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WHILE PARTNERS ARE IN HIGH DEMAND:
RUSSIA'S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH CIS COUNTRIES IS PLAYING AN EVER INCREASING ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by: Vladimir Semenchenko
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 13, April 4 - 10, 2007, p. 2
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 11, 2007 Wednesday
The Shape And Prospects Of Military-Technical Cooperation In The Commonwealth;
Analysis of military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth.
The Russian military-industrial complex is playing a major role in the
maintenance of the defense capability of the country and as a supplier
of military hardware to CIS states and distant foreign countries. As
a matter of fact, the military-technical cooperation is attaining
additional importance within the framework of international relations.
Russia's military-technical cooperation with CIS countries is
particularly close.
Some experts say that without the cooperation of CIS countries,
Russia will be able to produce only 17% of what military hardware
and double purpose products it is currently making. In fact, this
is the best parameter in all of the Commonwealth. The preservation
and advancement of military-technical contacts with CIS countries is
therefore the best optimal solution.
Its Nagorno-Karabakh problem unsolved, Armenia is doing what it can
to advance its defense capabilities. Unfortunately for Yerevan, the
capacities of the practically nonexistent national military-industrial
complex and budget are quite limited. The role played by Russia
therefore cannot be overestimated. Armenia procures all military
hardware from Russia. The term "outsorting" applies here, the practice
of leaving fringe functions to another organization. The Armenian
military-industrial complex has been receiving Russian contracts
since 2006. In fact, all these exercises were turned over to Russia
completely, as payment for the Armenian state debt.
Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan entered
a new phase on November 14, 2005, with the signing of the Treaty
on Relations of Allies. Article 10 of the Treaty states that
"the signatories pledge to actively interact in modernization
and reorganization of the armed forces and their rearmament with
modern hardware." According to official estimates, the Russian-Uzbek
military-technical cooperation amounted to dozens millions dollars by
2006. Russia is selling this former Soviet republic weapons, aircraft,
antiaircraft means, munitions, and spares. When Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov visited Uzbekistan in March 2007, Moscow and Tashkent agreed
to establish Uzrosavia, a joint venture where the Russian share in
the registered capital was to amount to at least 51%.
Azerbaijan established the Defense Industry Ministry. Its plans
include the production of light weapons and light artillery pieces.
Where it intends to find the personnel, however, remains to be seen.
The Azerbaijani regular army is using Russian military hardware
nowadays, which means services by the Russian military-industrial
complex. This country in the meantime is building up its military
potential and making an emphasis on NATO hardware. Negotiations are
under way with the United States over three patrol ships and the
construction of radars on the territory of Azerbaijan. In any case,
Azerbaijan remains a staunch promoter of a well-balanced policy with
regard to Russia, Iran, and the United States. The Azerbaijani-Russian
military-technical cooperation will probably remain unchanged.
Military-technical cooperation with Kyrgyzstan is in a decline.
Russia has been losing political clout with the region in general
and military-economic influence along with it. Pro-American moods
are taking root in Central Asia. The situation with Tajikistan is
more or less similar but will hopefully clarify soon.
The Ukraine's position is somewhat controversial. The country of a
colossal scientific potential, envious geopolitical location, and a
broad spectrum of international contacts is at a loss over the choice
of political priorities. Some Ukrainian leaders would like to see
their country in NATO. What will it mean for the national economy?
First, membership in NATO is expensive. It will certainly require
additional investments in production (approximately 246.45 million
grivnas). Second, all of the military hardware will have to be
converted to NATO standards. Third, membership in NATO will leave
the Ukraine in the position of Poland. A country with a modern and
advanced military-industrial complex, it has nothing it could offer
its NATO partners. Compelled to stick to NATO standards, Warsaw is
buying weapons and military hardware elsewhere. It paid $1.1 million
for 690 armored personnel carriers from Finland.
It is common knowledge that the United States tolerates no rivals in
the sphere of military hardware. The Ukraine is a fine example. Not
even a NATO country yet, it is forced to abandon a whole assortment
of weapons including portable antiaircraft complexes like Strela-2
and others that are much more effective than the American Stingers.
In December 2005, Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister,
announced in no uncertain terms that entry into NATO would mean the
severance of industrial cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian
military-industrial complexes. Their existing symbiosis nowadays
is what keeps Ukraine on the list of five worldwide largest arms
exporters. Let Kiev think this over.
According to political scientists (including Stanislav Belkovsky),
all of that indicates that Ukraine cannot hope to create its
own military-industrial complex geared for NATO standards in the
foreseeable future and that cooperation with Russia will therefore
survive. And yet, Russia is gradually curtailing its economic contacts
with the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Last May, Russia even
withdrew from the joint Russian-Ukrainian AN-70 project.
It is proof that Ukraine had better think twice.
Despite the somewhat souring political relations between Moscow
and Minsk, military-technical cooperation with Belarus is quite
impressive. Two regiments of S-300PS antiaircraft complexes were
delivered to Belarus in April 2006 within the framework of the joint
Russian-Belarussian antiaircraft defense system. The complexes will be
deployed in the western part of the republic. It will make the killing
zone 150 kilometers wider. Where Russia is concerned, deliveries of
the antiaircraft complexes offer an additional entry into the national
economy and better airspace security. As for Belarus, Minsk provides
Liga-S combined sights for PT-76 floating tanks modernized in Moscow
(by Special Mechanic Engineering and Metallurgy).
The state of affairs with military-technical cooperation with
Kazakhstan is fine too. Its regular army is using military hardware of
Soviet vintage as well as what is being bought from Russia nowadays. In
the meantime, Kazakhstan itself is in the position to offer to the
Third World somewhat outdated Soviet military hardware - aircraft,
helicopters, tanks, light weapons, haulers, and jammers. In other
words, it is a potential rival of Russia in the sphere of arms
export. Even worse, this export may mount tension in the already
problematic region.
Kazakhstan's potential in the sphere of military hardware production
is quite impressive, particularly where Naval gear is concerned. This
particular segment is of particular interest to Russia. The Gidromash
factory in Alma-Ata makes APR-3 ASW missiles, Kuibyshev factory in
Petropavlovsk produces antiship mines (MTPK-2, Langust-Schuka, and
Krechet), Mechanical Engineering in Alma-Ata 65-75A torpedoes, Zenith
in Uralsk trawls and mine-seekers, Kirov factory in Petropavlovsk
radios for the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces... It may be mentioned
here that Naval gear accounts for a substantial part of arms export
from Russia. Kazakh enterprises are running at 25-30% their capacities
nowadays, and placement of Russian contracts there will benefit both
countries handsomely. Hence the conclusion: joint Russian-Kazakh work
on weapons and military hardware for their own safety and export is
better than rivalry in the world market in the sphere of sales of
outdated Soviet military hardware. Fradkov confirmed it on his visit
to Kazakhstan recently. Moscow and Astana agreed to activate the work
and prepare a number of accords for the signing by presidents.
Countries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization may
retain the existing economic ties and establish new ones in weapons
and military hardware design and development. It stands to reason to
expect that military hardware will soon be mutually produced. It will
ease the financial burden on every individual participant, allow for
mass production, and facilitate export capacities.
Maintenance (the availability of spare parts) of the weapons and
military hardware is another problem. The matter concerns the gear
still produced in some nearby foreign countries or that of Soviet
vintage. The construction of new factories to produce spare parts
for the weapons that will be hopelessly outmoded in 5-10 years is of
course inexpedient. The preservation of the existing economic ties
is therefore the answer, at least for the politically loyal countries.
Belarus and Kazakhstan will certainly remain partners in the
foreseeable future.
In other words, an analysis of the shape and prospects of
military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth in the near
future leads to the conclusion that Russia - potentially - remains
the nucleus of CIS military-industrial complex.
RUSSIA'S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH CIS COUNTRIES IS PLAYING AN EVER INCREASING ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by: Vladimir Semenchenko
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 13, April 4 - 10, 2007, p. 2
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 11, 2007 Wednesday
The Shape And Prospects Of Military-Technical Cooperation In The Commonwealth;
Analysis of military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth.
The Russian military-industrial complex is playing a major role in the
maintenance of the defense capability of the country and as a supplier
of military hardware to CIS states and distant foreign countries. As
a matter of fact, the military-technical cooperation is attaining
additional importance within the framework of international relations.
Russia's military-technical cooperation with CIS countries is
particularly close.
Some experts say that without the cooperation of CIS countries,
Russia will be able to produce only 17% of what military hardware
and double purpose products it is currently making. In fact, this
is the best parameter in all of the Commonwealth. The preservation
and advancement of military-technical contacts with CIS countries is
therefore the best optimal solution.
Its Nagorno-Karabakh problem unsolved, Armenia is doing what it can
to advance its defense capabilities. Unfortunately for Yerevan, the
capacities of the practically nonexistent national military-industrial
complex and budget are quite limited. The role played by Russia
therefore cannot be overestimated. Armenia procures all military
hardware from Russia. The term "outsorting" applies here, the practice
of leaving fringe functions to another organization. The Armenian
military-industrial complex has been receiving Russian contracts
since 2006. In fact, all these exercises were turned over to Russia
completely, as payment for the Armenian state debt.
Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan entered
a new phase on November 14, 2005, with the signing of the Treaty
on Relations of Allies. Article 10 of the Treaty states that
"the signatories pledge to actively interact in modernization
and reorganization of the armed forces and their rearmament with
modern hardware." According to official estimates, the Russian-Uzbek
military-technical cooperation amounted to dozens millions dollars by
2006. Russia is selling this former Soviet republic weapons, aircraft,
antiaircraft means, munitions, and spares. When Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov visited Uzbekistan in March 2007, Moscow and Tashkent agreed
to establish Uzrosavia, a joint venture where the Russian share in
the registered capital was to amount to at least 51%.
Azerbaijan established the Defense Industry Ministry. Its plans
include the production of light weapons and light artillery pieces.
Where it intends to find the personnel, however, remains to be seen.
The Azerbaijani regular army is using Russian military hardware
nowadays, which means services by the Russian military-industrial
complex. This country in the meantime is building up its military
potential and making an emphasis on NATO hardware. Negotiations are
under way with the United States over three patrol ships and the
construction of radars on the territory of Azerbaijan. In any case,
Azerbaijan remains a staunch promoter of a well-balanced policy with
regard to Russia, Iran, and the United States. The Azerbaijani-Russian
military-technical cooperation will probably remain unchanged.
Military-technical cooperation with Kyrgyzstan is in a decline.
Russia has been losing political clout with the region in general
and military-economic influence along with it. Pro-American moods
are taking root in Central Asia. The situation with Tajikistan is
more or less similar but will hopefully clarify soon.
The Ukraine's position is somewhat controversial. The country of a
colossal scientific potential, envious geopolitical location, and a
broad spectrum of international contacts is at a loss over the choice
of political priorities. Some Ukrainian leaders would like to see
their country in NATO. What will it mean for the national economy?
First, membership in NATO is expensive. It will certainly require
additional investments in production (approximately 246.45 million
grivnas). Second, all of the military hardware will have to be
converted to NATO standards. Third, membership in NATO will leave
the Ukraine in the position of Poland. A country with a modern and
advanced military-industrial complex, it has nothing it could offer
its NATO partners. Compelled to stick to NATO standards, Warsaw is
buying weapons and military hardware elsewhere. It paid $1.1 million
for 690 armored personnel carriers from Finland.
It is common knowledge that the United States tolerates no rivals in
the sphere of military hardware. The Ukraine is a fine example. Not
even a NATO country yet, it is forced to abandon a whole assortment
of weapons including portable antiaircraft complexes like Strela-2
and others that are much more effective than the American Stingers.
In December 2005, Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister,
announced in no uncertain terms that entry into NATO would mean the
severance of industrial cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian
military-industrial complexes. Their existing symbiosis nowadays
is what keeps Ukraine on the list of five worldwide largest arms
exporters. Let Kiev think this over.
According to political scientists (including Stanislav Belkovsky),
all of that indicates that Ukraine cannot hope to create its
own military-industrial complex geared for NATO standards in the
foreseeable future and that cooperation with Russia will therefore
survive. And yet, Russia is gradually curtailing its economic contacts
with the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Last May, Russia even
withdrew from the joint Russian-Ukrainian AN-70 project.
It is proof that Ukraine had better think twice.
Despite the somewhat souring political relations between Moscow
and Minsk, military-technical cooperation with Belarus is quite
impressive. Two regiments of S-300PS antiaircraft complexes were
delivered to Belarus in April 2006 within the framework of the joint
Russian-Belarussian antiaircraft defense system. The complexes will be
deployed in the western part of the republic. It will make the killing
zone 150 kilometers wider. Where Russia is concerned, deliveries of
the antiaircraft complexes offer an additional entry into the national
economy and better airspace security. As for Belarus, Minsk provides
Liga-S combined sights for PT-76 floating tanks modernized in Moscow
(by Special Mechanic Engineering and Metallurgy).
The state of affairs with military-technical cooperation with
Kazakhstan is fine too. Its regular army is using military hardware of
Soviet vintage as well as what is being bought from Russia nowadays. In
the meantime, Kazakhstan itself is in the position to offer to the
Third World somewhat outdated Soviet military hardware - aircraft,
helicopters, tanks, light weapons, haulers, and jammers. In other
words, it is a potential rival of Russia in the sphere of arms
export. Even worse, this export may mount tension in the already
problematic region.
Kazakhstan's potential in the sphere of military hardware production
is quite impressive, particularly where Naval gear is concerned. This
particular segment is of particular interest to Russia. The Gidromash
factory in Alma-Ata makes APR-3 ASW missiles, Kuibyshev factory in
Petropavlovsk produces antiship mines (MTPK-2, Langust-Schuka, and
Krechet), Mechanical Engineering in Alma-Ata 65-75A torpedoes, Zenith
in Uralsk trawls and mine-seekers, Kirov factory in Petropavlovsk
radios for the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces... It may be mentioned
here that Naval gear accounts for a substantial part of arms export
from Russia. Kazakh enterprises are running at 25-30% their capacities
nowadays, and placement of Russian contracts there will benefit both
countries handsomely. Hence the conclusion: joint Russian-Kazakh work
on weapons and military hardware for their own safety and export is
better than rivalry in the world market in the sphere of sales of
outdated Soviet military hardware. Fradkov confirmed it on his visit
to Kazakhstan recently. Moscow and Astana agreed to activate the work
and prepare a number of accords for the signing by presidents.
Countries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization may
retain the existing economic ties and establish new ones in weapons
and military hardware design and development. It stands to reason to
expect that military hardware will soon be mutually produced. It will
ease the financial burden on every individual participant, allow for
mass production, and facilitate export capacities.
Maintenance (the availability of spare parts) of the weapons and
military hardware is another problem. The matter concerns the gear
still produced in some nearby foreign countries or that of Soviet
vintage. The construction of new factories to produce spare parts
for the weapons that will be hopelessly outmoded in 5-10 years is of
course inexpedient. The preservation of the existing economic ties
is therefore the answer, at least for the politically loyal countries.
Belarus and Kazakhstan will certainly remain partners in the
foreseeable future.
In other words, an analysis of the shape and prospects of
military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth in the near
future leads to the conclusion that Russia - potentially - remains
the nucleus of CIS military-industrial complex.