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Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Feb 23 2007
SECESSIONIST LEADERS COORDINATE ACTIVITIES IN MOSCOW
By Vladimir Socor
Friday, February 23, 2007
Karabakh leader Arkady Gukasian Between February 16 and 21, the
`presidents' of South Ossetia and Transnistria and the `foreign
ministers' of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria paid
overlapping visits to Moscow for talks with Russian government
officials and in the State Duma. The three `foreign ministers' also
conferred among themselves on February 19-20 to plan an expansion of
joint actions by the three secessionist leaderships.
Prior to these visits, Karabakh leader Arkady Gukasian had paid his
own visit to Moscow in late January-early February -- a visit that he
reported to the Karabakh media on February 13. Formally invited by a
Russian military-connected think-tank, Gukasian met with
`high-ranking diplomats' in Moscow and was also awarded the Peter the
Great Medal for promoting Russian-Armenian friendship (Azat Artsakh,
February 13) -- incidentally amid a recrudescence of xenophobic
attacks on ethnic Armenians in Moscow and other Russian cities.
Transnistria's `president' Igor Smirnov and `foreign minister' Valery
Litskay were received by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov to discuss the resumption of negotiations with Moldova `on the
basis of earlier-achieved understandings' and for the purpose of
`creating a viable structure of Moldova and Transnistria' -- code
words for Russia-arbitrated `federalization.'
Litskay and his Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts, Sergei Shamba
and Murat Jioyev, conferred to prepare a meeting of the three
`presidents,' tentatively scheduled for April in Sukhumi. The
political framework, activated last year, is titled `Commonwealth for
Democracy and the Rights of Peoples' and forms part of the network
run by Modest Kolerov's department for external and regional ties
within Russia's presidential administration. The three `ministers''
joint communiqué terms Russia `our common strategic partner and
guarantor of the rights of the Abkhaz, Transnistrian, and Ossetian
peoples.'
Their cooperation agenda includes forming a joint `peacekeeping'
contingent -- an intention that was first announced officially last
year. According to Litskay at the concluding news conference in
Moscow on February 21, Transnistria can contribute two battalions
that are already operating as part of the existing `peacekeeping'
operation in Transnistria. Litskay inaccurately stated that the OSCE
Mission in Chisinau has frequently inspected these units, and it has
not expressed any criticism or objections to their operation.
Apparently he calculates based on experience from years past that the
OSCE Mission would hurt its own credibility by failing to challenge
such assertions.
Litskay also stated that South Ossetia is ready to contribute its
existing `peacekeeping' battalion, and Abkhazia is training a
battalion for peacekeeping duty with the planned tripartite
contingent. All three components shall be based on their own
territories and be available on call to respond to Georgian,
Moldovan, or international `threats and challenges.' The secessionist
leaderships are portraying this plan as a reaction to the GUAM
[Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova] countries' stated intention
to form a peacekeeping contingent for internationally authorized
missions. While in Moscow they specifically objected to Ukraine's
possible participation in peacekeeping operations in the South
Caucasus. In any case, the three secessionist forces (whether labeled
as peacekeeping or otherwise) are commanded and staffed by officers
assigned from Russia, within the Russian military and security
forces' chains of command.
The conclave also decided to set up a joint information center in
Moscow, with branch offices in Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali.
They also drew up a plan for coordinated activities on the
international level, to be approved by the three `presidents' and
unveiled at their upcoming meeting. Shamba and Kokoiti also held
their own news conferences (attacking NATO, inter alia) and Kokoiti
was featured in a lengthy interview by the governmental Rossiiskaya
gazeta (February 17).
Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili reacted to the
Moscow conclave in a brief statement, tersely objecting to `Russia's
encouragement of separatists through [such] conclaves' and urging
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to negotiate the terms of their status within
Georgia. For its part, Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
responded in a long-drawn and somewhat plaintive statement,
essentially regretting the Russian MFA's recent practice of referring
to Smirnov and Litskay by the titles President and Minister.
The three leaderships did not take any clear-cut position regarding
Kosovo as a possible `precedent' or `model' for resolving the
post-Soviet conflict. Ever since the Kremlin introduced that linkage
almost one year ago, the leaders in Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and Tiraspol
--- as well as those in Stepanakert and Yerevan --- have displayed
great wariness regarding such a linkage. They have no way of knowing
whether Russia will ultimately side with Serbia in favor of the
`territorial integrity of states' or with the post-Soviet
secessionists in favor of their own version of the
`self-determination of peoples.' In Moscow, they postponed taking any
clear-cut position on this issue, pending their planned `summit' in
Sukhumi.
(Interfax, Regnum, Olvia-Press, Basapres, Imedi Television, February
17-22)
Feb 23 2007
SECESSIONIST LEADERS COORDINATE ACTIVITIES IN MOSCOW
By Vladimir Socor
Friday, February 23, 2007
Karabakh leader Arkady Gukasian Between February 16 and 21, the
`presidents' of South Ossetia and Transnistria and the `foreign
ministers' of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria paid
overlapping visits to Moscow for talks with Russian government
officials and in the State Duma. The three `foreign ministers' also
conferred among themselves on February 19-20 to plan an expansion of
joint actions by the three secessionist leaderships.
Prior to these visits, Karabakh leader Arkady Gukasian had paid his
own visit to Moscow in late January-early February -- a visit that he
reported to the Karabakh media on February 13. Formally invited by a
Russian military-connected think-tank, Gukasian met with
`high-ranking diplomats' in Moscow and was also awarded the Peter the
Great Medal for promoting Russian-Armenian friendship (Azat Artsakh,
February 13) -- incidentally amid a recrudescence of xenophobic
attacks on ethnic Armenians in Moscow and other Russian cities.
Transnistria's `president' Igor Smirnov and `foreign minister' Valery
Litskay were received by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov to discuss the resumption of negotiations with Moldova `on the
basis of earlier-achieved understandings' and for the purpose of
`creating a viable structure of Moldova and Transnistria' -- code
words for Russia-arbitrated `federalization.'
Litskay and his Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts, Sergei Shamba
and Murat Jioyev, conferred to prepare a meeting of the three
`presidents,' tentatively scheduled for April in Sukhumi. The
political framework, activated last year, is titled `Commonwealth for
Democracy and the Rights of Peoples' and forms part of the network
run by Modest Kolerov's department for external and regional ties
within Russia's presidential administration. The three `ministers''
joint communiqué terms Russia `our common strategic partner and
guarantor of the rights of the Abkhaz, Transnistrian, and Ossetian
peoples.'
Their cooperation agenda includes forming a joint `peacekeeping'
contingent -- an intention that was first announced officially last
year. According to Litskay at the concluding news conference in
Moscow on February 21, Transnistria can contribute two battalions
that are already operating as part of the existing `peacekeeping'
operation in Transnistria. Litskay inaccurately stated that the OSCE
Mission in Chisinau has frequently inspected these units, and it has
not expressed any criticism or objections to their operation.
Apparently he calculates based on experience from years past that the
OSCE Mission would hurt its own credibility by failing to challenge
such assertions.
Litskay also stated that South Ossetia is ready to contribute its
existing `peacekeeping' battalion, and Abkhazia is training a
battalion for peacekeeping duty with the planned tripartite
contingent. All three components shall be based on their own
territories and be available on call to respond to Georgian,
Moldovan, or international `threats and challenges.' The secessionist
leaderships are portraying this plan as a reaction to the GUAM
[Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova] countries' stated intention
to form a peacekeeping contingent for internationally authorized
missions. While in Moscow they specifically objected to Ukraine's
possible participation in peacekeeping operations in the South
Caucasus. In any case, the three secessionist forces (whether labeled
as peacekeeping or otherwise) are commanded and staffed by officers
assigned from Russia, within the Russian military and security
forces' chains of command.
The conclave also decided to set up a joint information center in
Moscow, with branch offices in Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali.
They also drew up a plan for coordinated activities on the
international level, to be approved by the three `presidents' and
unveiled at their upcoming meeting. Shamba and Kokoiti also held
their own news conferences (attacking NATO, inter alia) and Kokoiti
was featured in a lengthy interview by the governmental Rossiiskaya
gazeta (February 17).
Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gela Bezhuashvili reacted to the
Moscow conclave in a brief statement, tersely objecting to `Russia's
encouragement of separatists through [such] conclaves' and urging
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to negotiate the terms of their status within
Georgia. For its part, Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
responded in a long-drawn and somewhat plaintive statement,
essentially regretting the Russian MFA's recent practice of referring
to Smirnov and Litskay by the titles President and Minister.
The three leaderships did not take any clear-cut position regarding
Kosovo as a possible `precedent' or `model' for resolving the
post-Soviet conflict. Ever since the Kremlin introduced that linkage
almost one year ago, the leaders in Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and Tiraspol
--- as well as those in Stepanakert and Yerevan --- have displayed
great wariness regarding such a linkage. They have no way of knowing
whether Russia will ultimately side with Serbia in favor of the
`territorial integrity of states' or with the post-Soviet
secessionists in favor of their own version of the
`self-determination of peoples.' In Moscow, they postponed taking any
clear-cut position on this issue, pending their planned `summit' in
Sukhumi.
(Interfax, Regnum, Olvia-Press, Basapres, Imedi Television, February
17-22)