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BETTER MAINTAIN STATUS QUO BUT DEMARK SPHERES OF GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE
Astsatur Antonyan, analyst
KarabakhOpen
21-12-2007 12:27:52
Some time ago the international mediators stated that the election
in Armenia may have the settlement slow down. Then everyone states
unanimously that it is possible and even necessary to sign with
Azerbaijan a document on the basic issues. In addition, mutually
excluding tendencies and statements are noticed inside the Armenian
establishment. President Kocharyan says it is not realistic to sign a
document before the presidential election, whereas the prime minister
and the main presidential candidate Serge Sargsyan says there is such
possibility. Certainly, the contrast of the opinions of the president
and the prime minister might be interpretational but it is clear that
it is far from the reality.
As to the Armenian political sphere, everything is clear. The
possibility of signing an agreement before the presidential election
in Armenia is hardly probable. Afterwards the candidate who will
lose the election will go on protest, a new government will be
appointed, and it may take 3-5 months. It should be added that
President Kocharyan leaves office at the beginning of April 2008. It
turns out that next time the process of settlement will cheer up in
September-October 2008. At that time, however, the presidential race
starts in Azerbaijan, and some time later in the United States.
Besides, the stances of the sides are too different. If the mediators
want to have some agreement signed, they naturally should insist
on compromise.
But what we witness is hardly a compromise. Azerbaijan continues
to voice their stance on the proposals. The press secretary of the
foreign ministry states that the talks continue based on the principle
of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and control over the occupied
territories, the return of Azerbaijanis to their homes, including in
Nagorno-Karabakh, who had undergone ethnic clearing by Armenia.
The Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammedyarov set an
ultimatum to everyone who wants to visit Karabakh. He stated
that the representatives of international organizations visiting
Nagorno-Karabakh should cross the border from the Azerbaijani
side. Although he generously allowed the co-chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group mediating the talks over Karabakh sometimes to arrive in
Nagorno-Karabakh through Armenia considering their tough schedule.
In the light of this it becomes clear that hardly any fundamental
transformations in the regional and global aspects regarding the
settlement of the Karabakh issue are possible in 2008. Obviously, the
mediators also understand this. So how should the existing tendencies
be explained? It is possible that fearing the precedent of Kosovo the
international mediators want to establish an alternative to Kosovo
and show through Karabakh that after the recognition of Kosovo the
other unrecognized states will not be necessarily recognized.
The key issue is not the possibility or impossibility of recognition
but the period of time of this act. It is clear that the recognition of
Kosovo will improve relations between the West and the East. Therefore,
in parallel with the launch of the recognition of Kosovo it is
necessary to make efforts to settle another conflict. Apart from the
rest, it will help bring the stances of the queens on the geopolitical
chessboard closer.
In this sense, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is more convenient. With
regard to Kosovo there are more possibilities for multi-party actions
since Kosovo is within the geopolitical dominance of the West. The same
is in the case of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which are in the area of the
geopolitical dominance of Russia. If these cards are played, it will
kindle tensions in the relations of the great powers: they will be
recognized one after another. Both the West and the East understand it.
Nagorno-Karabakh is at the border of these areas, and there is no
distinct dominance of one bloc or another. Therefore, the "settling
of scores" will be aimed at seeking a new formula of coexistence of
the West and strengthening Russia in such key regions as the Caucasus
rather than the settlement of the conflict. It does not mean that the
conflict will be solved. The chance of the current status quo will
lead to geostrategic transformations in the South Caucasus after which
it will be possible to forecast who will benefit, the West or the East.
This uncertainty causes Azerbaijan to assume a radical position and
reject compromise. The logic is quite simple: a radical attract
attention, and the radical may draw dividends, such as a deeper
picture of developments underway and a more precise location of the
"queens". For the "queens", it is preferable to maintain the status
quo but define their spheres of geopolitical influence.
Astsatur Antonyan, analyst
KarabakhOpen
21-12-2007 12:27:52
Some time ago the international mediators stated that the election
in Armenia may have the settlement slow down. Then everyone states
unanimously that it is possible and even necessary to sign with
Azerbaijan a document on the basic issues. In addition, mutually
excluding tendencies and statements are noticed inside the Armenian
establishment. President Kocharyan says it is not realistic to sign a
document before the presidential election, whereas the prime minister
and the main presidential candidate Serge Sargsyan says there is such
possibility. Certainly, the contrast of the opinions of the president
and the prime minister might be interpretational but it is clear that
it is far from the reality.
As to the Armenian political sphere, everything is clear. The
possibility of signing an agreement before the presidential election
in Armenia is hardly probable. Afterwards the candidate who will
lose the election will go on protest, a new government will be
appointed, and it may take 3-5 months. It should be added that
President Kocharyan leaves office at the beginning of April 2008. It
turns out that next time the process of settlement will cheer up in
September-October 2008. At that time, however, the presidential race
starts in Azerbaijan, and some time later in the United States.
Besides, the stances of the sides are too different. If the mediators
want to have some agreement signed, they naturally should insist
on compromise.
But what we witness is hardly a compromise. Azerbaijan continues
to voice their stance on the proposals. The press secretary of the
foreign ministry states that the talks continue based on the principle
of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and control over the occupied
territories, the return of Azerbaijanis to their homes, including in
Nagorno-Karabakh, who had undergone ethnic clearing by Armenia.
The Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammedyarov set an
ultimatum to everyone who wants to visit Karabakh. He stated
that the representatives of international organizations visiting
Nagorno-Karabakh should cross the border from the Azerbaijani
side. Although he generously allowed the co-chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group mediating the talks over Karabakh sometimes to arrive in
Nagorno-Karabakh through Armenia considering their tough schedule.
In the light of this it becomes clear that hardly any fundamental
transformations in the regional and global aspects regarding the
settlement of the Karabakh issue are possible in 2008. Obviously, the
mediators also understand this. So how should the existing tendencies
be explained? It is possible that fearing the precedent of Kosovo the
international mediators want to establish an alternative to Kosovo
and show through Karabakh that after the recognition of Kosovo the
other unrecognized states will not be necessarily recognized.
The key issue is not the possibility or impossibility of recognition
but the period of time of this act. It is clear that the recognition of
Kosovo will improve relations between the West and the East. Therefore,
in parallel with the launch of the recognition of Kosovo it is
necessary to make efforts to settle another conflict. Apart from the
rest, it will help bring the stances of the queens on the geopolitical
chessboard closer.
In this sense, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is more convenient. With
regard to Kosovo there are more possibilities for multi-party actions
since Kosovo is within the geopolitical dominance of the West. The same
is in the case of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which are in the area of the
geopolitical dominance of Russia. If these cards are played, it will
kindle tensions in the relations of the great powers: they will be
recognized one after another. Both the West and the East understand it.
Nagorno-Karabakh is at the border of these areas, and there is no
distinct dominance of one bloc or another. Therefore, the "settling
of scores" will be aimed at seeking a new formula of coexistence of
the West and strengthening Russia in such key regions as the Caucasus
rather than the settlement of the conflict. It does not mean that the
conflict will be solved. The chance of the current status quo will
lead to geostrategic transformations in the South Caucasus after which
it will be possible to forecast who will benefit, the West or the East.
This uncertainty causes Azerbaijan to assume a radical position and
reject compromise. The logic is quite simple: a radical attract
attention, and the radical may draw dividends, such as a deeper
picture of developments underway and a more precise location of the
"queens". For the "queens", it is preferable to maintain the status
quo but define their spheres of geopolitical influence.