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Turan News Agency, Azerbaijan
Dec 17 2007
Current stage of Karabakh talks bodes ill for Azerbaijan
"Imitation of activity or a new phase of the game?"
No basis for a breakthrough
A new cycle of either imitation or real activity has recently taken
shape in the protracted and extremely unsuccessful negotiation
process on the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani (Nagornyy
Karabakh) conflict. On the heels of the intriguing Madrid round of
talks and the ensuing visit of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to the
region, everybody suddenly started talking about the availability of
a modified and coordinated text of the core principles for a peaceful
settlement of the conflict and on possibility of concluding a certain
framework agreement very soon.
This was sudden because of several factors: First, there has been no
substantial novelty in the position of the conflicting sides (Armenia
and Azerbaijan), or in the approaches of the mediating countries (the
USA, Russia and France) or in the essence of the process which could
have intensify the peacemaking efforts.
Second, there seem to be no such solid foundations to speak about the
availability of a wide consensus basis or matured geopolitical demand
for a quick settlement to the conflict.
Thirdly and finally, against the backdrop of the approaching
presidential elections almost in all the interested countries
(Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan and the USA) and bearing in mind the
whole experience of dynamics of the negotiations process, it would
have been highly logical to expect not invigoration but full
attenuation of the peacemaking diplomacy. Why then are we not
observing uncommon slump despite all circumstances but intriguing
intensity in the peacemaking diplomacy? For what purpose is a new
phase of invigoration importunately reanimated in the desperate
negotiating process that has come to a standstill? Why do the Minsk
Group co-chairs so insistently thrust the next expectation of swift
breakthrough in the negotiations process on the public of the
conflicting parties? What is it?
Is this the continuation of the previously standing and imitating
activity or a new phase in the peacemaking game implying a real
breakthrough?
Unfavourable outcome for Azerbaijan?
Without rejecting an option of usual imitating activity, about which
we have reported many times, let us consider an option of a
possibility of a real breakthrough. A lot speaks in favour of the
fact that actually strenuous efforts are applied to achieve a certain
framework peace agreement within the modified Prague process. And, it
is possible that not entirely in favour of Azerbaijan. To this
testifies also the fact of ignoring the argument of elections in both
conflicting states by the international peace brokers.
Whilst the upcoming presidential election in Azerbaijan is just a
formality which in no way is able to influence the negotiating
process, then in this plan, it becomes more significant and
intriguing the [19] February presidential election in Armenia,
unpredictable outcome of which in many respects will depend also on
upheavals in the settlement of the Karabakh problem.
If Yerevan continues to actively participate in the negotiations
process literally in the run-up to the election and even expresses
optimism for a possible conclusion of a swift peace agreement, then
this might mean that the discussed model of a settlement of the
conflict is acceptable enough for Armenia. Otherwise, the
negotiations process at this stage might have halted with no
progress.
"Kosovo precedent" bodes ill for Azerbaijan
"The Kosovo precedent" might also be a quite alarming factor for
Baku. The coincidence of a new phase of activity in the negotiations
on the Karabakh problem with the completing period in the Kosovo
settlement may not be accidental.
Despite all absolute differences between the given problems and
assurances of the OSCE Minsk Group members (first of all, the USA and
France) that the "Kosovo incident" is unacceptable for the settlement
of the post-Soviet conflicts, nevertheless, in case of successful
realization of this model, Azerbaijan may encounter a problem of a
shift of accent in favour of separatist interests of Armenians, and
consequently, with transformation of the negotiations process to
other level.
By the way, one of the co-chair countries (Russia) already
unambiguously recognizes the possibility of applying the "Kosovo
precedent" to the settlement of the post-Soviet conflicts. Yerevan
also expresses its readiness to take political and psychological
advantage of the "Kosovo precedent" for its own interest.
"If Kosovo gains independence, no-one should tell as that they can
but we cannot," Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan has
recently said. In any case, the "Kosovo incident" may notably
aggravate the process of achievement of an acceptable for Azerbaijan
peace agreement.
Given this, a sole alternative to a capitulatory peace can be a
resumption of hostilities and an attempt to militarily compel to a
worthy peace.
Nevertheless, the negotiations process that has become active
unexpectedly can in the long run bring unpleasant surprises for
Yerevan as well: a lot will depend not only on the geo-energy
situation, secret scenarios or plans of the co-chairing countries but
also on domestic and foreign outcomes of the Armenian presidential
election.
The overall intrigue in the negotiating process is also strengthened
by the rather quick inclusion of the issue of frozen conflicts on the
agenda of the UN initiated by the GUAM [regional alliance of Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova] member countries. The GUAM
initiative assumes an examination and a resolution to the conflicts
in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan within the framework of the
territorial integrity of these states.
If the GUAM initiative enjoys convincing support by the UN (moreover,
prior to the completion of the "Kosovo crisis"), then this will
undoubtedly remove the registered threat to a certain degree and
slightly reinforce Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations process.
[translated]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Dec 17 2007
Current stage of Karabakh talks bodes ill for Azerbaijan
"Imitation of activity or a new phase of the game?"
No basis for a breakthrough
A new cycle of either imitation or real activity has recently taken
shape in the protracted and extremely unsuccessful negotiation
process on the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani (Nagornyy
Karabakh) conflict. On the heels of the intriguing Madrid round of
talks and the ensuing visit of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to the
region, everybody suddenly started talking about the availability of
a modified and coordinated text of the core principles for a peaceful
settlement of the conflict and on possibility of concluding a certain
framework agreement very soon.
This was sudden because of several factors: First, there has been no
substantial novelty in the position of the conflicting sides (Armenia
and Azerbaijan), or in the approaches of the mediating countries (the
USA, Russia and France) or in the essence of the process which could
have intensify the peacemaking efforts.
Second, there seem to be no such solid foundations to speak about the
availability of a wide consensus basis or matured geopolitical demand
for a quick settlement to the conflict.
Thirdly and finally, against the backdrop of the approaching
presidential elections almost in all the interested countries
(Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan and the USA) and bearing in mind the
whole experience of dynamics of the negotiations process, it would
have been highly logical to expect not invigoration but full
attenuation of the peacemaking diplomacy. Why then are we not
observing uncommon slump despite all circumstances but intriguing
intensity in the peacemaking diplomacy? For what purpose is a new
phase of invigoration importunately reanimated in the desperate
negotiating process that has come to a standstill? Why do the Minsk
Group co-chairs so insistently thrust the next expectation of swift
breakthrough in the negotiations process on the public of the
conflicting parties? What is it?
Is this the continuation of the previously standing and imitating
activity or a new phase in the peacemaking game implying a real
breakthrough?
Unfavourable outcome for Azerbaijan?
Without rejecting an option of usual imitating activity, about which
we have reported many times, let us consider an option of a
possibility of a real breakthrough. A lot speaks in favour of the
fact that actually strenuous efforts are applied to achieve a certain
framework peace agreement within the modified Prague process. And, it
is possible that not entirely in favour of Azerbaijan. To this
testifies also the fact of ignoring the argument of elections in both
conflicting states by the international peace brokers.
Whilst the upcoming presidential election in Azerbaijan is just a
formality which in no way is able to influence the negotiating
process, then in this plan, it becomes more significant and
intriguing the [19] February presidential election in Armenia,
unpredictable outcome of which in many respects will depend also on
upheavals in the settlement of the Karabakh problem.
If Yerevan continues to actively participate in the negotiations
process literally in the run-up to the election and even expresses
optimism for a possible conclusion of a swift peace agreement, then
this might mean that the discussed model of a settlement of the
conflict is acceptable enough for Armenia. Otherwise, the
negotiations process at this stage might have halted with no
progress.
"Kosovo precedent" bodes ill for Azerbaijan
"The Kosovo precedent" might also be a quite alarming factor for
Baku. The coincidence of a new phase of activity in the negotiations
on the Karabakh problem with the completing period in the Kosovo
settlement may not be accidental.
Despite all absolute differences between the given problems and
assurances of the OSCE Minsk Group members (first of all, the USA and
France) that the "Kosovo incident" is unacceptable for the settlement
of the post-Soviet conflicts, nevertheless, in case of successful
realization of this model, Azerbaijan may encounter a problem of a
shift of accent in favour of separatist interests of Armenians, and
consequently, with transformation of the negotiations process to
other level.
By the way, one of the co-chair countries (Russia) already
unambiguously recognizes the possibility of applying the "Kosovo
precedent" to the settlement of the post-Soviet conflicts. Yerevan
also expresses its readiness to take political and psychological
advantage of the "Kosovo precedent" for its own interest.
"If Kosovo gains independence, no-one should tell as that they can
but we cannot," Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan has
recently said. In any case, the "Kosovo incident" may notably
aggravate the process of achievement of an acceptable for Azerbaijan
peace agreement.
Given this, a sole alternative to a capitulatory peace can be a
resumption of hostilities and an attempt to militarily compel to a
worthy peace.
Nevertheless, the negotiations process that has become active
unexpectedly can in the long run bring unpleasant surprises for
Yerevan as well: a lot will depend not only on the geo-energy
situation, secret scenarios or plans of the co-chairing countries but
also on domestic and foreign outcomes of the Armenian presidential
election.
The overall intrigue in the negotiating process is also strengthened
by the rather quick inclusion of the issue of frozen conflicts on the
agenda of the UN initiated by the GUAM [regional alliance of Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova] member countries. The GUAM
initiative assumes an examination and a resolution to the conflicts
in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan within the framework of the
territorial integrity of these states.
If the GUAM initiative enjoys convincing support by the UN (moreover,
prior to the completion of the "Kosovo crisis"), then this will
undoubtedly remove the registered threat to a certain degree and
slightly reinforce Azerbaijan's position in the negotiations process.
[translated]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress