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IS TURKEY MOVING AWAY FROM THE WEST? A CRITICAL REDUX
Miguel Vargas
Foreign Policy Blogs Network
May 31, 2012 Thursday 1:25 AM EST
Dear FPA Blog followers,
You might now that I feature some analyses and articles not published
elsewhere for the benefit of this blog. This post is one of them; it is
written by an exceedingly capable student of mine at Princeton Miguel
Vargas, whose final article for the course International Relations of
the Middle East provided more insight and sound analysis than much
of the scholarship that comes out of Washington s policy debate on
Turkey and whether it is moving away from the West or not.
Is Turkey Moving Away from the West? A Critical Redux by Miguel Vargas
([email protected])
According to Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at
Washington s Center for Strategic and International Studies: There
is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve,
and there s a floor which it can t go below We are getting pretty
close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve
their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now
talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations. [i] He is not
alone however in this assessment, as State Department officials such
as Philip Gordon have echoed Aliriza s remarks. [ii] But to what is
extent is this true? Has Turkey moved away from the West? In short,
no. While Turkey is expanding Eastward, forging a new strategic
set of economic and diplomatic alliances, in an attempt to become
the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world, it is not abandoning,
nor interested in leaving, its still strategically necessary ties to
the West.
Some of Turkey s recent behavior is consistent with the idea of
Western abandonment however. According to Ariel Cohen, a senior
research fellow at The Heritage foundation since taking power in a
landslide democratic election in 2002, the Just and Development Party,
or AKP, is leading Turkey in a new direction both domestically and
in terms of foreign policy. [iii] This new direction, Cohen further
attest, includes rapprochement with Iran; working more closely with
the Islamist regime of Sudan despite the indictment of its president
on genocide chargers; supporting Hamas movement which rules Gaza;
and fostering stronger ties with two of the West biggest rivals in
China and Russia.[iv]
This latter alliance is particularly surprising, as the former Soviet
Union was one of Turkey s earliest enemies and one of the sources,
if not the original source of Turkey s alliance with the United States.
[v] Nevertheless, after 32 years without a visit from a Russian
president, Turkey received Vladimir Putin in December of 2004; this
meeting was the first of many more high-level politician contacts
between the two nations as each not only shared business but also
geopolitical interests. [vi] As of 2008, Russia is Turkey s largest
trade partner with a projected trade volume of $100 billion dollars
between 2008 and 2013. [vii] Further, bounding these two nations
together is Turkey s $20 billion investment in 2010 for the Russian
construction of nuclear plant to be built on Turkey s southern
coast.[viii] Not only does this new relationship provide realist
economic benefits for Turkey, but it also secured peaceful relations
between the two former enemies that allow for Turkey s greater mission
of becoming the hegemonic influence of the Middle East. [ix]
The Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, with the Turkish prime minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the Botas gas pumping station near Samsun.
(Reuters)
But what is the motivation behind such expansion. According to Stephen
Larrabee, while the AKP s Islamic roots have influenced Turkish
policy, [it] has not been the driving force behind it. [x] Rather,
Turkey s new alliances and expansions can be credited to Turkey s
new foreign minister Ahmet Davuto lu and his Strategic Depth foreign
policy. According to Larrabee, holder of the Distinguished Chair in
European Security, the concept of Strategic Depth is part of a larger
debate in Turkey about the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. [xi] Ever
since Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, founded the Turkish Republic in 1923,
Kemalists have sought to attach a negative image to Turkey s Ottoman
legacy. Kemalists argue that Turkey s Ottoman heritage including its
public identification with Islam is inherently backwards and as such
an inhibitor to Turkey s modernization.[xii]
However, as Larrabee points out, just as the AKP have brought back
Islam back to politics in Turkey, today many Turks have begun to
view the Ottoman Empire in more nuanced and positive terms. They
see aspects of the Ottoman legacy, particularly its emphasis on
multicultural identities, as potential building blocks for a more
active regional and global role for modern Turkey. [xiii] Instead of
seeing the Kemalist Republic era and its avoidance of the rest of the
Middle East as a role model example, these Turks have instead viewed
this era as an anomaly. [xiv] Thus, the policy of Strategic Depth
is a means of reinstating Turkey, the once center of the Ottoman
Empire, as the dominant power in the Middle East. Though Turkey has
no intention of physically expanding and conquering these nations,
the AKP instead seeks through diplomatic and economic ties become
the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world.[xv]
As such, Turkey is not holding back in its formation of new allies.
While Cohen believes that Turkey would oppose any strengthening
of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, recent evidence suggests
otherwise.[xvi] According to Turkish international relations expert
Soli Ozel, given the instability of Iraq, especially in the face of a
US withdrawal, and the fact that relations with Bagdad are rotten now,
it now transpires that the Kurds are the Turk s natural allies in
Iraq. They are the second largest export market, and if you include
informal trade, they may very well be the first. [xvii] Furthermore,
Turkey s geopolitical position with regards to the shipment and sale
of Iraqi oil and gas has drastically changed the manner by which
the Turkish government deals with the northern Iraqi Kurds; the
relationship between leaders of these two states is vastly different
today than it was in the past.[xviii] So much so, that whereas talks
of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq used to strike fear in the
Turkish leadership who believed that their own Kurdish populations
would follow suit, today, Turkey upon hearing such rhetoric fails to
reply with any opposition. [xix] Given the instability of the Iraqi
state and the large presence of Kurds in Turkey, an economic alliance
with the Northern Iraqi Kurds makes strategic sense, as such alliance
would effectively deter the PKK s ability and desire to destabilize
the Turkish state.
To the apparent dismay of the West, Turkey has also extended support to
the Iranian regime. According to Cohen, above all else, it is Turkey
s support for Iran s nuclear program that proves to Washington that
Turkey s foreign policy objectives are changing. [Whereas] Ankara,
was once an important ally in helping to contain Iran, [today, Turkey]
has become a friendly diplomatic ally of the Islamist dictatorship in
Tehran. [xx] However, like Robert Wexler, president of the S. Daniel
Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, suggests Turkey s relationship
with Iran does not appear to be intended to undercut American
foreign policy on Iran.[xxi] Instead, it seems that Turkey may have
actually believed that it was doing what Americans wanted them to
do, as Turkey, like America does not want Iran to develop a nuclear
weapons program. [xxii] This position makes more sense as both Iran
and Turkey have goals of becoming the Middle East s hegemonic power;
Iran s nuclear attainment would undermine all of Turkey s influence on
the region.[xxiii] Thus, the difference between American and Turkish
foreign policy with Iran appears to be a difference in means not ends.
According to Wexler, America and Turkey share the same objective but
have a fundamentally different view as to how to get there. Turkey
has regional interests that may at times be different from American
interests. The challenge is to take those differences and channel
them in a positive way. In the case of the Security Council vote,
however, the channeling was anything but positive. [xxiv] Furthermore,
by appearing defiant to Western regimes, Turkey can appear to be
an independent Muslim power and further its influence within the
Middle East. After all, Turkey s new foreign policy concept is to
emerge as regional hegemony through developing economic presence,
interdependence, and a conspicuously important diplomatic role. [xxv]
One of the only nations to which Turkey has not extended a friendly
hand to has been its former ally, Israel. After the tragic Israeli
raid and murder of several activists on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish
ship carrying humanitarian relief to the Palestinians, Turkey has
gradually abandoned its role as a neutral mediator between Israel and
its Arab neighbors and instead has become an active supporter of Arab
and Muslim causes against Israel. [xxvi] This shift in alliances did
not occur however without granting Israel a chance to redeem itself.
According to Gul Tuysuz, after the raid, Turkey offered Iran an
ultimatum: apologize for the raid, pay compensation to the victims,
and lift the blockade on Gaza, or face reduced diplomatic relations,
the departure of the Israeli ambassador in Turkey, and possible
prosecution on behalf of the International Court of Justice. [xxvii]
After refusing to apologize, Turkey made good on its threat to
eject the ambassador and downgrade relations. [xxviii] Furthermore,
when Turkey rewrote the Red Book, an assessment of Turkey s national
security threats, Iran was taken off its critical threats list and
in its place Israel s name was placed. [xxix] In sum, as President
Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdo an hastened to clarify [Turkey
s] friendship with Israel is over. [xxx] Making sense of this move
is a bit more difficult, as hostility to Israel does not favor an
alliance with the West. However, like Turkey s apparent defiance at
the UN, hostility to Israel may also advance Turkey s popularity in
the rest of the Middle East. Nevertheless, as will be shown below,
this behavior may have actually arisen from a Western source.
In order to arrive at the thesis of this paper, we must analyze all of
Turkey s foreign policy movements in a greater context, as otherwise
the evidence seems clear that Turkey is going East.[xxxi] The reality
of the matter is that Turkey is seeking to become a member of the
European Union[xxxii] and that as such it is expected to behave as
other European nations do. While scholars such as Ionnis N.
Grigoriadis cite as a milestone in the deterioration of US-Turkey
relations the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003 to
allow US troop the use of Turkish territory in preparation for their
invasion in Iraq, [xxxiii] such scholars fail to realize as Tarik
Oguzlu points out that the absence of support from the European Union,
particularly that of France and Germany, is considered to be one of the
reasons as to why Turkey was reluctant to partake in the War in the
first place.[xxxiv] Furthermore, the European Union as evidenced in
the European s Commission most recent progress report is not only in
full support of Turkey s foreign policy activism under its Strategic
Depth but encourages it.[xxxv]
If Turkey s foreign activism is not an indication of it moving away
from the West than what is. According to Ihsan Dagi, in accusing Turkey
of turning against the West [critics] are mainly looking at Turkey s
critical position with Israel. [xxxvi] While the Turkish government
did call Israel s attack of the Mavi Marmara, disproportionate and a
war crime, Turkey was only joining the opinion of the body of nations
it sought to join, as European states repeated the same comments
regarding Israel s atrocities in Gaza. [xxxvii] Furthermore, as Dagi
points out even if Turkey s political stance towards Israel is out
of line with that Europe and the United States, why should it mean
a departure from Turkey s pro-Western foreign policy orientation? Is
Israel the West? Obviously, it is not and as such Dagi indicates it
would be a mistake to equate an aggressive stance against Israel with
one against the West. [xxxviii] Turkey has never been this integrated
with the West economically, socially, and politically. It is in fact
breaking its self-imposed isolation and opening up the world around
itself. Turkey today is not bullying in its region but trying to
establish cooperative relationships with Armenia, Iraq, the Iraqi
Kurdish administration, Iran, Syria, Georgia, Russia, Bulgaria,
and Greece. [xxxix] According to Dagi, Turkey has never become more
Westernized in its foreign affairs. [xl]
However, not everyone is convinced; after all, Europe is not the entire
West. According to Ian Lesser, Turkey is now a place where public
opinion counts [During the Bush Administration], opinion polls point
to a dramatic decline in public perceptions of the U.S. and Turkish
views of American policy are among the most negative in Europe. [xli]
According to Ionnis N. Grigoriadis recent findings allude to the
development of an emerging anti-US bias in large segments of Turkish
society. This could presage the establishment of anti-Americanism as
a permanent feature of Turkish political discourse The deterioration
of the US image in Turkey could be considered a result of the recent
US political and military involvement in the Middle East and the
perceived clash of US and Turkish national interests in the region
.The election of Barack Obama has mitigated this trend but not
reversed it. [xlii] Continuing polls do not show promising signs,
as President Obama s gains in the first two years of his presidency
(14%; 17%) has dropped to an all time low of 10% merely a point better
that president Bush worst rating upon leaving office.[xliii] Despite
a long and enduring alliance between the United States and Turkey,
Turkey now ranks among the countries where the United States enjoys
its least popularity. Although the shift of public opinion against
the United Stated is not tantamount to a wholesale rejection of the
US political and cultural model, it still has the potential to harm
bilateral relations and US interests. [xliv]
According to a 2007 PEW Global Attitudes Survey, 64% of the respondents
from Turkey defined the U.S. as a "threat"; a figure that began to
lower slightly following the Obama administration
The publication by Wiki Leaks of classified cables between Ankara
and the United States embassy that portray Prime Minister Erdogan
and Foreign Minister Davuto lu negatively have not aided the public
opinion situation. [xlv] However, while embarrassing, the leaked
cables represent a diplomatic tempest in a teapot and not a serious
crisis in bilateral relations. [xlvi] Mid-level diplomats wrote
these cables during the Bush administration a time when strains in
U.S.-Turkish relations were much worse than they are today. [xlvii]
Indicating a desirability for the West, Davuto lu has gone out of his
way to downplay the significance of the leaks, stressing the close and
cordial ties that exist at the highest level with U.S. officials in
the Obama Administration, and both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and President Obama have publically reiterated the importance that
the United States attaches to good relations with Turkey. [xlviii]
Despite the decline in public support inside of Turkey, according
Joshua W. Walker, it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly switched
sides but rather still objectively represents America s best ally [as]
Turkey represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most
urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq. [xlix] According
to David Ignatius, President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan have developed a working relationship that is one of
the most important but least discussed developments shaping the Arab
world. [l] After Turkey voted not in favor of, a previously mentioned,
UN sanctions resolution against Iran in 2010, Obama and Erdogan
discussed their foreign policy goals and established this new sense of
partnership.[li] Sources from the White House claim that just in 2011
both of these leaders have spoken by phone 13 times.[lii] Currently,
the most delicate piece of Turkish-American business is trying to
organize a peaceful transfer of power in Syria [where] Erdogan, once
the closest foreign ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is now
a bitter foe. [liii] According to Ignatius, Turkey s shift in policy
towards Syria originates from a diplomatic negotiation failure where
Erdogan promised Obama a reform deal within 72 hours that Syria left to
dry.[liv] Even with Iran, Turkey has demonstrated has turned a new leaf
as Erdogan has recently agreed to deploy forward-based radar system
as part of a NATO missile defense plan aimed chiefly at Iran. [lv]
According to a senior Obama administrator, Erdogan s signing of
this missile defense plan is probably the biggest strategic decision
between the U.S. and Turkey over the past 10 to 15 years. [lvi]
Lastly though no less important is the issue of public support in
Turkey. According to Ian Lesser, in order for public opinion of
the United States to increase, the US must aid Turkey in its fight
against the PKK. [lvii] Not surprisingly, the administration has
stepped up military cooperation and assistance to Turkey in its
struggle against the PKK Turkey s number one security problem and a
source of tension with the Bush Administration [lviii] Furthermore,
the Obama administration has recently entertained pleas from Turkey
s regime asking for a Predator drone base to deal with the PKK in
Northern Iran and has supported Turkey s desire to purchase drones
of their own.[lix] Combined with massive grants of intelligence
and diplomatic support against the PKK, it is not surprising that
commander of the Turkish armed forces, Gen. Iker Basbug has deemed
the US and Turkish relationship perfect. [lx] Furthermore, the Obama
administration has strongly backed Turkey s bid for EU membership,
the rapprochement with Armenia, and the Erdogan government s Kurdish
Opening three other important Turkish policy priorities. [lxi]
According to Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, the most troubling of
Turkey s relationships with the West is that Ankara no longer has a
fallback U.S. option in case its relations with EU sour. Turkish-US
relations have become a casualty of the war in Iraq. [lxii] Given what
was just presented about Obama & Erdogan s relationship, Gordon and
Taspinar s observations could not be farther from the truth. Rather as
Larrabee points out Turkey still wants and needs strong ties the United
States. [lxiii] Furthermore, despite frustration at the slow progress,
most Turkish politicians still insist EU membership is a goal worth
pursuing, even if they have to wait many years to get there. [lxiv]
Turkey benefits greatly from the military assistance it gains from
both the US and the economic gains in energy and business deals with
Europe. [lxv] Thus, Turkey has a strategic interest in remaining with
the West for the benefit of its security and its economy. However,
there is no denying that Turkey s Strategic Depth plan of expansion
East is also providing it large strategic benefits.
Regarding, the West the more influential Turkey is in the Middle
the higher the likelihood that the US will continue supporting it
militarily and the higher the likelihood that the EU will not reject
Turkey s ascension.
However, its expansion East is also providing it other strategic
benefits similar to those it gains from the West. Turkey s involvement
in the Middle East has been accompanied by soft power and the expansion
of economic relations. Growing tourism from Arab states, coupled with
cultural interactions mainly with the popularity of Turkish soap
operas has improved the image of Turkey in the Middle East. While
Turkey s trade with Arab countries stood at $6.5 billion in 2000,
it reached $35 billion in 2011. Last year approximately 1.5 million
Arab tourists visited Turkey. [lxvi] Furthermore, its popularity has
increased incredibly with one poll conducted by the Turkish Economic
and Social Studies Foundation measuring that of Middle Eastern citizens
78% have at least somewhat favorable view of the nation, 71% believed
it should have a larger role in the region, and 61% thought of Turkey
as a role model. [lxvii] What does this money and influence translate
to Davuto lu the designer of Turkey s long term plan Strategic Depth
frames Turkey s strategic, or realist, goals best: A new Middle East
is about to be born. We will be the owner, pioneer and servant of this
new Middle East. [lxviii] Turkey is neither leaving nor interested
in leaving the West, for the West provides Turkey the security and
stability it needs to dominate the East.
[i] Yigal Schleifer, US-Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough
Patch, EurasiaNet.org, January 28, 2010, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61426.
[ii] Yigal Schleifer, US-Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough
Patch,
[iii]Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the
West, Hurriyet Daily News, September 1, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=washington-concerned-as-turkey-leaving-the-west-2011-
01-09.
[iv] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[v] Stephen F. Larrabee, Turkey s New Geopolitics, Survival 52, no. 2
(2010), doi:10.1080/00396331003764686.
[vi] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[vii] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[viii] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[ix] Farruk Akkan, Turkey and Russia Develop Strategic Alliance,
[x] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics. Survival 52, no. 2
(2010): 157-80. doi:10.1080/00396331003764686.
[xi] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics.
[xii] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics.
[xiii] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics.
[xiv] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics.
[xv] Larrabee, Stephen F. Turkey s New Geopolitics.
[xvi] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the
West, Hurriyet Daily News, September 1, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=washington-concerned-as-turkey-leaving-the-west-2011-01-09.
[xvii] Dorian Jones, Regional Crises Boost Turkey s Ties
With Iraq s Kurds, VOA, May 17, 2012, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.voanews.com/content/regional_crises_boost_turkey_ties_kurds/667173.html.
[xviii] Dorian Jones, Regional Crises Boost Turkey s Ties With Iraq
s Kurds,
[xix] Dorian Jones, Regional Crises Boost Turkey s Ties With Iraq
s Kurds,
[xx] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[xxi]Robert Wexler, United States and Turkey: Allies at Odds?,
Insight Turkey 12, no. 4 (2010), accessed May 18, 2012,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/763262812.
[xxii] Robert Wexler, United States and Turkey: Allies at Odds?,
[xxiii] Dorian Jones, Regional Crises Boost Turkey s Ties With Iraq
s Kurds,
[xxiv] Robert Wexler, United States and Turkey: Allies at Odds?,
[xxv] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[xxvi] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[xxvii] Gul Tuysuz, Has Turkey Abandoned the West?, Has Turkey
Abandoned the West?, September 22, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.salon.com/2011/09/22/turkey_west_defiance/.
[xxviii] Gul Tuysuz, Has Turkey Abandoned the West?,
[xxix] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[xxx] Arial Cohen, Washington Concerned as Turkey Is Leaving the West,
[xxxi] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?, Today
s Zaman, November 2, 2009, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-191716-is-turkey-abandoning-the-west.html.
[xxxii] EU Seeks Fresh Start with Turkey on Membership
Bid, BBC News, May 17, 2012, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18100706.
[xxxiii] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Friends No More? The Rise of
Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,
[xxxiv]Tarik Oguzlu, Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?,
Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 4 (Winter 2010), accessed May 18,
2012, http://search.proquest.com/docview/840266743.
[xxxv] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?, Today
s Zaman, November 2, 2009, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-191716-is-turkey-abandoning-the-west.html.
[xxxvi] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?,
[xxxvii] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?,
[xxxviii] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?,
[xxxix] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?,
[xl] Ihsan Dagi, Is Turkey Abandoning West?,
[xli] Ian Lesser, Turkey in the EU Means a New
Kind of US-Turkish Relationship | Wilson Center,
Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/turkey-the-eu-means-new-kind-us-turkish-relationship.
[xlii] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Friends No More? The Rise of
Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey, Middle East Journal 64, no. 1
(Winter 2010), accessed May 18, 2012, doi:10.3751/64.1.13.
[xliii] Opinion of the United States Do You Have a Favorable or
Unfavorable View of the U.S.?, Datbase | Pew Global Attitudes,
accessed May 18, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1.
[xliv] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Friends No More? The Rise of
Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey, .
[xlv] F. Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and U.S.-Turkish
Relations, The New Turkey, May 12, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.thenewturkey.org/new-world/142/the-new-turkey-and-us-turkish-relations.
[xlvi] F. Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and U.S.-Turkish Relations,
[xlvii] F. Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and U.S.-Turkish Relations,
[xlviii] F. Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and U.S.-Turkish
Relations,
[xlix]Joshua Walker, Turkey: Still America s Best Ally in the Middle
East?, Foreign Policy, January 25, 2010, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/25/turkey_still_america_s_best_ally_in_the_middle_eas t.
[l] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That
Works, Washington Post, December 07, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-and-turkey-find-a-relationship-that-works/2011/12/06/gIQAh5UcdO_story.html.
[li] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That Works,
[lii] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That Works,
[liii] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That Works,
[liv] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That Works,
[lv] David Ignatius, U.S. and Turkey Find a Relationship That Works,
[lvi] Craig Whitlock, Turkey Agrees to Host U.S. Radar
Site, a Key Piece of Europe Missile Shield, Washington
Post, September 15, 2011, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/turkey-agrees-to-host-us-radar-site/2011/09/15/gIQAKu4UVK_story.html.
[lvii] Ian Lesser, Turkey in the EU Means a New Kind of US-Turkish
Relationship | Wilson Center, .
[lviii] F Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and American-Turkish
Relations, Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011), accessed May 18, 2012,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/848934237.
[lix] Craig Whitlock, Turkey Agrees to Host U.S. Radar Site, a Key
Piece of Europe Missile Shield,
[lx] Craig Whitlock, Turkey Agrees to Host U.S. Radar Site, a Key
Piece of Europe Missile Shield,
[lxi] F Stephen Larrabee, The New Turkey and American-Turkish
Relations, Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011), accessed May 18, 2012,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/848934237.
[lxii] Phillip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, Turkey on the Brink,
The Washington Quarterly, December 2006, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://web.ebscohost.com/pov/pdf?sid=7f7ef898-4199-4cd1-a64d-7053ab53c72f%40sessionmgr110&vid=2&hid=105.
[lxiii] Stephen F. Larrabee, Turkey s New Geopolitics, Survival 52,
no. 2 (2010), doi:10.1080/00396331003764686.
[lxiv] EU Seeks Fresh Start with Turkey on Membership Bid, BBC News,
May 17, 2012, accessed May 18, 2012, EU Seeks Fresh Start with Turkey
on Membership Bid, BBC News, May 17, 2012, accessed May 18, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18100706..
[lxv] EU Seeks Fresh Start with Turkey on Membership Bid, BBC News,
[lxvi] Opportunities and Limitations: Turkey s Diplomatic Strength in
the Middle East, 16 May 2012 Wednesday 15:31. The Journal of Turkish
Weekly. May 16, 2012. Accessed May 18, 2012.
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/136243/opportunities-and-limitations-turkey-39-s-diplomatic-strength-in-the-middle-east.html.
[lxvii] Opportunities and Limitations: Turkey s Diplomatic Strength
in the Middle East
[lxviii] Opportunities and Limitations: Turkey s Diplomatic Strength
in the Middle East
Miguel Vargas
Foreign Policy Blogs Network
May 31, 2012 Thursday 1:25 AM EST
Dear FPA Blog followers,
You might now that I feature some analyses and articles not published
elsewhere for the benefit of this blog. This post is one of them; it is
written by an exceedingly capable student of mine at Princeton Miguel
Vargas, whose final article for the course International Relations of
the Middle East provided more insight and sound analysis than much
of the scholarship that comes out of Washington s policy debate on
Turkey and whether it is moving away from the West or not.
Is Turkey Moving Away from the West? A Critical Redux by Miguel Vargas
([email protected])
According to Bulent Aliriza, the director of the Turkey Project at
Washington s Center for Strategic and International Studies: There
is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve,
and there s a floor which it can t go below We are getting pretty
close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve
their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now
talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations. [i] He is not
alone however in this assessment, as State Department officials such
as Philip Gordon have echoed Aliriza s remarks. [ii] But to what is
extent is this true? Has Turkey moved away from the West? In short,
no. While Turkey is expanding Eastward, forging a new strategic
set of economic and diplomatic alliances, in an attempt to become
the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world, it is not abandoning,
nor interested in leaving, its still strategically necessary ties to
the West.
Some of Turkey s recent behavior is consistent with the idea of
Western abandonment however. According to Ariel Cohen, a senior
research fellow at The Heritage foundation since taking power in a
landslide democratic election in 2002, the Just and Development Party,
or AKP, is leading Turkey in a new direction both domestically and
in terms of foreign policy. [iii] This new direction, Cohen further
attest, includes rapprochement with Iran; working more closely with
the Islamist regime of Sudan despite the indictment of its president
on genocide chargers; supporting Hamas movement which rules Gaza;
and fostering stronger ties with two of the West biggest rivals in
China and Russia.[iv]
This latter alliance is particularly surprising, as the former Soviet
Union was one of Turkey s earliest enemies and one of the sources,
if not the original source of Turkey s alliance with the United States.
[v] Nevertheless, after 32 years without a visit from a Russian
president, Turkey received Vladimir Putin in December of 2004; this
meeting was the first of many more high-level politician contacts
between the two nations as each not only shared business but also
geopolitical interests. [vi] As of 2008, Russia is Turkey s largest
trade partner with a projected trade volume of $100 billion dollars
between 2008 and 2013. [vii] Further, bounding these two nations
together is Turkey s $20 billion investment in 2010 for the Russian
construction of nuclear plant to be built on Turkey s southern
coast.[viii] Not only does this new relationship provide realist
economic benefits for Turkey, but it also secured peaceful relations
between the two former enemies that allow for Turkey s greater mission
of becoming the hegemonic influence of the Middle East. [ix]
The Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, with the Turkish prime minister,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at the Botas gas pumping station near Samsun.
(Reuters)
But what is the motivation behind such expansion. According to Stephen
Larrabee, while the AKP s Islamic roots have influenced Turkish
policy, [it] has not been the driving force behind it. [x] Rather,
Turkey s new alliances and expansions can be credited to Turkey s
new foreign minister Ahmet Davuto lu and his Strategic Depth foreign
policy. According to Larrabee, holder of the Distinguished Chair in
European Security, the concept of Strategic Depth is part of a larger
debate in Turkey about the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. [xi] Ever
since Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk, founded the Turkish Republic in 1923,
Kemalists have sought to attach a negative image to Turkey s Ottoman
legacy. Kemalists argue that Turkey s Ottoman heritage including its
public identification with Islam is inherently backwards and as such
an inhibitor to Turkey s modernization.[xii]
However, as Larrabee points out, just as the AKP have brought back
Islam back to politics in Turkey, today many Turks have begun to
view the Ottoman Empire in more nuanced and positive terms. They
see aspects of the Ottoman legacy, particularly its emphasis on
multicultural identities, as potential building blocks for a more
active regional and global role for modern Turkey. [xiii] Instead of
seeing the Kemalist Republic era and its avoidance of the rest of the
Middle East as a role model example, these Turks have instead viewed
this era as an anomaly. [xiv] Thus, the policy of Strategic Depth
is a means of reinstating Turkey, the once center of the Ottoman
Empire, as the dominant power in the Middle East. Though Turkey has
no intention of physically expanding and conquering these nations,
the AKP instead seeks through diplomatic and economic ties become
the hegemonic influence of the Muslim world.[xv]
As such, Turkey is not holding back in its formation of new allies.
While Cohen believes that Turkey would oppose any strengthening
of the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, recent evidence suggests
otherwise.[xvi] According to Turkish international relations expert
Soli Ozel, given the instability of Iraq, especially in the face of a
US withdrawal, and the fact that relations with Bagdad are rotten now,
it now transpires that the Kurds are the Turk s natural allies in
Iraq. They are the second largest export market, and if you include
informal trade, they may very well be the first. [xvii] Furthermore,
Turkey s geopolitical position with regards to the shipment and sale
of Iraqi oil and gas has drastically changed the manner by which
the Turkish government deals with the northern Iraqi Kurds; the
relationship between leaders of these two states is vastly different
today than it was in the past.[xviii] So much so, that whereas talks
of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq used to strike fear in the
Turkish leadership who believed that their own Kurdish populations
would follow suit, today, Turkey upon hearing such rhetoric fails to
reply with any opposition. [xix] Given the instability of the Iraqi
state and the large presence of Kurds in Turkey, an economic alliance
with the Northern Iraqi Kurds makes strategic sense, as such alliance
would effectively deter the PKK s ability and desire to destabilize
the Turkish state.
To the apparent dismay of the West, Turkey has also extended support to
the Iranian regime. According to Cohen, above all else, it is Turkey
s support for Iran s nuclear program that proves to Washington that
Turkey s foreign policy objectives are changing. [Whereas] Ankara,
was once an important ally in helping to contain Iran, [today, Turkey]
has become a friendly diplomatic ally of the Islamist dictatorship in
Tehran. [xx] However, like Robert Wexler, president of the S. Daniel
Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, suggests Turkey s relationship
with Iran does not appear to be intended to undercut American
foreign policy on Iran.[xxi] Instead, it seems that Turkey may have
actually believed that it was doing what Americans wanted them to
do, as Turkey, like America does not want Iran to develop a nuclear
weapons program. [xxii] This position makes more sense as both Iran
and Turkey have goals of becoming the Middle East s hegemonic power;
Iran s nuclear attainment would undermine all of Turkey s influence on
the region.[xxiii] Thus, the difference between American and Turkish
foreign policy with Iran appears to be a difference in means not ends.
According to Wexler, America and Turkey share the same objective but
have a fundamentally different view as to how to get there. Turkey
has regional interests that may at times be different from American
interests. The challenge is to take those differences and channel
them in a positive way. In the case of the Security Council vote,
however, the channeling was anything but positive. [xxiv] Furthermore,
by appearing defiant to Western regimes, Turkey can appear to be
an independent Muslim power and further its influence within the
Middle East. After all, Turkey s new foreign policy concept is to
emerge as regional hegemony through developing economic presence,
interdependence, and a conspicuously important diplomatic role. [xxv]
One of the only nations to which Turkey has not extended a friendly
hand to has been its former ally, Israel. After the tragic Israeli
raid and murder of several activists on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish
ship carrying humanitarian relief to the Palestinians, Turkey has
gradually abandoned its role as a neutral mediator between Israel and
its Arab neighbors and instead has become an active supporter of Arab
and Muslim causes against Israel. [xxvi] This shift in alliances did
not occur however without granting Israel a chance to redeem itself.
According to Gul Tuysuz, after the raid, Turkey offered Iran an
ultimatum: apologize for the raid, pay compensation to the victims,
and lift the blockade on Gaza, or face reduced diplomatic relations,
the departure of the Israeli ambassador in Turkey, and possible
prosecution on behalf of the International Court of Justice. [xxvii]
After refusing to apologize, Turkey made good on its threat to
eject the ambassador and downgrade relations. [xxviii] Furthermore,
when Turkey rewrote the Red Book, an assessment of Turkey s national
security threats, Iran was taken off its critical threats list and
in its place Israel s name was placed. [xxix] In sum, as President
Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdo an hastened to clarify [Turkey
s] friendship with Israel is over. [xxx] Making sense of this move
is a bit more difficult, as hostility to Israel does not favor an
alliance with the West. However, like Turkey s apparent defiance at
the UN, hostility to Israel may also advance Turkey s popularity in
the rest of the Middle East. Nevertheless, as will be shown below,
this behavior may have actually arisen from a Western source.
In order to arrive at the thesis of this paper, we must analyze all of
Turkey s foreign policy movements in a greater context, as otherwise
the evidence seems clear that Turkey is going East.[xxxi] The reality
of the matter is that Turkey is seeking to become a member of the
European Union[xxxii] and that as such it is expected to behave as
other European nations do. While scholars such as Ionnis N.
Grigoriadis cite as a milestone in the deterioration of US-Turkey
relations the refusal of the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003 to
allow US troop the use of Turkish territory in preparation for their
invasion in Iraq, [xxxiii] such scholars fail to realize as Tarik
Oguzlu points out that the absence of support from the European Union,
particularly that of France and Germany, is considered to be one of the
reasons as to why Turkey was reluctant to partake in the War in the
first place.[xxxiv] Furthermore, the European Union as evidenced in
the European s Commission most recent progress report is not only in
full support of Turkey s foreign policy activism under its Strategic
Depth but encourages it.[xxxv]
If Turkey s foreign activism is not an indication of it moving away
from the West than what is. According to Ihsan Dagi, in accusing Turkey
of turning against the West [critics] are mainly looking at Turkey s
critical position with Israel. [xxxvi] While the Turkish government
did call Israel s attack of the Mavi Marmara, disproportionate and a
war crime, Turkey was only joining the opinion of the body of nations
it sought to join, as European states repeated the same comments
regarding Israel s atrocities in Gaza. [xxxvii] Furthermore, as Dagi
points out even if Turkey s political stance towards Israel is out
of line with that Europe and the United States, why should it mean
a departure from Turkey s pro-Western foreign policy orientation? Is
Israel the West? Obviously, it is not and as such Dagi indicates it
would be a mistake to equate an aggressive stance against Israel with
one against the West. [xxxviii] Turkey has never been this integrated
with the West economically, socially, and politically. It is in fact
breaking its self-imposed isolation and opening up the world around
itself. Turkey today is not bullying in its region but trying to
establish cooperative relationships with Armenia, Iraq, the Iraqi
Kurdish administration, Iran, Syria, Georgia, Russia, Bulgaria,
and Greece. [xxxix] According to Dagi, Turkey has never become more
Westernized in its foreign affairs. [xl]
However, not everyone is convinced; after all, Europe is not the entire
West. According to Ian Lesser, Turkey is now a place where public
opinion counts [During the Bush Administration], opinion polls point
to a dramatic decline in public perceptions of the U.S. and Turkish
views of American policy are among the most negative in Europe. [xli]
According to Ionnis N. Grigoriadis recent findings allude to the
development of an emerging anti-US bias in large segments of Turkish
society. This could presage the establishment of anti-Americanism as
a permanent feature of Turkish political discourse The deterioration
of the US image in Turkey could be considered a result of the recent
US political and military involvement in the Middle East and the
perceived clash of US and Turkish national interests in the region
.The election of Barack Obama has mitigated this trend but not
reversed it. [xlii] Continuing polls do not show promising signs,
as President Obama s gains in the first two years of his presidency
(14%; 17%) has dropped to an all time low of 10% merely a point better
that president Bush worst rating upon leaving office.[xliii] Despite
a long and enduring alliance between the United States and Turkey,
Turkey now ranks among the countries where the United States enjoys
its least popularity. Although the shift of public opinion against
the United Stated is not tantamount to a wholesale rejection of the
US political and cultural model, it still has the potential to harm
bilateral relations and US interests. [xliv]
According to a 2007 PEW Global Attitudes Survey, 64% of the respondents
from Turkey defined the U.S. as a "threat"; a figure that began to
lower slightly following the Obama administration
The publication by Wiki Leaks of classified cables between Ankara
and the United States embassy that portray Prime Minister Erdogan
and Foreign Minister Davuto lu negatively have not aided the public
opinion situation. [xlv] However, while embarrassing, the leaked
cables represent a diplomatic tempest in a teapot and not a serious
crisis in bilateral relations. [xlvi] Mid-level diplomats wrote
these cables during the Bush administration a time when strains in
U.S.-Turkish relations were much worse than they are today. [xlvii]
Indicating a desirability for the West, Davuto lu has gone out of his
way to downplay the significance of the leaks, stressing the close and
cordial ties that exist at the highest level with U.S. officials in
the Obama Administration, and both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and President Obama have publically reiterated the importance that
the United States attaches to good relations with Turkey. [xlviii]
Despite the decline in public support inside of Turkey, according
Joshua W. Walker, it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly switched
sides but rather still objectively represents America s best ally [as]
Turkey represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most
urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq. [xlix] According
to David Ignatius, President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan have developed a working relationship that is one of
the most important but least discussed developments shaping the Arab
world. [l] After Turkey voted not in favor of, a previously mentioned,
UN sanctions resolution against Iran in 2010, Obama and Erdogan
discussed their foreign policy goals and established this new sense of
partnership.[li] Sources from the White House claim that just in 2011
both of these leaders have spoken by phone 13 times.[lii] Currently,
the most delicate piece of Turkish-American business is trying to
organize a peaceful transfer of power in Syria [where] Erdogan, once
the closest foreign ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is now
a bitter foe. [liii] According to Ignatius, Turkey s shift in policy
towards Syria originates from a diplomatic negotiation failure where
Erdogan promised Obama a reform deal within 72 hours that Syria left to
dry.[liv] Even with Iran, Turkey has demonstrated has turned a new leaf
as Erdogan has recently agreed to deploy forward-based radar system
as part of a NATO missile defense plan aimed chiefly at Iran. [lv]
According to a senior Obama administrator, Erdogan s signing of
this missile defense plan is probably the biggest strategic decision
between the U.S. and Turkey over the past 10 to 15 years. [lvi]
Lastly though no less important is the issue of public support in
Turkey. According to Ian Lesser, in order for public opinion of
the United States to increase, the US must aid Turkey in its fight
against the PKK. [lvii] Not surprisingly, the administration has
stepped up military cooperation and assistance to Turkey in its
struggle against the PKK Turkey s number one security problem and a
source of tension with the Bush Administration [lviii] Furthermore,
the Obama administration has recently entertained pleas from Turkey
s regime asking for a Predator drone base to deal with the PKK in
Northern Iran and has supported Turkey s desire to purchase drones
of their own.[lix] Combined with massive grants of intelligence
and diplomatic support against the PKK, it is not surprising that
commander of the Turkish armed forces, Gen. Iker Basbug has deemed
the US and Turkish relationship perfect. [lx] Furthermore, the Obama
administration has strongly backed Turkey s bid for EU membership,
the rapprochement with Armenia, and the Erdogan government s Kurdish
Opening three other important Turkish policy priorities. [lxi]
According to Philip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, the most troubling of
Turkey s relationships with the West is that Ankara no longer has a
fallback U.S. option in case its relations with EU sour. Turkish-US
relations have become a casualty of the war in Iraq. [lxii] Given what
was just presented about Obama & Erdogan s relationship, Gordon and
Taspinar s observations could not be farther from the truth. Rather as
Larrabee points out Turkey still wants and needs strong ties the United
States. [lxiii] Furthermore, despite frustration at the slow progress,
most Turkish politicians still insist EU membership is a goal worth
pursuing, even if they have to wait many years to get there. [lxiv]
Turkey benefits greatly from the military assistance it gains from
both the US and the economic gains in energy and business deals with
Europe. [lxv] Thus, Turkey has a strategic interest in remaining with
the West for the benefit of its security and its economy. However,
there is no denying that Turkey s Strategic Depth plan of expansion
East is also providing it large strategic benefits.
Regarding, the West the more influential Turkey is in the Middle
the higher the likelihood that the US will continue supporting it
militarily and the higher the likelihood that the EU will not reject
Turkey s ascension.
However, its expansion East is also providing it other strategic
benefits similar to those it gains from the West. Turkey s involvement
in the Middle East has been accompanied by soft power and the expansion
of economic relations. Growing tourism from Arab states, coupled with
cultural interactions mainly with the popularity of Turkish soap
operas has improved the image of Turkey in the Middle East. While
Turkey s trade with Arab countries stood at $6.5 billion in 2000,
it reached $35 billion in 2011. Last year approximately 1.5 million
Arab tourists visited Turkey. [lxvi] Furthermore, its popularity has
increased incredibly with one poll conducted by the Turkish Economic
and Social Studies Foundation measuring that of Middle Eastern citizens
78% have at least somewhat favorable view of the nation, 71% believed
it should have a larger role in the region, and 61% thought of Turkey
as a role model. [lxvii] What does this money and influence translate
to Davuto lu the designer of Turkey s long term plan Strategic Depth
frames Turkey s strategic, or realist, goals best: A new Middle East
is about to be born. We will be the owner, pioneer and servant of this
new Middle East. [lxviii] Turkey is neither leaving nor interested
in leaving the West, for the West provides Turkey the security and
stability it needs to dominate the East.
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[lxvii] Opportunities and Limitations: Turkey s Diplomatic Strength
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[lxviii] Opportunities and Limitations: Turkey s Diplomatic Strength
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