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  • More Than Meets The Eye

    MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

    What's Behind Israel's Foreign Policy in the Southern Caucasus?

    Sergey Markedonov & Maxim Suchkov

    For some Iranians, the recent elections were a hopeful signal; for many
    outsiders, they were a signal for cautious optimism. But there's one
    country that has good reasons to be skeptical of any good news from
    Tehran: namely, Israel. That skepticism has driven Israel to search
    far and wide for geopolitical partners in places that have heretofore
    been hardly worthy of their note. The Caucasus is one of those places,
    having been transformed into such by the dramatic changes underway
    following the Arab Spring.

    Thanks in part to the Arab political awakening, Israel now finds
    itself in a more dangerous environment than in years past. With the
    war in Syria raging, its peace treaty with Egypt under strain, overall
    anti-Semitism in the region growing, and the bellicose rhetoric from
    Tehran escalating, Israel needs new allies. In 2008-09, the Foreign
    Ministry created specialized departments for the Caucasus and Central
    Asia although for decades the Caucasus has not been a priority region
    for Israeli foreign policy.

    Israel's overarching target with these moves is clearly to deter Iran,
    its main strategic security challenge. Tehran has too many allies when
    it comes to Israel; the Jewish state is the one issue that all too
    often transcends religious and other divisions. The "second Lebanon
    campaign" in 2006 is a perfect showcase of this; Israel suffered a
    sensitive military defeat in a "proxy war" (which Iran waged through
    Hizballah), and many new opportunities for the Islamic Republic
    opened up. Since 2006, Iran has consistently attempted to offer
    itself not only as a center of gravity for Shi'a but also for all
    Muslims, regardless of confessional affiliation-witness the attempted
    cooperation between Tehran and Hamas before the Syrian civil war put
    them on opposite sides.

    The recent elections in the Islamic Republic have changed little
    in Israel's calculations. No one in Israel really buys that the
    President-elect Hassan Rouhani will set aside Iran's nuclear program,
    let alone temper its quest for regional power status. After thousands
    of Iranians welcomed Rouhani's expressed intent to preserve Iran's
    national pride, Israel urged the international community not to lessen
    the pressure on Tehran's nuclear program.

    The Caucasus offers a new venue for what some Israeli politicians call
    Iran's encirclement by means of forming alliances and partnerships
    with neighboring countries of the Caucasus. In this context, Azerbaijan
    is the centerpiece of Israeli foreign policy in the region.

    It is, in the words of Shimon Peres, "a key in limiting Iran's
    influence in the Greater Middle East." Baku has its own long-standing
    record of political grievances with Tehran, which includes four major
    highly intertwined areas: the disputable status of the Caspian Sea,
    the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (on which Azerbaijan views Iran's position
    as pro-Armenian), the discussion over the northwestern part of Iran
    (so called Iranian Azerbaijan, where an estimated twenty million Azeris
    live) and, finally, the religious factor. The latter has been gaining
    a special significance in recent years. Azerbaijan, a secular state,
    albeit one with a Shi'a-majority population, accuses Iran of fueling
    radical Islamist activities on its territory, undermining the position
    of the central government in Baku.

    On the contrary, Israel recognizes Azerbaijan's territorial integrity
    in its conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and its political relationship
    is energized by dynamic economic cooperation, which represents a
    second group of Israeli interests in the South Caucasus.

    The two main areas of economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and
    Israel are energy and military supplies. Israel buys Azerbaijani oil
    representing a fifth of its domestic needs, and the trade turnover
    between the two countries is about $4 billion. Besides this, Israel
    has also begun to import Azerbaijani gas and for the next decade will
    import 12 billion cubic meters from the country. This may be a wise
    solution for the Jewish state, since Egypt, an important partner in
    supplying natural gas to Israel, only recently considered revising
    its supply terms.

    The military side of the partnership mainly has to do with the sales
    of Israeli unmanned military aircraft. In February 2012, Israeli
    officials confirmed a $1.6 billion contract to supply military drones
    and the training to use them.

    Surprisingly as it may be, Israeli foreign policy in the region,
    thought to be a short-term effort up to now, has already pivoted to
    some extent. It was Georgia that was Israel's prime partner in the
    region in the lead-up to the fall 2008 war with Russia. Jerusalem's
    political and military cooperation with Georgia stemmed from both
    economic benefits (Israel helped reform the Georgian army, trained its
    soldiers and supplied Tbilisi with its drones) and political benefits
    (as a reaction to Russian cooperation with Syria and Hamas).

    However, after 2008 the situation changed. Frequent visits by
    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Russia somewhat improved the
    relationship between Moscow and Jerusalem in the face of the common
    threat of radical Islam, and a series of scandals involving Israeli
    businessmen in Georgia took the drone sales off the agenda and
    deteriorated the overall climate of the Georgian-Israeli relationship.

    It was then that Israel began to build up contacts with the partially
    recognized Republic of Abkhazia-a move that was considered by
    many in Tbilisi as a poke in the Georgians' eyes. The new Georgian
    leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili feels the need to restore the damaged
    relationship with Israel; he has already made his official visit in
    June 2013. Ivanishvili considered this visit as the "most successful"
    of all his foreign trips and said that he believes the two countries
    should abolish entry visas and re-establish strategic partnership.

    Thus Israel may soon have more opportunities to wield its influence
    in the region.

    At the same time, being a newcomer to the region, Israel faces many
    serious challenges. When dealing with Georgia it has to walk a fine
    line in order not to upset its relations with Russia. When dealing
    with Azerbaijan, it cannot exclude Turkey from its calculations. When
    dealing with both, it must be watchful of Iran, which is extremely
    jealous of any non-regional players penetrating into the Caucasus-all
    the more so when that player is Israel.

    Besides traditional great regional power rivalry, Israel will run
    into other complications. While greatly cherished by both sides,
    the Israeli-Azerbaijani partnership has its own domestic and external
    limitations. Baku, for instance, enjoys a good relationship with the
    Palestinian Authority and supports the creation of a Palestinian state
    with its capital in East Jerusalem. Second, against the background
    of rising Islamization, there is strong opposition inside Azerbaijan
    to cooperation with Israel, which some see as "the betrayal of the
    Muslim world." Finally, Baku can't ignore the general evolution of
    the foreign policy of its crucial strategic partner: Turkey. Relations
    between Turkey and Israel deteriorated dramatically after the "Freedom
    Flotilla" incident in May 2010; so did public perceptions of the
    other in both countries. Although relations have slightly improved
    in recent months, they can be described, at best, as being part of a
    "cold peace." Meanwhile, Ankara's growing influence in the Middle East
    assumes a more independent role in regional affairs and hence some
    distancing both from the United States and Israel. The Azeri-Israeli
    relationship depends on these factors to a great extent.

    Israel, too, has the same limited leverage over Turkey as the United
    States: "the Armenian issue." Although in its relationship with Yerevan
    Israel has not gone beyond diplomatic recognition since the early
    1990s (the countries have no embassies in their respective capitals),
    the debates over recognition of events of 1915 as "the genocide of
    Armenians" sparkle-especially in times of political turmoil between
    Israel and Turkey. Besides, there are some heavyweight supporters
    of the issue inside the Jewish state (including the Deputy Foreign
    Minister of Israel from the Likud Party, Ze'ev Elkin), so it too
    leaves some space for Israeli political maneuvering.

    Finally, there's a less visible but still important factor of Israel's
    engagement in the region. Supporting Jewish communities abroad has
    been a significant dimension of Israeli foreign policy for many years.

    The 2002 census estimates about 3,540 Jews living in Georgia (some
    experts think there are as many as 8,000-12,000 people). It is much
    harder to estimate how many Jews are there in Azerbaijan; the first
    census after the break-up of the Soviet Union counted 9,000, but other
    estimates say that number is more like 16,000-20,000. Nevertheless,
    the diasporas are a resource Israel may draw on as well.

    To the United States, whose policy in the region has a long and twisted
    history, Israel's engagement gives an additional leverage in several
    ways. First, the Caucasus is very likely to be a vital logistical
    route in maintaining American military and civilian personnel after
    the drawdown in Afghanistan, especially if the Obama Administration
    decides for the "zero option", leaving no U.S. troops on the ground.

    Second, it's the region where America has traditionally reinforced its
    own activities by means of a close cooperation with its regional NATO
    ally, Turkey. Now that U.S.-Turkish relations are far from ideal and
    the future of the Erdogan team is somewhat blurred, the challenges and
    the opportunities for the United States are at least two-fold. On the
    one hand, there's a need for America to find a pivotal geopolitical
    stronghold in the Greater Middle East; the South Caucasus may once
    more serve in this capacity as it did right after the 9/11 atrocities.

    On the other hand, finding a new partner in the region among old
    friends may be a shot in the arm for Washington, especially with its
    own activities in the region declining in the recent years.

    Eventually, after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 American
    foreign policy in the South Caucasus became less dynamic. To some
    extent, it stemmed from pragmatic reasons: Washington needed Moscow's
    support on key international issues and thus didn't want to irritate
    the Kremlin with activities that could be considered provocative.

    Therefore, visits by high-profile policymakers grew less frequent,
    and America's overall visibility in the Caucasus was diminished. But to
    a large degree the seeming drift was entailed by objective realities.

    America was wrapping up in Iraq even as it was getting bogged down in
    Afghanistan; the rise of China was precipitating the "pivot to Asia";
    and, to top it all off, the financial crisis and the growing political
    split inside the country were keeping the Obama team preoccupied with
    domestic troubles.

    Under these circumstances American foreign policy in the South
    Caucasus fell into a dormant period, but as many regional initiatives
    and programs continued, the policy itself did not become less
    substantial; nor did the country's national interests. On the
    contrary, issues of politics, economics and energy transit (for
    example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Nabucco pipeline) acquired
    new security dimensions as the United States seeked to balance Iran,
    secure Afghanistan and project force into Pakistan-let alone master
    relations with Russia and China.

    Israel discerned these opportunities in the Caucasus through the
    lens of its national interests, and it was well prepared to allocate
    resources for them. Its engagement and policies in the region in many
    ways demonstrate the proactive thinking that American policymakers seem
    to have lost. The formation of a new status quo in the Middle East and
    the tangled knot of relations in the South Caucasus have triggered
    non-standard circuits and solutions, where American diplomacy might
    restore its best practices to secure its role after the withdrawal
    from Afghanistan.

    http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1464

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