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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ARMENIAN HISTORY
Daily Sabah, Turkey
April 30 2014
For the genocide industry, the labeling of the Armenian tragedy as
genocide is a matter of life and death: If the Armenians did not
suffer a genocide, then many genocide scholars would be unemployed
by Tal Buenos
Published : 29.04.2014 20:37:37
In addition to asking how one feels about what happened to many
innocent Armenians in Anatolia during World War I, one might find it
an interesting and cerebral exercise to ask: Why is the history of
these events immersed in political controversy to this day, especially
on April 24?
Edward A. Freeman, who was appointed at the recommendation of Prime
Minister Gladstone to chair the University of Oxford's prestigious
Regius Professorship of Modern History in the late 19th century,
famously announced it as true "that history is past politics and
that politics are but present history."He embodied both history
and politics. While Freeman failed in his three political bids for
parliament, as a historian he was the progenitor for a long line of
Turcophobic historians and politicians in Britain, including James
Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, authors of the wartime propaganda that
serves as the basis for the Armenian narrative today.
Freeman taught that "the Turk and the Jew are leagued against the
Christian," and that Europe is "the common possession of Aryan blood
and speech." He tirelessly incited all Ottoman Christians to rebel
against the Turks whom he considered to be strangers in Europe and
unfit to rule, and proclaimed that "every nation has a right to get
rid of strangers who prove a nuisance, whether they are Chinese in
America, or Jews in Russia, Serbia, Hungary, and Romania." Freeman
also held the conviction that America would be a better place "if
every Irishman should kill a negro and be hanged for it."This is the
man who intensified the calls for "the Turkish horde" to be "driven
back to its native deserts, or else die out" in the 1860s, before
inspiring Gladstone's Bulgarian Agitation and, yes, before tutoring
Bryce into first problematizing the Ottoman Armenian condition in 1876.
To a great extent, Freeman, whose influence is vastly understudied,
is responsible for the fact that the Armenian issue, as a subplot of
Britain's Eastern Question, was fated to be a case of politicized
history.However, when considering the current map of international
politics, why is the history of the Armenian tragedy still politicized
rather than remembered?
For Britain, the unraveling of the Armenian narrative would mean
an embarrassing review of a British historiography that is based on
interpersonal ties to Liberal leaders, unchecked prejudice, and the
pretense of "moral" imperialism. A long list of revered politicians,
scientists and historians in the late Victorian era would have to be
viewed in a different light in order to fully contextualize the spirit
of anti-Semitism and Turcophobia among the Liberal opposition during
Benjamin Disraeli's premiership from 1874 to 1880. Understanding
why certain Armenian representatives in Europe were empowered to
perpetuate conflict with the Ottoman state and jeopardize the lives of
many Armenian communities in Anatolia would necessarily cast a dark
shadow on the memory of Gladstone, who was elected to lead Britain's
government more times than any other in the kingdom's history.
Moreover, an examination of the Armenian narrative would not only
call into question the accuracy of Britain's wartime reports but
reveal a clear British motivation to organize Armenian rebellion in
World War I for the very purpose of having it result in bloodshed
and effective propaganda.
For France, the position on the Armenian narrative is mainly dictated
by the political commitment to please an Armenian population
that is largely concentrated in certain electoral districts, and
this has led to a draconian bill that was designed to force the
public into accepting a biased narration of history.For instance,
it is no coincidence that the main supporters of the notorious
genocide bill represent Armenian constituents, be it Valerie Boyer of
Bouches-du-Rhône in the National Assembly (2011) or Herve Marseille of
Hauts-de-Seine in the Senate (2012). Passing such a bill is tantamount
to robbing Turks of the freedom to speak about their own history,
all because of French domestic politics.
For the EU, the demand that Turkey should recognize the Armenian
tragedy as genocide is one of several political options through which
Brussels may deny Turkish membership and still make it seem as if it
is Turkey's own doing. Thus, Turkey will be made to appear as stubborn
and non-cooperative while certain European governments will continue
to harbor their Islamophobic denial of Turkish progress.
In truth, had there not been an Armenian issue, there likely would
have been another European pretext to block Turkey out of Europe.
For Russia, the politicization of the Armenian narrative is an
indirect manner of dancing around the next round of cold-warring with
the West. As evidenced by Russia, Today, a TV news network owned by
Russia, and The Independent, a London newspaper owned by a Russian,
the Armenian issue seems to resurface every time there is need to
harass Turkey in hope of disrupting its NATO alliance with the West
and tilting the balance of power in the Middle East.
For the U.S., when considering Turkey's pivotal role in several
regions, the Armenian issue is a leverage better kept than discarded.
In this fashion, the U.S. is balancing a convenient push and
pull:Turkey's compliance with American interests is procured by
both incentives and pressures. While there are plenty of carrots in
U.S.-Turkey relations, the Armenian issue is one clear stick that
the U.S. is waving at Turkey. This is achieved by the constant threat
of officially labeling the Armenian tragedy as genocide in Congress
or the U.N. It should seem odd that in the U.S. more scholars and
politicians talk about genocide in the Armenian context than in
the context of both slavery and America's indigenous population;
it would only be odd if politics were not involved. Throughout this
practice, Turkey is made to appear as if it was "saved" by the White
House from the ramifications of international condemnation that a
genocide label entails. Along these lines, it is made to appear as if
the Turks are taking advantage of American pragmatic considerations
of foreign policy, and as if the reason to support genocide labeling
is a moral one.
For the genocide industry, the labeling of the Armenian tragedy as
genocide is a matter of life and death: If the Armenians did not suffer
a genocide, then many genocide scholars would be unemployed.These
centers and organizations, which are dedicated to "genociding" most
cases of mass deaths from famine to tsunami, may have the appearance
of nonstate actors but are closely aligned with the interests of
state institutions. They are programed to deny the uniqueness of the
Holocaust in order to weaken Turkey's position in the international
political system.For Armenia, the genocide narrative is the foundation
of its obsession with playing the role of victim.Since the 1990s,
the constant networking to associate Armenians with suffering has
had the deliberate effect of diminishing the level of international
criticism on Armenia's vicious annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the
displacement of nearly one million Azeris. In other words, for Armenia
to successfully cover up its offenses against Azerbaijan it has been
enough to keep parading the genocide claims as a symbol of Armenian
victimhood without even having to prove that what happened in World War
I corresponds with the U.N. definition of genocide.Sadly, as in the
days of Armenian rebellion against the Ottoman state, decisions that
affect the common Armenian in the Caucasus are made by the diasporic
Armenians of power and wealth. For the Armenian Americans, the genocide
extravaganza is not only a source of identity, but the source of
their political participation and relevance in Washington, D.C.
And for Turkey? Why are there calls for genocide recognition in
Turkey? Many Turkish scholars and journalists, who continuously search
for opportunities to showcase their Euro-lust, hear the persisting
calls against their Ottoman predecessors and jump on the genocide
bandwagon. Their wish to be accepted by Western intellectuals, in
keeping with their imagined society, has led them to choose the cheap
semblance of liberalism over the study of facts and the demonstration
of loyalty to their own people's history. Should the quest for European
acceptance mean that Turkey has to accept lies and derision?
Truly progressive intellectuality would have the Turk debate other
Europeans, equal among equals, historiography to historiography,
rather than yield to political dictations of history.
* PhD candidate, University of Utah
http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/30/the-international-politics-of-armenian-history
Daily Sabah, Turkey
April 30 2014
For the genocide industry, the labeling of the Armenian tragedy as
genocide is a matter of life and death: If the Armenians did not
suffer a genocide, then many genocide scholars would be unemployed
by Tal Buenos
Published : 29.04.2014 20:37:37
In addition to asking how one feels about what happened to many
innocent Armenians in Anatolia during World War I, one might find it
an interesting and cerebral exercise to ask: Why is the history of
these events immersed in political controversy to this day, especially
on April 24?
Edward A. Freeman, who was appointed at the recommendation of Prime
Minister Gladstone to chair the University of Oxford's prestigious
Regius Professorship of Modern History in the late 19th century,
famously announced it as true "that history is past politics and
that politics are but present history."He embodied both history
and politics. While Freeman failed in his three political bids for
parliament, as a historian he was the progenitor for a long line of
Turcophobic historians and politicians in Britain, including James
Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, authors of the wartime propaganda that
serves as the basis for the Armenian narrative today.
Freeman taught that "the Turk and the Jew are leagued against the
Christian," and that Europe is "the common possession of Aryan blood
and speech." He tirelessly incited all Ottoman Christians to rebel
against the Turks whom he considered to be strangers in Europe and
unfit to rule, and proclaimed that "every nation has a right to get
rid of strangers who prove a nuisance, whether they are Chinese in
America, or Jews in Russia, Serbia, Hungary, and Romania." Freeman
also held the conviction that America would be a better place "if
every Irishman should kill a negro and be hanged for it."This is the
man who intensified the calls for "the Turkish horde" to be "driven
back to its native deserts, or else die out" in the 1860s, before
inspiring Gladstone's Bulgarian Agitation and, yes, before tutoring
Bryce into first problematizing the Ottoman Armenian condition in 1876.
To a great extent, Freeman, whose influence is vastly understudied,
is responsible for the fact that the Armenian issue, as a subplot of
Britain's Eastern Question, was fated to be a case of politicized
history.However, when considering the current map of international
politics, why is the history of the Armenian tragedy still politicized
rather than remembered?
For Britain, the unraveling of the Armenian narrative would mean
an embarrassing review of a British historiography that is based on
interpersonal ties to Liberal leaders, unchecked prejudice, and the
pretense of "moral" imperialism. A long list of revered politicians,
scientists and historians in the late Victorian era would have to be
viewed in a different light in order to fully contextualize the spirit
of anti-Semitism and Turcophobia among the Liberal opposition during
Benjamin Disraeli's premiership from 1874 to 1880. Understanding
why certain Armenian representatives in Europe were empowered to
perpetuate conflict with the Ottoman state and jeopardize the lives of
many Armenian communities in Anatolia would necessarily cast a dark
shadow on the memory of Gladstone, who was elected to lead Britain's
government more times than any other in the kingdom's history.
Moreover, an examination of the Armenian narrative would not only
call into question the accuracy of Britain's wartime reports but
reveal a clear British motivation to organize Armenian rebellion in
World War I for the very purpose of having it result in bloodshed
and effective propaganda.
For France, the position on the Armenian narrative is mainly dictated
by the political commitment to please an Armenian population
that is largely concentrated in certain electoral districts, and
this has led to a draconian bill that was designed to force the
public into accepting a biased narration of history.For instance,
it is no coincidence that the main supporters of the notorious
genocide bill represent Armenian constituents, be it Valerie Boyer of
Bouches-du-Rhône in the National Assembly (2011) or Herve Marseille of
Hauts-de-Seine in the Senate (2012). Passing such a bill is tantamount
to robbing Turks of the freedom to speak about their own history,
all because of French domestic politics.
For the EU, the demand that Turkey should recognize the Armenian
tragedy as genocide is one of several political options through which
Brussels may deny Turkish membership and still make it seem as if it
is Turkey's own doing. Thus, Turkey will be made to appear as stubborn
and non-cooperative while certain European governments will continue
to harbor their Islamophobic denial of Turkish progress.
In truth, had there not been an Armenian issue, there likely would
have been another European pretext to block Turkey out of Europe.
For Russia, the politicization of the Armenian narrative is an
indirect manner of dancing around the next round of cold-warring with
the West. As evidenced by Russia, Today, a TV news network owned by
Russia, and The Independent, a London newspaper owned by a Russian,
the Armenian issue seems to resurface every time there is need to
harass Turkey in hope of disrupting its NATO alliance with the West
and tilting the balance of power in the Middle East.
For the U.S., when considering Turkey's pivotal role in several
regions, the Armenian issue is a leverage better kept than discarded.
In this fashion, the U.S. is balancing a convenient push and
pull:Turkey's compliance with American interests is procured by
both incentives and pressures. While there are plenty of carrots in
U.S.-Turkey relations, the Armenian issue is one clear stick that
the U.S. is waving at Turkey. This is achieved by the constant threat
of officially labeling the Armenian tragedy as genocide in Congress
or the U.N. It should seem odd that in the U.S. more scholars and
politicians talk about genocide in the Armenian context than in
the context of both slavery and America's indigenous population;
it would only be odd if politics were not involved. Throughout this
practice, Turkey is made to appear as if it was "saved" by the White
House from the ramifications of international condemnation that a
genocide label entails. Along these lines, it is made to appear as if
the Turks are taking advantage of American pragmatic considerations
of foreign policy, and as if the reason to support genocide labeling
is a moral one.
For the genocide industry, the labeling of the Armenian tragedy as
genocide is a matter of life and death: If the Armenians did not suffer
a genocide, then many genocide scholars would be unemployed.These
centers and organizations, which are dedicated to "genociding" most
cases of mass deaths from famine to tsunami, may have the appearance
of nonstate actors but are closely aligned with the interests of
state institutions. They are programed to deny the uniqueness of the
Holocaust in order to weaken Turkey's position in the international
political system.For Armenia, the genocide narrative is the foundation
of its obsession with playing the role of victim.Since the 1990s,
the constant networking to associate Armenians with suffering has
had the deliberate effect of diminishing the level of international
criticism on Armenia's vicious annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the
displacement of nearly one million Azeris. In other words, for Armenia
to successfully cover up its offenses against Azerbaijan it has been
enough to keep parading the genocide claims as a symbol of Armenian
victimhood without even having to prove that what happened in World War
I corresponds with the U.N. definition of genocide.Sadly, as in the
days of Armenian rebellion against the Ottoman state, decisions that
affect the common Armenian in the Caucasus are made by the diasporic
Armenians of power and wealth. For the Armenian Americans, the genocide
extravaganza is not only a source of identity, but the source of
their political participation and relevance in Washington, D.C.
And for Turkey? Why are there calls for genocide recognition in
Turkey? Many Turkish scholars and journalists, who continuously search
for opportunities to showcase their Euro-lust, hear the persisting
calls against their Ottoman predecessors and jump on the genocide
bandwagon. Their wish to be accepted by Western intellectuals, in
keeping with their imagined society, has led them to choose the cheap
semblance of liberalism over the study of facts and the demonstration
of loyalty to their own people's history. Should the quest for European
acceptance mean that Turkey has to accept lies and derision?
Truly progressive intellectuality would have the Turk debate other
Europeans, equal among equals, historiography to historiography,
rather than yield to political dictations of history.
* PhD candidate, University of Utah
http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/30/the-international-politics-of-armenian-history