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Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, March 30, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 62
IN THIS ISSUE:
*New president fails to halt violence in Dagestan
*Turkey's role to increase under Azerbaijan's latest Caspian gas proposal
*World Azerbaijani Congress spoils Iranian-Azerbaijani relations
DAGESTAN CONTINUES TO SINK INTO CHAOS DESPITE APPOINTMENT OF NEW LEADER
More than a month has passed since the Kremlin appointed a new leader
for Dagestan, the largest republic in the North Caucasus. On February
20, Russian President Vladimir Putin put 65-year-old Mukhu Aliev at
the helm of the North Caucasus republic and Dagestan's legislature
readily confirmed the choice for president.
Many observers in Russia favored the appointment. Some even called the
decision to appoint Aliev "a rare example of the right decision of the
Kremlin in its North Caucasian policy." The observers expressed hopes
that Aliev, a long-time Communist party boss and an experienced
administrator, would improve the Dagestani economy, fight corruption,
and repel the growing local insurgency. In particular, Moscow regards
Aliev as a figure who can oppose the mighty clan of Magomedali
Magomedov, Aliev's predecessor, who had ruled Dagestan for 14 years
(see EDM, February 23).
However, after one month in office, doubts began to appear regarding
his ability to change the deteriorating situation. Apparently the
insurgency ignored the leadership change and kept to their plans to
launch a spring campaign. On February 24 a police patrol was attacked
in the town of Khasavyurt. Then on March 10, Magomed Magomedov,
deputy head of the republican Criminal Investigation Department, was
killed in Makhachkala, the republican capital, by a bomb planted
underneath his car. Two days later, March 12, a senior officer from
the Organized Crime Department was shot dead in Makhachkala, and
another was killed on March 21 in the town of Buinaksk. On March 29,
two policemen were wounded in a shoot-out with rebels in the capital.
As reported earlier, on March 2 during a security sweep of several
villages in Khasavyurt district, Russian troops desecrated a Koran,
the holy book of all Muslims. This incident only added fuel to the
fire (see EDM, March 23).
In addition to the standoff between militancy and security officials,
Dagestan was also hit by waves of criminal violence and unrest this
March. On March 20, the family of a businessman was killed in the
capital. There were three brazen robberies in Dagestan during the last
two months, including two attacks on pension delivery vehicles in
Khasavyurt and Makhachkala, and one robbery of a pension payment
office in the village of Baba-Urt (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
On March 20, residents from the village of Korkmaskala, in
Kyimtorkalin district, tried to storm a local office building to
protest what they considered to be an unfair land distribution
scheme. The police special-task unit guarding the building opened
fire, and 20 people were injured. Shamil Zainalov, the new prime
minister of Dagestan, had to go to the area to personally resolve the
conflict (Interfax, March 20).
There were also two attacks on district administration heads. On March
10, there was an assassination attempt on the head of the
administration of Magarmakent district (regions.ru, March 10). On
March 22, gunmen shot dead Ruslan Aliev, head of the mountainous
Botlikh district, who was returning home after a meeting with
President Aliev and other Dagestani district chiefs. Ruslan Aliyev's
vehicle was struck by gunfire in the center of Makhachkala, on the
city's most guarded street (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
Despite the rapidly increasing rebel attacks, unrest, and criminal
violence, there were still some hopes that the new leader of Dagestan
could at least partly succeed with economic and political
reforms. Aliev's first changes within the republican government
generated a belief that he might indeed be able to shake up the
political structure of Dagestan, which has been completely based on
clan connections and bribery. The most odious figures in the
government, like Umalat Nasrutdinov, the minister of agriculture, and
Marat Ilyasov, the minister of economy, both of whom became ministers
thanks to family ties, were replaced (Kavkazky Uzel, March 10).
Nevertheless, the most powerful clans in Dagestan, that of former
president Magomedali Magomedov and Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov, have
not relinquished their positions yet. On the same day that Aliev was
appointed, Magomed-Salam Magomedov, son of Magomedali, became chairman
of the republican parliament. With the help of his farther,
Magomed-Salam had become one of the richest and most powerful tycoons
in Dagestan. A member of the Board of Elbin-Bank and a member of the
Working Group for Offshore Oil Resources of the Dagestani Sector of
the Caspian Sea, Magomed-Salam is also the unofficial owner of many
local businesses and real estate. The position of parliamentarian
leader will help Magomedov's family to legalize their control over the
republican economy. There are rumors circulating in Dagestan that next
year Magomedov Jr. might claim the post of prime minister of Dagestan.
Said Amirov, an old rival of Magomedov and the deeply entrenched mayor
of Makhachkala, also remains a strong and independent political figure
in the region. On March 13, Amirov was elected mayor for the third
time in elections that independent observers described as fraudulent
(Kavkazky Uzel, March 13).
So far the new leadership in Dagestan has not successfully implemented
any of the tasks that the Russian authorities had entrusted to it. The
clans remain strong while the chaos and violence in the region
continues.
--Andrei Smirnov and Mikhail Roshchin
AZERBAIJAN SPEARHEADING INITIATIVE ON TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE
Addressing an international energy conference in progress in Baku,
Azerbaijan's Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev outlined the
advantages of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan via the South Caucasus to European markets. Natig Aliyev
underscored the project's value for diversifying supplies and
restraining prices as well as the favorable international context for
this project, as Western interest rebounds in the wake of this
winter's disruption in supplies. Urging Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to
become part of the project without waiting for approval from other
Caspian countries -- an allusion to Russia and Tehran -- Aliyev noted
that any impediments to a seabed pipeline are political, not technical
ones.
A trans-Caspian seabed pipeline "would ensure Europe's energy security
and protect it from Russian monopolism," Aliyev remarked. "Europe has
understood that it is naive to place all its hopes on Russian gas. The
events of recent months, when Russia has in effect demonstrated its
status as a monopolist, indicate that prices will rise further." Thus,
the timing is now ripe for starting the negotiations (AP, Turan,
Trend, Ekho [Baku], March 29).
The preceding week, Russia opposed the trans-Caspian pipeline proposal
during a routine meeting of the five riparian countries on defining
the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia, which happens to be the
leading industrial polluter of that sea, cited environmental risks in
opposing a trans-Caspian pipeline and claimed that any such project
requires approval from all five countries. Azerbaijan took the lead in
refuting Russia's position (RIA-Novosti, March 22). Azerbaijan,
seconded by Kazakhstan, upholds the right of Caspian countries to make
sovereign decisions about laying pipelines on their respective seabed
sectors.
Baku estimates the construction costs at billion for a pipeline with
an annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters that would run from the
eastern Caspian shore, across the seabed to Azerbaijan, and further
via Georgia into Turkey. With Turkey as a transit corridor, the gas
could be piped to European Union member countries in southern and
central Europe. The concept largely follows that promoted by the
United States in 1996-2001, primarily in Europe's interest, though
amid European indifference at that stage. Azerbaijan and Georgia were
firmly on board the U.S.-led project, Turkmenistan prevaricated, and
Turkey mismanaged the negotiations.
The updated concept, now under exploratory discussion by the same
countries with European participation for the first time, includes
major novel elements, such as:
a) The opportunity for Kazakhstan to joint the project;
b) Turkey's role as transit corridor to Europe, rather than consumer
country as had earlier been envisaged;
c) Massive input from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz gas field into the
proposed pipeline via Turkey to Europe (the offshore field's
anticipated yield is 20 billion cubic meters annually, almost twice
the earlier projection, and most of it available for delivery to
Europe); and
d) Possibly integrating the Caspian gas pipeline with the Nabucco
project (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) by connecting the
two planned lines near Erzurum in eastern Turkey.
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has signaled an intention to
rejoin negotiations on the trans-Caspian pipelines. Receiving a
Turkish delegation (unrelated to the energy sector) in Ashgabat,
Niyazov offered on live television, "We can provide you with cheap gas
… I had already made such an offer to you in the past, but your
leadership was slow to act and failed to get the Turkmen gas in
time. At present, you are purchasing expensive gas and it does not
even match your demand" (Turkmen Television Channel One, March
19). Niyazov was alluding to Turkish government officials who made it
possible for Gazprom's pipeline across the Black Sea to defeat the
U.S.-proposed trans-Caspian pipeline in the race for Turkey's gas
market in 2001. Those Turkish officials have since been investigated
and indicted for having secretly agreed on onerous terms of purchase
for Russian gas.
Turkey has recently been paying 3 per one thousand cubic meters of
Russian gas, and Gazprom recently demanded a hike to 3, which Turkey
finds unacceptable (Zaman, February 2). Meanwhile, the pipeline across
the Black Sea is being underutilized while Turkey's gas market is
oversubscribed. The initial trans-Caspian project had targeted the
Turkish market as main downstream destination. In the new
circumstances, Turkey's role can change from that of a potential
consumer of Caspian gas to that of a transit country for Caspian gas
to Europe.
--Vladimir Socor
NEW TENSIONS COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN BAKU AND TEHRAN
More than 600 representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations in
49 countries assembled in Baku on March 16 for the second World
Azerbaijani Congress. The event was organized by the State Committee
on the Affairs of Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, which was established in
2003 by a decree from then-President Heydar Aliyev to help unite all
Azerbaijanis abroad.
The event was grandiose both in scale and impact. The goal of showing
the unity of millions of Azerbaijanis around the world for the sake of
an independent, strong, and prosperous Azerbaijan was achieved. The
Congress discussed issues regarding coordination among the Azerbaijani
diaspora organizations, strengthening relations with other nations'
diaspora organizations, promoting information about Azerbaijan around
the world, and building relations with foreign governments.
As a result of the Congress' work, a new strategy was developed
regarding the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora in other
countries and the joint activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish
diaspora organizations. Moreover, Congress participants adopted a
resolution addressed to Azerbaijanis around the world, foreign
governments, and international organizations regarding Armenian
aggression toward Azerbaijan.
Yet, the Congress made news not so much for its work, but for a row
that erupted between Azerbaijan and Iran after the Congress. The
Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Afshar Suleymani, reacted very
angrily and emotionally to the speeches given at the World Azerbaijani
Congress by some representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations
in Europe. These delegates called for the unification of North
Azerbaijan (the independent Republic of Azerbaijan) and South
Azerbaijan (in northern Iran, populated by Azerbaijanis and considered
by Azerbaijanis as part of a once-unified Azerbaijani state). The
speech by Javad Derekhti, an Azerbaijani from the Iranian Azerbaijan,
was particularly provocative, because he talked about human rights
violations suffered by ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran (Trend News Agency,
March 16).
The Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, which ended the three-decade
Russian-Iranian War eventually divided Azerbaijan into two parts along
the banks of the Araz River. It is estimated that more than 25 million
ethnic Azerbaijanis currently live in Iran, but they have no rights to
be educated in their native language and any attempts to organize
movements for cultural autonomy are strongly repressed by the
authorities in Tehran. Iran is extremely touchy about this issue and
has kept its distance from official Baku for most of the 1990s exactly
because of the issue of Azerbaijani separatism in Iran.
Suleymani tore into these speeches in a press release from the Iranian
embassy on March 17. "Iran is deeply upset about the participation of
some anti-Iranian elements in the Congress and their provocative
statements on the issues of Iran's domestic affairs," it read. "The
Embassy considers these steps to contradict the friendly relations
between the brotherly nations and those commitments taken by the
Azerbaijani government in the treaty of 2002, sighed in Tehran. The
Embassy is very surprised about the references at the Congress to the
Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828 and mentioning Azerbaijan as a divided
country."
The Iranian Foreign Ministry also sent a protest note to the
Azerbaijani ambassador in Iran. The row intensified after remarks by
the Iranian ambassador regarding Azerbaijani poets Nizami and
Shahriyar, whom he called "Iranian poets." This caused an immediate
protest from the Azerbaijani Writers Union, saying, "The Union deeply
regrets and is surprised that the ambassador made such remarks and
demands an immediate end to such uneducated discoveries" (APA News
Agency, March 24).
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the Iranian
ambassador's complaints by asking him to calm his emotions. Speaking
at a press conference the next day, Tahir Tagi-zadeh, the head of the
informational department of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign
Affairs said, "The speeches made at the World Azerbaijani Congress by
representative of the public organizations are their personal
opinions. The emotional speeches of the ambassadors might spoil the
cooperation based on the principles of friendship and good
neighborliness" (day.az, March 17).
Nazim Ibrahimov, head of the State Committee on the Affairs of
Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, also downplayed the significance of
speeches, saying they were private opinions of Congress
participants. "The State Committee has functioned for three years
already, and we have never interfered in the internal issues of Iran"
he explained (AzTV, March 20).
The issue continues to be a hot topic of discussion in the local
press, with a majority of Azerbaijani politicians and intelligentsia
condemning the actions of the Iranian ambassador and calling for a
renewed discussion of the human rights situation of Azerbaijanis in
Iran. Yet some diplomats and experts in the country believe that the
Iranian ambassador's remarks were intentionally aggressive, meant to
scare off the United States from using the ethnic card to weaken the
regime in Tehran.
--Fariz Ismailzade
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
http://www.jamestown.org
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.
Thursday, March 30, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 62
IN THIS ISSUE:
*New president fails to halt violence in Dagestan
*Turkey's role to increase under Azerbaijan's latest Caspian gas proposal
*World Azerbaijani Congress spoils Iranian-Azerbaijani relations
DAGESTAN CONTINUES TO SINK INTO CHAOS DESPITE APPOINTMENT OF NEW LEADER
More than a month has passed since the Kremlin appointed a new leader
for Dagestan, the largest republic in the North Caucasus. On February
20, Russian President Vladimir Putin put 65-year-old Mukhu Aliev at
the helm of the North Caucasus republic and Dagestan's legislature
readily confirmed the choice for president.
Many observers in Russia favored the appointment. Some even called the
decision to appoint Aliev "a rare example of the right decision of the
Kremlin in its North Caucasian policy." The observers expressed hopes
that Aliev, a long-time Communist party boss and an experienced
administrator, would improve the Dagestani economy, fight corruption,
and repel the growing local insurgency. In particular, Moscow regards
Aliev as a figure who can oppose the mighty clan of Magomedali
Magomedov, Aliev's predecessor, who had ruled Dagestan for 14 years
(see EDM, February 23).
However, after one month in office, doubts began to appear regarding
his ability to change the deteriorating situation. Apparently the
insurgency ignored the leadership change and kept to their plans to
launch a spring campaign. On February 24 a police patrol was attacked
in the town of Khasavyurt. Then on March 10, Magomed Magomedov,
deputy head of the republican Criminal Investigation Department, was
killed in Makhachkala, the republican capital, by a bomb planted
underneath his car. Two days later, March 12, a senior officer from
the Organized Crime Department was shot dead in Makhachkala, and
another was killed on March 21 in the town of Buinaksk. On March 29,
two policemen were wounded in a shoot-out with rebels in the capital.
As reported earlier, on March 2 during a security sweep of several
villages in Khasavyurt district, Russian troops desecrated a Koran,
the holy book of all Muslims. This incident only added fuel to the
fire (see EDM, March 23).
In addition to the standoff between militancy and security officials,
Dagestan was also hit by waves of criminal violence and unrest this
March. On March 20, the family of a businessman was killed in the
capital. There were three brazen robberies in Dagestan during the last
two months, including two attacks on pension delivery vehicles in
Khasavyurt and Makhachkala, and one robbery of a pension payment
office in the village of Baba-Urt (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
On March 20, residents from the village of Korkmaskala, in
Kyimtorkalin district, tried to storm a local office building to
protest what they considered to be an unfair land distribution
scheme. The police special-task unit guarding the building opened
fire, and 20 people were injured. Shamil Zainalov, the new prime
minister of Dagestan, had to go to the area to personally resolve the
conflict (Interfax, March 20).
There were also two attacks on district administration heads. On March
10, there was an assassination attempt on the head of the
administration of Magarmakent district (regions.ru, March 10). On
March 22, gunmen shot dead Ruslan Aliev, head of the mountainous
Botlikh district, who was returning home after a meeting with
President Aliev and other Dagestani district chiefs. Ruslan Aliyev's
vehicle was struck by gunfire in the center of Makhachkala, on the
city's most guarded street (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
Despite the rapidly increasing rebel attacks, unrest, and criminal
violence, there were still some hopes that the new leader of Dagestan
could at least partly succeed with economic and political
reforms. Aliev's first changes within the republican government
generated a belief that he might indeed be able to shake up the
political structure of Dagestan, which has been completely based on
clan connections and bribery. The most odious figures in the
government, like Umalat Nasrutdinov, the minister of agriculture, and
Marat Ilyasov, the minister of economy, both of whom became ministers
thanks to family ties, were replaced (Kavkazky Uzel, March 10).
Nevertheless, the most powerful clans in Dagestan, that of former
president Magomedali Magomedov and Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov, have
not relinquished their positions yet. On the same day that Aliev was
appointed, Magomed-Salam Magomedov, son of Magomedali, became chairman
of the republican parliament. With the help of his farther,
Magomed-Salam had become one of the richest and most powerful tycoons
in Dagestan. A member of the Board of Elbin-Bank and a member of the
Working Group for Offshore Oil Resources of the Dagestani Sector of
the Caspian Sea, Magomed-Salam is also the unofficial owner of many
local businesses and real estate. The position of parliamentarian
leader will help Magomedov's family to legalize their control over the
republican economy. There are rumors circulating in Dagestan that next
year Magomedov Jr. might claim the post of prime minister of Dagestan.
Said Amirov, an old rival of Magomedov and the deeply entrenched mayor
of Makhachkala, also remains a strong and independent political figure
in the region. On March 13, Amirov was elected mayor for the third
time in elections that independent observers described as fraudulent
(Kavkazky Uzel, March 13).
So far the new leadership in Dagestan has not successfully implemented
any of the tasks that the Russian authorities had entrusted to it. The
clans remain strong while the chaos and violence in the region
continues.
--Andrei Smirnov and Mikhail Roshchin
AZERBAIJAN SPEARHEADING INITIATIVE ON TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE
Addressing an international energy conference in progress in Baku,
Azerbaijan's Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev outlined the
advantages of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan via the South Caucasus to European markets. Natig Aliyev
underscored the project's value for diversifying supplies and
restraining prices as well as the favorable international context for
this project, as Western interest rebounds in the wake of this
winter's disruption in supplies. Urging Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to
become part of the project without waiting for approval from other
Caspian countries -- an allusion to Russia and Tehran -- Aliyev noted
that any impediments to a seabed pipeline are political, not technical
ones.
A trans-Caspian seabed pipeline "would ensure Europe's energy security
and protect it from Russian monopolism," Aliyev remarked. "Europe has
understood that it is naive to place all its hopes on Russian gas. The
events of recent months, when Russia has in effect demonstrated its
status as a monopolist, indicate that prices will rise further." Thus,
the timing is now ripe for starting the negotiations (AP, Turan,
Trend, Ekho [Baku], March 29).
The preceding week, Russia opposed the trans-Caspian pipeline proposal
during a routine meeting of the five riparian countries on defining
the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia, which happens to be the
leading industrial polluter of that sea, cited environmental risks in
opposing a trans-Caspian pipeline and claimed that any such project
requires approval from all five countries. Azerbaijan took the lead in
refuting Russia's position (RIA-Novosti, March 22). Azerbaijan,
seconded by Kazakhstan, upholds the right of Caspian countries to make
sovereign decisions about laying pipelines on their respective seabed
sectors.
Baku estimates the construction costs at billion for a pipeline with
an annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters that would run from the
eastern Caspian shore, across the seabed to Azerbaijan, and further
via Georgia into Turkey. With Turkey as a transit corridor, the gas
could be piped to European Union member countries in southern and
central Europe. The concept largely follows that promoted by the
United States in 1996-2001, primarily in Europe's interest, though
amid European indifference at that stage. Azerbaijan and Georgia were
firmly on board the U.S.-led project, Turkmenistan prevaricated, and
Turkey mismanaged the negotiations.
The updated concept, now under exploratory discussion by the same
countries with European participation for the first time, includes
major novel elements, such as:
a) The opportunity for Kazakhstan to joint the project;
b) Turkey's role as transit corridor to Europe, rather than consumer
country as had earlier been envisaged;
c) Massive input from Azerbaijan's Shah-Deniz gas field into the
proposed pipeline via Turkey to Europe (the offshore field's
anticipated yield is 20 billion cubic meters annually, almost twice
the earlier projection, and most of it available for delivery to
Europe); and
d) Possibly integrating the Caspian gas pipeline with the Nabucco
project (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) by connecting the
two planned lines near Erzurum in eastern Turkey.
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has signaled an intention to
rejoin negotiations on the trans-Caspian pipelines. Receiving a
Turkish delegation (unrelated to the energy sector) in Ashgabat,
Niyazov offered on live television, "We can provide you with cheap gas
… I had already made such an offer to you in the past, but your
leadership was slow to act and failed to get the Turkmen gas in
time. At present, you are purchasing expensive gas and it does not
even match your demand" (Turkmen Television Channel One, March
19). Niyazov was alluding to Turkish government officials who made it
possible for Gazprom's pipeline across the Black Sea to defeat the
U.S.-proposed trans-Caspian pipeline in the race for Turkey's gas
market in 2001. Those Turkish officials have since been investigated
and indicted for having secretly agreed on onerous terms of purchase
for Russian gas.
Turkey has recently been paying 3 per one thousand cubic meters of
Russian gas, and Gazprom recently demanded a hike to 3, which Turkey
finds unacceptable (Zaman, February 2). Meanwhile, the pipeline across
the Black Sea is being underutilized while Turkey's gas market is
oversubscribed. The initial trans-Caspian project had targeted the
Turkish market as main downstream destination. In the new
circumstances, Turkey's role can change from that of a potential
consumer of Caspian gas to that of a transit country for Caspian gas
to Europe.
--Vladimir Socor
NEW TENSIONS COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN BAKU AND TEHRAN
More than 600 representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations in
49 countries assembled in Baku on March 16 for the second World
Azerbaijani Congress. The event was organized by the State Committee
on the Affairs of Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, which was established in
2003 by a decree from then-President Heydar Aliyev to help unite all
Azerbaijanis abroad.
The event was grandiose both in scale and impact. The goal of showing
the unity of millions of Azerbaijanis around the world for the sake of
an independent, strong, and prosperous Azerbaijan was achieved. The
Congress discussed issues regarding coordination among the Azerbaijani
diaspora organizations, strengthening relations with other nations'
diaspora organizations, promoting information about Azerbaijan around
the world, and building relations with foreign governments.
As a result of the Congress' work, a new strategy was developed
regarding the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora in other
countries and the joint activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish
diaspora organizations. Moreover, Congress participants adopted a
resolution addressed to Azerbaijanis around the world, foreign
governments, and international organizations regarding Armenian
aggression toward Azerbaijan.
Yet, the Congress made news not so much for its work, but for a row
that erupted between Azerbaijan and Iran after the Congress. The
Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Afshar Suleymani, reacted very
angrily and emotionally to the speeches given at the World Azerbaijani
Congress by some representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations
in Europe. These delegates called for the unification of North
Azerbaijan (the independent Republic of Azerbaijan) and South
Azerbaijan (in northern Iran, populated by Azerbaijanis and considered
by Azerbaijanis as part of a once-unified Azerbaijani state). The
speech by Javad Derekhti, an Azerbaijani from the Iranian Azerbaijan,
was particularly provocative, because he talked about human rights
violations suffered by ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran (Trend News Agency,
March 16).
The Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, which ended the three-decade
Russian-Iranian War eventually divided Azerbaijan into two parts along
the banks of the Araz River. It is estimated that more than 25 million
ethnic Azerbaijanis currently live in Iran, but they have no rights to
be educated in their native language and any attempts to organize
movements for cultural autonomy are strongly repressed by the
authorities in Tehran. Iran is extremely touchy about this issue and
has kept its distance from official Baku for most of the 1990s exactly
because of the issue of Azerbaijani separatism in Iran.
Suleymani tore into these speeches in a press release from the Iranian
embassy on March 17. "Iran is deeply upset about the participation of
some anti-Iranian elements in the Congress and their provocative
statements on the issues of Iran's domestic affairs," it read. "The
Embassy considers these steps to contradict the friendly relations
between the brotherly nations and those commitments taken by the
Azerbaijani government in the treaty of 2002, sighed in Tehran. The
Embassy is very surprised about the references at the Congress to the
Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828 and mentioning Azerbaijan as a divided
country."
The Iranian Foreign Ministry also sent a protest note to the
Azerbaijani ambassador in Iran. The row intensified after remarks by
the Iranian ambassador regarding Azerbaijani poets Nizami and
Shahriyar, whom he called "Iranian poets." This caused an immediate
protest from the Azerbaijani Writers Union, saying, "The Union deeply
regrets and is surprised that the ambassador made such remarks and
demands an immediate end to such uneducated discoveries" (APA News
Agency, March 24).
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the Iranian
ambassador's complaints by asking him to calm his emotions. Speaking
at a press conference the next day, Tahir Tagi-zadeh, the head of the
informational department of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign
Affairs said, "The speeches made at the World Azerbaijani Congress by
representative of the public organizations are their personal
opinions. The emotional speeches of the ambassadors might spoil the
cooperation based on the principles of friendship and good
neighborliness" (day.az, March 17).
Nazim Ibrahimov, head of the State Committee on the Affairs of
Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, also downplayed the significance of
speeches, saying they were private opinions of Congress
participants. "The State Committee has functioned for three years
already, and we have never interfered in the internal issues of Iran"
he explained (AzTV, March 20).
The issue continues to be a hot topic of discussion in the local
press, with a majority of Azerbaijani politicians and intelligentsia
condemning the actions of the Iranian ambassador and calling for a
renewed discussion of the human rights situation of Azerbaijanis in
Iran. Yet some diplomats and experts in the country believe that the
Iranian ambassador's remarks were intentionally aggressive, meant to
scare off the United States from using the ethnic card to weaken the
regime in Tehran.
--Fariz Ismailzade
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].
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