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THERE IS WAY OUT OF KOSOVO DEADLOCK
RIA Novosti, Russia
Feb 7 2007
MOSCOW. (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Problems of the de facto
countries in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union remain a
priority on the international agenda.
But it is absolutely clear that Kosovo's "final self-determination"
will not be quick and triumphant.
The parliamentary election in Serbia proved the maxim that
democratic procedures do not automatically ensure progress in a
peacekeeping process. Almost all of the country's leading political
forces (the radical party, Boris Tadic's democrats and Vojislav
Kostunica's democrats) voted for its territorial integrity. The only
exception was the bloc led by the Liberal Democratic Party of Cedomir
Jovanovic. Nevertheless, about 40% of Serbian voters chose the forces
that to a greater or lesser extent appealed to ethnic nationalism.
Today, Serbia is in the spotlight or CIS political elites. Kosovo's
success in self-determination, supported by international institutions,
will be a precedent that leaders of the de facto states in the former
Soviet Union will be able to refer to in the future.
It does not matter that their attempts will be indignantly dismissed
by the U.S. and European leaders. The Kosovo precedent already
has its own laws as a political motto and an algorithm. In fact,
leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr
do not care whether their problems have anything in common with former
Serbian-Albanian conflicts and the political claims of Serbia's former
autonomy. The phenomenon of ethnical self-determination (supported by
the mighty and powerful up to a certain moment) is very convenient for
them. At the same time, the behavior of Serbian politicians, their
ability or inability to find a compromise to protect the national
cause will be carefully examined in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
Neither the Serbian, nor the Azerbaijani or Georgian elites have
resources to integrate disputed territories. In Kosovo, with its 90%
Albanian population, any interpretation of the Serbian idea will
be rejected by the majority of voters. The same can be seen in the
ethnically homogenous Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia does not have the real
political potential to integrate Abkhazia either. As to South Ossetia,
Tbilisi does have proponents among Ossetians, but it does not have
mass support of the people. Consequently, even there its integration
potential is limited. In Moldova, the key obstacle for integration
of Transdnestr is the economic weakness of the "parent territory."
The other side of the problem, however, is that the Kosovo precedent
does not just hurt Serbia or help Russia to secure a foothold in the
CIS. It works against European integration and in favor of ethnical
self-determination. In this connection, it is hard to avoid partiality
in recognizing one's right for it and denying another's.
Hence the need to work out common rules and criteria for recognizing
an entity. We could draw a parallel to an elite club (and the
international community is an elite club): to join it, one has to
meet certain requirements.
The first criterion for recognizing self-proclaimed entities could be
their validity as a state. Why doesn't the international community
rush with Kosovo's recognition? The reason is quite pragmatic. It
is not because of Orthodox Serbs, but because state governance there
has been replaced with the clan system.
The second criterion could be a mother country's ability to control
a breakaway territory by any means other than deportation and ethnic
cleansings. What, apart from the "broad autonomy" rhetoric, can Georgia
give to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan to Karabakh? After
all, if these territories are re-integrated, Azerbaijan will get
Armenians as its new citizens, while Georgia will receive Ossetians,
Abkhazes, Armenians and Russians. In other words, re-integration
should be assumed impossible if it can lead to a military conflict.
The third criterion could be the existence of democratic procedures
in self-proclaimed states.
The fourth one - real (not Kosovo-like) guarantees of ethnic
minorities' rights, secured by law and in real life.
And, the fifth could be the establishment of bilateral economic,
diplomatic and other relations between a mother country and a breakaway
territory.
Only by setting clear criteria for recognizing self-proclaimed
territories will the international community be able to break the
Kosovo deadlock and prevent (or, at least, minimize) the possibility
of emerging similar precedents somewhere in Europe or Eurasia.
Sergei Markedonov is an expert at the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
RIA Novosti, Russia
Feb 7 2007
MOSCOW. (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Problems of the de facto
countries in former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union remain a
priority on the international agenda.
But it is absolutely clear that Kosovo's "final self-determination"
will not be quick and triumphant.
The parliamentary election in Serbia proved the maxim that
democratic procedures do not automatically ensure progress in a
peacekeeping process. Almost all of the country's leading political
forces (the radical party, Boris Tadic's democrats and Vojislav
Kostunica's democrats) voted for its territorial integrity. The only
exception was the bloc led by the Liberal Democratic Party of Cedomir
Jovanovic. Nevertheless, about 40% of Serbian voters chose the forces
that to a greater or lesser extent appealed to ethnic nationalism.
Today, Serbia is in the spotlight or CIS political elites. Kosovo's
success in self-determination, supported by international institutions,
will be a precedent that leaders of the de facto states in the former
Soviet Union will be able to refer to in the future.
It does not matter that their attempts will be indignantly dismissed
by the U.S. and European leaders. The Kosovo precedent already
has its own laws as a political motto and an algorithm. In fact,
leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr
do not care whether their problems have anything in common with former
Serbian-Albanian conflicts and the political claims of Serbia's former
autonomy. The phenomenon of ethnical self-determination (supported by
the mighty and powerful up to a certain moment) is very convenient for
them. At the same time, the behavior of Serbian politicians, their
ability or inability to find a compromise to protect the national
cause will be carefully examined in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
Neither the Serbian, nor the Azerbaijani or Georgian elites have
resources to integrate disputed territories. In Kosovo, with its 90%
Albanian population, any interpretation of the Serbian idea will
be rejected by the majority of voters. The same can be seen in the
ethnically homogenous Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia does not have the real
political potential to integrate Abkhazia either. As to South Ossetia,
Tbilisi does have proponents among Ossetians, but it does not have
mass support of the people. Consequently, even there its integration
potential is limited. In Moldova, the key obstacle for integration
of Transdnestr is the economic weakness of the "parent territory."
The other side of the problem, however, is that the Kosovo precedent
does not just hurt Serbia or help Russia to secure a foothold in the
CIS. It works against European integration and in favor of ethnical
self-determination. In this connection, it is hard to avoid partiality
in recognizing one's right for it and denying another's.
Hence the need to work out common rules and criteria for recognizing
an entity. We could draw a parallel to an elite club (and the
international community is an elite club): to join it, one has to
meet certain requirements.
The first criterion for recognizing self-proclaimed entities could be
their validity as a state. Why doesn't the international community
rush with Kosovo's recognition? The reason is quite pragmatic. It
is not because of Orthodox Serbs, but because state governance there
has been replaced with the clan system.
The second criterion could be a mother country's ability to control
a breakaway territory by any means other than deportation and ethnic
cleansings. What, apart from the "broad autonomy" rhetoric, can Georgia
give to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan to Karabakh? After
all, if these territories are re-integrated, Azerbaijan will get
Armenians as its new citizens, while Georgia will receive Ossetians,
Abkhazes, Armenians and Russians. In other words, re-integration
should be assumed impossible if it can lead to a military conflict.
The third criterion could be the existence of democratic procedures
in self-proclaimed states.
The fourth one - real (not Kosovo-like) guarantees of ethnic
minorities' rights, secured by law and in real life.
And, the fifth could be the establishment of bilateral economic,
diplomatic and other relations between a mother country and a breakaway
territory.
Only by setting clear criteria for recognizing self-proclaimed
territories will the international community be able to break the
Kosovo deadlock and prevent (or, at least, minimize) the possibility
of emerging similar precedents somewhere in Europe or Eurasia.
Sergei Markedonov is an expert at the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.