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Armenian paper critical of government's stance in talks with OSCE mediators
Ayots Ashkar, Yerevan
15 Jul 05
Text of Sarkis Gevorkyan's report by Armenian newspaper Ayots Ashkar
on 15 July headlined "Who and how meets the co-chairmen"
The "preliminary submission" of new proposals on the settlement of
the Karabakh issue to the communities of Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nagornyy Karabakh on the eve of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen's
visit to the region proves the fact that the so-called Key West-2
[reference to talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in
Florida's Key West in 2001] programme will have much more complicated
and far-reaching goals.
Let us try to understand what is its preliminary impact on the
political and public sphere in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagornyy
Karabakh.
Azerbaijan. Our enemy has made good preparations to make the US
programme on the settlement of the Karabakh issue serve its own
purposes. The following fact proves this that instead of meeting
[Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev and [Azerbaijani Foreign Minister]
Elmar Mammadyarov, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen for about two
hours held a meeting with representatives of the so-called "executive
authorities of Shushi [Susa] and Lachin [Lacin]".
The negotiations conducted in Baku however showed that the
demonstration of Azerbaijan's "constructive stance" did not have that
big effect on the mediators. Moreover, programmes of this type, which
are aimed at "demographic aggression", cannot but have a response
in Armenia.
Thus, the negotiations in Baku showed that the leadership of Azerbaijan
was trying to benefit on the new US programme. The tense election
atmosphere in that country however hindered the use of cunning steps of
this kind. The situation is different in Armenia or Nagornyy Karabakh.
For this reason, when the co-chairmen arrived in Yerevan and
immediately left for Stepanakert [Xankandi], Baku's "constructive
stance" was replaced with an official statement about preserving
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and a hue and cry of the Azerbaijani
opposition that simply rules out the "delayed referendum".
Armenia. Neither the authorities nor the opposition tried to present
any "constructive counter evidence" at meetings with the co-chairmen.
The reason for this is that in fact the public equates the incumbent
authorities with Karabakh and the Karabakh issue. That is why, only
few people believe that at some stage the authorities may take moves
against Karabakh's vital interests.
Karabakh. Incidentally, today Stepanakert takes responsibility for
settling the problem of the liberated territories [seven Azerbaijani
districts around Karabakh occupied by Armenia] and refugees, making the
mediators realise that the levers of this problem are in its hands. At
the same time, Nagornyy Karabakh compares the problem of the possible
return of Azerbaijani refugees with the problem of the restoration
of the rights of 500,000 Armenians expelled from Azerbaijan.
Thus, the following situation occurred before the co-chairmen's Yerevan
talks: in Baku they were simply deceived, first demonstrating unlimited
constructive stance and then denying everything. In Karabakh, it was
explained to the co-chairmen that everything they were negotiating
about was, in fact, under Karabakh's control and therefore they have
to deal with Stepanakert.
In this case, how should the co-chairmen be met here in Yerevan? We
think Yerevan should draw attention of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen
to the following:
a) to demand that talks must be conducted with representatives of the
executive authorities of Shaumyan and Getashen districts of Karabakh
[Azerbaijan's Goranboy District and Caykand village respectively]
as only logical counter-balance to the fact that they had a meeting
with representatives of the "Shushi and Lachin executive authorities";
b) to stress that it is absolutely unacceptable for Yerevan to mention
the point about the opening of the border with Armenia by Turkey in
any agreement on the Karabakh settlement as Turkey may use it as a
serious lever to exert pressure on Armenia in the Karabakh issue;
c) to explain to the co-chairmen that it is impossible for the
Karabakh authorities to separately resolve the problem of the liberated
territories and refugees' return.
After presenting these three principled problems, Armenia could freely
demonstrate its readiness to accept suggestions of the co-chairmen
and put entire responsibility for the future of the said US programme
on the conflict settlement on the Azerbaijani side.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Ayots Ashkar, Yerevan
15 Jul 05
Text of Sarkis Gevorkyan's report by Armenian newspaper Ayots Ashkar
on 15 July headlined "Who and how meets the co-chairmen"
The "preliminary submission" of new proposals on the settlement of
the Karabakh issue to the communities of Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nagornyy Karabakh on the eve of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen's
visit to the region proves the fact that the so-called Key West-2
[reference to talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in
Florida's Key West in 2001] programme will have much more complicated
and far-reaching goals.
Let us try to understand what is its preliminary impact on the
political and public sphere in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagornyy
Karabakh.
Azerbaijan. Our enemy has made good preparations to make the US
programme on the settlement of the Karabakh issue serve its own
purposes. The following fact proves this that instead of meeting
[Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev and [Azerbaijani Foreign Minister]
Elmar Mammadyarov, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen for about two
hours held a meeting with representatives of the so-called "executive
authorities of Shushi [Susa] and Lachin [Lacin]".
The negotiations conducted in Baku however showed that the
demonstration of Azerbaijan's "constructive stance" did not have that
big effect on the mediators. Moreover, programmes of this type, which
are aimed at "demographic aggression", cannot but have a response
in Armenia.
Thus, the negotiations in Baku showed that the leadership of Azerbaijan
was trying to benefit on the new US programme. The tense election
atmosphere in that country however hindered the use of cunning steps of
this kind. The situation is different in Armenia or Nagornyy Karabakh.
For this reason, when the co-chairmen arrived in Yerevan and
immediately left for Stepanakert [Xankandi], Baku's "constructive
stance" was replaced with an official statement about preserving
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and a hue and cry of the Azerbaijani
opposition that simply rules out the "delayed referendum".
Armenia. Neither the authorities nor the opposition tried to present
any "constructive counter evidence" at meetings with the co-chairmen.
The reason for this is that in fact the public equates the incumbent
authorities with Karabakh and the Karabakh issue. That is why, only
few people believe that at some stage the authorities may take moves
against Karabakh's vital interests.
Karabakh. Incidentally, today Stepanakert takes responsibility for
settling the problem of the liberated territories [seven Azerbaijani
districts around Karabakh occupied by Armenia] and refugees, making the
mediators realise that the levers of this problem are in its hands. At
the same time, Nagornyy Karabakh compares the problem of the possible
return of Azerbaijani refugees with the problem of the restoration
of the rights of 500,000 Armenians expelled from Azerbaijan.
Thus, the following situation occurred before the co-chairmen's Yerevan
talks: in Baku they were simply deceived, first demonstrating unlimited
constructive stance and then denying everything. In Karabakh, it was
explained to the co-chairmen that everything they were negotiating
about was, in fact, under Karabakh's control and therefore they have
to deal with Stepanakert.
In this case, how should the co-chairmen be met here in Yerevan? We
think Yerevan should draw attention of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen
to the following:
a) to demand that talks must be conducted with representatives of the
executive authorities of Shaumyan and Getashen districts of Karabakh
[Azerbaijan's Goranboy District and Caykand village respectively]
as only logical counter-balance to the fact that they had a meeting
with representatives of the "Shushi and Lachin executive authorities";
b) to stress that it is absolutely unacceptable for Yerevan to mention
the point about the opening of the border with Armenia by Turkey in
any agreement on the Karabakh settlement as Turkey may use it as a
serious lever to exert pressure on Armenia in the Karabakh issue;
c) to explain to the co-chairmen that it is impossible for the
Karabakh authorities to separately resolve the problem of the liberated
territories and refugees' return.
After presenting these three principled problems, Armenia could freely
demonstrate its readiness to accept suggestions of the co-chairmen
and put entire responsibility for the future of the said US programme
on the conflict settlement on the Azerbaijani side.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress