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Reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the key to Caucasus

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  • Reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the key to Caucasus

    Reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the key to Caucasus stability
    18:04

    RIA Novosti, Russia
    June 1 2005

    MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Nagorno-Karabakh was the
    first ethnic conflict that shook the foundations of the political
    power "vertical" of the Soviet Union and became the detonator that
    exploded it.

    It enriched our active political vocabulary with such terms as
    "ethnic cleansing" and "cleansing of the territory." As a result of
    the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabakh, about 500,000 Armenians
    had to leave Azerbaijan, and about 200,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave
    Armenia. Both states (particularly Armenia) have essentially become
    homogenous mono-ethnic entities. During the armed clashes over
    Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost 13% of its original territory.

    The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not simply the largest regional
    conflict to affect the former Soviet Union. First, it became
    an example for Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhasians, Moldavians and
    residents of the Dnestr region (Russians and Ukrainians). Secondly,
    it caused the "karabakhization" of the political life in Armenia and
    Azerbaijan. The Karabakh problem became a reference point for both
    Caucasus republics. Any event in the political life of both states
    is tested by the Karabakh factor.

    However, the Karabakh problem is also a problem for Russia. This
    thesis is not a tribute to nostalgia for the former Soviet Union
    or to imperial ambitions. Russia has the world's largest Armenian
    diaspora. Data recorded as part of the 2002 Russia census, suggest that
    1,130,000 Armenians live in Russia, while various expert estimates put
    the current figure at about 2 million people. The Armenian migration
    to Russia increased largely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    In 2002, the official Azerbaijani population of Russia numbered 621,500
    people (the 13th place among ethnic groups in Russia). The Azerbaijanis
    reside in 55 Federation members, with the Azeri communities in
    Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and the Tver region. The diaspora
    is an important economic factor for the development of Azerbaijan
    itself. According to R.S. Grinberg, the head of the Institute for
    International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy
    of Sciences, money transfers alone to Azerbaijan are worth $1.8-2.4
    billion.

    These Caucasian diasporas are two of the ten largest in Russia,
    which means "karabakhization" became a factor in Russian as well.

    Russia is a Caucasus power. The territory of its Caucasus subjects
    is twice as large as the three independent countries in the Southern
    Caucasus put together. In addition, the border, which passes over
    mountain ridges, makes the four neighboring countries a system of
    "communicating vessels."

    Russia's role in any future resolution of the conflict should be based
    on the potential of the diasporas and the ties between Armenian and
    Azerbaijani residents of Russia and their native lands. Initially,
    Russia should attempt to establish interaction between the two ethnic
    groups, which regard one another cautiously, if not with animosity.

    At present, it would be sensible to avoid two problems in the
    settlement for the time being, as the sides cannot find acceptable
    compromises. Azerbaijan demands the "liberation" of the regions
    allegedly occupied by the Armenians and the return of Azerbaijani
    refugees. Armenia (Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh) demands a solution
    to the problem of the political and legal status of Nagorny Karabakh.
    It is obvious that the situation demands compromises, which would at
    least point to some progress in the conflict's resolution.

    Russian diplomacy could certainly provide such solutions. "The
    liberation" of seven districts occupied by Armenian forces could be
    separated from the issue of returning refugees, which the Armenians
    regard as a security threat. It would eliminate both the "Armenian
    occupation" (a political trauma for Azerbaijan) and the security
    threat, which is a complicated issue for Armenia. International
    peacekeeping forces (led by Russia) could be deployed in the seven
    districts that would become a buffer zone between the conflicting
    sides, and the Azerbaijani refugees could receive serious material
    compensation from global financial structures for the loss of
    property and moral damages. Real progress toward a compromise and
    signs of certain positive developments in the process (even if they
    are palliative) could evidently be beneficial both for Russia and
    for the conflict's resolution, even though the final solution is a
    long way off.

    Russia needs Armenia, a traditional ally, and Azerbaijan, which
    aside from its geopolitical importance is notable for its public's
    pro-Russian views. Success in the process of reconciliation between
    Armenia and Azerbaijan would mean there was no alternative to
    Russian-Georgian dialogue. Therefore, the key to stability in the
    entire Caucasus region is the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement with
    proactive support from Russia, if it demonstrates the political will.


    Sergei Markedonov is the head of the ethnic relations department at
    the Institute for Political and Military Analysis

    The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
    may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
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