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Eurasia Daily Monitor - 03/15/2006

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  • Eurasia Daily Monitor - 03/15/2006

    Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
    Wednesday, March 15, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 51

    IN THIS ISSUE:
    *Kyiv revisits RosUkrEnergo's role in Gazprom deal
    *Will Russian become a second state language in Ukraine?
    *Ethnic conflict flares in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia

    ROSUKRENERGO SNEAKING BACK INTO UKRAINE

    Pending the March 26 parliamentary elections, official Kyiv has shelved
    the deeply damaging gas deals it signed on January 4 and February 2 with
    Gazprom and its offshoot RosUkrEnergo. President Viktor Yushchenko and
    those close associates who confused him into advocating for these deals
    seemed prepared to ignore the widespread criticism, until unpublicized
    U.S. intercessions finally caused the presidency to delay any decision
    until a new government is formed and to exclude the shadowy RosUkrEnergo
    from whatever agreements are eventually reached with the Russian side.
    Yushchenko has dropped the subject altogether since mid-February.

    However, indirect attempts seem to be under way to keep those deals
    alive and set the stage for reactivating them after the elections. On
    March 13, Gazprom's deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev declared that it
    will be RosUkrEnergo [not Ukraine] that will pay Gazprom for the gas
    consumed by Ukraine in January above the volume stipulated for that
    month; and that the price of that gas will be 0 per one thousand cubic
    meters -- i.e., under the terms of the January 4 agreement. In what
    looks like a parallel move, Naftohaz Ukrainy chairman Oleksiy Ivchenko
    declared that Kyiv would pay RosUkrEnergo [not Gazprom] for that same
    volume of gas, at the price of per one thousand cubic meters -- again,
    under the January 4 agreement (Inter TV, March 13).

    Taken together, these moves seem designed to keep the January 4
    agreement alive, implement at least some of its provisions, and cement
    RosUkrEnergo's role as intermediary. If this were done, Kyiv would
    severely weaken its case for dropping out of that agreement after the
    election.

    One week earlier, Ukraine's National Energy Regulatory Commission
    awarded a five-year license to the UkrGazEnergo closed joint-stock
    company to deliver gas on Ukraine's internal market. UkrGazEnergo is a
    joint venture of RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz Ukrainy and was created by
    the secret February 4 agreement that triggered a storm of criticism when
    it was leaked. Thus, Gazprom -- acting via RosUkrEnergo/UkrGazEnergo --
    is capturing a share of Ukraine's market and access to the internal
    infrastructure. The Regulatory Commission's move also seems designed to
    make certain that RosUkrEnergo via UkrGazEnergo enters Ukraine to stay
    (Interfax-Ukraine, March 9).

    The Regulatory Commission's chairman happens to be a candidate for
    parliament for the Party of Regions. However, support for RosUkrEnergo
    and UkrGazEnergo by a handful of strategically placed officials clearly
    cuts across partisan lines, given the fact that Ivchenko is Yushchenko's
    choice for Naftohaz chief and his political ally in the Our Ukraine
    bloc.

    Kyiv now apparently seeks to regain the chance to buy Turkmen gas
    directly, without corrupt intermediaries, possibly in the second half of
    2006 or at least in 2007. Ashgabat demands repayment of Ukrainian
    arrears as a pre-condition to resuming negotiations on a supply
    agreement. Ivchenko and Fuel and Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov lost that
    opportunity in the final months of 2005 -- the negotiations went down to
    the wire until December 28 -- by stonewalling on a debt-settlement
    agreement or even denying the existence of the debt. Kyiv now seems to
    change that negotiating approach and certainly the negotiator.

    On March 10-12, a delegation led by Naftohaz Ukrainy commercial director
    Anatoly Popadyuk held what appear to be conclusive debt-settlement
    negotiations in Ashgabat. The delegation acknowledged that Ukraine owed
    9 million, most of it for Turkmen gas delivered in 2005, as Ashgabat had
    all along claimed. At the end of Popadyuk's visit, the Ukrainian side
    apparently disbursed .5 million in cash, pledged to pay another million
    also in cash, and made a commitment to supply million worth of
    Ukrainian goods, including million worth of steel pipes for
    Turkmenistan's oil and gas industry (Turkmen Foreign Ministry press
    release, Turkmenistan.ru, March 12).

    This result constitutes major progress toward removing an issue that has
    poisoned Ukrainian-Turkmen relations, restricting Kyiv's margin of
    maneuver vis-à-vis Gazprom. As recently as February 17-18, Plachkov
    and Ivchenko were stonewalling on the debt issue in their talks with
    Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat. Their stance may have
    reflected their role as the main authors on the Ukrainian side of the
    January 4 and February 2 agreements with Russia. Back in Kyiv from
    Ashgabat, Ivchenko told mass media that the debt "does not exist" and
    accused Turkmenistan and its president of "displaying Eastern perfidy,"
    "humiliating Ukraine and damaging its image." Ivchenko urged Ukraine to
    "renounce Turkmen gas altogether" and stop holding talks with
    Turkmenistan, and he threatened to sue Turkmenistan in the Stockholm
    Arbitration Court for breach of contract. He assured the public that
    Ukraine would in any case receive gas for per one thousand cubic meters
    (RosUkrEnergo's price), but did not explain the reasons for such
    confidence (One Plus One Television [Kyiv], February 20).

    Just as Ivchenko's statements seemed to contradict Yushchenko's February
    14 announcement on shelving the deals with RosUkrEnergo, so the March 13
    convergent statements by Medvedev and Ivchenko and the Energy Regulatory
    Commission's licensing of UkrGazEnergo raise questions about who is in
    charge of Ukraine's energy policy and about the authority of the
    president's word with some of his officials (see EDM, February 16, 17,
    23).

    --Vladimir Socor



    UKRAINIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES CAMPAIGN FOR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

    The Russian language issue has been employed in the run-up to the March
    26 Ukrainian parliamentary election probably more actively than in any
    past poll. Unlike in previous elections, where marginal groups and
    low-key candidates played the Russian-language card, now such
    heavyweights as the frontrunner Party of Regions (PRU) has made
    elevating the status of Russian a key promise.

    "This issue has a significant conflict potential, that is why it is very
    tempting to use it in elections," Andriy Bychenko of the Razumkov Center
    think tank said, presenting the results of a December 2005 nationwide
    opinion poll on the attitudes toward the Russian language. The poll
    showed that more than 60% of Ukrainians are in favor of raising the
    status of Russian, including 37% who believe that Ukrainian and Russian
    should have equal status. The 1996 Constitution, however, does not
    provide for any status for Russian whatsoever, but stipulates that
    Ukrainian is the sole state language. Hence the high conflict potential
    and temptation to abuse the issue.

    Feelings about the Russian language are especially strong in eastern and
    southern Ukraine, including Crimea. In those areas, according to an
    April 2005 poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the
    Kyiv-based Sociology Institute, support for the idea of making Russian
    either a second state language or an official regional language hovers
    around 90%. More than half of western Ukrainians are against this,
    according to the same poll.

    The parties that regard the Russophone eastern and southern areas as
    their strongholds have been capitalizing on what they describe as the
    authorities' failure to address the Russian-language issue. In the
    current campaign, all those parties represent the opposition, while the
    national-minded west and center of Ukraine have stayed loyal to the
    parties that used to form the Orange Revolution coalition. Playing the
    Russian-language card is nothing new for the radical leftists -- the
    Communist Party (CPU) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU) of
    Natalya Vitrenko. Elevating the status of Russian to a second state
    language has always been among their main slogans. In the current
    campaign, however, they have at least two very strong rivals playing in
    the same field: the United Social Democratic Party (SDPUO) of Viktor
    Medvedchuk, who was a key aide to former president Leonid Kuchma, and
    the Party of Regions (PRU) of former presidential candidate Viktor
    Yanukovych.

    One of the main slogans of the SDPUO's campaign reads: "Against NATO,
    for the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and
    for the Russian language." The text reads more like a communist leaflet.
    The appearance of strong rivals playing in the same field is arguably
    the main reason behind dwindling popular support for the CPU and the
    PSPU. One telling example is the Russophone Donetsk Region, which was
    the main electoral base of the CPU a decade ago, but now is the
    stronghold of the PRU.

    PRU leader Viktor Yanukovych, who routinely spoke Ukrainian when he was
    prime minister in 2002-2004, ostensibly speaks Russian on his campaign
    trips. The PRU's campaign brochure "50 questions and answers" promises a
    nationwide referendum in order to give Russian "the state status, on par
    with Ukrainian," as "56% of Ukrainian citizens routinely use the Russian
    language in everyday life."

    The PRU collected 300,000 signatures for a local referendum on the
    status of the Russian language earlier this year in Crimea, which is,
    ironically, the only region where Russian actually enjoys a special
    status, according to the local constitution. Based on this, on February
    22 the Crimean parliament voted to hold a local non-binding referendum
    on the status of Russian on March 26, to coincide with the general
    elections. The Ukrainian Justice Ministry, however, warned that the
    referendum would be illegal.

    For the moment, it is not clear whether the referendum will be held at
    all. It is clear, however, that it will have no legal consequences,
    which its organizers readily admit, saying that their goal is just to
    raise public awareness of the problem. The Crimean Tatars, who back the
    government in Kyiv, will ignore the Russian language referendum, their
    leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, told Glavred web site.

    On March 6, the city council of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine voted to
    grant Russian the status of a regional language. President Yushchenko's
    legal adviser, Mykola Poludyony, said the council's decision was
    illegal, as the council had acted outside its remit. Kyiv's official
    position is that there is no Russian language problem. "This is
    speculation by certain politicians ahead of the election," Yushchenko
    said on a trip to western Ivano-Frankivsk last month. On March 11, in
    his regular weekly radio address to the nation, Yushchenko warned
    against "provoking conflicts around the language issue in the heat of
    the election campaign."

    (LIGABiznesInform, May 5, 2005; proUA.com, February 22;
    Interfax-Ukraine, February 24; Glavred.info, March 3; Itar-Tass, UT1,
    March 6; UNIAN, February 7, March 7; Ukrainian radio, March 11)

    --Oleg Varfolomeyev



    KARABAKH CONFLICT HANGS OVER GEORGIA'S ARMENIAN-POPULATED REGIONS

    Tensions are running high in Tsalka and Akhalkalaki, two regions of
    Georgia that are predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians.

    The latest problem began in Tsalka on March 9, when a trivial brawl at a
    restaurant between local Armenians and Georgians resulted in the death
    of Gevork Gevorkian, a 24-year-old Armenian, and injuries to four other
    Armenians. However, Maria Mikoyan of the Armenian Union in Georgia (Nor
    Serund) claimed that the fight began because the Georgian young men were
    irritated by the Armenian music playing in the restaurant.

    Although police have arrested five Georgian suspects, about 500 Armenian
    protesters gathered outside the Tsalka administrative building on March
    10, calling for prosecution of the suspects. On March 11, the upheaval
    spread to Akhalkalaki, a town in the predominately Armenian populated
    Samtskhe-Javakheti region in southern Georgia.

    About 300 participants in the Akhalkalaki rally were Tsalka Armenians.
    They later took their appeal to the Georgian government and demanded
    that Tbilisi "stop the policy of pressure by fueling interethnic
    tensions" and "stop the settlement of other nationalities in
    Armenian-populated regions." Later, the protesters voiced demands
    related to the right to conduct court proceedings and government
    business in the Armenian language. Specifically, they want the central
    government to make the Armenian language a state language equal to
    Georgian in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Reiterating the alleged
    threat to the rights of Armenians in Georgia, the appeal also demanded
    political autonomy for the region.

    The rally soon turned violent. The protesters, mostly youth, left the
    government building and raided a local court chamber, ousting a Georgian
    judge. They also attacked a building on Tbilisi State University's
    Akhalkalaki campus and a local Georgian Orthodox Church. Later on
    Khachatur Stepanian, a representative of the council of Armenian civic
    groups in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which organized the rally, attempted to
    soften the anxiety and called the incident a "provocation" staged by
    "someone else."

    On March 11, leaders of the public movement Multiethnic Georgia and the
    Armenian Union in Georgia complained that police had brutally dispersed
    the rally in Tsalka where "ethnic confrontation is increasingly becoming
    a reason behind crimes." They said that if tension in Tsalka and
    Samtskhe-Javakheti continues, then Tbilisi would be forced to establish
    direct presidential rule there.

    Although Georgian Public Defender Sozar Subari investigated the Tsalka
    incident and ruled it to be a "communal crime," the majority of the
    Armenian communities in these regions consider the incident to be a
    demonstration of ethnic hatred towards Armenians, which they believe is
    the result of the Georgian government's misguided policies towards
    ethnic minorities. They further alleged that Georgian law-enforcement
    agents were working in tandem with those who committed the crime.

    United Javakh, a radical Armenian organization in Samtskhe-Javakheti,
    issued a statement accusing Tbilisi of "discriminatory policies" against
    "the Armenian population of Javakh," the Armenian nomenclature for the
    region. They described the recent dismissal of the region's ethnic
    Armenian judges for ignorance of the Georgian language as "cynically
    trampling on the rights of the Armenian-populated region." Georgian
    authorities insist the judges were dismissed for misconduct.

    The United Javakh statement warned about "destructive trends in the
    Georgian government's policy" aimed at artificially creating a "climate
    of ethnic intolerance" and "crushing the will of Javakh's Armenian
    population to protect its right to live in its motherland." Finally the
    statement demands that Tbilisi show "political prudence" and put an end
    to the "infringement" of the Armenian community's rights.

    The content and tone of this and previous statements by United Javakh
    and other radical Armenian organizations reportedly have strong backing
    from political forces in Armenia. In fact, the statements recall the
    language used by the Armenian community in Karabakh in its relations
    with the Azerbaijani government before war erupted. Vardan Akopian,
    chair of the Javakh Youth organization, argued, "The current situation
    in Javakheti is a cross between situations in Nakhichevan and Karabakh."
    Several protestors explicitly cited the Karabakh precedent.

    Symptomatically, on October 8, 2005, Garnik Isagulyan, the Armenian
    president's national security advisor, bluntly warned Tbilisi to be
    "extremely cautious" with regard to Samtskhe-Javakheti "because any
    minor provocation can turn into a large-scale clash" (EDM, October 12,
    2005). Various Armenian political parties, officials, and media have
    actively discussed the problems of the Armenian community in
    Samtskhe-Javakheti. Some Armenian members of the Georgian parliament
    linked this activity with the approaching parliamentary elections in
    Armenia.

    Recently Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian released a paper on
    security issues in which he expressed concern over the situation in
    Samtskhe-Javakheti. The excessively critical tone of the Armenian
    minister towards Tbilisi's policy in Samtskhe-Javakheti reportedly
    alarmed Georgian politicians and analysts, but they preferred to stay
    tight-lipped, perhaps to avoid upsetting the already-complex
    Georgian-Armenian relationship (EDM, August 3, June 7, May 24, March 23,
    2005). Russia has tried to capitalize on the problem by fueling tensions
    in Akhalkalaki, location of a Russian military base slated for closure.

    Although the Georgian government is continuously downplaying the ethnic
    aspects of the disturbances in Armenian-populated regions, this factor
    appears to lurk beneath the surface. Georgia remains Armenia's sole
    transport route to Russia and Europe due to the ongoing blockade by
    Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus an unstable Samtskhe-Javakheti would hardly
    be a gain for Yerevan. However, the "Karabakh syndrome" should not be
    removed from the agenda.

    (Resonance, March 9, 11; Akhali Taoba, Civil Georgia, Rustavi-2, Regnum,
    vesti.ru, March 11; Imedi-TV, March 10, 11)

    --Zaal Anjaparidze

    The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
    edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
    the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
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