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EU: RISKING AN EMANCIPATED TURKEY
International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Switzerland
April 17 2007
While the EU has accepted Turkey's return to accession negotiations,
the bloc should abstain from future provocation or paternalism or
it could risk losing Turkey, harming its engagement in the Southern
Caucasus
In December last year, EU leaders decided to temporarily suspend
eight of Turkey's 35 accession negotiation chapters due to Ankara's
failure to open its ports to trade from the EU. This major setback
coincided with the French National Assembly's approval of a bill a
few months earlier criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide
at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in 1915.
There is a widespread feeling in Turkish society that the process
of accession negotiations is highly influenced by the political
climate and by domestic considerations on the part of the EU member
states ¬- a perception that makes even the modern Turkish youth (who
generally tend towards pro-European attitudes) suspicious of joining
the Western club. Unfortunately, this is a development that has gone
largely unnoticed in Europe.
However, to the astonishment of many Europeans, Ankara - having
initially felt snubbed and frustrated - seems to have recovered
quickly from this backlash. It is evident today that Turkey is more
comfortable with the idea of an open-ended negotiation process and
that it is acting more independently.
Recently, Turkey has shifted its focus away from the official
timetables for accession talks with Brussels and has instead embarked
upon reforms on the basis of its own priorities. Turkey's ruling party
is also resisting pressure from Brussels to complete its third national
plan detailing steps to adopt EU political and economic standards:
Instead of the binding plan, it presented a road map covering the
period from 2007-2013.
It is therefore time for the EU to pay closer attention to the
emancipation process that is currently underway in Turkey.
A new elite has come to power that is questioning the decades-old
dominant paradigm of Turkey's pro-Western orientation. This more
religious elite is also less critical of Turkey's Ottoman past.
Moreover, economic stabilization has considerably increased Turkish
self-confidence.
When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on 27 March - when
the EU accepted Turkey's return to the accession negotiation table -
that Ankara was not concerned about the prospect not joining the EU,
he sent a clear message to Brussels that Turkey sees alternatives
to EU membership. Turkey's relations with Russia, for example, have
improved exponentially since President Vladimir Putin's official visit
to Ankara in December 2004 and the announcement of a "multidimensional
partnership."
Brussel s cannot afford further faux pas like the failure to invite
Turkey to the celebration of the anniversary of the EU's founding last
month unless it wants to incur the risk that Turkey might drift away.
The EU is especially seeking to perform a political and security role
in regions such as the Balkans, Russia and the Mediterranean, including
the Middle East. However, the Southern Caucasus also has become a key
priority of the German EU presidency. In February, German Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier embarked on a tour of the region,
saying that his "visit was intended to give a clear signal that the
EU wants to make a stronger commitment to the Southern Caucasus."
A disaffected Turkey that is hostile toward Europe would, however,
have a detrimental effect on the EU's engagement in the region. This
is all the more true since Turkey has traditionally perceived this
region as in its own sphere of influence. Even today, Ankara remains
very suspicious about US or EU interference in the region. When US
officials called last year for NATO to operate in the Black Sea to
combat terrorism and smuggling, the idea was strongly opposed not
only by Russia, but also by NATO member Turkey as well.
Moreover, the strengthening Turkish-Russian relationship is an
important factor for developments in the Southern Caucasus. Any US
or EU attempt to change the status quo in the region is followed
with great attention and mutual consultation in the capitals of both
countries. It is therefore questionable to what extent they would
accept attempts by the EU to act as an important mediator in the
delicate resolution of the "frozen conflicts" in that region, for
example, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniester.
A dispute with Turkey could considerably increase the risk of a
clash between the EU's ambitions to take on a larger role as a
security actor and Turkey's increasing presence in the region. In
its own security interest, Brussels should thus offer an apolitical
negotiation framework to Turkey and try to leverage the predominant
role of the latter in the region.
The EU's interest in the Southern Caucasus has only emerged since the
"Rose Revolution" in Georgia. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were
successively accepted as partners in the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) in 2004. Turkey, on the other hand, has already been engaged
in this critical region for a long time.
Turkey's experience and integration in the region could be an
important asset for filling the security vacuum at the EU's gates,
and thus become a conduit for exporting the European democratic and
economic model as envisaged by the ENP.
Turkey is Azerbaijan's most important trade partner. Moreover,
the abolishment of visa requirements between Turkey and Georgia at
the beginning of 2006 has considerably encouraged business travel
and tourism between the two countries. The recent modernization of
Batumi's airport - a Turkish project - will further enhance cooperation
in the near future.
The construction of a 258-kilometer railway along the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku route is expected begin in June.
According to Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, the project
"will develop the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor, thereby
advancing the region's integration with Europe."
Ankara and its partners in the region have also paved the way for
further European energy diversification. The most visible of these
efforts is the newly opened gas pipeline from the Caspian Shah Deniz
field via Tbilisi to Erzurum in eastern Turkey. Once the Nabucco
gas pipeline connecting Europe to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line is
completed, the EU will be less dependent on Russian gas imports.
Turkey has much to offer today to support the EU's aspirations in the
region, such as trade relations, transport and energy infrastructure.
It is time for EU leaders to adopt a more pragmatic attitude.
This article was written by Muriel Gschwend who obtained her master's
degree from the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies and
is currently in a European Studies' Master Program at Istanbul's Bilgi
University. She has just finished her internship at the Center for
Security Studies in Zurich. Her main areas of interest are EU foreign
policies with regional focus on Turkey and the Southern Caucasus.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only,
not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
Based in Zurich, Switzerland, the Center for Security Studies
(CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich),
provides via the International Relations and Security Network a wide
range of high-quality and comprehensive products and resources to
encourage the exchange of information among international relations
and security professionals worldwide. The ISN works to promote a
better understanding of the strategic challenges we face in today's
changed security environment.
--Boundary_(ID_4LSwWCSVCqExGc3OWFonC Q)--
International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Switzerland
April 17 2007
While the EU has accepted Turkey's return to accession negotiations,
the bloc should abstain from future provocation or paternalism or
it could risk losing Turkey, harming its engagement in the Southern
Caucasus
In December last year, EU leaders decided to temporarily suspend
eight of Turkey's 35 accession negotiation chapters due to Ankara's
failure to open its ports to trade from the EU. This major setback
coincided with the French National Assembly's approval of a bill a
few months earlier criminalizing the denial of the Armenian genocide
at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in 1915.
There is a widespread feeling in Turkish society that the process
of accession negotiations is highly influenced by the political
climate and by domestic considerations on the part of the EU member
states ¬- a perception that makes even the modern Turkish youth (who
generally tend towards pro-European attitudes) suspicious of joining
the Western club. Unfortunately, this is a development that has gone
largely unnoticed in Europe.
However, to the astonishment of many Europeans, Ankara - having
initially felt snubbed and frustrated - seems to have recovered
quickly from this backlash. It is evident today that Turkey is more
comfortable with the idea of an open-ended negotiation process and
that it is acting more independently.
Recently, Turkey has shifted its focus away from the official
timetables for accession talks with Brussels and has instead embarked
upon reforms on the basis of its own priorities. Turkey's ruling party
is also resisting pressure from Brussels to complete its third national
plan detailing steps to adopt EU political and economic standards:
Instead of the binding plan, it presented a road map covering the
period from 2007-2013.
It is therefore time for the EU to pay closer attention to the
emancipation process that is currently underway in Turkey.
A new elite has come to power that is questioning the decades-old
dominant paradigm of Turkey's pro-Western orientation. This more
religious elite is also less critical of Turkey's Ottoman past.
Moreover, economic stabilization has considerably increased Turkish
self-confidence.
When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on 27 March - when
the EU accepted Turkey's return to the accession negotiation table -
that Ankara was not concerned about the prospect not joining the EU,
he sent a clear message to Brussels that Turkey sees alternatives
to EU membership. Turkey's relations with Russia, for example, have
improved exponentially since President Vladimir Putin's official visit
to Ankara in December 2004 and the announcement of a "multidimensional
partnership."
Brussel s cannot afford further faux pas like the failure to invite
Turkey to the celebration of the anniversary of the EU's founding last
month unless it wants to incur the risk that Turkey might drift away.
The EU is especially seeking to perform a political and security role
in regions such as the Balkans, Russia and the Mediterranean, including
the Middle East. However, the Southern Caucasus also has become a key
priority of the German EU presidency. In February, German Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier embarked on a tour of the region,
saying that his "visit was intended to give a clear signal that the
EU wants to make a stronger commitment to the Southern Caucasus."
A disaffected Turkey that is hostile toward Europe would, however,
have a detrimental effect on the EU's engagement in the region. This
is all the more true since Turkey has traditionally perceived this
region as in its own sphere of influence. Even today, Ankara remains
very suspicious about US or EU interference in the region. When US
officials called last year for NATO to operate in the Black Sea to
combat terrorism and smuggling, the idea was strongly opposed not
only by Russia, but also by NATO member Turkey as well.
Moreover, the strengthening Turkish-Russian relationship is an
important factor for developments in the Southern Caucasus. Any US
or EU attempt to change the status quo in the region is followed
with great attention and mutual consultation in the capitals of both
countries. It is therefore questionable to what extent they would
accept attempts by the EU to act as an important mediator in the
delicate resolution of the "frozen conflicts" in that region, for
example, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniester.
A dispute with Turkey could considerably increase the risk of a
clash between the EU's ambitions to take on a larger role as a
security actor and Turkey's increasing presence in the region. In
its own security interest, Brussels should thus offer an apolitical
negotiation framework to Turkey and try to leverage the predominant
role of the latter in the region.
The EU's interest in the Southern Caucasus has only emerged since the
"Rose Revolution" in Georgia. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia were
successively accepted as partners in the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP) in 2004. Turkey, on the other hand, has already been engaged
in this critical region for a long time.
Turkey's experience and integration in the region could be an
important asset for filling the security vacuum at the EU's gates,
and thus become a conduit for exporting the European democratic and
economic model as envisaged by the ENP.
Turkey is Azerbaijan's most important trade partner. Moreover,
the abolishment of visa requirements between Turkey and Georgia at
the beginning of 2006 has considerably encouraged business travel
and tourism between the two countries. The recent modernization of
Batumi's airport - a Turkish project - will further enhance cooperation
in the near future.
The construction of a 258-kilometer railway along the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku route is expected begin in June.
According to Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, the project
"will develop the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor, thereby
advancing the region's integration with Europe."
Ankara and its partners in the region have also paved the way for
further European energy diversification. The most visible of these
efforts is the newly opened gas pipeline from the Caspian Shah Deniz
field via Tbilisi to Erzurum in eastern Turkey. Once the Nabucco
gas pipeline connecting Europe to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line is
completed, the EU will be less dependent on Russian gas imports.
Turkey has much to offer today to support the EU's aspirations in the
region, such as trade relations, transport and energy infrastructure.
It is time for EU leaders to adopt a more pragmatic attitude.
This article was written by Muriel Gschwend who obtained her master's
degree from the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies and
is currently in a European Studies' Master Program at Istanbul's Bilgi
University. She has just finished her internship at the Center for
Security Studies in Zurich. Her main areas of interest are EU foreign
policies with regional focus on Turkey and the Southern Caucasus.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only,
not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
Based in Zurich, Switzerland, the Center for Security Studies
(CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich),
provides via the International Relations and Security Network a wide
range of high-quality and comprehensive products and resources to
encourage the exchange of information among international relations
and security professionals worldwide. The ISN works to promote a
better understanding of the strategic challenges we face in today's
changed security environment.
--Boundary_(ID_4LSwWCSVCqExGc3OWFonC Q)--