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Russia isn't only suspect country for nuclear smuggling
The Hamilton Spectator
(Feb 3, 2007)
It's a chance, you might think, for Russia to show the co-operation
its president, Vladimir Putin, regularly promises in clamping down on
the global traffic in dangerous nuclear materials. Yet the release
last week of new tidbits about a Georgian sting operation that
reportedly netted just short of 80 grams of highly enriched
weapons-usable uranium, a Russian citizen from Vladikavkaz in North
Ossetia (a part of Russia) and several Georgian accomplices -- was a
"provocation," thundered Russia's foreign minister.
The sting was first reported in February last year and Russia loathes
Georgia. But there is more to the Kremlin's nuclear frostiness. While
it co-operates with the U.S. in securing dangerous nuclear materials
around the world -- most recently airlifting back to Russia a whopping
286 kilos of highly enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor in
Dresden in former East Germany -- Russian officialdom's souring mood
at home augurs ill.
Russia is not the only country with a nuclear-smuggling habit.
Excluding the Georgian sting operation, a database maintained by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear
guardian, has recorded 16 confirmed cases worldwide since 1993 where
highly enriched uranium or plutonium (both, in the right form, can be
used as the fissile core of a nuclear weapon) has been lost, stolen or
seized from would-be traffickers, mostly in Europe and Russia.
But not all countries bother to report. China, India and Pakistan have
been among the 95 contributors to the list only since last
year. Coverage is most patchy in the least secure parts of the world,
including Africa and the Middle East.
The Georgian case is alarming. The uranium being hawked was enriched
to about 90 per cent and intended for weapons use. Fuel for nuclear
power reactors is typically enriched to 5 per cent or less. Georgian
officials say their prisoner revealed his bagful came from an as yet
undiscovered stash of two to three kilograms. The amount isn't enough
for a weapon -- that takes up to 25 kg -- but it's still a threat.
This case resembles one in 2003, when 170 grams of similar material
was seized on the Georgian-Armenian border. Its Armenian smuggler said
he had picked it up in Vladikavkaz, too, although tests showed the
material originated at a Russian nuclear site in Novosibirsk.
Although the quantities of weapons grade material seized by police are
usually quite small, the consequences of any falling into terrorist
hands are huge. Al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden, has called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction a "religious duty."
Nor is al-Qaeda the only potential customer. Chechen rebels who
attacked a Moscow theatre in 2002 had first considered an assault on a
nuclear research reactor at the nearby Kurchatov Institute. Among
other terrorist mischief in Russia, an article in the September 2006
issue of the Annals of the American Academy lists the casing of
nuclear reactors, monitoring the trains that transport Russia's
nuclear weapons and even a plan to hijack a nuclear submarine.
At a summit in Bratislava in 2005, the Russian and U.S. presidents
agreed to speed a global effort to secure all dangerous nuclear
materials. This included repatriating fresh and spent fuel from the
more than 100 nuclear research reactors in 40 countries that Russia
and the U.S. between them supplied during the Cold War.
Russia's concerns about terrorism are one incentive to fix its nuclear
problems. Another is huge dollops of American cash. Since the Soviet
Union collapsed, America has helped dismantle thousands of surplus
nuclear warheads, consolidate a vast archipelago of nuclear materials,
and find jobs for otherwise unemployed Russian weapons scientists. The
window for such co-operation is closing, says Laura Holgate of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, an independent outfit that has paid for the
return of some Russian reactor fuel from abroad.
Much of the easier work in Russia has been done. But officials there
still reject help at their most sensitive nuclear sites, where the
bulk of the most dangerous materials are kept. Without the U.S.
looking over its shoulder, says Holgate, it is unclear that Russia
will be so conscientious in maintaining security. And if, as Georgia
found, it resents being told its nuclear controls aren't perfect,
there won't be much outsiders can do to help anyway.
Contents copyright 1991-2005, The Hamilton Spectator.
The Hamilton Spectator
(Feb 3, 2007)
It's a chance, you might think, for Russia to show the co-operation
its president, Vladimir Putin, regularly promises in clamping down on
the global traffic in dangerous nuclear materials. Yet the release
last week of new tidbits about a Georgian sting operation that
reportedly netted just short of 80 grams of highly enriched
weapons-usable uranium, a Russian citizen from Vladikavkaz in North
Ossetia (a part of Russia) and several Georgian accomplices -- was a
"provocation," thundered Russia's foreign minister.
The sting was first reported in February last year and Russia loathes
Georgia. But there is more to the Kremlin's nuclear frostiness. While
it co-operates with the U.S. in securing dangerous nuclear materials
around the world -- most recently airlifting back to Russia a whopping
286 kilos of highly enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor in
Dresden in former East Germany -- Russian officialdom's souring mood
at home augurs ill.
Russia is not the only country with a nuclear-smuggling habit.
Excluding the Georgian sting operation, a database maintained by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear
guardian, has recorded 16 confirmed cases worldwide since 1993 where
highly enriched uranium or plutonium (both, in the right form, can be
used as the fissile core of a nuclear weapon) has been lost, stolen or
seized from would-be traffickers, mostly in Europe and Russia.
But not all countries bother to report. China, India and Pakistan have
been among the 95 contributors to the list only since last
year. Coverage is most patchy in the least secure parts of the world,
including Africa and the Middle East.
The Georgian case is alarming. The uranium being hawked was enriched
to about 90 per cent and intended for weapons use. Fuel for nuclear
power reactors is typically enriched to 5 per cent or less. Georgian
officials say their prisoner revealed his bagful came from an as yet
undiscovered stash of two to three kilograms. The amount isn't enough
for a weapon -- that takes up to 25 kg -- but it's still a threat.
This case resembles one in 2003, when 170 grams of similar material
was seized on the Georgian-Armenian border. Its Armenian smuggler said
he had picked it up in Vladikavkaz, too, although tests showed the
material originated at a Russian nuclear site in Novosibirsk.
Although the quantities of weapons grade material seized by police are
usually quite small, the consequences of any falling into terrorist
hands are huge. Al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden, has called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction a "religious duty."
Nor is al-Qaeda the only potential customer. Chechen rebels who
attacked a Moscow theatre in 2002 had first considered an assault on a
nuclear research reactor at the nearby Kurchatov Institute. Among
other terrorist mischief in Russia, an article in the September 2006
issue of the Annals of the American Academy lists the casing of
nuclear reactors, monitoring the trains that transport Russia's
nuclear weapons and even a plan to hijack a nuclear submarine.
At a summit in Bratislava in 2005, the Russian and U.S. presidents
agreed to speed a global effort to secure all dangerous nuclear
materials. This included repatriating fresh and spent fuel from the
more than 100 nuclear research reactors in 40 countries that Russia
and the U.S. between them supplied during the Cold War.
Russia's concerns about terrorism are one incentive to fix its nuclear
problems. Another is huge dollops of American cash. Since the Soviet
Union collapsed, America has helped dismantle thousands of surplus
nuclear warheads, consolidate a vast archipelago of nuclear materials,
and find jobs for otherwise unemployed Russian weapons scientists. The
window for such co-operation is closing, says Laura Holgate of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, an independent outfit that has paid for the
return of some Russian reactor fuel from abroad.
Much of the easier work in Russia has been done. But officials there
still reject help at their most sensitive nuclear sites, where the
bulk of the most dangerous materials are kept. Without the U.S.
looking over its shoulder, says Holgate, it is unclear that Russia
will be so conscientious in maintaining security. And if, as Georgia
found, it resents being told its nuclear controls aren't perfect,
there won't be much outsiders can do to help anyway.
Contents copyright 1991-2005, The Hamilton Spectator.