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ZNet: Hrant Dink's Death

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  • ZNet: Hrant Dink's Death

    Hrant Dink's Death
    Ali Saysel
    ZNet
    Feb. 1, 2007
    http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?S ectionID=3D74&ItemID=3D12009


    Hrant Dink, the prominent Armenian intellectual of Turkey, co-founder
    and the editor-in-chief of the Armenian weekly Agos was shot dead on
    19th January at around 3 pm on one of the busiest streets of Istanbul,
    just in front ofthe apartment block home to Agos's small office. Hrant
    Dink was known as a vocal and true defender of people's fraternity,
    equity and freedom of expression.

    He was courageous enough to express in Turkey that "1915 was
    genocide", even though he knew very well about the many articles in
    Turkish Penal Code that can immediately criminalize anyone making such
    a claim publicly. And he had held a true standard of freedom of
    expression that urged him to express in France that "1915 was not
    genocide", ridiculing French Parliament's ruling against such contrary
    claims.

    Hrant Dink was born in 1954 in Malatya, one of the many eastern towns
    of Turkey, all once home to a lively Armenian community before
    1915. At the age of seven, with his family, he migrated to Istanbul
    and had his primary education in Armenian orphanages and minority
    schools. He studied zoology and philosophy in Istanbul University. He
    had somehow been active in the leftist movement in the 70's, managed a
    large Armenian summer school in the 80's, had his first journalism
    experience in Patriarchate's office and in 1996 co-found the weekly
    Agos with the purpose of building a bridge between the Armenian and
    Turkish communities, to be the voice of the Armenian community and to
    fight against all sorts of injustices against those who are
    underprivileged and in particular the Armenians. But Hrant Dink's
    impact and reach had been beyond Agos, with his speeches and columns
    published in other dissident and sometimes in main-stream media and
    press, and through his participation in many forums and democratic
    platforms.

    There have been many responses to his assassination. For the Armenian
    community, perhaps it was a trauma recalling the sufferings that are
    well written on their national folklore and common memory. Were their
    elders right when they warned the young Armenians that Turks are not
    dependable? Were Hrant and his friends over-optimistic in thinking
    that Turks can actually change? His friends, the rather thin
    democratic groups, leftists and some liberals hadan emotional turmoil
    knowing that Hrant was not the first and probably would not be the
    last. After all, since the Turkish state was established in 1923, 69
    prominent journalists were killed, excluding the "less valuable" ones,
    like the over 26 mostly Kurdish media workers that disappeared between
    1992-1995.

    For the state and its cogs in the elite-press, this murder was awful,
    inhuman and would obviously harm Turkey's foreign interests. The
    perpetrators hadto be brought before justice, now it was time to
    question the nationalist and jingoist atmosphere in the country, yet
    without any specific reference to their own contribution in the
    creation of this nationalist atmosphere. Finally, the extreme
    nationalists and national-islamists adopted a rather pragmatic, hence
    hypocritical stand saying that the murder was detrimental for the
    national interests and therefore that could be a conspiracy of foreign
    intelligence units like MOSSAD and CIA and their local collaborators,
    or rather Armenian diaspora trying to break down the national unity
    and the national identityof the country.

    Who then killed Hrant Dink? It had been easy to catch the hoodlum, a
    seventeen years old male, an easy recruit probably acting for his
    bigger brother's group which was possibly subcontracted by some more
    experienced group that involves real professionals with considerable
    counterinsurgency experiencein official service. Following the fate of
    previous investigations for other assassins of prominent intellectuals
    and activists, there is not much hopethat this inquiry will go deep
    enough to discover the real criminal elements. For instance, Hrant
    Dink's lawyer says that he was receiving death treats froma retired
    General, Veli Küçük who has been allegedly organizing and commanding
    Special Forces in Gendarmerie before his retirement. General Küçük
    stays active after his retirement conducting a group of lawyers
    bringing lawsuits against the prominent intellectuals and thus
    victimizing them by organized insulting demonstrations in front of the
    courts while the sessions are being held.

    Almost ten days after the assassination, none of these people are
    questioned by the authorities yet.

    There are many assassinations in the recent history of Turkey that are
    very well known by the public and have become a common memory of the
    Turkish and Kurdish dissidents. When the voice of the opposition needs
    to be suppressed, a prominent intellectual or human rights activist is
    murdered, followed by others, until a terror atmosphere is created
    where no one dares to speak out, so that some sections of the state
    apparatus can implement their sinister hidden agenda.

    It can be argued that, Dink had been the victim of Turkish
    militarism. The military and the political parties deliberately sought
    to create a jingoist-militarist cultural atmosphere; the mass-media,
    mass-culture industry intentionally endorsed and exploited this
    ascending culture and helped to create a "lynch culture" of so-called
    self motivated hooligans. And under this atmosphere, the articles in
    the new Turkish Penal Code of year 2005 and the new Anti-Terror Law of
    year 2006 deliberately victimized the human rights activists and
    intellectuals and labeled them betrayers.

    What is then at stake at the moment? During US's restructuring of the
    Middle East, Turkey found its conventional Kurdish denial policy
    obsolete. Seeing that it is impossible to avoid an emerging Kurdish
    political structure in old Iraqi soils, the military establishment
    panicked by projections that the country can be divided if the
    millions of Kurds in Turkey pursue common ends with their Iraqi
    fellows. The developments in Iraqi Kurdistan and the inability of the
    Turkish military to manipulate the situation in Iraq and to suppress
    the political demands of Kurds at home raised the atmosphere against
    Kurds.

    Human rights violations in Kurdish regions increased and approached
    its 1990s levels at the time when there was a low-intensity
    warfare. In the 2005 Newroz celebrations, after a child burned a
    Turkish flag, the Chief Army Officer addressed many Kurds as not
    proper citizens but "so-called" citizens. In Autumn 2005, in the
    border Kurdish town of Semdinli in southeast Turkey, when the
    perpetrators of the bombing of a bookstore were unveiled by the local
    people they were found out to be army officials. Soon, the judicial
    process also accusing the Chief Army Officer for organized conspiracy
    was halted by the dismissal of the public prosecutor, to the
    disappointment of many Kurds. In April 2006, during the funeral of a
    Kurdish armed militant in his hometown, the largest Kurdish town of
    Diyarbakir, people revolted against police and the succeeding events
    were suppressed in days by force, killing tens of children and adults
    on the street.

    The political parties, without exception, laid their faith on this
    ascending jingoist-militarist atmosphere. The red-white colors of
    Turkish nationalism and the crescent-star on Turkish flag became
    ordinary objects of propaganda.

    A conference on "Ottoman Armenians" in Spring 2005, by three
    relatively liberal universities in Istanbul had to be indefinitely
    postponed becauseof the rivaling nationalist attitudes of both the
    governing and opposition parties in the Parliament in Ankara. Again,
    the participants of the conference were labeled as betrayers before
    the public.

    A TV series, covering illegal acts and crimes of a Turkish mafioso
    character against so-called national enemies, his talents on how one
    can evade being punished by law had become a cult for teenage males in
    the country. Fictions and movies on Turkish forces fighting against
    Americans and romantic and legendry versions of Turkish Liberation War
    became best sellers in published media. Hitler's Mein Kampf sold
    thousands of copies, by far exceeding the circulation of any decent
    book on the shelves in recent years.

    Furthermore, thin activist groups and intellectuals were threatened by
    law.

    The year 2005 Turkish Penal Code, TPC 301 "insulting Turkishness", TPC
    216 "inflicting hatred", the special law 5816 "insulting Kemal Ataturk
    - the founder of the modern republic", and Anti-Terror Law article 6
    "adopting the propaganda of terror organization", and many other
    articles were designed to suppress the truths about suffering
    underprivileged groups, harass the intellectuals and label them as
    betrayers and disrupters before an extremely nationalistic
    public. Even their trials were a drama. Jingoist groups weregathering
    around the court, insulting and assaulting, and all this was being
    watchedby the police officials.

    Hrant Dink was one of those defendants. He was tried and convicted by
    TPC 301. Against all expert opinion before the court, claiming that
    Hrant did not insult Turkishness, he was convicted to 6 months
    imprisonment by the Supreme Court in Ankara. He was sure of himself
    that he did not insult but the verdict was a big disappointment. It
    was very difficult for him to be understood and perceived as someone
    insulting his Turkish fellows, he would not insult anyone, and under
    such circumstances it could even become impossible for him to live
    with Turks, with a group of people he had supposedly insulted. Other
    fellow defendants of similar trials, like the Nobel Laureate Orhan
    Pamuk,Elif Safak and some others were acquitted. Hrant was not,
    although he was quiteas salient as Pamuk and Safak for the world
    public opinion and international community.

    He was not acquitted, because he was Armenian. He did something wrong,
    something that cannot be tolerated: for the first time since 1915, an
    Armenian in Turkey stood up and openly claimed that "1915 is genocide"
    and at the same time said "I am an Armenian and this is my
    country". And he said all this without inflicting any hatred on
    Turkish and Kurdish people. He sought equitable means to live
    together. That was too much, that was something to be punished.

    Eventually, on 19th January, he was assassinated by a seventeen year
    old hoodlum. His funeral on 23rd January was quite unanticipated in
    many respects.

    For the first time in Istanbul, over 100.000 people marched and
    mourned during a funeral. For the first time in Turkey, over 100.000
    people chanted "We are all Armenians". This obviously shows an
    emerging democratic culture against ascending racism and jingoism in
    the country. Moreover, for the first time in the country, the citizens
    had the chance to see the true human face of a dissident and the
    mourning of his friends and relatives on live broadcast through elite
    media channels. It proved that, when people are given the chance to
    see the truth, they have the ability to understand and build empathy
    with the victims. That is, if they can generalize this feeling onto
    hundreds of other victims in this country whose names are unknown to
    many, a decent public opinion can emerge and can help building a more
    democratic society.

    Hrant Dink's life, and unfortunately his funeral taught something. On
    the other hand malicious forces are still much larger, much stronger
    and much more vocal. The future in Turkey will be one of struggle
    between thriving democratic opinion and Turkish militarism, covering
    itself as lay people's nationalism, racism and jingoism.

    Ali Saysel is a scholar in Bogazici University, Istanbul and he can be
    reached at [email protected]
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