Tweet
RUSSIA'S MAIN STRATEGY FOR THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE
Energy Monitor Worldwide
December 1, 2014 Monday
After the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, and
some disruption to Russia's efforts to influence Ukraine's European
and NATO political course, the Kremlin activated its policy in the
Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. The main goal of Putin's policy is to
preclude the political influence and activity of Western powers in
unsettled conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The Kremlin's purpose is to marginalize and to distance
itself from the OSCE Minsk Group initiatives.
Russia believes that the time has come to resolve the Karabakh issue
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis by compelling one of the sides of
conflict. Moscow adopted the Eurasian doctrine to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue in favor of Azerbaijan, which seems more
acceptable for its geopolitical and economic plans. Basically, as
Russia assumed, the acceleration of negotiation around
Nagorno-Karabakh is directly connected with Moscow's goal to carry out
military-political expansion in the South Caucasus.
Putin's plan to settle the conflict is clear. Russian policy towards
Armenia is highlighted by its comprehensive impact features:
First, Armenia's sudden volte-face away from a closer relationship
with the EU since September 3, 2013 was caused by Russian political
pressure and threats. As the Ukrainian crisis started, the Russian
leadership aimed to isolate Armenia politically from the Western
states and Iran, constraining Armenia to relinquish its sovereignty in
favor of Russia's interests. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that
most of Russia's gradually increasing demands contradict the interests
of Armenia, its weak and hesitating leadership reluctantly fulfils
them. Particularly, strengthening its intelligence and ideologically
pro-Russian oriented individuals in the presidential administration
and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Moscow achieved its
purpose to deflect Armenia from the pro-Western path. In this plan
Moscow relied on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Nalbandyan,
who certainly satisfies the orders from the Kremlin, having a
comprehensive contribution from the Presidential administration and
advanced political parties such as the "Republican" and oppositional
"Prosperity" parties. The only state institution struggling for
independent policy that still remains is the Ministry of Defense, due
to the numerous high-ranking officers that are experts on various
military institutions of NATO's member-states. Meanwhile, it is
absolutely clear that Moscow has no enthusiasm for the revival of the
economy of Armenia, which is stuck in stagnation since 2009. Second,
Russia is continually undermining Armenia's security system,
propagandizing that the future of the people and the state depends on
Russia's will. Otherwise, Armenia has no alternative but to be drawn
into Russia's economic and political projects, as the South Caucasus
is part of a traditional Russian sphere. Additionally, pro-Russian
media and satellite organizations imply that if Armenian authorities
or political opposition adopt the Western direction of development,
like Ukraine and Georgia, they will instantaneously face Russia's
determined and formidable resistance. There is an assumption that
Russians, in the case of Armenia's political redirection, are going to
use all possible means and methods to thwart those plans even by
affording Azerbaijan to restart the conflict either towards Karabakh
or Armenia.
To achieve the previously mentioned psychological consequences among
Armenian society, Russian leadership conspicuously set in motion
different large-scale military exercises with the participation of the
entire personnel of the 102nd military base and airbase of "Erebuni",
situated nearby Armenia's capital.[1] Overall, Russians conducted
military exercises from the Russian base in Armenia from October 13 to
17. In addition, on October 16, Colonel General Victor Bondarev
officially announced that Moscow is planning to expand its airbase in
Armenia,[2] factually without the consent of Armenian leadership. This
tactic is directed not only towards society, but first of all it had a
certain effect of enforcement against President Serzh Sargsyan and his
political team.
The third and final factor of the Russian policy towards Armenia is
closely connected to Azerbaijan. In this case, Russia promotes a
policy of continuous intimidation of Armenia by openly militarizing
Azerbaijan and supporting the modernization of its military power.
Moreover, from the political aspect Russia adheres to Azerbaijani
positions, simultaneously, opposing Azerbaijan to the United States on
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. A case in point: during the current year
some Russian experts, who have close ties with the Putin
administration, repeatedly accused the US in their reluctance to
return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and are interested in the persistence of
the status quo.[3]
The known military contract between Russia and Azerbaijan, in which
Russia is going to deliver until the end of 2014 offensive weaponry
costing $5 billion, definitely affects the reaction of Armenia.[4]
Meanwhile, Moscow is using this fact as a tool for disseminating
additional tensions among Armenian society, and this is one of the
reasons why Armenia's parliamentary opposition announced the beginning
of a protest movement but refused to criticize Russia's expansionist
policy.
Thus, these three basic aims of Russia concerning Armenia form
Moscow's approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Moscow applies
different tactics and methods with Azerbaijan, trying to illustrate a
reliable partnership and friendly attitude. Russia intends to control
Azerbaijani oil and natural gas capacities and transportation
infrastructure. Baku in certain circumstances may offer to supply its
oil and gas to Europe through the Russian territory, accepting Putin's
rules and energy policy concerning Europe. In exchange for this
political service, Ilham Aliev's government may gain the patronage of
Russia in the Karabakh issue. Furthermore, the Kremlin may convince
Baku to join the Eurasian Union in exchange for several territories of
Karabakh. Interestingly, for the ideologists of the Eurasian doctrine,
Azerbaijan is more valuable than Armenia, and this is why Russia is
deeply interested in developing a close relationship with Azerbaijan.
Additionally, another benefit that Moscow emphasizes is the
significant capacities of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, which
can be used with the support of Baku after the final deterioration of
Armenia and the Armenian factor in the South Caucasus.
Putin strongly believes that settlement of the South Caucasian
conflicts and particularly Karabakh issue resolution are Russia's
prerogative only. And now, for the future development and expenditure
of the Eurasian Union, Moscow is interested in the quick resolution of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. To accomplish this goal, Russia
attempts to monopolize the right of intermediary, with the purpose of
imposing its own position on the OSCE Minsk Group. From the other
side, after Armenia's involvement in the Eurasian Union, there are the
first signals that Russia is going to coerce Armenia to relinquish the
seven territories around Nagorno-Karabakh in order to deepen its
influence in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, some Russian officials believe
that 2015 will be the time of great changes in the Caucasus. This
means that Putin will pursue the goal to eliminate the recent status
quo in the South Caucasus, implementing the policy of coercion against
Armenia and the policy of conviction towards Azerbaijan. All the
changes will be directed to mitigate Western impact on the region.
Such a disposition suggests that Karabakh will be used as a tool of
Russian domination in the region.
Because of insufficient participation by NATO, the United States, and
the EU in the military-political integration of the South Caucasian
states--particularly in Armenia--Russia is able to dictate to the region
as Putin wills.
Some representatives of the Russian political elite, sympathizers of
the Soviet might of the past, and Russian hegemony adherents do not
rely on Armenia as a sovereign state. And now, from the background of
Russian military-political expansion in the South Caucasus, Putin's
leadership has a strong reason to liquidate Armenia as an independent
political factor. In 1991, during the agony of the USSR, Moscow
decided to organize a referendum for the future of the Union, and the
question put to voters was "Do you consider necessary the preservation
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of
equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an
individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?"[5] Armenian
local authorities boycotted this referendum and undertook the
organization of a national referendum in order to re-establish the
Armenian Republic, occupied by the Soviets in 1921. Ninety-nine per
cent of Armenian voters were for national independence, whereas
Azerbaijani authorities organized the referendum dictated from Moscow
and 94.12% of registered voters gave their consent for saving the
Soviet Union.[6] These different paths adopted by neighboring
Caucasian states had a considerable effect on Russian social and
political elites in prospect. These are the roots of the Putin
administration's attitude nowadays. Recently, Russia feels more
comfortable with Azerbaijan. The bilateral relations are benefiting a
political convergence than relations with Armenia, which is
traditionally orientated towards the West on par with Georgia.
>From the global point of view, Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement is
determined by the political aspirations of Turkey to have close ties
with Russia. Specifically, Azerbaijan might become a convenient factor
for Russia to contain both the West and Iran. In t 2014 Global Data
Point.
Energy Monitor Worldwide
December 1, 2014 Monday
After the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, and
some disruption to Russia's efforts to influence Ukraine's European
and NATO political course, the Kremlin activated its policy in the
Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. The main goal of Putin's policy is to
preclude the political influence and activity of Western powers in
unsettled conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The Kremlin's purpose is to marginalize and to distance
itself from the OSCE Minsk Group initiatives.
Russia believes that the time has come to resolve the Karabakh issue
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis by compelling one of the sides of
conflict. Moscow adopted the Eurasian doctrine to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue in favor of Azerbaijan, which seems more
acceptable for its geopolitical and economic plans. Basically, as
Russia assumed, the acceleration of negotiation around
Nagorno-Karabakh is directly connected with Moscow's goal to carry out
military-political expansion in the South Caucasus.
Putin's plan to settle the conflict is clear. Russian policy towards
Armenia is highlighted by its comprehensive impact features:
First, Armenia's sudden volte-face away from a closer relationship
with the EU since September 3, 2013 was caused by Russian political
pressure and threats. As the Ukrainian crisis started, the Russian
leadership aimed to isolate Armenia politically from the Western
states and Iran, constraining Armenia to relinquish its sovereignty in
favor of Russia's interests. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that
most of Russia's gradually increasing demands contradict the interests
of Armenia, its weak and hesitating leadership reluctantly fulfils
them. Particularly, strengthening its intelligence and ideologically
pro-Russian oriented individuals in the presidential administration
and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Moscow achieved its
purpose to deflect Armenia from the pro-Western path. In this plan
Moscow relied on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Nalbandyan,
who certainly satisfies the orders from the Kremlin, having a
comprehensive contribution from the Presidential administration and
advanced political parties such as the "Republican" and oppositional
"Prosperity" parties. The only state institution struggling for
independent policy that still remains is the Ministry of Defense, due
to the numerous high-ranking officers that are experts on various
military institutions of NATO's member-states. Meanwhile, it is
absolutely clear that Moscow has no enthusiasm for the revival of the
economy of Armenia, which is stuck in stagnation since 2009. Second,
Russia is continually undermining Armenia's security system,
propagandizing that the future of the people and the state depends on
Russia's will. Otherwise, Armenia has no alternative but to be drawn
into Russia's economic and political projects, as the South Caucasus
is part of a traditional Russian sphere. Additionally, pro-Russian
media and satellite organizations imply that if Armenian authorities
or political opposition adopt the Western direction of development,
like Ukraine and Georgia, they will instantaneously face Russia's
determined and formidable resistance. There is an assumption that
Russians, in the case of Armenia's political redirection, are going to
use all possible means and methods to thwart those plans even by
affording Azerbaijan to restart the conflict either towards Karabakh
or Armenia.
To achieve the previously mentioned psychological consequences among
Armenian society, Russian leadership conspicuously set in motion
different large-scale military exercises with the participation of the
entire personnel of the 102nd military base and airbase of "Erebuni",
situated nearby Armenia's capital.[1] Overall, Russians conducted
military exercises from the Russian base in Armenia from October 13 to
17. In addition, on October 16, Colonel General Victor Bondarev
officially announced that Moscow is planning to expand its airbase in
Armenia,[2] factually without the consent of Armenian leadership. This
tactic is directed not only towards society, but first of all it had a
certain effect of enforcement against President Serzh Sargsyan and his
political team.
The third and final factor of the Russian policy towards Armenia is
closely connected to Azerbaijan. In this case, Russia promotes a
policy of continuous intimidation of Armenia by openly militarizing
Azerbaijan and supporting the modernization of its military power.
Moreover, from the political aspect Russia adheres to Azerbaijani
positions, simultaneously, opposing Azerbaijan to the United States on
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. A case in point: during the current year
some Russian experts, who have close ties with the Putin
administration, repeatedly accused the US in their reluctance to
return Karabakh to Azerbaijan and are interested in the persistence of
the status quo.[3]
The known military contract between Russia and Azerbaijan, in which
Russia is going to deliver until the end of 2014 offensive weaponry
costing $5 billion, definitely affects the reaction of Armenia.[4]
Meanwhile, Moscow is using this fact as a tool for disseminating
additional tensions among Armenian society, and this is one of the
reasons why Armenia's parliamentary opposition announced the beginning
of a protest movement but refused to criticize Russia's expansionist
policy.
Thus, these three basic aims of Russia concerning Armenia form
Moscow's approach towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Moscow applies
different tactics and methods with Azerbaijan, trying to illustrate a
reliable partnership and friendly attitude. Russia intends to control
Azerbaijani oil and natural gas capacities and transportation
infrastructure. Baku in certain circumstances may offer to supply its
oil and gas to Europe through the Russian territory, accepting Putin's
rules and energy policy concerning Europe. In exchange for this
political service, Ilham Aliev's government may gain the patronage of
Russia in the Karabakh issue. Furthermore, the Kremlin may convince
Baku to join the Eurasian Union in exchange for several territories of
Karabakh. Interestingly, for the ideologists of the Eurasian doctrine,
Azerbaijan is more valuable than Armenia, and this is why Russia is
deeply interested in developing a close relationship with Azerbaijan.
Additionally, another benefit that Moscow emphasizes is the
significant capacities of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, which
can be used with the support of Baku after the final deterioration of
Armenia and the Armenian factor in the South Caucasus.
Putin strongly believes that settlement of the South Caucasian
conflicts and particularly Karabakh issue resolution are Russia's
prerogative only. And now, for the future development and expenditure
of the Eurasian Union, Moscow is interested in the quick resolution of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. To accomplish this goal, Russia
attempts to monopolize the right of intermediary, with the purpose of
imposing its own position on the OSCE Minsk Group. From the other
side, after Armenia's involvement in the Eurasian Union, there are the
first signals that Russia is going to coerce Armenia to relinquish the
seven territories around Nagorno-Karabakh in order to deepen its
influence in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, some Russian officials believe
that 2015 will be the time of great changes in the Caucasus. This
means that Putin will pursue the goal to eliminate the recent status
quo in the South Caucasus, implementing the policy of coercion against
Armenia and the policy of conviction towards Azerbaijan. All the
changes will be directed to mitigate Western impact on the region.
Such a disposition suggests that Karabakh will be used as a tool of
Russian domination in the region.
Because of insufficient participation by NATO, the United States, and
the EU in the military-political integration of the South Caucasian
states--particularly in Armenia--Russia is able to dictate to the region
as Putin wills.
Some representatives of the Russian political elite, sympathizers of
the Soviet might of the past, and Russian hegemony adherents do not
rely on Armenia as a sovereign state. And now, from the background of
Russian military-political expansion in the South Caucasus, Putin's
leadership has a strong reason to liquidate Armenia as an independent
political factor. In 1991, during the agony of the USSR, Moscow
decided to organize a referendum for the future of the Union, and the
question put to voters was "Do you consider necessary the preservation
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of
equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an
individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?"[5] Armenian
local authorities boycotted this referendum and undertook the
organization of a national referendum in order to re-establish the
Armenian Republic, occupied by the Soviets in 1921. Ninety-nine per
cent of Armenian voters were for national independence, whereas
Azerbaijani authorities organized the referendum dictated from Moscow
and 94.12% of registered voters gave their consent for saving the
Soviet Union.[6] These different paths adopted by neighboring
Caucasian states had a considerable effect on Russian social and
political elites in prospect. These are the roots of the Putin
administration's attitude nowadays. Recently, Russia feels more
comfortable with Azerbaijan. The bilateral relations are benefiting a
political convergence than relations with Armenia, which is
traditionally orientated towards the West on par with Georgia.
>From the global point of view, Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement is
determined by the political aspirations of Turkey to have close ties
with Russia. Specifically, Azerbaijan might become a convenient factor
for Russia to contain both the West and Iran. In t 2014 Global Data
Point.