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AZERBAIJAN IN THE RUSSIAN-IRANIAN VISE
CENTRAL ASIA - CAUCASUS ANALYST
Wednesday / March 22, 2006
By Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin
A shared border and unique geopolitical location make Azerbaijan an
important stakeholder in the confrontation between the West and Iran
over its uranium enrichment program. It is not in Azerbaijan's interest
to foster animosity with its powerful neighbor, but at the same time, it
is not in its interest to side with rogue regimes, thereby alienating
the U.S. and the West. Russia has been aggressively courting Azerbaijan,
but widespread Western opposition to Iranian nuclear efforts and
Russia's desire to extend the Karabakh conflict for as long as possible
will give Azerbaijan room to find a way to stay in Russia's good graces
but out of its `sphere of influence.'
BACKGROUND: On February 21-22, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin
visited President Ilham Aliyev in Baku to mark the start of the `Year of
Russian Culture' in Azerbaijan. The two presidents discussed economic
cooperation, a military-technical commission to facilitate Russian
military sales to Azerbaijan, and, presumably, Azerbaijan's position on
Iranian nuclear enrichment. Some analysts believe that Putin is
pressuring Aliyev to support Russia in opposing UN sanctions against
Iran and to weaken U.S. influence in the Southern Caucasus, undoubtedly
using as leverage his support for Aliyev's New Azerbaijan Party in
Azerbaijan's disputed 2005 parliamentary elections.
Putin and Aliyev also discussed Russia's proposal for a Caspian Sea
security entity - `Caspian Defense Initiative,' or CASFOR. CASFOR's
stated goals are the prevention of terrorism and drug/WMD smuggling
across borders, as well as protection of the economic interests of the
five proposed signatories - Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
and Russia.
Such cooperation is inconsistent with the historically complicated
relationships between Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan has long
suspected both countries of clandestine support for Armenia in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, including Russian provision of troops to
the Armenian side. Recent negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan
have yielded some progress on the issue, but a solution remains elusive
given recent Armenian backtracking. There is some speculation that
Russia encouraged Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to harden his
position in peace negotiations in February 2006, derailing a
much-expected framework agreement. If true, this could be a signal to
Baku that independent statehood does not free Azerbaijan from Russian
meddling in its traditional sphere of influence.
Despite lingering mistrust, Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan have announced
the synchronization of their energy systems, with a
Russian-Iranian-Azerbaijani power corridor to be completed in 2009.
Increasing Western indifference to Azerbaijan, or pressure regarding its
political system as well as aggressive moves by Russia to court
Azerbaijan may push Azerbaijani President Aliyev further into the
Russian-Iranian camp, distancing him from the West.
IMPLICATIONS: By joining CASFOR and further increasing political and
economic cooperation with Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan risks unwittingly
positioning itself on the wrong side of the debate over Iranian nuclear
aspirations. Just like the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) has been for its members, CASFOR may become a trap for
Azerbaijan, as it stands to be used as a means for Russia to expand its
influence in the Caspian region and continue its efforts to turn
Azerbaijan into a client state. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is not looking
to align itself with Iran amidst a brewing crisis over the Iranian
nuclear program, and create tensions with the U.S. Russia is likely to
seek to avoid sanctions against Iran, given that Iran is a major
importer of Russian arms and nuclear technology . However, as G8
President, unequivocal support for Iran would damage Russia's
international legitimacy. Russia will continue to seek a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian problem, which only prolongs the crisis, but if
the rest of the G8 agrees that sanctions are necessary, Russia and Iran
are unlikely to win this battle, and Azerbaijan will be facing the
choice: defining its image in the West as a reliable partner or as a
Russian-Iranian vassal.
To encourage Azerbaijan to support the Western position on Iran, it is
crucial for the European Union to support Azerbaijan's efforts to expand
cooperation with the EU, while the U.S. should be willing to provide
Baku with necessary security guarantees and expanded military
assistance. Moreover, as Russia may be mulling escalation tensions in
the Caucasus, the U.S. needs to talk to Àzerbaijan and Turkey about
coordinating security cooperation, such as joint airspace control.
The worst development which can happen for the West is for Azerbaijan to
become disillusioned with its Euro-Atlantic orientation and follow the
examples of Uzbekistan and Belarus, seeking political patronage in
Moscow, Tehran or even Beijing.
Azerbaijan has strong incentives to expand economic ties with Europe.
Azerbaijan is the EU's largest trading partner in the Caucasus, and
development of the TRACECA (Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor) and
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status with the EU will be cornerstones for
expansion of Azerbaijani trade and investment. A firm partnership with
the EU could also strengthen Azerbaijan's economic institutions.
Cooperation with Western advisors could help Azerbaijan enact reforms to
tackle the weak regulatory framework, corruption, and potential for
armed conflict that have stymied economic growth and foreign and
domestic investment, and to diversify into sectors other than oil and
gas. Such reforms would enhance economic growth and stability.
Systemic reform will also improve Azerbaijan's external security. A
pluralistic, democratic Azerbaijan - a secular Shi'i state - can set an
example for other majority-Muslim states in the region, making it an
invaluable ally for the West. Engaging with the West politically,
cooperating on multilateral issues and observing Western standards of
government accountability, democracy, pluralism, and human rights will
contribute to domestic stability in Azerbaijan and improve the
likelihood of Western backing on energy and security issues. As the
country becomes more transparent and develops the rule of law and
better-functioning institution of governance and economic coordination,
Western investments are likely to flow beyond the oil and gas sectors. A
thriving secular, but culturally Muslim democracy will be increasingly
secure as Russia moves to reassert power in its `near abroad'.
CONCLUSIONS: Azerbaijan's strategic challenge is to stave off choosing
between Russia and the West. Economic cooperation with the U.S. and EU
can inject much-needed capital, technology, and managerial expertise
into the Azerbaijani economy. Security cooperation with Western partners
can ease pressure from Russia and Iran in the Caspian region and provide
Azerbaijan with the backing of strong allies. Azerbaijan should take
into account the dangers of Russian hegemony in its `backyard' and the
implications of a nuclear Iran, and concentrate on its long-term
national interests. With the political, military and economic support of
Western partners and genuine efforts at growth and reform, Azerbaijan
may develop the capacity to maintain a relationship with Russia based
not on clientelism, but on mutual interests.
AUTHORS' BIO:
-- Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation,
and author and editor of Eurasia in Balance (Ashgate, 2005).
-- Conway Irwin, SAIS 2005 graduate is an intern at The Heritage
Foundation, D.C. The authors wish to thank Katalin Vinkler for
contributing to this article.
CENTRAL ASIA - CAUCASUS ANALYST
Wednesday / March 22, 2006
By Ariel Cohen and Conway Irwin
A shared border and unique geopolitical location make Azerbaijan an
important stakeholder in the confrontation between the West and Iran
over its uranium enrichment program. It is not in Azerbaijan's interest
to foster animosity with its powerful neighbor, but at the same time, it
is not in its interest to side with rogue regimes, thereby alienating
the U.S. and the West. Russia has been aggressively courting Azerbaijan,
but widespread Western opposition to Iranian nuclear efforts and
Russia's desire to extend the Karabakh conflict for as long as possible
will give Azerbaijan room to find a way to stay in Russia's good graces
but out of its `sphere of influence.'
BACKGROUND: On February 21-22, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin
visited President Ilham Aliyev in Baku to mark the start of the `Year of
Russian Culture' in Azerbaijan. The two presidents discussed economic
cooperation, a military-technical commission to facilitate Russian
military sales to Azerbaijan, and, presumably, Azerbaijan's position on
Iranian nuclear enrichment. Some analysts believe that Putin is
pressuring Aliyev to support Russia in opposing UN sanctions against
Iran and to weaken U.S. influence in the Southern Caucasus, undoubtedly
using as leverage his support for Aliyev's New Azerbaijan Party in
Azerbaijan's disputed 2005 parliamentary elections.
Putin and Aliyev also discussed Russia's proposal for a Caspian Sea
security entity - `Caspian Defense Initiative,' or CASFOR. CASFOR's
stated goals are the prevention of terrorism and drug/WMD smuggling
across borders, as well as protection of the economic interests of the
five proposed signatories - Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
and Russia.
Such cooperation is inconsistent with the historically complicated
relationships between Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan has long
suspected both countries of clandestine support for Armenia in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, including Russian provision of troops to
the Armenian side. Recent negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan
have yielded some progress on the issue, but a solution remains elusive
given recent Armenian backtracking. There is some speculation that
Russia encouraged Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to harden his
position in peace negotiations in February 2006, derailing a
much-expected framework agreement. If true, this could be a signal to
Baku that independent statehood does not free Azerbaijan from Russian
meddling in its traditional sphere of influence.
Despite lingering mistrust, Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan have announced
the synchronization of their energy systems, with a
Russian-Iranian-Azerbaijani power corridor to be completed in 2009.
Increasing Western indifference to Azerbaijan, or pressure regarding its
political system as well as aggressive moves by Russia to court
Azerbaijan may push Azerbaijani President Aliyev further into the
Russian-Iranian camp, distancing him from the West.
IMPLICATIONS: By joining CASFOR and further increasing political and
economic cooperation with Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan risks unwittingly
positioning itself on the wrong side of the debate over Iranian nuclear
aspirations. Just like the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) has been for its members, CASFOR may become a trap for
Azerbaijan, as it stands to be used as a means for Russia to expand its
influence in the Caspian region and continue its efforts to turn
Azerbaijan into a client state. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is not looking
to align itself with Iran amidst a brewing crisis over the Iranian
nuclear program, and create tensions with the U.S. Russia is likely to
seek to avoid sanctions against Iran, given that Iran is a major
importer of Russian arms and nuclear technology . However, as G8
President, unequivocal support for Iran would damage Russia's
international legitimacy. Russia will continue to seek a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian problem, which only prolongs the crisis, but if
the rest of the G8 agrees that sanctions are necessary, Russia and Iran
are unlikely to win this battle, and Azerbaijan will be facing the
choice: defining its image in the West as a reliable partner or as a
Russian-Iranian vassal.
To encourage Azerbaijan to support the Western position on Iran, it is
crucial for the European Union to support Azerbaijan's efforts to expand
cooperation with the EU, while the U.S. should be willing to provide
Baku with necessary security guarantees and expanded military
assistance. Moreover, as Russia may be mulling escalation tensions in
the Caucasus, the U.S. needs to talk to Àzerbaijan and Turkey about
coordinating security cooperation, such as joint airspace control.
The worst development which can happen for the West is for Azerbaijan to
become disillusioned with its Euro-Atlantic orientation and follow the
examples of Uzbekistan and Belarus, seeking political patronage in
Moscow, Tehran or even Beijing.
Azerbaijan has strong incentives to expand economic ties with Europe.
Azerbaijan is the EU's largest trading partner in the Caucasus, and
development of the TRACECA (Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor) and
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status with the EU will be cornerstones for
expansion of Azerbaijani trade and investment. A firm partnership with
the EU could also strengthen Azerbaijan's economic institutions.
Cooperation with Western advisors could help Azerbaijan enact reforms to
tackle the weak regulatory framework, corruption, and potential for
armed conflict that have stymied economic growth and foreign and
domestic investment, and to diversify into sectors other than oil and
gas. Such reforms would enhance economic growth and stability.
Systemic reform will also improve Azerbaijan's external security. A
pluralistic, democratic Azerbaijan - a secular Shi'i state - can set an
example for other majority-Muslim states in the region, making it an
invaluable ally for the West. Engaging with the West politically,
cooperating on multilateral issues and observing Western standards of
government accountability, democracy, pluralism, and human rights will
contribute to domestic stability in Azerbaijan and improve the
likelihood of Western backing on energy and security issues. As the
country becomes more transparent and develops the rule of law and
better-functioning institution of governance and economic coordination,
Western investments are likely to flow beyond the oil and gas sectors. A
thriving secular, but culturally Muslim democracy will be increasingly
secure as Russia moves to reassert power in its `near abroad'.
CONCLUSIONS: Azerbaijan's strategic challenge is to stave off choosing
between Russia and the West. Economic cooperation with the U.S. and EU
can inject much-needed capital, technology, and managerial expertise
into the Azerbaijani economy. Security cooperation with Western partners
can ease pressure from Russia and Iran in the Caspian region and provide
Azerbaijan with the backing of strong allies. Azerbaijan should take
into account the dangers of Russian hegemony in its `backyard' and the
implications of a nuclear Iran, and concentrate on its long-term
national interests. With the political, military and economic support of
Western partners and genuine efforts at growth and reform, Azerbaijan
may develop the capacity to maintain a relationship with Russia based
not on clientelism, but on mutual interests.
AUTHORS' BIO:
-- Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation,
and author and editor of Eurasia in Balance (Ashgate, 2005).
-- Conway Irwin, SAIS 2005 graduate is an intern at The Heritage
Foundation, D.C. The authors wish to thank Katalin Vinkler for
contributing to this article.