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A CAUCASIAN SONG PLAYS IN SYRIA
Today's Zaman
July 31 2012
Turkey
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
"It was [our] contribution to the Syrian revolution" proclaimed social
media activists in Azerbaijan after last week's events in Aleppo
(Halep).
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) celebrated victory at the battle of the
country's second city and economic center Aleppo with an Arabic
rendition of the Azerbaijani song "Qal, Sene Qurban" (Stay, [I
will] Sacrifice for You). The battle for Aleppo, once a bastion of
support for Assad's regime, is critical for both the regime and the
opposition. The Syrian crisis is becoming increasingly difficult
to predict, and the pressing question at this juncture is "whose"
song we will hear in Syria.
Every turn of events in Syria is linked with further developments
in Iran, which is of more urgent concern among the South Caucasus
countries. Nevertheless, Syria has its own type of impact upon the
domestic and foreign policies of the Caucasian states.
Of the regional countries, Azerbaijan as a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council is equipped with a greater range of diplomatic
tools, but on the other hand, Baku's regional energy interests are
threatened by the current situation. Moreover, the Syrian crisis
could affect Azerbaijan's foreign relations, considering that
Azerbaijan's positions do not coincide with Russia's. For instance,
Moscow boycotted the "Friends of Syria" forum that took place on
April 1 in İstanbul, while Azerbaijan participated. Official Baku is
following the international community's direction on the resolution
of the crisis. This is made easier by the fact that Azerbaijan has no
border with Syria, and there are few domiciled Syrians. According to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku, there are just 60 Azerbaijanis
living in Syria.
The current crisis has also caused the collapse of the Syrian
component of Azerbaijan's gas export plan; Baku and Damascus reached
a preliminary agreement in June 2010 on export of some 1.5 billion
cubic meters (bcm) of gas for the Syrian market via the Pan-Arabian
pipeline once the fraction between Turkey (Kilis) and Syria (Homs)
had been constructed by the end of 2011. While the breakdown of this
particular agreement does not in itself pose a serious threat to
Azerbaijan's energy policy, in the context of the continuing turmoil
in the Middle East, Baku is increasingly anxious about maintaining
political balance. The focus here is more on Iran and on what Tehran
will do if they lose their position in Syria in the event of the fall
of the Assad regime.
Armenia's standpoint on Syria is different from Azerbaijan's.
Yerevan's policy toward Syria has domestic limitations and also
resource constraints. The first issue is the country's Syrian
Armenian community of around 60,000 people. When civil war broke
out in Syria in 2011, a huge proportion of this ethnic community
applied for Armenian citizenship and faced serious challenges in
the process. Many experts believed that the Armenian government
failed to take appropriate steps to protect Armenians in Syria. Key
challenges included high flight prices, complex visa requirements and
the difficulty of finding accommodation in Armenia. Armenia's main
airline, Armavia, advertised Aleppo-Yerevan-Aleppo tickets for $670,
higher than Syrian companies. Armavia is the national carrier of
Armenia, but is financially indebted to Russia; one might argue that
it is in Moscow's interests to keep the Armenian community in Syria.
Russia is enacting a type of "trench warfare" in the Middle East,
trying to prevent outright conflict for the sake of its national
interests and manipulating the situation to support components of
its policy toward the Caucasus. For example, Russia did not oppose
ethnic Abkhazians in Syria from returning to Abkhazia, as a stronger
Abkhaz population would strengthen its position against Georgia in
this contested territory.
Meanwhile, some experts and politicians have criticized Armenia's
policy in Syria. According to Ara Sanjian, a historian at the
University of Michigan, "the Armenian Government can do very little
in Syria because of its weak economy; Armenia, and more importantly
government officials, do not have adequate knowledge of the realities
of life among the Diaspora." Only following such criticism did the
Armenian government introduce an amendment to its citizenship laws,
whereby, as of July 26, Syrian and Lebanese citizens of Armenian
descent can receive Armenian passports from consulates and embassies.
It is remarkable that Tbilisi's position on this issue substantially
diverges from those of Baku and Yerevan. Georgia faces similar domestic
challenges to Armenia. According to the official position, reiterated
by Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze in an interview with Civil.ge on
June 27, 2012, "The crisis needs to be settled based on the will of
the Syrian people, irrespective of which ethnic or religious group
they belong to." The fall of the Assad regime poses one significant
advantage for Georgia: that Assad's comments on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia will be forgotten. During his visit to the Russian city of
Sochi on Aug. 21, 2008, Assad expressed his support for the Russian
position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia and declared that the August
War had been "provoked by Georgia." On the other hand, Georgia has
faced challenges from the de-facto authorities of Abkhazia. In Syria,
there are 8,000 Syrians of Abkhaz descent, and the Abkhaz authorities
have presented plans for just 90 of them.
While Azerbaijan and Georgia have, broadly speaking, followed the lead
of the international community regarding Syria, Armenia has remained
silent, giving rise to domestic criticism. Yerevan has been subjected
to significant external (i.e. Russian) influence, as well as having
planned poorly for the issue of Armenian communities in Syria at a
domestic level.
There is no doubt that what is occurring in Syria is a humanitarian
tragedy, and that the Assad regime believes that Western governments
lack the will to back up their rhetoric with action. The opposition's
song about sacrifice is increasingly relevant; at this point, with or
without international assistance, the opposition will make sacrifices
for a new and democratic Syria.
Today's Zaman
July 31 2012
Turkey
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
"It was [our] contribution to the Syrian revolution" proclaimed social
media activists in Azerbaijan after last week's events in Aleppo
(Halep).
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) celebrated victory at the battle of the
country's second city and economic center Aleppo with an Arabic
rendition of the Azerbaijani song "Qal, Sene Qurban" (Stay, [I
will] Sacrifice for You). The battle for Aleppo, once a bastion of
support for Assad's regime, is critical for both the regime and the
opposition. The Syrian crisis is becoming increasingly difficult
to predict, and the pressing question at this juncture is "whose"
song we will hear in Syria.
Every turn of events in Syria is linked with further developments
in Iran, which is of more urgent concern among the South Caucasus
countries. Nevertheless, Syria has its own type of impact upon the
domestic and foreign policies of the Caucasian states.
Of the regional countries, Azerbaijan as a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council is equipped with a greater range of diplomatic
tools, but on the other hand, Baku's regional energy interests are
threatened by the current situation. Moreover, the Syrian crisis
could affect Azerbaijan's foreign relations, considering that
Azerbaijan's positions do not coincide with Russia's. For instance,
Moscow boycotted the "Friends of Syria" forum that took place on
April 1 in İstanbul, while Azerbaijan participated. Official Baku is
following the international community's direction on the resolution
of the crisis. This is made easier by the fact that Azerbaijan has no
border with Syria, and there are few domiciled Syrians. According to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku, there are just 60 Azerbaijanis
living in Syria.
The current crisis has also caused the collapse of the Syrian
component of Azerbaijan's gas export plan; Baku and Damascus reached
a preliminary agreement in June 2010 on export of some 1.5 billion
cubic meters (bcm) of gas for the Syrian market via the Pan-Arabian
pipeline once the fraction between Turkey (Kilis) and Syria (Homs)
had been constructed by the end of 2011. While the breakdown of this
particular agreement does not in itself pose a serious threat to
Azerbaijan's energy policy, in the context of the continuing turmoil
in the Middle East, Baku is increasingly anxious about maintaining
political balance. The focus here is more on Iran and on what Tehran
will do if they lose their position in Syria in the event of the fall
of the Assad regime.
Armenia's standpoint on Syria is different from Azerbaijan's.
Yerevan's policy toward Syria has domestic limitations and also
resource constraints. The first issue is the country's Syrian
Armenian community of around 60,000 people. When civil war broke
out in Syria in 2011, a huge proportion of this ethnic community
applied for Armenian citizenship and faced serious challenges in
the process. Many experts believed that the Armenian government
failed to take appropriate steps to protect Armenians in Syria. Key
challenges included high flight prices, complex visa requirements and
the difficulty of finding accommodation in Armenia. Armenia's main
airline, Armavia, advertised Aleppo-Yerevan-Aleppo tickets for $670,
higher than Syrian companies. Armavia is the national carrier of
Armenia, but is financially indebted to Russia; one might argue that
it is in Moscow's interests to keep the Armenian community in Syria.
Russia is enacting a type of "trench warfare" in the Middle East,
trying to prevent outright conflict for the sake of its national
interests and manipulating the situation to support components of
its policy toward the Caucasus. For example, Russia did not oppose
ethnic Abkhazians in Syria from returning to Abkhazia, as a stronger
Abkhaz population would strengthen its position against Georgia in
this contested territory.
Meanwhile, some experts and politicians have criticized Armenia's
policy in Syria. According to Ara Sanjian, a historian at the
University of Michigan, "the Armenian Government can do very little
in Syria because of its weak economy; Armenia, and more importantly
government officials, do not have adequate knowledge of the realities
of life among the Diaspora." Only following such criticism did the
Armenian government introduce an amendment to its citizenship laws,
whereby, as of July 26, Syrian and Lebanese citizens of Armenian
descent can receive Armenian passports from consulates and embassies.
It is remarkable that Tbilisi's position on this issue substantially
diverges from those of Baku and Yerevan. Georgia faces similar domestic
challenges to Armenia. According to the official position, reiterated
by Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze in an interview with Civil.ge on
June 27, 2012, "The crisis needs to be settled based on the will of
the Syrian people, irrespective of which ethnic or religious group
they belong to." The fall of the Assad regime poses one significant
advantage for Georgia: that Assad's comments on Abkhazia and South
Ossetia will be forgotten. During his visit to the Russian city of
Sochi on Aug. 21, 2008, Assad expressed his support for the Russian
position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia and declared that the August
War had been "provoked by Georgia." On the other hand, Georgia has
faced challenges from the de-facto authorities of Abkhazia. In Syria,
there are 8,000 Syrians of Abkhaz descent, and the Abkhaz authorities
have presented plans for just 90 of them.
While Azerbaijan and Georgia have, broadly speaking, followed the lead
of the international community regarding Syria, Armenia has remained
silent, giving rise to domestic criticism. Yerevan has been subjected
to significant external (i.e. Russian) influence, as well as having
planned poorly for the issue of Armenian communities in Syria at a
domestic level.
There is no doubt that what is occurring in Syria is a humanitarian
tragedy, and that the Assad regime believes that Western governments
lack the will to back up their rhetoric with action. The opposition's
song about sacrifice is increasingly relevant; at this point, with or
without international assistance, the opposition will make sacrifices
for a new and democratic Syria.