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GEORGIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT: NEW TAKES ON OLD STRATEGIES
Today's Zaman
Jan 10 2012
Turkey
Turkey is Georgia's "leading regional partner" and Azerbaijan its
"strategic partner," confirms Georgia's new national security concept,
the purpose of which is to analyze and present Tbilisi's regional
and international security challenges.
The new national security concept, adopted by the Georgian parliament
on Dec. 23, 2011, is an updated and revised version of a previous
one from July 2005 and serves both as a crucial driver of the
government's regional and international strategic aims and a platform
for discussions regarding the security challenges that Tbilisi is
currently facing.
Georgia's political landscape changed substantially after the Rose
Revolution in November 2003, which prompted structural reforms within
the government, demonstrating that the problem had been a systemic
one exacerbated by a lack of political will. In the aftermath of the
August War in 2008, the key questions were how Georgia would define
its regional policy, what strategy it would implement regarding
the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and how
relations with Russia would develop. The answers to these questions
can be found in Tbilisi's post-2008 politics. The main changes
brought about by the August War relate to two areas: the status of
the conflicts and the actual control over the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
Under the July 2005 policy document, Georgia aspired to build good
relations with Russia based on mutual respect. Notably, it emphasized
that the existence of a Russian military base in Georgian territory
was not perceived by Tbilisi as a threat to its sovereignty. The
concept attempted to balance the rhetoric, but underlined that
granting Russian citizenship to residents of the breakaway republics
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could constitute grounds for military
intervention. Indeed, this assumption became a reality during the
Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russian officials justified their
invasion by pointing to the need to protect Russian citizens living
in South Ossetia. Russia argued that the legal basis of the operation
was guaranteed by Article 14.5 of the Russian Federal Law on State
Policy on Fellow Citizens Residing Abroad, which provides that "if a
foreign state violates recognized norms of international law and human
rights with regard to Russian expatriates, the Russian Federation
shall undertake efforts authorized by international law to defend
their interests." This is the Russian version of the "responsibility
to protect."
The main change within the new security concept is that the document
openly describes Russia as an occupying presence and states that
Moscow's primary goal is to turn Georgia into a "failed state"
in order to derail Georgia from its path towards Euro-Atlantic
integration and to "forcibly return Georgia to the Russian orbit."
Another important issue is the threat of terrorism; the new document
declares that "Russia uses [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] for recruiting
and training terrorists with the aim of carrying out terrorist acts
on Georgian territory."
Georgia can envisage the normalization of bilateral relations only once
Russia has withdrawn its troops. But describing Russia as an occupying
state seems to allow Moscow to respond that the Georgian government
is not ready to normalize relations, arguing that Tbilisi is trying
to blame their more powerful neighbor for their own mistakes. The
policy paper makes it extremely clear that "the enemy is abroad." This
issue will become increasingly important in light of the approaching
parliamentary elections, and then the presidential elections next year.
In terms of relations with neighboring countries, Tbilisi continues
to identify Azerbaijan as a strategic partner and Armenia as a close
partner. The concept argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still
threatens the stability of all states in the region. Interestingly,
the regional media is presenting those elements as new developments,
but closer analysis reveals this stance is merely repeating what the
2005 version had already established.
As well as changes to Georgia's Russian strategy, the new concept
envisages a pragmatic and realistic approach to EU relations, to be
implemented as a process of "gradual integration." NATO membership
remains the top priority on Georgia's political agenda; just a few
days before adopting the new policy concept, the Georgian parliament
voted in favor of President Mikheil Saakashvili's plan to send more
troops to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), deemed a gesture of support and a message of commitment
to NATO. The current government is keen to let NATO know they are
eagerly awaiting the result of NATO's Chicago Summit in May 2012,
which they hope will mark a significant step forward for Georgia in
its drive to join the alliance.
Georgia is unique in the South Caucasus in the sense that its attitudes
toward forming alliances and its wish to join NATO reflect the absence
of a strong military ally; compare this to Armenia, which has Russia,
and Azerbaijan, which has Turkey. First of all, this is primarily down
to the lack of historical or cultural affinities with any of the big
powers, which, had they existed, would have been revived following
independence in 1991. Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have
chosen their allies based upon geographical proximity along with
either historical or cultural affinities, while Georgia looks to
more geographically remote partners in the West. Full membership in
NATO, as many experts have argued, could have prevented Russia from
intervening in South Ossetia in 2008. However, others argue that the
quest for NATO membership was actually the cause of the Russian attack
on Georgia. Ultimately, the 2008 August Russian-Georgian war did not
change the fact that Tbilisi's military cooperation with NATO is under
the special category of "pre-alliance status" and that Tbilisi still
aspires to full membership.
The main changes and challenges in the new security concept are
the definition of the relationship with Russia and the orientation
towards Europe through gradual integration with the EU. Moreover,
the government wants to combine a pragmatic notion of balance in its
foreign policy with a continuous strategy; the document proves that
there has been a shift in the government's stance -- once ideologically
driven, it seems now to be based on realpolitik. The ambivalence of
the government during the Arab Spring demonstrated that while Georgia
supported the color revolutions across the former Soviet Union,
now it is far from adopting an ideologically driven foreign policy,
preferring to wait until the situation becomes clearer.
Today's Zaman
Jan 10 2012
Turkey
Turkey is Georgia's "leading regional partner" and Azerbaijan its
"strategic partner," confirms Georgia's new national security concept,
the purpose of which is to analyze and present Tbilisi's regional
and international security challenges.
The new national security concept, adopted by the Georgian parliament
on Dec. 23, 2011, is an updated and revised version of a previous
one from July 2005 and serves both as a crucial driver of the
government's regional and international strategic aims and a platform
for discussions regarding the security challenges that Tbilisi is
currently facing.
Georgia's political landscape changed substantially after the Rose
Revolution in November 2003, which prompted structural reforms within
the government, demonstrating that the problem had been a systemic
one exacerbated by a lack of political will. In the aftermath of the
August War in 2008, the key questions were how Georgia would define
its regional policy, what strategy it would implement regarding
the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and how
relations with Russia would develop. The answers to these questions
can be found in Tbilisi's post-2008 politics. The main changes
brought about by the August War relate to two areas: the status of
the conflicts and the actual control over the territories of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
Under the July 2005 policy document, Georgia aspired to build good
relations with Russia based on mutual respect. Notably, it emphasized
that the existence of a Russian military base in Georgian territory
was not perceived by Tbilisi as a threat to its sovereignty. The
concept attempted to balance the rhetoric, but underlined that
granting Russian citizenship to residents of the breakaway republics
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could constitute grounds for military
intervention. Indeed, this assumption became a reality during the
Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russian officials justified their
invasion by pointing to the need to protect Russian citizens living
in South Ossetia. Russia argued that the legal basis of the operation
was guaranteed by Article 14.5 of the Russian Federal Law on State
Policy on Fellow Citizens Residing Abroad, which provides that "if a
foreign state violates recognized norms of international law and human
rights with regard to Russian expatriates, the Russian Federation
shall undertake efforts authorized by international law to defend
their interests." This is the Russian version of the "responsibility
to protect."
The main change within the new security concept is that the document
openly describes Russia as an occupying presence and states that
Moscow's primary goal is to turn Georgia into a "failed state"
in order to derail Georgia from its path towards Euro-Atlantic
integration and to "forcibly return Georgia to the Russian orbit."
Another important issue is the threat of terrorism; the new document
declares that "Russia uses [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] for recruiting
and training terrorists with the aim of carrying out terrorist acts
on Georgian territory."
Georgia can envisage the normalization of bilateral relations only once
Russia has withdrawn its troops. But describing Russia as an occupying
state seems to allow Moscow to respond that the Georgian government
is not ready to normalize relations, arguing that Tbilisi is trying
to blame their more powerful neighbor for their own mistakes. The
policy paper makes it extremely clear that "the enemy is abroad." This
issue will become increasingly important in light of the approaching
parliamentary elections, and then the presidential elections next year.
In terms of relations with neighboring countries, Tbilisi continues
to identify Azerbaijan as a strategic partner and Armenia as a close
partner. The concept argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still
threatens the stability of all states in the region. Interestingly,
the regional media is presenting those elements as new developments,
but closer analysis reveals this stance is merely repeating what the
2005 version had already established.
As well as changes to Georgia's Russian strategy, the new concept
envisages a pragmatic and realistic approach to EU relations, to be
implemented as a process of "gradual integration." NATO membership
remains the top priority on Georgia's political agenda; just a few
days before adopting the new policy concept, the Georgian parliament
voted in favor of President Mikheil Saakashvili's plan to send more
troops to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), deemed a gesture of support and a message of commitment
to NATO. The current government is keen to let NATO know they are
eagerly awaiting the result of NATO's Chicago Summit in May 2012,
which they hope will mark a significant step forward for Georgia in
its drive to join the alliance.
Georgia is unique in the South Caucasus in the sense that its attitudes
toward forming alliances and its wish to join NATO reflect the absence
of a strong military ally; compare this to Armenia, which has Russia,
and Azerbaijan, which has Turkey. First of all, this is primarily down
to the lack of historical or cultural affinities with any of the big
powers, which, had they existed, would have been revived following
independence in 1991. Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have
chosen their allies based upon geographical proximity along with
either historical or cultural affinities, while Georgia looks to
more geographically remote partners in the West. Full membership in
NATO, as many experts have argued, could have prevented Russia from
intervening in South Ossetia in 2008. However, others argue that the
quest for NATO membership was actually the cause of the Russian attack
on Georgia. Ultimately, the 2008 August Russian-Georgian war did not
change the fact that Tbilisi's military cooperation with NATO is under
the special category of "pre-alliance status" and that Tbilisi still
aspires to full membership.
The main changes and challenges in the new security concept are
the definition of the relationship with Russia and the orientation
towards Europe through gradual integration with the EU. Moreover,
the government wants to combine a pragmatic notion of balance in its
foreign policy with a continuous strategy; the document proves that
there has been a shift in the government's stance -- once ideologically
driven, it seems now to be based on realpolitik. The ambivalence of
the government during the Arab Spring demonstrated that while Georgia
supported the color revolutions across the former Soviet Union,
now it is far from adopting an ideologically driven foreign policy,
preferring to wait until the situation becomes clearer.