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Eurasian Home Analytical Resource, Russia
Jan 31 2007
RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE IN 2006
STANISLAV BELKOVSKY,
Director of the National Strategy Institute, Moscow
Summing up the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space in
2006, we should acknowledge that Russia has ceased to be a regional
power.
Before 2006 the post-Soviet space had been fragmented and segmented
for about 2 years, i.e. it ceased to exist as an informal formation
with the capital in Moscow. Since 2006, Russia has not been a source
of legitimacy of the post-Soviet regimes. In the near future the
post-Soviet space will be structured by the new subregional powers,
such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Apart from that, in 2006 the myth that the New Independent States
crucially depended on Russia in energy supplies was destroyed. Now it
is clear that Ukraine and Belarus as energy transit countries can
exert influence upon Russia, because the latter is interested in
guaranteeing security of energy supplies to Europe.
Also it became clear that dependence of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as
energy suppliers on Russia was not critical. Many events that took
place last year indicate that.
Putting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline into operation means the
appearance of a new route from Central Asia to Europe. As oil from
the Central Asian countries flows along the pipeline, the route
through the Russian port of Novorossiysk will become less attractive.
In 2006 the construction of Nabukko pipeline was more intense. It
will be built through the Caspian Sea bottom, Turkey, Hungary,
Romania to Western Europe with a branch line to Ukraine. Thus,
Ukraine will have an opportunity to get the Central Asian gas that
will be supplied to it without going through Russia. Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych back
this project.
The death of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006
and the changes followed in the government of Turkmenistan livened up
the discussion of the construction of the Transafghan gas pipeline.
After this gas pipeline is put into operation, Turkmenistan will
reduce its dependence on the Russian company Gazprom. The country
will need not sell its gas to Gazprom at a price that is lower than
the market one. As a result, in 2012 Russia may not fill its gas
pipelines with the cheap Turkmen gas.
In the heat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute at the beginning of
2006 the world came to know that Gazprom had no capacity for limiting
its gas exports, because it couldn't stop supplies to the EU
countries through Ukraine for more than 4 or 5 days.
In 2006 the Belarus-Russia Union project actually ceased to exist.
The project was of importance to the Kremlin, because it allowed
Russia to keep Belarus as a strategic partner. In many respects the
legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka's regime was based on the idea of
reviving the `USSR in miniature'.
In 2007 Lukashenka will have to carry out an alternative national
project that implies building of a full-format national state.
As early as in 2006 we saw Belarus' rapprochement with the other New
Independent States that have recently been regarded as opponents of
the Belarus-Russia Union (Ukraine, Azerbaijan etc.).
In January 2007 contacts between Belarus and the EU have become much
more intense. On January 16, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development announced that it would implement a new strategy towards
Belarus that would imply the increase of the level of cooperation
with the Belarusian private capital.
On January 18, during his official visit to Minsk PACE President René
van der Linden firstly stated that Belarus getting out of the
political isolation would guarantee its democratization and
successful development. He did not criticize Lukashenka severely. In
return, the Belarusian President allowed René van der Linden to meet
with some key figures of the Belarusian opposition.
As we expect, Belarus will intensify cooperation with Ukraine in
2007.
In 2007-2011 Lukashenka will most likely make an attempt to
democratize his regime. It is possible that the new Constitution will
be adopted. The EU will give up the efforts to change Lukashenka's
regime and it will help Belarus to integrate into the European
economic and political projects. Ukraine will act as a mediator of
the Belarus-EU relations and a new subregional power.
In 2006 Russia ceased to be a geopolitical force in the South
Caucasus. Moscow's efforts to establish a blockade on Georgia seem to
be unsuccessful. The country is able to do without the Russian energy
resources.
The blockade, imposed on Georgia, led to the economic losses - 1.5 %
of Georgia's GDP. But it is not critical. Before 2006 Gazprom was the
exclusive Georgia's gas supplier, in 2007 it will supply only 35% of
the Russian gas to Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey have become
alternative energy suppliers of Georgia. If the USA gave its consent,
Iran could cover Gazprom's share.
In 2006 the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan worsened.
Azerbaijan refused to purchase the Russian gas and didn't back up the
blockade, set up over Georgia.
Deterioration of relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan endangers the
interests of Armenia, the last Russia's ally in the region. Armenia
has become dependent not only on the Azerbaijani but also on the
Georgian transport corridors.
The replacement of the Kazakh Prime Minister at the beginning of 2007
means that focus of Kazakhstan's foreign policy will be shifted. The
key posts in the Cabinet, which were occupied by the representatives
of the old Russia-oriented elite, now are occupied by the officials
who intend to develop deep economic and political ties with the USA
and China, which indicates that Kazakhstan should not be considered
to be a strategic ally or an outpost of Russia either.
Thus, after 2006 Russia remained all alone in the post-Soviet space.
Its only allies are the unrecognized republics that also have a
number of disagreements with their `elder brother'.
In particular, Russia did not recognize the 2006 referendum in
Transnistria that took place on 17 September 2006 (on that date,
Transnistria voted to continue its de facto independence and seek
closer ties with Russia), although Moscow had forced the
Transnistrian authorities to hold the referendum.
Thus, Russia has ceased to be a moderator in the post-Soviet space.
And this is a policy followed by the Russian ruling political class
for all the recent years.
Such an unreasoned policy makes Russia develop a new positioning
strategy in the post-Soviet space in the near future. But there are
doubts that this strategy will be developed, while the current
political elite remains in power.
The strategy will most likely be proposed after the presidential
election in Russia that is scheduled for 2008.
The text is based on Stanislav Belkovsky's address to the
press-conference `Russia in the post-Soviet space: forecast of the
future scenarios' that was organized by the Russian News and
Information Agency RIA Novosti on January 23, 2007.
January 31, 2007
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml? lang=en&nic=expert&pid=950&qmonth=0&am p;qyear=0
Jan 31 2007
RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE IN 2006
STANISLAV BELKOVSKY,
Director of the National Strategy Institute, Moscow
Summing up the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space in
2006, we should acknowledge that Russia has ceased to be a regional
power.
Before 2006 the post-Soviet space had been fragmented and segmented
for about 2 years, i.e. it ceased to exist as an informal formation
with the capital in Moscow. Since 2006, Russia has not been a source
of legitimacy of the post-Soviet regimes. In the near future the
post-Soviet space will be structured by the new subregional powers,
such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Apart from that, in 2006 the myth that the New Independent States
crucially depended on Russia in energy supplies was destroyed. Now it
is clear that Ukraine and Belarus as energy transit countries can
exert influence upon Russia, because the latter is interested in
guaranteeing security of energy supplies to Europe.
Also it became clear that dependence of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as
energy suppliers on Russia was not critical. Many events that took
place last year indicate that.
Putting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline into operation means the
appearance of a new route from Central Asia to Europe. As oil from
the Central Asian countries flows along the pipeline, the route
through the Russian port of Novorossiysk will become less attractive.
In 2006 the construction of Nabukko pipeline was more intense. It
will be built through the Caspian Sea bottom, Turkey, Hungary,
Romania to Western Europe with a branch line to Ukraine. Thus,
Ukraine will have an opportunity to get the Central Asian gas that
will be supplied to it without going through Russia. Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych back
this project.
The death of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006
and the changes followed in the government of Turkmenistan livened up
the discussion of the construction of the Transafghan gas pipeline.
After this gas pipeline is put into operation, Turkmenistan will
reduce its dependence on the Russian company Gazprom. The country
will need not sell its gas to Gazprom at a price that is lower than
the market one. As a result, in 2012 Russia may not fill its gas
pipelines with the cheap Turkmen gas.
In the heat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute at the beginning of
2006 the world came to know that Gazprom had no capacity for limiting
its gas exports, because it couldn't stop supplies to the EU
countries through Ukraine for more than 4 or 5 days.
In 2006 the Belarus-Russia Union project actually ceased to exist.
The project was of importance to the Kremlin, because it allowed
Russia to keep Belarus as a strategic partner. In many respects the
legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka's regime was based on the idea of
reviving the `USSR in miniature'.
In 2007 Lukashenka will have to carry out an alternative national
project that implies building of a full-format national state.
As early as in 2006 we saw Belarus' rapprochement with the other New
Independent States that have recently been regarded as opponents of
the Belarus-Russia Union (Ukraine, Azerbaijan etc.).
In January 2007 contacts between Belarus and the EU have become much
more intense. On January 16, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development announced that it would implement a new strategy towards
Belarus that would imply the increase of the level of cooperation
with the Belarusian private capital.
On January 18, during his official visit to Minsk PACE President René
van der Linden firstly stated that Belarus getting out of the
political isolation would guarantee its democratization and
successful development. He did not criticize Lukashenka severely. In
return, the Belarusian President allowed René van der Linden to meet
with some key figures of the Belarusian opposition.
As we expect, Belarus will intensify cooperation with Ukraine in
2007.
In 2007-2011 Lukashenka will most likely make an attempt to
democratize his regime. It is possible that the new Constitution will
be adopted. The EU will give up the efforts to change Lukashenka's
regime and it will help Belarus to integrate into the European
economic and political projects. Ukraine will act as a mediator of
the Belarus-EU relations and a new subregional power.
In 2006 Russia ceased to be a geopolitical force in the South
Caucasus. Moscow's efforts to establish a blockade on Georgia seem to
be unsuccessful. The country is able to do without the Russian energy
resources.
The blockade, imposed on Georgia, led to the economic losses - 1.5 %
of Georgia's GDP. But it is not critical. Before 2006 Gazprom was the
exclusive Georgia's gas supplier, in 2007 it will supply only 35% of
the Russian gas to Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey have become
alternative energy suppliers of Georgia. If the USA gave its consent,
Iran could cover Gazprom's share.
In 2006 the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan worsened.
Azerbaijan refused to purchase the Russian gas and didn't back up the
blockade, set up over Georgia.
Deterioration of relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan endangers the
interests of Armenia, the last Russia's ally in the region. Armenia
has become dependent not only on the Azerbaijani but also on the
Georgian transport corridors.
The replacement of the Kazakh Prime Minister at the beginning of 2007
means that focus of Kazakhstan's foreign policy will be shifted. The
key posts in the Cabinet, which were occupied by the representatives
of the old Russia-oriented elite, now are occupied by the officials
who intend to develop deep economic and political ties with the USA
and China, which indicates that Kazakhstan should not be considered
to be a strategic ally or an outpost of Russia either.
Thus, after 2006 Russia remained all alone in the post-Soviet space.
Its only allies are the unrecognized republics that also have a
number of disagreements with their `elder brother'.
In particular, Russia did not recognize the 2006 referendum in
Transnistria that took place on 17 September 2006 (on that date,
Transnistria voted to continue its de facto independence and seek
closer ties with Russia), although Moscow had forced the
Transnistrian authorities to hold the referendum.
Thus, Russia has ceased to be a moderator in the post-Soviet space.
And this is a policy followed by the Russian ruling political class
for all the recent years.
Such an unreasoned policy makes Russia develop a new positioning
strategy in the post-Soviet space in the near future. But there are
doubts that this strategy will be developed, while the current
political elite remains in power.
The strategy will most likely be proposed after the presidential
election in Russia that is scheduled for 2008.
The text is based on Stanislav Belkovsky's address to the
press-conference `Russia in the post-Soviet space: forecast of the
future scenarios' that was organized by the Russian News and
Information Agency RIA Novosti on January 23, 2007.
January 31, 2007
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml? lang=en&nic=expert&pid=950&qmonth=0&am p;qyear=0