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EurasiaNet, NY -
Aug 24 2007
IRAN-AZERBAIJAN SUMMIT: "BROTHERLY" FEELINGS, WITHOUT RESULTS
Rovshan Ismayilov 8/24/07
Analysts in Baku are divided over the outcome of Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's first official visit to Azerbaijan on August
21-22. Major issues such as regional defense and energy projects and
the Caspian Sea territorial dispute are believed to have been the
focus of the visit, but both sides have been tight-lipped on the
substance of the discussions.
Publicly, both Azerbaijani and Iranian officials stressed consensus,
emphasizing the historical and religious ties that bind the two
Shi'ia Muslim nations. A joint presidential statement signed on
August 21 affirms "the importance of bilateral political dialogue in
the context of equality of states, non-interference into each other's
affairs" and a commitment to refrain from the use or threat of force.
Repeating earlier assertions by Baku, the declaration also states
that Azerbaijan recognizes Iran's right "to use nuclear energy
peacefully within the framework of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency." [For additional information see
the Eurasia Insight archive].
"The countries are getting closer," Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev said at a joint news conference. "Our relations are strong and
we are sharing opinions on all issues," Aliyev claimed that Iran also
fully supports Azerbaijan's position on the conflict with Armenia
over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. [For background see
the Eurasia Insight archive].
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described Iran and Azerbaijan
as "two brotherly countries" that share common views "over political
issues."
"Azerbaijan's development is Iran's development and Iran's
development is Azerbaijan's development," Ahmadinejad added. "Iran
strongly supports Azerbaijan's independence and security."
Political analysts in Baku remain unconvinced that bilateral
relations are as strong as Aliyev and Ahmadinejad portrayed them to
be. One expert, Rasim Musabekov, contends that the declarations about
a common purpose and mutual support are "just words."
"Each of these countries has its own agenda . . . and the agendas are
different. Azerbaijan will not plan to change its policy on military
cooperation with the West, nor will Iran reconsider its position on
regional and international problems," said Musabekov, a
pro-opposition commentator. "The sides carefully listened to each
other - it's the visit's only result."
Security issues could explain the effusiveness. Although Azerbaijan
has publicly declared its neutrality in the wrangle between Tehran
and Western states over Iran's nuclear program, "Tehran is concerned
about Azerbaijani-US security cooperation," commented Vafa Guluzade,
a former presidential foreign policy advisor. "Iran does not want to
see threats to its national security proceeding from Azerbaijan."
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Aliyev also has a stake in interaction with Ahmadinejad, he added.
Keeping the door open to Tehran helps Baku maintain balance in its
relations with Washington and Moscow. "Iran is one of the major
players in our region. Therefore, Baku should confer with Tehran,"
Guluzade said.
Prior to Ahmadinejad's visit, US-Azerbaijani security consultations
on issues ranging from North Atlantic Treaty Organization integration
to anti-missile systems were held in Washington on July 9-10. Similar
discussions took place in Baku on July 26-27 with a Russian
delegation led by Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak.
The Aliyev administration's warm welcome for Ahmadinejad was
criticized by the Azerbaijani opposition. "Such visits to Azerbaijan
by the leader of a regime that the international community considers
a real threat are not a good sign," Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar
told the party's Yeni Musavat newspaper on August 23. A day earlier,
police outside the Iranian Embassy forcefully broke up a
demonstration by another opposition party, the Azerbaijan National
Independence Party, which was protesting against violations of ethnic
Azeris' rights in Iran. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
Guluzade believes that it is too early to say for sure where
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations are headed. Experts believe they will
have a better idea only after a meeting of the five Caspian Sea
littoral states, scheduled for October 16. The Caspian states --
Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Russia and Kazakhstan -- will use the
gathering to try to break the stalemate surrounding the territorial
division of the Caspian Sea. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
"If Iran accepts any compromise on the Caspian legal status there
[during the meeting], it would mean Baku likely gave some guarantees
about not [raising] military cooperation with the United States to a
level that would threaten Iran," he said.
Ilgar Mammadov, an independent Baku-based political analyst, drew
attention to energy issues.
At the news conference, President Aliyev said that the two countries
are considering joint projects to "ensure regional security," as well
as the European Union-backed 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline
project, intended to export gas from Turkey to Austria via Eastern
Europe. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Despite US misgivings about such a partnership, growing demand from
Europe for alternatives to Russian gas could motivate this interest,
Mammadov believes. Securing compromises from Tehran on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea could better position Azerbaijan to be a
major player in the European gas game. To win the concessions,
Azerbaijan may offer guarantees to bar "anti-Iranian military
cooperation" with the United States and propose possibilities for
facilitating the export of Iranian gas to Europe, he suggested.
In Baku, Ahmadinejad took a backhanded swipe at what he cast as US
attempts to enlist Baku in a plan to geopolitically encircle Tehran.
"Some forces" who are allegedly trying to "create problems between
Iran and Azerbaijan," the Iranian president said, "have no chances"
for success.
Mammadov believes no particular agreements between Baku and Tehran
were reached during Ahmadinejad's recent visit. "There are still
debates between the West and Russia for Central Asian gas from one
side, and between the Europe and the US on energy cooperation with
Iran. And Ahmadinejad's visit to Baku highlighted these conflicts,"
Mammadov said.
The trip was the Iranian leader's third visit to Azerbaijan, though
the first official trip. Ahmadinejad last visited Baku in May 2006 at
the Organization of Economic Cooperation's summit. [For details, see
the Eurasia Insight archive]. Aliyev, in turn, last visited Tehran in
2005.
Editor's Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in
Baku.
Aug 24 2007
IRAN-AZERBAIJAN SUMMIT: "BROTHERLY" FEELINGS, WITHOUT RESULTS
Rovshan Ismayilov 8/24/07
Analysts in Baku are divided over the outcome of Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's first official visit to Azerbaijan on August
21-22. Major issues such as regional defense and energy projects and
the Caspian Sea territorial dispute are believed to have been the
focus of the visit, but both sides have been tight-lipped on the
substance of the discussions.
Publicly, both Azerbaijani and Iranian officials stressed consensus,
emphasizing the historical and religious ties that bind the two
Shi'ia Muslim nations. A joint presidential statement signed on
August 21 affirms "the importance of bilateral political dialogue in
the context of equality of states, non-interference into each other's
affairs" and a commitment to refrain from the use or threat of force.
Repeating earlier assertions by Baku, the declaration also states
that Azerbaijan recognizes Iran's right "to use nuclear energy
peacefully within the framework of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency." [For additional information see
the Eurasia Insight archive].
"The countries are getting closer," Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev said at a joint news conference. "Our relations are strong and
we are sharing opinions on all issues," Aliyev claimed that Iran also
fully supports Azerbaijan's position on the conflict with Armenia
over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. [For background see
the Eurasia Insight archive].
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described Iran and Azerbaijan
as "two brotherly countries" that share common views "over political
issues."
"Azerbaijan's development is Iran's development and Iran's
development is Azerbaijan's development," Ahmadinejad added. "Iran
strongly supports Azerbaijan's independence and security."
Political analysts in Baku remain unconvinced that bilateral
relations are as strong as Aliyev and Ahmadinejad portrayed them to
be. One expert, Rasim Musabekov, contends that the declarations about
a common purpose and mutual support are "just words."
"Each of these countries has its own agenda . . . and the agendas are
different. Azerbaijan will not plan to change its policy on military
cooperation with the West, nor will Iran reconsider its position on
regional and international problems," said Musabekov, a
pro-opposition commentator. "The sides carefully listened to each
other - it's the visit's only result."
Security issues could explain the effusiveness. Although Azerbaijan
has publicly declared its neutrality in the wrangle between Tehran
and Western states over Iran's nuclear program, "Tehran is concerned
about Azerbaijani-US security cooperation," commented Vafa Guluzade,
a former presidential foreign policy advisor. "Iran does not want to
see threats to its national security proceeding from Azerbaijan."
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Aliyev also has a stake in interaction with Ahmadinejad, he added.
Keeping the door open to Tehran helps Baku maintain balance in its
relations with Washington and Moscow. "Iran is one of the major
players in our region. Therefore, Baku should confer with Tehran,"
Guluzade said.
Prior to Ahmadinejad's visit, US-Azerbaijani security consultations
on issues ranging from North Atlantic Treaty Organization integration
to anti-missile systems were held in Washington on July 9-10. Similar
discussions took place in Baku on July 26-27 with a Russian
delegation led by Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak.
The Aliyev administration's warm welcome for Ahmadinejad was
criticized by the Azerbaijani opposition. "Such visits to Azerbaijan
by the leader of a regime that the international community considers
a real threat are not a good sign," Musavat Party leader Isa Gambar
told the party's Yeni Musavat newspaper on August 23. A day earlier,
police outside the Iranian Embassy forcefully broke up a
demonstration by another opposition party, the Azerbaijan National
Independence Party, which was protesting against violations of ethnic
Azeris' rights in Iran. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
Guluzade believes that it is too early to say for sure where
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations are headed. Experts believe they will
have a better idea only after a meeting of the five Caspian Sea
littoral states, scheduled for October 16. The Caspian states --
Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Russia and Kazakhstan -- will use the
gathering to try to break the stalemate surrounding the territorial
division of the Caspian Sea. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
"If Iran accepts any compromise on the Caspian legal status there
[during the meeting], it would mean Baku likely gave some guarantees
about not [raising] military cooperation with the United States to a
level that would threaten Iran," he said.
Ilgar Mammadov, an independent Baku-based political analyst, drew
attention to energy issues.
At the news conference, President Aliyev said that the two countries
are considering joint projects to "ensure regional security," as well
as the European Union-backed 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline
project, intended to export gas from Turkey to Austria via Eastern
Europe. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Despite US misgivings about such a partnership, growing demand from
Europe for alternatives to Russian gas could motivate this interest,
Mammadov believes. Securing compromises from Tehran on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea could better position Azerbaijan to be a
major player in the European gas game. To win the concessions,
Azerbaijan may offer guarantees to bar "anti-Iranian military
cooperation" with the United States and propose possibilities for
facilitating the export of Iranian gas to Europe, he suggested.
In Baku, Ahmadinejad took a backhanded swipe at what he cast as US
attempts to enlist Baku in a plan to geopolitically encircle Tehran.
"Some forces" who are allegedly trying to "create problems between
Iran and Azerbaijan," the Iranian president said, "have no chances"
for success.
Mammadov believes no particular agreements between Baku and Tehran
were reached during Ahmadinejad's recent visit. "There are still
debates between the West and Russia for Central Asian gas from one
side, and between the Europe and the US on energy cooperation with
Iran. And Ahmadinejad's visit to Baku highlighted these conflicts,"
Mammadov said.
The trip was the Iranian leader's third visit to Azerbaijan, though
the first official trip. Ahmadinejad last visited Baku in May 2006 at
the Organization of Economic Cooperation's summit. [For details, see
the Eurasia Insight archive]. Aliyev, in turn, last visited Tehran in
2005.
Editor's Note: Rovshan Ismayilov is a freelance journalist based in
Baku.