Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Tbilisi: Pulling Back Troops, Georgia Calls for European Help

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Tbilisi: Pulling Back Troops, Georgia Calls for European Help

    Civil Georgia, Georgia
    Aug 31 2004

    Pulling Back Troops, Georgia Calls for European Help
    by Jaba Devdariani / 2004-08-31 18:25:46
    Reposted from Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst

    President Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to pull back his troops from
    South Ossetia is almost desperate cry for the political assistance from
    the European powers. Georgia is ready to accept suboptimal solutions
    with regards to peacekeeping, but return to the pre-July status quo
    is no longer acceptable. If no definitive answer is received within
    a month, resumption of hostilities becomes likely.

    Background: On August 19, in a first offensive military operation
    since the resumption of fire in South Ossetia, Georgian special
    forces captured the strategic heights from which Georgian villages
    were pounded during almost two weeks. Despite popular calls for a
    continued offensive, Georgian authorities decided to hand over the
    heights to the tripartite peacekeeping troops and withdraw the police
    and military detachments from South Ossetia.

    Simultaneously, President Saakashvili called upon the international
    community to assist in elaborating a new format of the peace process,
    which would allow for international presence during the political
    negotiations, and for increased international military monitoring on
    the ground. The Georgian government has reiterated that the format
    of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) established in accordance with
    the 1992 peace accords is no longer acceptable, as it allows South
    Ossetia, backed by two other members - North Ossetia and Russia -
    to stonewall all Georgian proposals. Top Georgian officials also
    repeated offers of substantial autonomy for South Ossetia.

    Before Saakashvili's decision became known on August 19, Russian
    Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said there was no need for an
    international conference or any new peace process in South Ossetia,
    as the JCC format already provided for a political mechanism. The
    U.S. State Department also accepted the language of using "existing
    political mechanisms" for defusing the crisis.

    However, after the decision on troop pullout, the OSCE's ambassador to
    Georgia hinted optimism on a potential expansion of OSCE monitoring
    in South Ossetia. EU special ambassador Heikki Talvitie was visiting
    Georgia on August 23, OSCE Permanent Council members are invited
    to visit Georgia on September 5 and the president of the European
    Commission Romano Prodi is to visit Tbilisi in mid-September.

    Implications: The armed clashes in August confirmed the presence of
    armed volunteers or mercenaries that have infiltrated South Ossetia
    from Russia to fight against Georgian authorities. Following the
    most fierce exchanges of August 17-18, independent military analysts
    tend to conclude that specific night vision and sniper equipment used
    against Georgian detachments indicates either that the Russian special
    forces are participating in the clashes directly, or that they have
    been training and equipping the Ossetian military for a substantial
    period of time.

    Saakashvili is determined to engage South Ossetian de facto authorities
    in a dialogue over the political status of South Ossetia. However,
    Russia's military backing gives no incentive for the South Ossetian
    president, Eduard Kokoity, to launch such a dialogue. Simultaneously,
    Georgia has no confidence in a Russia-dominated JCC format.

    On August 18, Georgian foreign minister Salome Zourabichvili formulated
    the Georgian vision of the peace process at the OSCE Permanent Council
    session in Vienna: "demilitarization, ceasefire and direct dialogue
    [with South Ossetian authorities]." To achieve these aims, Georgia
    calls for an expanded OSCE monitoring, which should include the South
    Ossetian section of the Russo-Georgian border (Roki tunnel). Georgia
    also calls for an international conference under a OSCE/UN aegis to
    discuss the proposals for a political settlement.

    So far, the OSCE's reaction has been cautious, and the support of
    the EU and the U.S. rather lukewarm. The Russian foreign ministry
    characterized the Georgian requests to increase the OSCE role on July
    31 as "obviously unattainable" and accused OSCE monitors of siding
    with Georgians in South Ossetia. This is an interesting twist, as
    on July 8 the OSCE was accused by CIS countries (except Georgia and
    Azerbaijan) of focusing "exclusively on monitoring human rights and
    democratic institutions" in the CIS.

    The statement argued for an increased security role of the organization
    to "correct the imbalance." Strengthening the security arm of
    the OSCE (where Russia has an effective veto right) in Europe to
    counterweigh NATO is a familiar goal of Russian diplomacy since
    the mid-1990s. Still, Russia consistently objects to even OSCE
    participation in South Ossetia, apparently unwilling to dilute it
    own direct influence even to a slight extent.

    Recently, some Russian politicians commented positively on using the
    "Minsk group" format, applied to Nagorno Karabakh conflict since
    1992. The "Minsk Group" - a consultative political forum of selected
    members of the OSCE - has failed to deliver results in Nagorno
    Karabakh, not least because its mandate was blurred, its participants
    had no clear commitments, and the initiatives were at times blocked
    or ignored by Russia. Involvement of Western powers would still be
    a positive outcome for official Tbilisi, but a "Minsk Group" format
    can be one, but by no means the only new mechanism for South Ossetia.

    For Georgia, expanded OSCE involvement is a suboptimal option.
    Certainly, Tbilisi would like to see NATO or EU peacekeepers replace
    the Russian ones. Nonetheless, Saakashvili is pragmatic about
    available options. U.S. troops are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and Washington is consumed by the upcoming presidential elections.
    The EU recently took over an operation in Afghanistan and plans to
    do the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    Thus Georgia's requests to the international community are rather
    minimal: to give an international backing to the political dialogue
    by the means of a conference (Bulgaria already offered Sofia as a
    venue) and to significantly increase monitoring of South Ossetia as
    a confidence-building measure. The Russian-dominated multipartite
    peacekeeping forces are allowed to remain in South Ossetia.

    If Saakashvili fails to secure this minimal support, Tbilisi would
    not be able to restore the situation to pre-escalation status quo.
    This would mean a re-opening of the gushing smuggling from South
    Ossetia, and a major loss of face with the electorate by backtracking
    on key election commitments. There would be a strong public support
    for a military operation in South Ossetia, possibly endorsed by
    the security establishment in the government and the parliament.
    Sustained clashes will undoubtedly damage Georgia's economic reforms
    that the European powers have staked on through a Euro 1 billion
    support package. While Saakashvili-Zhvania's government is genuinely
    committed to these reforms, the issues of national security are bound
    to prevail.

    Conclusions: It would be an illusion to assume that the JCC framework
    is capable of addressing the current situation in South Ossetia.
    Georgian authorities have acted to solve the key economic (smuggling)
    and political (territorial integrity) issues by "de-frosting" the
    South Ossetian conflict and it is impossible to reset the clock to
    the situation of Spring 2004. Georgian authorities have indicated
    willingness to compromise and accept suboptimal security arrangements
    to the extent that they ensure minimal security of its citizens and
    a progress at the negotiating table.

    If the EU and OSCE shuttle diplomacy fails to deliver results within
    the coming month, resumption of hostilities could be real in mid-
    to late October.

    Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (Civil.Ge), currently
    works for the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Working...
X