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US influence seen in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan Caspian cooperation

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  • US influence seen in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan Caspian cooperation

    Paper says US influence seen in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan Caspian cooperation

    Karavan web site, Almaty
    5 Mar 04

    Text of article by Dosym Satpayev, director of the Risk Assessment
    Group, entitled "Will there be a Caspian duet?" published by Kazakh
    newspaper Karavan web site on 5 March; subheadings inserted

    While Aliyev Sr late President Heydar Aliyev was pinned to his
    hospital bed, relations between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan appeared
    temporarily frozen. Kazakhstan's participation in the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was in doubt, for example. Everyone
    understood that a presence in this project, an alternative to the
    Russian direction, could hit at relations with Moscow.

    But the meeting in Astana, at which the leaders spoke about everything
    openly and without constraint, dotted the "i's". Kazakhstan will
    supply oil by the new pipeline. But another question has arisen
    concerning security in the Caspian.

    Political scientists and economists will, following the Azerbaijani
    president's visit, set about tallying the political and economic
    benefits from the meeting. But let us, for a start, cite several
    reasons why President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev's visit attracted
    such interest.

    Reasons for interest in Azerbaijani president's visit

    First, this was his first visit to our republic as head of state.

    Second, Ilham Aliyev is a new player on the political field of Central
    Asia, and there is undoubtedly heightened interest in his person.

    Third, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as Caspian neighbours, have
    practically no contentious issues and are cooperating closely in
    various spheres.

    Fourth, this visit was indirectly linked with Caspian topics in
    various areas, be it the process of demilitarization of the Caspian or
    Kazakhstan's affiliation to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line. This was
    the main and most symbolic subject, in any event.

    Ilham Aliyev came to Kazakhstan not only as president but also as a
    lobbyist for the abovementioned oil project. He came for a specific
    answer to a specific question: when does Kazakhstan intend to become
    part of the oil pipe? This is for Azerbaijan by no means an idle
    question, since all the participants in this project long since
    arrived at the thought that without Kazakhstan the oil line will be
    simply populist.

    As the Azerbaijani expert F. Fatulla observes, "it is increasingly
    often coming to be a question of the oil in the Azerbaijani sector
    being insufficient for filling the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. But the
    problem is not only that of filling this pipeline but also of finding
    oil for the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk oil lines that are
    already operating and for two major oil refineries."

    It is not known whether Ilham Aliyev was satisfied with the response
    of the president of Kazakhstan, who in oriental fashion subtly spoke
    about Astana's interest in the successful implementation of the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, from the viewpoint of the multi-vector
    nature of oil and gas exports included. But, on the other hand,
    questions pertaining to the tariffs proposed by Kazakhstan for the
    transfer of oil, which did not satisfy Astana, remain.

    Will there be enough Kazakh oil?

    In addition, Azerbaijan, the United States, Turkey, and other
    lobbyists for the oil line could not have failed to have been alerted
    by the fact that on the threshold of Ilham Aliyev's visit the
    management of the KazMunayGaz national oil company announced its
    decision to begin implementation of the plan for the construction of a
    West Kazakhstan-Western China oil line. The legitimate question
    arises: where will Kazakh oil flow to the west or the east and will
    its quantities be sufficient for filling the two new oil lines plus
    the pipe of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which is already
    operating, simultaneously?

    Also important for Kazakhstan is the level of political risk in the
    countries through which the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line will run. The
    reference is primarily to Georgia, where the change of power has not
    reduced the political tension, between Tbilisi and the separatist
    regions included. In addition, the Chechen hotbed of instability is
    still smouldering, which is reflected in the level of security of the
    entire Caucasus region.

    Threat of terrorist attacks

    It is not surprising that during Ilham Aliyev's visit Kazakhstan
    offered to discuss an initiative for the formation of a regional
    anti-terrorist centre of Caspian states. This indicates that
    Kazakhstan takes seriously the threat of terrorist acts in the
    Caspian, which would strike primarily at the oil and gas

    >From the viewpoint of any terrorist organization, sabotage in the
    area of the Caspian could have serious consequences: incite interstate
    clashes, particularly if they are carried out in disputed oil and gas
    fields, and strike at the economic security of certain states whose
    budget depends on exports of Caspian oil. This would, naturally, cause
    a deterioration in the investment climate, which also would strike
    primarily at the economy of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

    In addition, acts of terrorism like, for example, the bombing of
    operating oil lines or tankers could give rise to serious
    environmental problems, which also could result in interstate strife.

    Distrust between Caspian states

    Another problem into which both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been
    pulled is the militarization of the Caspian. Given the geopolitical
    and geo-economic significance of the Caspian, the appearance of the
    military factor is perfectly natural. The militarization of the
    Caspian region is an objective process, which is only just beginning
    to gather speed and is more a restraining factor than an instrument of

    A principal reason for the militarization of the Caspian is the mutual
    distrust of the Caspian states, primarily Iran and Turkmenistan of
    Azerbaijan over disputed fields. Nor should we forget the
    participation in the process of militarization of the Caspian of third
    countries the United States and Turkey which is doing little to
    promote a lessening of the mistrust in this region.

    China's increased assertiveness noted

    A possible change in the balance of military-political forces in the
    Caspian having to do with the increased assertiveness of China, which
    also could provoke new interstate strife, is also giving rise to
    certain fears in the pessimists. The competition of the oil lines is
    making its contribution to the militarization also. We can agree here
    with Vardan Oskanyan, minister of foreign affairs of Armenia, who
    believes that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line
    could result in a foreign military presence in the region.

    The fruitlessness of the negotiations on the Caspian's legal status
    against the background of the start of the active development of the
    oil and gas fields in the Caspian on the part of Russia, Kazakhstan
    and Azerbaijan, and now Turkmenistan also may also be highlighted as
    being among the reasons for its militarization. The military
    reinforcement of these states is aimed at securing the efforts of
    their own and foreign oil and gas companies under the conditions of
    the current friction between Caspian states. And it is ultimately not
    a question of militarization itself but of the fact that this process
    is still moving ahead under the conditions of the uncertain legal
    status of the Caspian.

    As a result, Azerbaijan is now, not without the assistance of the
    United States and Turkey, the second military flotilla in strength
    level in the Caspian after Russia. This has given rise to a
    retaliatory response on the part of Iran and even Turkmenistan. A
    Caspian arms race has begun. And Kazakhstan has decided to join it,
    forming its own navy and military infrastructure in the Caspian,
    despite Russia protests.

    It is interesting to note that Donald Rumsfeld, who spoke in
    militarily direct fashion of the United States's interest in helping
    Kazakhstan, building up its military arsenal in this region, visited
    Kazakhstan shortly before Ilham Aliyev's visit. It is noticeable also
    that one of the agreements signed between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
    was one on cooperation in the military sphere.

    One solution is the synchronization of the military interests of the
    five Caspian states. It makes no sense to separate the security of its
    states from the security of the region as a whole.

    But this is merely a pious wish. Reality is pointing to an interesting
    situation arising. Whereas in the sphere of division of the Caspian
    along a median modified line a stable trio in the shape of Kazakhstan,
    Russia and Azerbaijan has evolved, in the military plane in the
    Caspian a Kazakh-Azerbaijani duet could emerge, specially since the
    two states are being given active assistance by Uncle Sam here.