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TALKING HISTORY: THE CHINESE CLASSICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
by Nikolas K. Gvosdev
The National Interest Online, DC
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=1 5306
Aug 28 2007
In the aftermath of the Bishkek summit of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, some Western observers have raised concerns about
a China more prepared to operate "out of area" and have wondered
about the type of global order China seeks. Some have wondered if
Beijing¡¯s plans for the 21st century reflect a break with past
Chinese traditions. Perhaps an examination of some of China¡¯s
classical historical texts is in order.
First, even a casual perusal of some of the Chinese classics indicates
that our Western notion of what constitutes a historically Chinese
"sphere of influence" (essentially limited to East Asia) is somewhat
deficient. This becomes clear when considering what is to be found in
the entries grouped under the rubric of "Traditions regarding Western
Countries". [NOTE: My thanks to Paul Halsall of Fordham University
and his Asia History Sourcebook, from which the following excerpts
are taken.]
For instance, in the 123rd chapter of the Shiji of Sima Qian, we read
of the first embassy sent by the Chinese to the Parthians (the nation
then in control of what we today would consider to be Iran) in 91 BC,
following the campaigns undertaken under the orders of Emperor Wudi in
Central Asia. A Parthian ruler, probably Mithradates II (123-88 BC),
sent a return embassy to "to come and see the extent and greatness
of the Han Empire."
The H¨°u H¨¤nsh¨± (The Book of the Later Han), contained the notes
and observations of the famous General Ban Chao, who campaigned in
what is now Uzbekistan, reached the shores of the Caspian Sea, and
established outposts of the Chinese army only a few days march from
the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon, a city on the Tigris in the heart
of present-day Iraq. He also sent an emissary to treat with the Roman
Emperor Nerva under Gan Ying (who turned back before reaching Italy).
The Chinese presence in the region caused one of the kings of Armenia
to send tribute to China, and the 86th chapter of the Book of the
Later Han records that the Emperor An Di made an Armenian potentate
a daduwei, a "great commander in chief" of the empire, in essence,
recognizing him as a vassal.
In the Summer 2005 issue of The National Interest, Ambassador Robert
Blackwillnoted, "Too often we do not know our history" when touching
upon India¡¯s "civilizational ties" to the Greater Middle East. The
same might be said of China.
And in ancient China¡¯s relationship with the other superpower of
its day, the Roman Empire, we might gain some insight into the type
of multipolar world order Beijing has in mind for the future.
What is striking from the Chinese classics is the emphasis on the
Roman Empire as "another China"¡ªan equal state on the opposite side
of the world creating a balance for the global order. By the first
century, enough "Westerners" had made their way to China so that
differences in physiognomy could be registered, and yet the Hou Hanshu,
in describing the Romans with approval for the type of empire they
had created, had this to say: "The inhabitants of that country are
tall and well-proportioned, somewhat like the Han, whence they are
called Da Qin." Da Qin¡ª"Great Qin"¡ªis a reference to the founding
dynasty of China, and reflects the opinion that on "either side of
the world" are to be found two similar peoples, two similar states,
even to the point of suggesting that the Romans somehow "resembled"
the peoples of the Chinese empire in appearance.
In the Weil¨¹e of Yu Huan, written in the early third century, an
even more revealing passage occurs, when Yu says that the Romans call
their realm "another Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo)"¡ªperhaps drawing upon
the Roman notion of their empire as the "circle of lands" around the
"Middle Sea" or a reference to the Greek concept of the Roman realm
as the oikumene, the civilized world.
Indeed, in these classical texts, one gets a sense of a global order
defined by two "Middle Kingdoms", each with their own set of vassal
states and subordinate realms, linked together by a series of smaller
independent powers (such as the Parthians or the Gupta kingdom in
India) that facilitated contact between the two "Qins". I found an
echo of these ancient sentiments in recent comments by a former Chinese
ambassador to Germanywho opined that the way forward in international
affairs is for leading states, each reflecting their own particular
history and culture, each influential in their own regions of the
world as well as on the global scene, to foster dialogue to find
common solutions.
It is very true that most modern Chinese foreign policymakers are not
read in their classics, just as few members of the State Department
can be said to be well-versed in Thucydides, Polybius or Herodotus.
But our "civilizational" heritage does help to shape attitudes
and worldviews. Looking at China¡¯s past can help provide some
understanding about the type of future they hope to create.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of The National Interest.
--Boundary_(ID_xFT+btHRibc/iZLF0ahMOQ)- -
by Nikolas K. Gvosdev
The National Interest Online, DC
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=1 5306
Aug 28 2007
In the aftermath of the Bishkek summit of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, some Western observers have raised concerns about
a China more prepared to operate "out of area" and have wondered
about the type of global order China seeks. Some have wondered if
Beijing¡¯s plans for the 21st century reflect a break with past
Chinese traditions. Perhaps an examination of some of China¡¯s
classical historical texts is in order.
First, even a casual perusal of some of the Chinese classics indicates
that our Western notion of what constitutes a historically Chinese
"sphere of influence" (essentially limited to East Asia) is somewhat
deficient. This becomes clear when considering what is to be found in
the entries grouped under the rubric of "Traditions regarding Western
Countries". [NOTE: My thanks to Paul Halsall of Fordham University
and his Asia History Sourcebook, from which the following excerpts
are taken.]
For instance, in the 123rd chapter of the Shiji of Sima Qian, we read
of the first embassy sent by the Chinese to the Parthians (the nation
then in control of what we today would consider to be Iran) in 91 BC,
following the campaigns undertaken under the orders of Emperor Wudi in
Central Asia. A Parthian ruler, probably Mithradates II (123-88 BC),
sent a return embassy to "to come and see the extent and greatness
of the Han Empire."
The H¨°u H¨¤nsh¨± (The Book of the Later Han), contained the notes
and observations of the famous General Ban Chao, who campaigned in
what is now Uzbekistan, reached the shores of the Caspian Sea, and
established outposts of the Chinese army only a few days march from
the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon, a city on the Tigris in the heart
of present-day Iraq. He also sent an emissary to treat with the Roman
Emperor Nerva under Gan Ying (who turned back before reaching Italy).
The Chinese presence in the region caused one of the kings of Armenia
to send tribute to China, and the 86th chapter of the Book of the
Later Han records that the Emperor An Di made an Armenian potentate
a daduwei, a "great commander in chief" of the empire, in essence,
recognizing him as a vassal.
In the Summer 2005 issue of The National Interest, Ambassador Robert
Blackwillnoted, "Too often we do not know our history" when touching
upon India¡¯s "civilizational ties" to the Greater Middle East. The
same might be said of China.
And in ancient China¡¯s relationship with the other superpower of
its day, the Roman Empire, we might gain some insight into the type
of multipolar world order Beijing has in mind for the future.
What is striking from the Chinese classics is the emphasis on the
Roman Empire as "another China"¡ªan equal state on the opposite side
of the world creating a balance for the global order. By the first
century, enough "Westerners" had made their way to China so that
differences in physiognomy could be registered, and yet the Hou Hanshu,
in describing the Romans with approval for the type of empire they
had created, had this to say: "The inhabitants of that country are
tall and well-proportioned, somewhat like the Han, whence they are
called Da Qin." Da Qin¡ª"Great Qin"¡ªis a reference to the founding
dynasty of China, and reflects the opinion that on "either side of
the world" are to be found two similar peoples, two similar states,
even to the point of suggesting that the Romans somehow "resembled"
the peoples of the Chinese empire in appearance.
In the Weil¨¹e of Yu Huan, written in the early third century, an
even more revealing passage occurs, when Yu says that the Romans call
their realm "another Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo)"¡ªperhaps drawing upon
the Roman notion of their empire as the "circle of lands" around the
"Middle Sea" or a reference to the Greek concept of the Roman realm
as the oikumene, the civilized world.
Indeed, in these classical texts, one gets a sense of a global order
defined by two "Middle Kingdoms", each with their own set of vassal
states and subordinate realms, linked together by a series of smaller
independent powers (such as the Parthians or the Gupta kingdom in
India) that facilitated contact between the two "Qins". I found an
echo of these ancient sentiments in recent comments by a former Chinese
ambassador to Germanywho opined that the way forward in international
affairs is for leading states, each reflecting their own particular
history and culture, each influential in their own regions of the
world as well as on the global scene, to foster dialogue to find
common solutions.
It is very true that most modern Chinese foreign policymakers are not
read in their classics, just as few members of the State Department
can be said to be well-versed in Thucydides, Polybius or Herodotus.
But our "civilizational" heritage does help to shape attitudes
and worldviews. Looking at China¡¯s past can help provide some
understanding about the type of future they hope to create.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is editor of The National Interest.
--Boundary_(ID_xFT+btHRibc/iZLF0ahMOQ)- -