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Day.Az, Azerbaijan
Dec 18 2007
Azerbaijan's importance grows over year - pundit
An Azerbaijani political analyst has said that the geopolitical
significance and foreign policy of Azerbaijan have improved over the
past year. In an interview with Azerbaijan's Day.az website, Rasim
Musabayov said: "Azerbaijan's geopolitical capitalization has
considerably increased over the past year. However, it is true that
we have not managed to use this to resolve or achieve significant
progress in our vital problems like the Karabakh settlement or the
division of the Caspian". The following is the text of the interview
headlined "Rasim Musabayov: 'Azerbaijan's geopolitical capitalization
has substantially increased over the past year'. Subheadings have
been inserted editorially;
[Day.az] Rasim muallim [mode of address], the year 2007 is coming to
an end. How this year has been in terms of the development of
relations between Azerbaijan and the USA?
Azeri-US relations
[Musabayov] Although no bilateral agreements have been signed,
diplomatic contact between our countries has been very intensive. Top
ranking officials at the level of a deputy or assistant secretary of
state have visited Baku more than once. The head of the CIA paid an
unpublicized visit to Azerbaijan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
sent a letter expressing the USA's readiness to consider the issue of
applying security guarantees to Azerbaijan. I would like to remind
you that such guarantees are not even offered to Georgia, which is a
favourable country for the West. A big delegation from Azerbaijan
paid a visit to Washington in summer to hold consultations on
security issues.
There is a significant fact proving Azerbaijan's increasing strategic
importance for the USA: the paragraph of the official document of the
US Department of State on Armenian occupation of Nagornyy Karabakh
and other Azerbaijani territories was edited under the influence of
the Armenian lobby. But it was restored to the previous wording after
Baku's move. This reflected the existing realities more adequately
and was acceptable for us.
In all, US-Azerbaijani relations have been developing well. We could
have been even a reliable ally for Washington in the region but for
some quite understandable caution exercised by the Azerbaijani
leadership in an attempt not to irritate Moscow and Tehran too much.
Section 907
[Interviewer] When do you think the notorious Section 907 is going to
be totally repealed?
[Musabayov] In essence, this section lost its original meaning and
importance a long time ago. Relations between our countries take
place outside the context of this section, including in the area of
security.
The section does not stop Washington from allocating and Azerbaijan
from receiving US aid for modernizing our military infrastructure and
intensifying border control. Rather than having Section 907 repealed
- although efforts should be continued in this direction - it is
important for us today to have a similar section enacted against
Armenia, which receives wide scale US aid, but not only refuses to
vacate our occupied territories, but also acts against the US policy
in the region by being a vassal and a satellite of Russia.
It is more important for us not to have the volume of US aid to
Azerbaijan and Armenia levelled, but to use the dependence of the
Armenians on US aid to persuade Armenia to behave in a constructive
manner.
Oil for Karabakh policy "an illusion"
[Interviewer] How much did Azerbaijan succeed in the implementation
of the programme "energy resources in exchange for assistance in
returning Karabakh", which was taken as a basis by the leadership of
our country in relations with the West?
[Musabayov] The simplified illusions circulating in the public
opinion and possibly shared by some people in the ruling elite about
having the USA and the European Union resolve the Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict in exchange for providing access to our oil and gas have not
come true.
Cooperation with the West in the area of oil meets the interests of
both sides and it is wrong to make it dependent on receiving
assistance in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
However, it is beyond any doubt that the oil factor has strengthened
our country's foreign policy in strategic terms and the calculations
in this regard have been fully justified.
Let us recall that the Armenians illegally occupied our territories
in the early 1990s. They were blaming us and introducing
discriminatory sections against us (including Section 907). We were
losing to the Armenians not only in the battlefield, but also in the
diplomatic front and propaganda.
Now, the situation has changed. The development of our oil fields in
the Caspian shelf in cooperation with British Petroleum has given
Azerbaijan full financial supremacy over Armenia. Our voice has
started to be heard in the capitals of the great powers. They started
listening to Azerbaijan's opinion and position.
Let me explain my ideas in the example of the Minsk Group. It is
evident that the co-chairs of this group - Russia, the USA and France
(these countries have the most powerful Armenian diaspora
organizations in the world) are at heart with our rival. But their
interests draw them to Azerbaijan since Armenia can not even come
closer to compete with us in economic and strategic terms.
I think that the longer it takes the more the interests related to
Azerbaijan and, the last, but not the least, the interest in our
energy resources will prevail over the sentiments towards the
Armenians.
So, the political potential of the oil resources has not been
depleted yet and can have a say in the context of strengthening
Azerbaijan's international positions, including the position on the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
Russian-Azeri relations
[Interviewer] How was the year 2007 in terms of the development of
relations between Azerbaijan and Russia?
[Musabayov] Last year these relations were known for some chill. The
dynamics of improvement of Russian-Azerbaijani relations in previous
years had evidently created more expectations in both sides.
Baku hoped that Moscow would use its influence to keep down the
territorial appetites of its "Armenian outpost" and achieve a
breakthrough in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In turn, the
Kremlin expected to reinstate its dominant role in Azerbaijan like it
did in Uzbekistan. But this did not happen. The geopolitical
realities made some corrections to the positions and plans of both
sides. Baku did not support Moscow's plans to punish and create
energy starvation for stubborn Georgia. Moreover, Azerbaijan started
to set the pitch in strengthening GUAM [a regional alliance of
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova], signed an energy charter,
which was refuted by Moscow, with the European Union, and pursued
quite an independent policy in security issues. For its part, Moscow
continued flexing the military muscles of Armenia (transportation of
military hardware from Georgia to Gyumri, plans to install the most
up-to-date air defence system C-400 in Armenia and to modernize
Armenian aircraft), selling gas to Armenia at a third of its actual
price and providing financial handouts.
But the sides had enough common sense not to express their complaints
publicly, not to aggravate relations without any need and to keep the
door open for compromises.
Good economic prospects for Russian-Azeri ties
[Interviewer] What are the prospects for the development of
Azerbaijani-Russian relations?
[Musabayov] The prospects are good in the economic area. The trade
turnover between the two countries is on the rise despite our refusal
to buy Russian gas. In general, Azerbaijan is the biggest, most
rapidly growing and, unlike Armenia, quite a solvent market in the
region. We are attractive for Russian investors because we do not
have any problems with communications. It is unnecessary to speak
about Russia's economic significance for Azerbaijan and the hundreds
of thousands of Azerbaijani citizens [living in Russia].
As for the political and diplomatic relations, the moment of truth
will come in a couple of years. Georgia's membership of NATO will be
on the agenda after [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's
victory at the presidential election (which is quite likely) and
Russia's provocative steps concerning the issues of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The Kremlin has a choice: either to open
communications to its strategic ally - Armenia - through our
territory by facilitating a breakthrough in the Karabakh settlement
and keep Azerbaijan in a neutral position or to see Baku moving
towards NATO faster, the strategic axis of Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku taking
shape and Russian influence in the region totally collapsing. I do
not rule out that under this scenario Moscow may provoke renewed
military hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to
prevent the South Caucasus from falling under the full sway of the
West.
But I assume that the situation will not grow into critical scenarios
and Azerbaijani-Russian relations will not go beyond pragmatic
boundaries with all this friction. This is because besides the
problems our countries also have a lot of converging interests
(counteraction against Islamic radicals, safe development of Caspian
energy resources, the North-South transport corridor, etc).
Outgoing year "good" for Baku
[Interviewer] Summing up all that has been said, was the outgoing
year successful for Azerbaijan's foreign policy?
[Musabayov] I would comfortably put the mark of four. Diplomatic
activity was good in terms of both high-level visits and the number
of important international events held in Azerbaijan. Neither Tbilisi
nor Yerevan can compete with Baku in this regard.
Using the economic terminology, I would like to say that Azerbaijan's
geopolitical capitalization has considerably increased over the past
year. However, it is true that we have not managed to use this to
resolve or achieve significant progress in our vital problems (the
Karabakh settlement, the division of the Caspian, etc).
But the strengthening of the country's foreign policy positions will
bring results sooner or later.
[translated]
Dec 18 2007
Azerbaijan's importance grows over year - pundit
An Azerbaijani political analyst has said that the geopolitical
significance and foreign policy of Azerbaijan have improved over the
past year. In an interview with Azerbaijan's Day.az website, Rasim
Musabayov said: "Azerbaijan's geopolitical capitalization has
considerably increased over the past year. However, it is true that
we have not managed to use this to resolve or achieve significant
progress in our vital problems like the Karabakh settlement or the
division of the Caspian". The following is the text of the interview
headlined "Rasim Musabayov: 'Azerbaijan's geopolitical capitalization
has substantially increased over the past year'. Subheadings have
been inserted editorially;
[Day.az] Rasim muallim [mode of address], the year 2007 is coming to
an end. How this year has been in terms of the development of
relations between Azerbaijan and the USA?
Azeri-US relations
[Musabayov] Although no bilateral agreements have been signed,
diplomatic contact between our countries has been very intensive. Top
ranking officials at the level of a deputy or assistant secretary of
state have visited Baku more than once. The head of the CIA paid an
unpublicized visit to Azerbaijan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
sent a letter expressing the USA's readiness to consider the issue of
applying security guarantees to Azerbaijan. I would like to remind
you that such guarantees are not even offered to Georgia, which is a
favourable country for the West. A big delegation from Azerbaijan
paid a visit to Washington in summer to hold consultations on
security issues.
There is a significant fact proving Azerbaijan's increasing strategic
importance for the USA: the paragraph of the official document of the
US Department of State on Armenian occupation of Nagornyy Karabakh
and other Azerbaijani territories was edited under the influence of
the Armenian lobby. But it was restored to the previous wording after
Baku's move. This reflected the existing realities more adequately
and was acceptable for us.
In all, US-Azerbaijani relations have been developing well. We could
have been even a reliable ally for Washington in the region but for
some quite understandable caution exercised by the Azerbaijani
leadership in an attempt not to irritate Moscow and Tehran too much.
Section 907
[Interviewer] When do you think the notorious Section 907 is going to
be totally repealed?
[Musabayov] In essence, this section lost its original meaning and
importance a long time ago. Relations between our countries take
place outside the context of this section, including in the area of
security.
The section does not stop Washington from allocating and Azerbaijan
from receiving US aid for modernizing our military infrastructure and
intensifying border control. Rather than having Section 907 repealed
- although efforts should be continued in this direction - it is
important for us today to have a similar section enacted against
Armenia, which receives wide scale US aid, but not only refuses to
vacate our occupied territories, but also acts against the US policy
in the region by being a vassal and a satellite of Russia.
It is more important for us not to have the volume of US aid to
Azerbaijan and Armenia levelled, but to use the dependence of the
Armenians on US aid to persuade Armenia to behave in a constructive
manner.
Oil for Karabakh policy "an illusion"
[Interviewer] How much did Azerbaijan succeed in the implementation
of the programme "energy resources in exchange for assistance in
returning Karabakh", which was taken as a basis by the leadership of
our country in relations with the West?
[Musabayov] The simplified illusions circulating in the public
opinion and possibly shared by some people in the ruling elite about
having the USA and the European Union resolve the Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict in exchange for providing access to our oil and gas have not
come true.
Cooperation with the West in the area of oil meets the interests of
both sides and it is wrong to make it dependent on receiving
assistance in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
However, it is beyond any doubt that the oil factor has strengthened
our country's foreign policy in strategic terms and the calculations
in this regard have been fully justified.
Let us recall that the Armenians illegally occupied our territories
in the early 1990s. They were blaming us and introducing
discriminatory sections against us (including Section 907). We were
losing to the Armenians not only in the battlefield, but also in the
diplomatic front and propaganda.
Now, the situation has changed. The development of our oil fields in
the Caspian shelf in cooperation with British Petroleum has given
Azerbaijan full financial supremacy over Armenia. Our voice has
started to be heard in the capitals of the great powers. They started
listening to Azerbaijan's opinion and position.
Let me explain my ideas in the example of the Minsk Group. It is
evident that the co-chairs of this group - Russia, the USA and France
(these countries have the most powerful Armenian diaspora
organizations in the world) are at heart with our rival. But their
interests draw them to Azerbaijan since Armenia can not even come
closer to compete with us in economic and strategic terms.
I think that the longer it takes the more the interests related to
Azerbaijan and, the last, but not the least, the interest in our
energy resources will prevail over the sentiments towards the
Armenians.
So, the political potential of the oil resources has not been
depleted yet and can have a say in the context of strengthening
Azerbaijan's international positions, including the position on the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
Russian-Azeri relations
[Interviewer] How was the year 2007 in terms of the development of
relations between Azerbaijan and Russia?
[Musabayov] Last year these relations were known for some chill. The
dynamics of improvement of Russian-Azerbaijani relations in previous
years had evidently created more expectations in both sides.
Baku hoped that Moscow would use its influence to keep down the
territorial appetites of its "Armenian outpost" and achieve a
breakthrough in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In turn, the
Kremlin expected to reinstate its dominant role in Azerbaijan like it
did in Uzbekistan. But this did not happen. The geopolitical
realities made some corrections to the positions and plans of both
sides. Baku did not support Moscow's plans to punish and create
energy starvation for stubborn Georgia. Moreover, Azerbaijan started
to set the pitch in strengthening GUAM [a regional alliance of
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova], signed an energy charter,
which was refuted by Moscow, with the European Union, and pursued
quite an independent policy in security issues. For its part, Moscow
continued flexing the military muscles of Armenia (transportation of
military hardware from Georgia to Gyumri, plans to install the most
up-to-date air defence system C-400 in Armenia and to modernize
Armenian aircraft), selling gas to Armenia at a third of its actual
price and providing financial handouts.
But the sides had enough common sense not to express their complaints
publicly, not to aggravate relations without any need and to keep the
door open for compromises.
Good economic prospects for Russian-Azeri ties
[Interviewer] What are the prospects for the development of
Azerbaijani-Russian relations?
[Musabayov] The prospects are good in the economic area. The trade
turnover between the two countries is on the rise despite our refusal
to buy Russian gas. In general, Azerbaijan is the biggest, most
rapidly growing and, unlike Armenia, quite a solvent market in the
region. We are attractive for Russian investors because we do not
have any problems with communications. It is unnecessary to speak
about Russia's economic significance for Azerbaijan and the hundreds
of thousands of Azerbaijani citizens [living in Russia].
As for the political and diplomatic relations, the moment of truth
will come in a couple of years. Georgia's membership of NATO will be
on the agenda after [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's
victory at the presidential election (which is quite likely) and
Russia's provocative steps concerning the issues of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The Kremlin has a choice: either to open
communications to its strategic ally - Armenia - through our
territory by facilitating a breakthrough in the Karabakh settlement
and keep Azerbaijan in a neutral position or to see Baku moving
towards NATO faster, the strategic axis of Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku taking
shape and Russian influence in the region totally collapsing. I do
not rule out that under this scenario Moscow may provoke renewed
military hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to
prevent the South Caucasus from falling under the full sway of the
West.
But I assume that the situation will not grow into critical scenarios
and Azerbaijani-Russian relations will not go beyond pragmatic
boundaries with all this friction. This is because besides the
problems our countries also have a lot of converging interests
(counteraction against Islamic radicals, safe development of Caspian
energy resources, the North-South transport corridor, etc).
Outgoing year "good" for Baku
[Interviewer] Summing up all that has been said, was the outgoing
year successful for Azerbaijan's foreign policy?
[Musabayov] I would comfortably put the mark of four. Diplomatic
activity was good in terms of both high-level visits and the number
of important international events held in Azerbaijan. Neither Tbilisi
nor Yerevan can compete with Baku in this regard.
Using the economic terminology, I would like to say that Azerbaijan's
geopolitical capitalization has considerably increased over the past
year. However, it is true that we have not managed to use this to
resolve or achieve significant progress in our vital problems (the
Karabakh settlement, the division of the Caspian, etc).
But the strengthening of the country's foreign policy positions will
bring results sooner or later.
[translated]