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Azerbaijan: From Showmanship To Brinkmanship
By Liz Fuller
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, Czech Rep.
Sept 2 2005
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for 6 November,
Azerbaijani leaders face an unenviable dilemma.
On the one hand, they are under pressure from the Council of Europe,
the OSCE, and the United States to avoid the egregious violations
and outright falsification that marred the elections of 1995, 1998,
2000, and 2003 and to deliver on their repeated pledges that this
time around the vote will be transparent, free, and fair. And, on the
other hand, they need to secure a comfortable parliamentary majority
for the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party without sparking postelections
protests on the lines of those that over the past two years have
toppled entrenched regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The
tactics and strategy selected to achieve that objective appear to
contain elements of both showmanship and brinkmanship.
Showmanship
On 11 May, President Ilham Aliyev issued a decree outlining measures to
improve the conduct of elections. The preamble to that decree admitted
that contrary to the "political will" of the Azerbaijani authorities,
previous elections were marred by "illegalities," but it blamed those
irregularities on the "lack of professionalism" and "post-Soviet
mentality" of individual local officials and election commission
members. (No effort has been made over the past two years to identify
the individuals responsible for those "irregularities" and bring them
to justice.) The first of 11 measures listed in President Aliyev's
decree and intended to prevent a recurrence of procedural violations
entailed programs to raise the professionalism and competence of the
officials responsible for the organization of the election process
and the vote count; the second was a warning to those officials
that they will be held legally responsible for any infringements
of the Election Law, such as hampering electioneering by opposition
candidates or intervening in the voting process or vote count. The
Azerbaijani leadership is thus apparently seeking to offload in advance
the blame for possible violations on to regional officials, who will
have to calculate which offense will be perceived as greater: failing
to ensure at all costs the victory of the ruling party's candidate,
or risking their superiors' opprobrium should international observers
register and publicly condemn malpractice in voting stations under
their jurisdiction.The final list of candidates is to be announced on
7 September, and manifestations of both brinkmanship and "black PR"
are likely to multiply in the two months remaining before the election.
A third provision of President Aliyev's decree, ostensibly intended to
contribute to the fairness of the election process, is the provision
for the conduct of exit polls. Paradoxically, however, this provision
could have the opposite effect if voters in rural areas, fearful of
the wrath of the local authorities, claim to have voted for the YAP
candidate when in fact they cast their votes for a member of the
opposition. A glaring discrepancy between the actual division of
ballots cast and the exit-poll results could impel local election
commission members to bring the "official" tally into line with the
inaccurate exit-poll data.
Further aspects of the election campaign to date that could be
construed as manifestations of showmanship include the lifting of
long-standing restrictions on holding opposition demonstrations in
Baku; registration of several controversial opposition candidates,
first and foremost former parliamentary speaker Rasul Guliev; the
MSK's 12 August appeal to the Armenian population of the breakaway
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to register to elect a candidate
to represent the enclave in the next Azerbaijani parliament; and
the belated launch, on 29 August, of a nominally independent public
television station whose mandate requires it to provide equal access
to both pro-government and opposition parliamentary candidates. On
the same day as the MSK announced Guliev's registration, the office of
Azerbaijan's prosecutor-general declared that it has stripped Guliev
of his immunity from prosecution. Should he return to Baku from the
United States, as he has pledged to do, he consequently risks arrest
on charges of large-scale embezzlement.
Following the 11 May presidential decree, in late June, under pressure
from the international community, Azerbaijan's parliament adopted
43 amendments proposed by President Aliyev to the existing election
law. Those amendments did not, however, include the most important
changes called for by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, nor
did they increase opposition representation on election commissions at
all levels, as the opposition had demanded. (The opposition demanded
equal representation on election commissions, which the authorities
rejected, accusing the opposition of thus seeking to prevent such
commissions from adopting any decisions. Presidential-administration
head Ramiiz Mekhtiev told day.az on 23 July that the opposition's
objective in demanding equal representation was the desire to be in a
position to paralyze the functioning of election commissions and thus
sabotage the entire election process. The Council of Europe called
for appointing an additional opposition representative to the MSK to
give a total of seven opposition and nine pro-government members.)
..And Brinkmanship .
The presidential administration appears to regard the combined
provisions of the presidential decree and the amended election
law as a panacea against election fraud -- provided lower-level
bureaucrats abide by its provisions. Proceeding from that conviction,
the Azerbaijani leadership has apparently switched from showmanship
to brinkmanship, arguing that additional measures to preclude fraud
are unnecessary. For example, Ali Hasanov, who heads the political
department within the presidential administration, told day.az on
1 September that the authorities do not consider it necessary to
accede to the proposal, made most recently during a visit to Baku
late last month by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) Chairman Rene van der Linden, to mark voters' fingers with
indelible ink to prevent multiple voting.
Further, uglier manifestations of brinkmanship include the recourse
for the first time in an Azerbaijani election to "doubles," meaning
the nomination in a given constituency of additional candidates
with the same name as a prominent oppositionist. The first target
for such confusion is former presidential adviser Edar Namazov,
one of the leaders of the opposition alliance Yeni Siyaset, who will
compete against two namesakes in a Baku constituency. The questionable
allegations of collusion with Armenian special services brought by
the Prosecutor-General's Office against Ruslan Bashirli, chairman
of the opposition youth movement Yeni Fikir, fall into the same
category. Allegations of treason by association were subsequently
brought against Bashirli's mentor Ali Kerimli, chairman of the
progressive wing of Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, one of three
opposition parties aligned in the Azadlyg bloc. Some observers
have construed the vilification campaign launched against Kerimli
as an attempt to split Azadlyg by creating the impression that the
authorities consider Kerimli, rather than fellow Azadlyg leader and
Musavat party Chairman Isa Gambar (who lost to President Aliyev in the
October 2003 presidential ballot), as the most popular and influential
candidate, and by extension as a threat to be neutralized.
The final list of candidates is to be announced on 7 September;
manifestations of both brinkmanship and "black PR" are likely to
multiply in the two months remaining before the election.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Liz Fuller
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, Czech Rep.
Sept 2 2005
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for 6 November,
Azerbaijani leaders face an unenviable dilemma.
On the one hand, they are under pressure from the Council of Europe,
the OSCE, and the United States to avoid the egregious violations
and outright falsification that marred the elections of 1995, 1998,
2000, and 2003 and to deliver on their repeated pledges that this
time around the vote will be transparent, free, and fair. And, on the
other hand, they need to secure a comfortable parliamentary majority
for the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party without sparking postelections
protests on the lines of those that over the past two years have
toppled entrenched regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The
tactics and strategy selected to achieve that objective appear to
contain elements of both showmanship and brinkmanship.
Showmanship
On 11 May, President Ilham Aliyev issued a decree outlining measures to
improve the conduct of elections. The preamble to that decree admitted
that contrary to the "political will" of the Azerbaijani authorities,
previous elections were marred by "illegalities," but it blamed those
irregularities on the "lack of professionalism" and "post-Soviet
mentality" of individual local officials and election commission
members. (No effort has been made over the past two years to identify
the individuals responsible for those "irregularities" and bring them
to justice.) The first of 11 measures listed in President Aliyev's
decree and intended to prevent a recurrence of procedural violations
entailed programs to raise the professionalism and competence of the
officials responsible for the organization of the election process
and the vote count; the second was a warning to those officials
that they will be held legally responsible for any infringements
of the Election Law, such as hampering electioneering by opposition
candidates or intervening in the voting process or vote count. The
Azerbaijani leadership is thus apparently seeking to offload in advance
the blame for possible violations on to regional officials, who will
have to calculate which offense will be perceived as greater: failing
to ensure at all costs the victory of the ruling party's candidate,
or risking their superiors' opprobrium should international observers
register and publicly condemn malpractice in voting stations under
their jurisdiction.The final list of candidates is to be announced on
7 September, and manifestations of both brinkmanship and "black PR"
are likely to multiply in the two months remaining before the election.
A third provision of President Aliyev's decree, ostensibly intended to
contribute to the fairness of the election process, is the provision
for the conduct of exit polls. Paradoxically, however, this provision
could have the opposite effect if voters in rural areas, fearful of
the wrath of the local authorities, claim to have voted for the YAP
candidate when in fact they cast their votes for a member of the
opposition. A glaring discrepancy between the actual division of
ballots cast and the exit-poll results could impel local election
commission members to bring the "official" tally into line with the
inaccurate exit-poll data.
Further aspects of the election campaign to date that could be
construed as manifestations of showmanship include the lifting of
long-standing restrictions on holding opposition demonstrations in
Baku; registration of several controversial opposition candidates,
first and foremost former parliamentary speaker Rasul Guliev; the
MSK's 12 August appeal to the Armenian population of the breakaway
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to register to elect a candidate
to represent the enclave in the next Azerbaijani parliament; and
the belated launch, on 29 August, of a nominally independent public
television station whose mandate requires it to provide equal access
to both pro-government and opposition parliamentary candidates. On
the same day as the MSK announced Guliev's registration, the office of
Azerbaijan's prosecutor-general declared that it has stripped Guliev
of his immunity from prosecution. Should he return to Baku from the
United States, as he has pledged to do, he consequently risks arrest
on charges of large-scale embezzlement.
Following the 11 May presidential decree, in late June, under pressure
from the international community, Azerbaijan's parliament adopted
43 amendments proposed by President Aliyev to the existing election
law. Those amendments did not, however, include the most important
changes called for by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, nor
did they increase opposition representation on election commissions at
all levels, as the opposition had demanded. (The opposition demanded
equal representation on election commissions, which the authorities
rejected, accusing the opposition of thus seeking to prevent such
commissions from adopting any decisions. Presidential-administration
head Ramiiz Mekhtiev told day.az on 23 July that the opposition's
objective in demanding equal representation was the desire to be in a
position to paralyze the functioning of election commissions and thus
sabotage the entire election process. The Council of Europe called
for appointing an additional opposition representative to the MSK to
give a total of seven opposition and nine pro-government members.)
..And Brinkmanship .
The presidential administration appears to regard the combined
provisions of the presidential decree and the amended election
law as a panacea against election fraud -- provided lower-level
bureaucrats abide by its provisions. Proceeding from that conviction,
the Azerbaijani leadership has apparently switched from showmanship
to brinkmanship, arguing that additional measures to preclude fraud
are unnecessary. For example, Ali Hasanov, who heads the political
department within the presidential administration, told day.az on
1 September that the authorities do not consider it necessary to
accede to the proposal, made most recently during a visit to Baku
late last month by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) Chairman Rene van der Linden, to mark voters' fingers with
indelible ink to prevent multiple voting.
Further, uglier manifestations of brinkmanship include the recourse
for the first time in an Azerbaijani election to "doubles," meaning
the nomination in a given constituency of additional candidates
with the same name as a prominent oppositionist. The first target
for such confusion is former presidential adviser Edar Namazov,
one of the leaders of the opposition alliance Yeni Siyaset, who will
compete against two namesakes in a Baku constituency. The questionable
allegations of collusion with Armenian special services brought by
the Prosecutor-General's Office against Ruslan Bashirli, chairman
of the opposition youth movement Yeni Fikir, fall into the same
category. Allegations of treason by association were subsequently
brought against Bashirli's mentor Ali Kerimli, chairman of the
progressive wing of Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, one of three
opposition parties aligned in the Azadlyg bloc. Some observers
have construed the vilification campaign launched against Kerimli
as an attempt to split Azadlyg by creating the impression that the
authorities consider Kerimli, rather than fellow Azadlyg leader and
Musavat party Chairman Isa Gambar (who lost to President Aliyev in the
October 2003 presidential ballot), as the most popular and influential
candidate, and by extension as a threat to be neutralized.
The final list of candidates is to be announced on 7 September;
manifestations of both brinkmanship and "black PR" are likely to
multiply in the two months remaining before the election.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress