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Council on Foreign Relations, NY
Dec 5 2007
Kosovo's End Game
December 5, 2007
Author: Lee Hudson Teslik
Kosovo's expected declaration of independence could have consequences
for a handful of breakaway post-Soviet provinces. (Sipa via AP
Images)
After more than eight years under a UN protectorate, and centuries of
ethnic wrangling, Kosovo seems on the verge of settling its political
status - sort of. On December 10, a UN deadline for settling the
Serbian province's `final status' seems all but certain to pass
without a clear resolution. The United States and many EU supporters
of a supervised Kosovo independence plan are deadlocked with
veto-wielding UN Security Council member Russia, which wants Kosovo
to remain part of Serbia. At some point after December 10, Kosovo's
ethnic Albanians, the overwhelming majority of the province's
population, say they will unilaterally declare independence (AP).
What might happen after that remains anyone's guess, but
international troops are bracing for possible violence (VOA).
A unilateral declaration raises several potential problems. First, it
would further complicate a transition away from the current UN-led
administration. Kosovo can call itself a country, but with Russian
opposition, it can't be admitted into the United Nations. Moreover,
UN peacekeepers won't be allowed to stay in Kosovo, and the idea of
transitioning to an EU-led peacekeeping force is complicated by the
fact that some eastern EU members likely won't recognize Kosovo
(B92). Yet the need for peacekeepers isn't likely to fade. Pockets of
Serb and Roma minorities remain throughout Kosovo. As recently as
November 2007, the UN reiterated the need to protect these groups.
The pressing question is whether a power vacuum might set off new
bouts of ethnic killing.
A declaration of independence might also leave Kosovo in an awkward
position regionally. Certainly it would calcify relations between
Kosovo and Serbia, at least in the short term. Richard C. Holbrooke,
the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and the architect of
the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, says in a new interview with CFR.org
that Belgrade remains `intensely nationalistic' and considers Kosovo
`sacred soil.' Given the entrenched stances on both sides, the senior
EU representative at meetings on the future of Kosovo recently
expressed regret that `no additional options' (Deutsche Welle)
remained for compromise in talks between Pristina and Belgrade.
Perhaps the biggest question, geopolitically, is what the precedent
of Kosovo declaring independence would mean for other states in
limbo, particularly in the former Soviet sphere. Russia's staunch
opposition to Pristina's push for independence comes partly from
concern that a handful of other breakaway provinces in the Kremlin's
`near abroad' would use the opportunity to follow Kosovo's lead
(Economist). Two regions within geographical Georgia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, are rattling for internationally recognized statehood.
Russia is a major patron to both regions but has stopped short of
endorsing independence. Only recently has Moscow quelled separatism
in its republic of Chechnya. Azerbaijan and Armenia are also locked
in a nearly two-decade-old standoff over the enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova remains bedeviled by the unresolved
status of its Trans-Dniester region.
Moscow might benefit if the upshot of negotiations in Kosovo is a
`frozen conflict' that would halt the expansion of NATO forces, says
a top RFE/RL analyst on Kosovo. In either case, Holbrooke says that
the most pressing matter now is for the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to dispatch additional troops
into Kosovo to stave off the immediate possibility of violence. `We
always talk about `preventative diplomacy,'' Holbrooke says. `Here is
a classic case where a few troops now might prevent the need for more
troops later.'
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14971/kos ovos_end_game.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpub lication_list%3Ftype%3Ddaily_analysis
Dec 5 2007
Kosovo's End Game
December 5, 2007
Author: Lee Hudson Teslik
Kosovo's expected declaration of independence could have consequences
for a handful of breakaway post-Soviet provinces. (Sipa via AP
Images)
After more than eight years under a UN protectorate, and centuries of
ethnic wrangling, Kosovo seems on the verge of settling its political
status - sort of. On December 10, a UN deadline for settling the
Serbian province's `final status' seems all but certain to pass
without a clear resolution. The United States and many EU supporters
of a supervised Kosovo independence plan are deadlocked with
veto-wielding UN Security Council member Russia, which wants Kosovo
to remain part of Serbia. At some point after December 10, Kosovo's
ethnic Albanians, the overwhelming majority of the province's
population, say they will unilaterally declare independence (AP).
What might happen after that remains anyone's guess, but
international troops are bracing for possible violence (VOA).
A unilateral declaration raises several potential problems. First, it
would further complicate a transition away from the current UN-led
administration. Kosovo can call itself a country, but with Russian
opposition, it can't be admitted into the United Nations. Moreover,
UN peacekeepers won't be allowed to stay in Kosovo, and the idea of
transitioning to an EU-led peacekeeping force is complicated by the
fact that some eastern EU members likely won't recognize Kosovo
(B92). Yet the need for peacekeepers isn't likely to fade. Pockets of
Serb and Roma minorities remain throughout Kosovo. As recently as
November 2007, the UN reiterated the need to protect these groups.
The pressing question is whether a power vacuum might set off new
bouts of ethnic killing.
A declaration of independence might also leave Kosovo in an awkward
position regionally. Certainly it would calcify relations between
Kosovo and Serbia, at least in the short term. Richard C. Holbrooke,
the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and the architect of
the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, says in a new interview with CFR.org
that Belgrade remains `intensely nationalistic' and considers Kosovo
`sacred soil.' Given the entrenched stances on both sides, the senior
EU representative at meetings on the future of Kosovo recently
expressed regret that `no additional options' (Deutsche Welle)
remained for compromise in talks between Pristina and Belgrade.
Perhaps the biggest question, geopolitically, is what the precedent
of Kosovo declaring independence would mean for other states in
limbo, particularly in the former Soviet sphere. Russia's staunch
opposition to Pristina's push for independence comes partly from
concern that a handful of other breakaway provinces in the Kremlin's
`near abroad' would use the opportunity to follow Kosovo's lead
(Economist). Two regions within geographical Georgia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, are rattling for internationally recognized statehood.
Russia is a major patron to both regions but has stopped short of
endorsing independence. Only recently has Moscow quelled separatism
in its republic of Chechnya. Azerbaijan and Armenia are also locked
in a nearly two-decade-old standoff over the enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova remains bedeviled by the unresolved
status of its Trans-Dniester region.
Moscow might benefit if the upshot of negotiations in Kosovo is a
`frozen conflict' that would halt the expansion of NATO forces, says
a top RFE/RL analyst on Kosovo. In either case, Holbrooke says that
the most pressing matter now is for the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to dispatch additional troops
into Kosovo to stave off the immediate possibility of violence. `We
always talk about `preventative diplomacy,'' Holbrooke says. `Here is
a classic case where a few troops now might prevent the need for more
troops later.'
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14971/kos ovos_end_game.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpub lication_list%3Ftype%3Ddaily_analysis