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THE END OF AN ERA IN THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE DEBATE: WILL RECOGNITION LEAD TO A TURKISH POLICY TRANSFORMATION?
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
Feb 5 2007
If Turkey gives up its opposition to potential US recognition of the
atrocities between Turks and Armenians that took place during World
War One as ¦Á ¡°genocide,¡± will its diplomatic hand ultimately be
strengthened? The following article argues that this just might be
the case.
What should have happened ninety-two years ago in 1915 is finally
likely to happen in 2007. Both Houses of the U.S. Congress are expected
to pass a resolution that recognizes the bitter WWI experience of
the Turkish Armenians as genocide after it is discussed in the House
Foreign Relations Committee in April. Ankara reflexively and as usual
warned Washington that bilateral relations may be damaged to a degree
never before seen. A similar resolution was stopped in the year 2000
due to Turkish diplomatic pressure. But times have changed.
For many Turks, passing the resolution will verify their suspicions
of the unfaithful friendship of the United States. Ankara is right
when it maintains that bilateral relations would be damaged severely
during a period in which the United States needs a reliable ally
in the Middle East. Nevertheless, by acknowledging the distinction
between recognizing the so-called Armenian genocide and letting the
U.S. Congress recognize it, Ankara could actually benefit by letting
the latter happen.
A sizeable part of the Turkish public, from officials to intellectuals
and ordinary men on the street, view the recognition of the so-called
Armenian genocide by the US Congress as an opportunity to break free
from an area of coercion in the United States¡¯ allegedly unfaithful
friendship, and from an almost century-long hysteria surrounding
the question of ¡°what if the United States recognizes the so-called
genocide?¡± In this regard, the recognition of the so-called genocide
seems to present a more of a threat to the interests of the United
States than to those of Turkey.
Recognizing the So-Called Armenian Genocide
Mr. Turgut Ozal, former President and Prime Minister of Turkey, was
among the first who sought to get rid of the hysteria by signaling
a tacit approval of recognizing the so-called genocide in 1991.
However, Ozal had to back up when political opponent Suleyman Demirel,
some high-ranking generals and the secular establishment accused him
of not being sensitive to this most important national matter. Nuzhet
Kandemir, then Turkish Ambassador to the US, ironically and yet
somehow proudly notes that he managed to convince Ozal to believe
that such an approval would not serve the Turkish national interests.
[1] More ironically, Ilter Turkmen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
suggests that Ozal did not in fact believe in what he said, but just
seemed so in order to stimulate a debate when he asked if it would
not be better for Turkey to recognize the so-called genocide. [2]
It is not clear whether Ozal thought the same way, but today it seems
like the ¡°genocide card¡± is destined to lose its value dramatically
as a foreign policy instrument against Turkey once the United States,
the long-time strategic ally of Turkey, recognizes the so-called
Armenian genocide. For so many years, thinks the majority of the
Turkish public, especially the Western European countries and the
United States have exploited the genocide question as a stick to beat
Turkey when the carrot did not indulge her. Today, US recognition is
likely to make the genocide issue much less effective as a foreign
policy instrument; with the threat of it gone, Turkey will be freed of
a longstanding preoccupation in its relations with the United States.
Although there is no unanimity among them, some in the media and
secular circles have speculated about the aftermath of the genocide
recognition and foresee potential sanctions against Turkey. These
speculations are often countered in the public debate by questions
such as: What happened after France long ago passed the resolution in
its parliament? What happened even after France declared it a crime
not to recognize the so-called Armenian genocide? Would the case be
any different with the United States?
International criminal law does not provide a guideline to deal with
historical atrocities, argues Swedish historian Bertil Dun¨¦r. [3]
Yet international law suggests the creation of an international
expert body representing both historians and the legal profession
to investigate such historical cases, and arrive at an eventual
condemnation of the responsible party or parties. This is actually
not much different from what Turkey, especially during the AK Party
government, has been advocating.
Whether the U.S. recognition makes any difference is something to
be seen in the future. However, it is not difficult to argue for now
that such recognition will have implications at multiple levels.
Possible Implications of the US Congress¡¯ Recognition
Turkey and Armenia are likely to gain from the US recognition of
the so-called genocide, while the United States is likely to lose in
the long term. First of all, the recognition will bring an end to a
prolonged era throughout which Turkey has suffered continuous hysteria
when considering the implications of the United States recognizing
the so-called Armenian genocide. Consequently, by the end of its de
facto liability to the United States for not recognizing the so-called
genocide, Turkey is likely to increase its bargaining power against
the US in their bilateral relations. Secondly, Turkish foreign policy,
which has essentially revolved around three issues throughout the
republic¡¯s history (defending against Armenian genocide allegations,
Cyprus, and relations with Greece), is likely to gain momentum that
could be developed down lesser-explored avenues such as increasing
bilateral relations with non-Western states.
Armenia has suffered profound economic hardship since the break-up
of the USSR. Some of this would have been lessened had the country
been able to develop economic relations with its immediate neighbor
to the west. However, the Armenian Diaspora¡¯s continuous efforts to
inflict pain on Turkey in the international arena have not helped in
this capacity. Beside its occupation of Azerbaijani territory adjoining
Karabagh, Armenia¡¯s constitutionally certified territorial claims on
areas of Eastern Turkey caused Turkey to impose a blockade on Armenia,
shutting off Yerevan¡¯s road and rail links to the West. [4]
However, with the Turkish people¡¯s overwhelming show of sympathy
following the recent murder of Turkish Armenian intellectual Hrant
Dink, Armenia¡¯s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arman Kirakosyan
stressed his government¡¯s readiness to open full diplomatic relations
with Turkey unconditionally. [5] Such a gesture hints that in the
absence of the Diaspora influence, Turkey and Armenia are likely to
sort out the problems hindering the two countries¡¯ ability to engage
in bilateral political and economic relations.
What is in it for the United States?
What are the pros and cons of the US recognizing the so-called Armenian
genocide? Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ) notes, ¡°[t]o truly dedicate
ourselves to improving human rights across the world, our government
must first learn from and properly condemn the mistakes of the past¡[6]
in order to express the rational behind his introduction of the
Armenian Genocide Resolution. He is right in that the U.S. government
should learn from and properly condemn the mistakes of the past, but
it hardly needs to look at the mistakes of others or go that far back
into history when it has more than enough of its own indiscretions
to use for that educative purpose. Understandably, however, Pallone
may not be able to distinguish between his own electoral interests
and the US national interests.
US-Turkish relations are unlikely to radically change due to the
Congress¡¯ recognition of the so-called genocide. Nor is Turkey
likely to take any radical action against the United States for that
matter, given the fact that it needs the US support to deal with the
Kurdish PKK separatists and the looming crisis in northern Iraq,
over Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the very fact that the United States
recognizes the so-called genocide would entail structural changes in
Turkey¡¯s foreign policy orientation, which would indirectly rather
than directly impact the US-Turkish relation in the long term.
Diminishing Influence of the ¡°White Turks¡±
There are likely to be losers on the Turkish side of the debate as
well once the so-called genocide is recognized by the US Congress.
These will include mainly the exclusivist and elitist secular
establishment in the state apparatus, its extension within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, and their contacts in Washington,
who have been reportedly lobbying on behalf of Turkey.
Throughout the republic¡¯s history, a small number of elite members
and diplomats have been considered to have the decisive influence on
Turkey¡¯s foreign policy orientation, formulation and implementation,
serving as a conduit between Ankara and Washington. This diplomatic
elite has earned the popular moniker, Beyaz Turkler (¡°White Turks¡±),
and frequently derive from familial dynasties, some non-Anatolian in
origin. The name implies a sort of ¡°untouchable,¡± elevated image
compared to the unwashed masses.
The prolonged conflicts such as the Armenian genocide issue, Cyprus,
Turkish-Greek relations, which pretty much constituted the triad of
Turkish foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century, entailed
an exclusivist foreign policy apparatus independent of whatever
particular government was in office. Understandably, dealing with
such conflicts required diplomatic expertise and personal connections
in Washington. Yet some have speculated that by prolonging these
conflicts, the very exclusivist ¡°White Turks¡± elite has kept the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs immune from the more traditional-minded
bulk of Turkish society, the so-called ¡°Black Turks,¡± and maintained
their grip on the country¡¯s foreign affairs.
Winds of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy
Nevertheless, in the recent years the so-called White Turks grip on
Turkish foreign policy, which is marked simply by an unconditional
attachment to the West, has started to diminish gradually. Turkish
foreign policy has gained multiple dimensions with the AK Party¡¯s
efforts to reach out to Central Asia, Middle East, Africa and even
Latin America. This new foreign policy orientation has thus opened
the door to those intellectuals who speak the languages, know the
cultures, or have even lived in these new regions of interest.
This expansion of interests represents a welcome breath of fresh
air for a foreign policy establishment that has become somewhat
close-minded due to a limited orientation traditionally focused on
a few narrow issues. By reaching out to other corners of the globe,
Turkey will develop for itself a more sophisticated and cosmopolitan
mindset and inevitably a more prestigious place on the global stage.
The most significant example of the new breed of foreign policy
intellectuals is probably Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign affairs
counselor to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He
was allegedly the most influential thinker who crafted the new
multi-dimensional foreign policy paradigm of the AK Party government,
which resulted in closer relations of Turkey with its immediate
neighbors such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and even Iran. The US Congress¡¯
recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide should only speed
up the transformation within the Turkish foreign policy apparatus,
which is in any case already underway, by eliminating a nagging issue
that has for too long forced Turkey to expend its political capital
in an investment promising little return.
[1]°Soykirimi tanisak daha iyi olmaz mi ¨C Would it not be better
if we recognize the genocide¡±, Hurriyet 7, March 2005, available
at http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx? viewid=546223
[2] Ibid
[3] Bertil Dun¨¦r, ¡°What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities? The
Armenian Case¡± International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2,
pp. 217¨C233, Summer 2004
[4] Jon Gorvett, ¡°Armenia, Turkey Takes Steps
towards Rapprochement,¡± May 29, 2002, available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/a rticles/eav052902.shtml
[5]°Cenazede gordukleri tablo Ermeni diasporasini
sasirtti¡± Zaman, January 25, 2007, available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?habe rno=492256
[6]°Armenian Genocide Resolution to be Introduced Tomorrow,¡± posted
by N.J. Dem. Rep.
Frank Pallone, January 29, 2007 available at
http://blog.thehill.com/category/politics/
htt p://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/02/05/the-end-of-an- era-in-the-armenian-genocide-debate-will-recogniti on-lead-to-a-turkish-policy-transformation/
--Bou ndary_(ID_h75GYC3dKrdPLV5FYpEOow)--
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
Feb 5 2007
If Turkey gives up its opposition to potential US recognition of the
atrocities between Turks and Armenians that took place during World
War One as ¦Á ¡°genocide,¡± will its diplomatic hand ultimately be
strengthened? The following article argues that this just might be
the case.
What should have happened ninety-two years ago in 1915 is finally
likely to happen in 2007. Both Houses of the U.S. Congress are expected
to pass a resolution that recognizes the bitter WWI experience of
the Turkish Armenians as genocide after it is discussed in the House
Foreign Relations Committee in April. Ankara reflexively and as usual
warned Washington that bilateral relations may be damaged to a degree
never before seen. A similar resolution was stopped in the year 2000
due to Turkish diplomatic pressure. But times have changed.
For many Turks, passing the resolution will verify their suspicions
of the unfaithful friendship of the United States. Ankara is right
when it maintains that bilateral relations would be damaged severely
during a period in which the United States needs a reliable ally
in the Middle East. Nevertheless, by acknowledging the distinction
between recognizing the so-called Armenian genocide and letting the
U.S. Congress recognize it, Ankara could actually benefit by letting
the latter happen.
A sizeable part of the Turkish public, from officials to intellectuals
and ordinary men on the street, view the recognition of the so-called
Armenian genocide by the US Congress as an opportunity to break free
from an area of coercion in the United States¡¯ allegedly unfaithful
friendship, and from an almost century-long hysteria surrounding
the question of ¡°what if the United States recognizes the so-called
genocide?¡± In this regard, the recognition of the so-called genocide
seems to present a more of a threat to the interests of the United
States than to those of Turkey.
Recognizing the So-Called Armenian Genocide
Mr. Turgut Ozal, former President and Prime Minister of Turkey, was
among the first who sought to get rid of the hysteria by signaling
a tacit approval of recognizing the so-called genocide in 1991.
However, Ozal had to back up when political opponent Suleyman Demirel,
some high-ranking generals and the secular establishment accused him
of not being sensitive to this most important national matter. Nuzhet
Kandemir, then Turkish Ambassador to the US, ironically and yet
somehow proudly notes that he managed to convince Ozal to believe
that such an approval would not serve the Turkish national interests.
[1] More ironically, Ilter Turkmen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs,
suggests that Ozal did not in fact believe in what he said, but just
seemed so in order to stimulate a debate when he asked if it would
not be better for Turkey to recognize the so-called genocide. [2]
It is not clear whether Ozal thought the same way, but today it seems
like the ¡°genocide card¡± is destined to lose its value dramatically
as a foreign policy instrument against Turkey once the United States,
the long-time strategic ally of Turkey, recognizes the so-called
Armenian genocide. For so many years, thinks the majority of the
Turkish public, especially the Western European countries and the
United States have exploited the genocide question as a stick to beat
Turkey when the carrot did not indulge her. Today, US recognition is
likely to make the genocide issue much less effective as a foreign
policy instrument; with the threat of it gone, Turkey will be freed of
a longstanding preoccupation in its relations with the United States.
Although there is no unanimity among them, some in the media and
secular circles have speculated about the aftermath of the genocide
recognition and foresee potential sanctions against Turkey. These
speculations are often countered in the public debate by questions
such as: What happened after France long ago passed the resolution in
its parliament? What happened even after France declared it a crime
not to recognize the so-called Armenian genocide? Would the case be
any different with the United States?
International criminal law does not provide a guideline to deal with
historical atrocities, argues Swedish historian Bertil Dun¨¦r. [3]
Yet international law suggests the creation of an international
expert body representing both historians and the legal profession
to investigate such historical cases, and arrive at an eventual
condemnation of the responsible party or parties. This is actually
not much different from what Turkey, especially during the AK Party
government, has been advocating.
Whether the U.S. recognition makes any difference is something to
be seen in the future. However, it is not difficult to argue for now
that such recognition will have implications at multiple levels.
Possible Implications of the US Congress¡¯ Recognition
Turkey and Armenia are likely to gain from the US recognition of
the so-called genocide, while the United States is likely to lose in
the long term. First of all, the recognition will bring an end to a
prolonged era throughout which Turkey has suffered continuous hysteria
when considering the implications of the United States recognizing
the so-called Armenian genocide. Consequently, by the end of its de
facto liability to the United States for not recognizing the so-called
genocide, Turkey is likely to increase its bargaining power against
the US in their bilateral relations. Secondly, Turkish foreign policy,
which has essentially revolved around three issues throughout the
republic¡¯s history (defending against Armenian genocide allegations,
Cyprus, and relations with Greece), is likely to gain momentum that
could be developed down lesser-explored avenues such as increasing
bilateral relations with non-Western states.
Armenia has suffered profound economic hardship since the break-up
of the USSR. Some of this would have been lessened had the country
been able to develop economic relations with its immediate neighbor
to the west. However, the Armenian Diaspora¡¯s continuous efforts to
inflict pain on Turkey in the international arena have not helped in
this capacity. Beside its occupation of Azerbaijani territory adjoining
Karabagh, Armenia¡¯s constitutionally certified territorial claims on
areas of Eastern Turkey caused Turkey to impose a blockade on Armenia,
shutting off Yerevan¡¯s road and rail links to the West. [4]
However, with the Turkish people¡¯s overwhelming show of sympathy
following the recent murder of Turkish Armenian intellectual Hrant
Dink, Armenia¡¯s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arman Kirakosyan
stressed his government¡¯s readiness to open full diplomatic relations
with Turkey unconditionally. [5] Such a gesture hints that in the
absence of the Diaspora influence, Turkey and Armenia are likely to
sort out the problems hindering the two countries¡¯ ability to engage
in bilateral political and economic relations.
What is in it for the United States?
What are the pros and cons of the US recognizing the so-called Armenian
genocide? Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ) notes, ¡°[t]o truly dedicate
ourselves to improving human rights across the world, our government
must first learn from and properly condemn the mistakes of the past¡[6]
in order to express the rational behind his introduction of the
Armenian Genocide Resolution. He is right in that the U.S. government
should learn from and properly condemn the mistakes of the past, but
it hardly needs to look at the mistakes of others or go that far back
into history when it has more than enough of its own indiscretions
to use for that educative purpose. Understandably, however, Pallone
may not be able to distinguish between his own electoral interests
and the US national interests.
US-Turkish relations are unlikely to radically change due to the
Congress¡¯ recognition of the so-called genocide. Nor is Turkey
likely to take any radical action against the United States for that
matter, given the fact that it needs the US support to deal with the
Kurdish PKK separatists and the looming crisis in northern Iraq,
over Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the very fact that the United States
recognizes the so-called genocide would entail structural changes in
Turkey¡¯s foreign policy orientation, which would indirectly rather
than directly impact the US-Turkish relation in the long term.
Diminishing Influence of the ¡°White Turks¡±
There are likely to be losers on the Turkish side of the debate as
well once the so-called genocide is recognized by the US Congress.
These will include mainly the exclusivist and elitist secular
establishment in the state apparatus, its extension within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, and their contacts in Washington,
who have been reportedly lobbying on behalf of Turkey.
Throughout the republic¡¯s history, a small number of elite members
and diplomats have been considered to have the decisive influence on
Turkey¡¯s foreign policy orientation, formulation and implementation,
serving as a conduit between Ankara and Washington. This diplomatic
elite has earned the popular moniker, Beyaz Turkler (¡°White Turks¡±),
and frequently derive from familial dynasties, some non-Anatolian in
origin. The name implies a sort of ¡°untouchable,¡± elevated image
compared to the unwashed masses.
The prolonged conflicts such as the Armenian genocide issue, Cyprus,
Turkish-Greek relations, which pretty much constituted the triad of
Turkish foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century, entailed
an exclusivist foreign policy apparatus independent of whatever
particular government was in office. Understandably, dealing with
such conflicts required diplomatic expertise and personal connections
in Washington. Yet some have speculated that by prolonging these
conflicts, the very exclusivist ¡°White Turks¡± elite has kept the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs immune from the more traditional-minded
bulk of Turkish society, the so-called ¡°Black Turks,¡± and maintained
their grip on the country¡¯s foreign affairs.
Winds of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy
Nevertheless, in the recent years the so-called White Turks grip on
Turkish foreign policy, which is marked simply by an unconditional
attachment to the West, has started to diminish gradually. Turkish
foreign policy has gained multiple dimensions with the AK Party¡¯s
efforts to reach out to Central Asia, Middle East, Africa and even
Latin America. This new foreign policy orientation has thus opened
the door to those intellectuals who speak the languages, know the
cultures, or have even lived in these new regions of interest.
This expansion of interests represents a welcome breath of fresh
air for a foreign policy establishment that has become somewhat
close-minded due to a limited orientation traditionally focused on
a few narrow issues. By reaching out to other corners of the globe,
Turkey will develop for itself a more sophisticated and cosmopolitan
mindset and inevitably a more prestigious place on the global stage.
The most significant example of the new breed of foreign policy
intellectuals is probably Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign affairs
counselor to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He
was allegedly the most influential thinker who crafted the new
multi-dimensional foreign policy paradigm of the AK Party government,
which resulted in closer relations of Turkey with its immediate
neighbors such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and even Iran. The US Congress¡¯
recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide should only speed
up the transformation within the Turkish foreign policy apparatus,
which is in any case already underway, by eliminating a nagging issue
that has for too long forced Turkey to expend its political capital
in an investment promising little return.
[1]°Soykirimi tanisak daha iyi olmaz mi ¨C Would it not be better
if we recognize the genocide¡±, Hurriyet 7, March 2005, available
at http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx? viewid=546223
[2] Ibid
[3] Bertil Dun¨¦r, ¡°What Can Be Done about Historical Atrocities? The
Armenian Case¡± International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 8, No. 2,
pp. 217¨C233, Summer 2004
[4] Jon Gorvett, ¡°Armenia, Turkey Takes Steps
towards Rapprochement,¡± May 29, 2002, available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/a rticles/eav052902.shtml
[5]°Cenazede gordukleri tablo Ermeni diasporasini
sasirtti¡± Zaman, January 25, 2007, available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?habe rno=492256
[6]°Armenian Genocide Resolution to be Introduced Tomorrow,¡± posted
by N.J. Dem. Rep.
Frank Pallone, January 29, 2007 available at
http://blog.thehill.com/category/politics/
htt p://www.balkanalysis.com/2007/02/05/the-end-of-an- era-in-the-armenian-genocide-debate-will-recogniti on-lead-to-a-turkish-policy-transformation/
--Bou ndary_(ID_h75GYC3dKrdPLV5FYpEOow)--