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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Feb 22 2007
Turkey's new foreign policy: `If you're not everywhere, you're nowhere'
by KERIM BALCI
Ankara is passing through a busy period. The top items on the
domestic political agenda are changing positions with a dazzling
speed.
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül is already the Speedy Gonzalez of world
politics. Within the last month, he has been to Albania, France, the
US and Saudi Arabia. Next week, he will be in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Simply following his mobility as an analyst is difficult.
Turkey's foreign policy initiatives are not limited to the activities
of Gül. Chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan is quite active on the EU
front. The prime minister himself is participating both rhetorically
and practically in the foreign policy execution process. And there is
the chief of the general staff, who not only visits foreign
countries, but also uses the opportunity of meaningful distance
provided by these trips to criticize, support and lead Turkey's
foreign policy.
Classic Turkish foreign policy was one dimensional. Ankara had a
non-proactive, all-cards-in-the-same-deck crisis resolution tactic.
Whenever Cyprus was an issue, the Aegean continental shelf would be
pushed to the edge of the policy making process. And elections... the
ballot box was the black hole of Turkish foreign policy.
Today, the government of Turkey has a multifaceted foreign policy.
This is not to glorify the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
government; this is the new face of world politics. In the past, the
ruling paradigm of international politics was a bloc-based
correspondence. Most of Turkey's foreign policy options were either
created or eliminated within the framework of NATO. But today Russian
President Vladimir Putin is wrong; the world is no longer uni-polar.
It is true that the US is able to impose military occupation on
countries, but it is not able to impose foreign policy decisions.
Even not on its strategic allies!
The first fruits of a multifaceted Turkish foreign policy, it seems,
will be harvested in the Middle East. Turkey has already convinced
the leaders of the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq -- and that
without even directly speaking to any one of them -- that it is
better not to speak about an independent Kurdistan. The Greek
Cypriots' claim for oil exploration in the Mediterranean was repulsed
at the same time as Turkey was dealing with the Armenian genocide
resolution waiting in the US Congress. In addition, it was dealing
with European pressure to amend the so-called `Notorious' Article 301
of the Turkish Penal Code; it was dealing with the approaching threat
of a commencement of Kurdish separatist terrorism and it was dealing
with its new role as a mediator in Israeli-Arab relations ... and,
cross your fingers, Ankara hasn't stumbled.
Turkey's new dynamism in regional and global politics was probably
also felt in regional capitals. This explains the recent traffic
between Ankara and these capitals. Israel's acceptance of a Turkish
delegation to inspect the recent excavations in the vicinity of the
Aqsa Mosque, or Iran's offer to engage in strategic relations
including joint oil production and marketing all attest to the truth
that this role is welcomed in the region. Now the critical question
is whether Turkey will be able to fulfill this role.
The biggest necessity of a multi-faceted foreign policy is qualified
human resources management. In order to knock the doors, one needs
only a finger, but once the doors are open there need to be a mouth
and a brain working at every door. And these brains need to be
interconnected and in a constructive dialogue. The apparent
discrepancies between foreign policy discourses of the prime
minister, president and the chief of the general staff not only
consist of foreign policy makers, but leverage is also given to
foreign diplomats opposed to Ankara's new role.
Feb 22 2007
Turkey's new foreign policy: `If you're not everywhere, you're nowhere'
by KERIM BALCI
Ankara is passing through a busy period. The top items on the
domestic political agenda are changing positions with a dazzling
speed.
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül is already the Speedy Gonzalez of world
politics. Within the last month, he has been to Albania, France, the
US and Saudi Arabia. Next week, he will be in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Simply following his mobility as an analyst is difficult.
Turkey's foreign policy initiatives are not limited to the activities
of Gül. Chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan is quite active on the EU
front. The prime minister himself is participating both rhetorically
and practically in the foreign policy execution process. And there is
the chief of the general staff, who not only visits foreign
countries, but also uses the opportunity of meaningful distance
provided by these trips to criticize, support and lead Turkey's
foreign policy.
Classic Turkish foreign policy was one dimensional. Ankara had a
non-proactive, all-cards-in-the-same-deck crisis resolution tactic.
Whenever Cyprus was an issue, the Aegean continental shelf would be
pushed to the edge of the policy making process. And elections... the
ballot box was the black hole of Turkish foreign policy.
Today, the government of Turkey has a multifaceted foreign policy.
This is not to glorify the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
government; this is the new face of world politics. In the past, the
ruling paradigm of international politics was a bloc-based
correspondence. Most of Turkey's foreign policy options were either
created or eliminated within the framework of NATO. But today Russian
President Vladimir Putin is wrong; the world is no longer uni-polar.
It is true that the US is able to impose military occupation on
countries, but it is not able to impose foreign policy decisions.
Even not on its strategic allies!
The first fruits of a multifaceted Turkish foreign policy, it seems,
will be harvested in the Middle East. Turkey has already convinced
the leaders of the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq -- and that
without even directly speaking to any one of them -- that it is
better not to speak about an independent Kurdistan. The Greek
Cypriots' claim for oil exploration in the Mediterranean was repulsed
at the same time as Turkey was dealing with the Armenian genocide
resolution waiting in the US Congress. In addition, it was dealing
with European pressure to amend the so-called `Notorious' Article 301
of the Turkish Penal Code; it was dealing with the approaching threat
of a commencement of Kurdish separatist terrorism and it was dealing
with its new role as a mediator in Israeli-Arab relations ... and,
cross your fingers, Ankara hasn't stumbled.
Turkey's new dynamism in regional and global politics was probably
also felt in regional capitals. This explains the recent traffic
between Ankara and these capitals. Israel's acceptance of a Turkish
delegation to inspect the recent excavations in the vicinity of the
Aqsa Mosque, or Iran's offer to engage in strategic relations
including joint oil production and marketing all attest to the truth
that this role is welcomed in the region. Now the critical question
is whether Turkey will be able to fulfill this role.
The biggest necessity of a multi-faceted foreign policy is qualified
human resources management. In order to knock the doors, one needs
only a finger, but once the doors are open there need to be a mouth
and a brain working at every door. And these brains need to be
interconnected and in a constructive dialogue. The apparent
discrepancies between foreign policy discourses of the prime
minister, president and the chief of the general staff not only
consist of foreign policy makers, but leverage is also given to
foreign diplomats opposed to Ankara's new role.