement will become another element which will promote
    stability and will become a relative guarantee of not spreading a
    conflict beyond its current frame and areal.

    The negative factors are as follows: 1. If the "roadmap" of the
    Karabakh conflict settlement is drafted now, two well-known statements
    of the presidents of Russia, US and France will be extrapolated (June
    10, 2009 and June 26, 2010) to it. Such a basis for the "roadmap" of
    the Karabakh conflict settlement, in our opinion, will be of negative
    character and will bring it to the dead end at the very first stage.

    The "roadmap" of the Karabakh conflict settlement cannot begin with
    the provision which reads "returning of the occupied territories
    round Nagorno-Karabakh"6. The first stage should be the conclusion by
    all the three conflicting parties of the agreement on the non-use of
    force at any stage of the Karabakh conflict settlement. The "roadmap"
    of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement was mostly brought
    to the dead end by the fact that the external actors had overstated
    expectations connected with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces
    behind the so-called "green line". Many experts mentioned that
    "many failures of the international diplomacy on the road to settle
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict are caused by the fact that the withdrawal
    of the Israeli forces behind the "green line"7 is considered as an
    immutable precondition necessary for the settlement. To set hopes on
    the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the borders which existed
    before 1967 as the main mean to achieve peace is as hopeless as to
    support the demagogic conversations of the US State Department about
    the correctness of the "roadmap" 8.

    There can be no retreat of the NKR to the borders of 1988, as there
    were no such borders, because today's NKR was de-facto territorially
    formed within the borders of historical Artsakh, meanwhile some of its
    territories are still occupied by the Azerbaijani Republic. There can
    be no withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the territory of Lowland
    Karabakh until a real format of the process of negotiations between
    two parties, which are responsible for any hypothetical withdrawal of
    their forces from some territories, is formed. Those parties can be
    the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijani Republic and they have
    to become the main actors while implementing definite provisions of
    the possible "roadmap",

    Thus, at current stage, there are no real grounds for the settlement
    and no real party composition of the "Karabakh roadmap", 2. The
    "roadmap" is always an imperative demand for the parties to stick to
    their commitments mentioned in the concluded agreements. Definitely the
    only party which has been violating the requirements is Azerbaijan and
    this is proved by a sequence of armistices concluded during the war in
    1991-1994, as well as a number of agreements with the participation
    of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic following it (the classical example
    is the Agreement about the Enforcement of the Cease-Fire Regime which
    was officially signed under the auspices of the OSCE on February 4,
    1995 by all the three conflicting parties).

    There can be no efficient or any positive return from any "roadmap"
    if the party, which initially considers itself "injured party",
    reserves the right to reconsider its commitments. In this connection
    the full name of the Israeli-Palestinian "roadmap" dated May
    2003 is demonstrative: "Roadmap" to a permanent settlement of
    Palestinian-Israeli conflict in accordance with the principle of
    coexistence of two states based on the evaluation of the implementation
    of the obligations by the parties. We believe that the assessment of
    the "implementation of the provisions of the roadmap" by Azerbaijan
    will always be unsatisfactory because there is no style of respectable
    attitude towards the opponents necessary for the constructive dialogue
    in Baku. "Karabakh roadmap" is unrealizable against the background
    of the chauvinism towards everything Armenian and claims on "Western
    Azerbaijan". 3. For the positive implementation of the "roadmap" there
    is no such an accepted in the international practice institution as
    the personal envoy whose intermediary services are accepted by all
    the parties to the conflict. The institution of co-chairmen of the
    Minsk group cannot be considered as the similar to the institution
    of the personal envoy of the head of the state. People are necessary
    who would work on the elaboration, coordination and implementation
    of the "roadmap" 24-hours a day, and, what is most important, they
    would have a mandate for such a work from the heads of states which
    are the external mediators. After the events round South Ossetia in
    August 2008 an issue of creation of the position of the special envoy
    of the US president on Karabakh settlement was discussed behind the
    scene by Western experts. Later on, they spoke that it would be more
    reasonable if there was a special envoy of the US State Secretary in
    the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.

    It is remarkable that today such conversations in the Russian expert
    circles have become more often.

    Thus, Russian experts, mentioning absence of any real progress in
    the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement after the
    meetings of the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan, said
    after the meeting in Astrakhan that "the promises of Medvedev that
    by the moment of holding the OSCE Summit in Kazakhstan on December
    1-2 Yerevan and Baku would get a new coordinated variant of general
    principles of the settlement of the conflict inspires no optimism. Even
    more, in case of elaboration of such principles they would not go
    beyond the norms formulated by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in
    the joint declaration signed in Moscow on November 2, 2008. Thu,
    they will again speak about obscure commitments which do not promote
    real initiation of the peace talks". Russian experts believe that the
    main reason for it is that Kremlin has not "enough diplomatic tools
    to solve this issue". All the contacts with the conflicting parties
    are mainly built through the president. The Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs provides technical support to the head of the state. At
    the same time Russia has no such position as the special envoy of
    the Russian president on Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Traditionally in
    the international practice, the special representative gets to the
    heart of the matter and reconciles differences between conflicting
    parties. He is also responsible for the everyday work and contacts
    with the counteragents. This is the only way not only to achieve a
    true understanding of the matter but also to gradually pave the way for
    the process of negotiations. Russia has nothing like that. Nominally,
    the role of the special envoy is taken by the representative of Moscow
    in the Minsk group. But this is mostly ceremonial post which has no
    full powers, just like the OSCE by itself" 9.

    4. And finally, probably the most important restraint for the positive
    implementation of the "roadmap" of Karabakh conflict settlement
    is the absence of the intentions of main external powers to settle
    anything in the Nagorno-Karabakh process. The fact that the process
    of settlement is necessary does not cause any contradictions. But
    this does not mean that the external powers tend to obtain any result.

    There is already a result and that result has caused relatively
    efficient sustention of the status-quo in the zone of the conflict
    for the recent 16 years. Enough is as good as a feast and the external
    powers realize that current situation is better than the uncertainty
    which follows the first step in the hastily drafted "roadmap" of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.

    Noravank




    From: A. Papazian
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