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The New Anatolian, Turkey
Jan 4 2007
Turkish foreign and security policy analysis (II)
Huseyin Bagci
[email protected] January 2007
In the second part of last year there was a big expectation that a
"train crash" was imminent in Turkish-European Union relations since
Turkey was accused of failing to do its best to carry on the reform
process in the first part.
Turkey's reform fatigue is a fact. After hard negotiations with the
EU over the course of the last couple of years, the Turkish
government concentrated on reducing anti-EU sentiments among the
people in light of the sharp fall in public support for the EU bid,
which was estimated late last year as 35 percent, a all-time low.
The Turks distrusted EU decisions and considered the Union one-sided
and against Turkey's national interests, which gave great strength to
the country's anti-EU forces. EU politicians' statements concerning
Turkey's membership in certain countries were met by great anger, and
the government had to face accusations that it, for instance, gave
unilateral compromises to the EU on political issues. So the
screening process finished in October and state institutions found
the opportunity to see their weaknesses and strengths in the course
of negotiation process. It was beneficial for all as almost all
delegates in Brussels during the screening process admitted that both
the EU and Turkey recognized each other and that it's healthier for
both sides to go on with this level of knowledge during the process.
Another turning point was June 12, when the Greek Cypriot
administration, together with Austria, tried to make life more
difficult for Turkey during negotiations on the first chapter. The
Turks considered this ''Chinese torture,'' and lost their confidence
in the EU. Since then the reform process lost its allure for Turkey.
In other words, the Turkish psyche saw a great change since June,
which considerably disappointed the Turkish government. Probably
without the initiative of British Ambassador to Ankara Peter
Westmacott, the Turkish government wouldn't have stuck with the
process. The EU was seen as having been taken "political hostage'' by
Greek Cypriots, and more of this would do harm to Turkish-EU
relations.
The Turkish public showed another interesting reaction to the EU.
Turks came to wonder why the EU shows little interest in elections
system, trade unions and social policies but is fond of harping on a
couple of political issues like the so-called Armenian genocide
claims, the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish problem.
EU policies were questioned in the second part of the year under the
Finnish presidency in particular. In the last six months, there was a
cat and mouse gave with Turkey, and it was under strong political
pressure. The case of novelist Elif Safak as well as Nobel winner
author Orhan Pamuk caused ill winds between the EU and Turkey due to
penal code Article 301. Both were acquitted, allegedly due to intense
EU pressure. Pamuk's Nobel even didn't change the atmosphere in the
country, and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer didn't congratulate Pamuk
even while the government did.
State policy somehow succeeded in staying pro-EU until it faced a
nasty experience which rekindled debates between the government and
the military in early October. Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar
Buyukanit criticized a report released by the Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on civilian-military relations --
actually a purely academic paper -- as the report, funded by
foreigners, pointed to the military's dominance of Turkish politics.
In the EU's fall progress report, there was constructive criticism of
Turkey's policies and it became clearer that the EU had no intention
of totally breaking off the negotiation process. French and German
pressure on Turkey to fulfill the additional protocol, which would
lead to de jure recognition of Greek Cyprus, was rejected by Turkish
government. Clearly the Greek Cypriots' and Greeks' concerted action
against Turkey was partially successful, and the last-minute attempt
by the Turkish government to open one harbor and one airport was
rejected automatically.
The final decision of the EU to prevent a train crash and freeze
eight out of 35 chapters was a last-minute solution but a good one.
It was a better alternative than canceling the whole process. Both
sides won three extra years to reconsider their policies. At least
for the first time in many years Turkey wasn't the main topic of an
EU summit.
What happens now? Turkey will remain a negotiating country and will
also act together with the EU in several fields. Turkey's role in the
Middle East after the execution of Saddam Hussein will be much
important and the EU, as a global player, will need Turkey more in
the coming years while Turkey will need Europe in order to continue
its reform process.
On Cyprus, there will probably not be a solution, as the Greek
Cypriots want it. No Turkish government would see the Turks there as
minority. So Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) President
Mehmet Ali Talat will take a further initiative like the very last
one to open another gate for civilians to the Greek Cypriot side. The
EU will eventually lift end the unjust isolation.
The Turkish government's policy of finding a solution to the problem
based on the UN framework means that there is no solution. This
government under Erdogan was probably the first and last government
to be so close to a solution. It's become clear that the Greek
Cypriots aren't interested in a solution. This tactic, "no solution
is the solution," will continue.
The new members, Bulgaria and Romania, will enrich the EU but there
will be other problems in the further enlargement process. It would
be in Turkey's interest to support the enlargement of the EU to
include the remaining Balkan countries even if Turkey's membership
process takes longer. A more stable Balkans is in Turkey's interest.
In the final analysis, except for the Cyprus issue, Turkish-EU
relations were less fragile compared to the past. Turkey faces two
elections in 2007, after which we will see how the next government
handles Turkish-EU relations.
Another fact remains, however: the general orientation remains EU
membership and for the EU to anchor Turkey as much as possible to
Europe. In other words, there's nothing new in the West except for
some unwanted remarks from certain EU politicians.
Jan 4 2007
Turkish foreign and security policy analysis (II)
Huseyin Bagci
[email protected] January 2007
In the second part of last year there was a big expectation that a
"train crash" was imminent in Turkish-European Union relations since
Turkey was accused of failing to do its best to carry on the reform
process in the first part.
Turkey's reform fatigue is a fact. After hard negotiations with the
EU over the course of the last couple of years, the Turkish
government concentrated on reducing anti-EU sentiments among the
people in light of the sharp fall in public support for the EU bid,
which was estimated late last year as 35 percent, a all-time low.
The Turks distrusted EU decisions and considered the Union one-sided
and against Turkey's national interests, which gave great strength to
the country's anti-EU forces. EU politicians' statements concerning
Turkey's membership in certain countries were met by great anger, and
the government had to face accusations that it, for instance, gave
unilateral compromises to the EU on political issues. So the
screening process finished in October and state institutions found
the opportunity to see their weaknesses and strengths in the course
of negotiation process. It was beneficial for all as almost all
delegates in Brussels during the screening process admitted that both
the EU and Turkey recognized each other and that it's healthier for
both sides to go on with this level of knowledge during the process.
Another turning point was June 12, when the Greek Cypriot
administration, together with Austria, tried to make life more
difficult for Turkey during negotiations on the first chapter. The
Turks considered this ''Chinese torture,'' and lost their confidence
in the EU. Since then the reform process lost its allure for Turkey.
In other words, the Turkish psyche saw a great change since June,
which considerably disappointed the Turkish government. Probably
without the initiative of British Ambassador to Ankara Peter
Westmacott, the Turkish government wouldn't have stuck with the
process. The EU was seen as having been taken "political hostage'' by
Greek Cypriots, and more of this would do harm to Turkish-EU
relations.
The Turkish public showed another interesting reaction to the EU.
Turks came to wonder why the EU shows little interest in elections
system, trade unions and social policies but is fond of harping on a
couple of political issues like the so-called Armenian genocide
claims, the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish problem.
EU policies were questioned in the second part of the year under the
Finnish presidency in particular. In the last six months, there was a
cat and mouse gave with Turkey, and it was under strong political
pressure. The case of novelist Elif Safak as well as Nobel winner
author Orhan Pamuk caused ill winds between the EU and Turkey due to
penal code Article 301. Both were acquitted, allegedly due to intense
EU pressure. Pamuk's Nobel even didn't change the atmosphere in the
country, and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer didn't congratulate Pamuk
even while the government did.
State policy somehow succeeded in staying pro-EU until it faced a
nasty experience which rekindled debates between the government and
the military in early October. Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar
Buyukanit criticized a report released by the Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on civilian-military relations --
actually a purely academic paper -- as the report, funded by
foreigners, pointed to the military's dominance of Turkish politics.
In the EU's fall progress report, there was constructive criticism of
Turkey's policies and it became clearer that the EU had no intention
of totally breaking off the negotiation process. French and German
pressure on Turkey to fulfill the additional protocol, which would
lead to de jure recognition of Greek Cyprus, was rejected by Turkish
government. Clearly the Greek Cypriots' and Greeks' concerted action
against Turkey was partially successful, and the last-minute attempt
by the Turkish government to open one harbor and one airport was
rejected automatically.
The final decision of the EU to prevent a train crash and freeze
eight out of 35 chapters was a last-minute solution but a good one.
It was a better alternative than canceling the whole process. Both
sides won three extra years to reconsider their policies. At least
for the first time in many years Turkey wasn't the main topic of an
EU summit.
What happens now? Turkey will remain a negotiating country and will
also act together with the EU in several fields. Turkey's role in the
Middle East after the execution of Saddam Hussein will be much
important and the EU, as a global player, will need Turkey more in
the coming years while Turkey will need Europe in order to continue
its reform process.
On Cyprus, there will probably not be a solution, as the Greek
Cypriots want it. No Turkish government would see the Turks there as
minority. So Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) President
Mehmet Ali Talat will take a further initiative like the very last
one to open another gate for civilians to the Greek Cypriot side. The
EU will eventually lift end the unjust isolation.
The Turkish government's policy of finding a solution to the problem
based on the UN framework means that there is no solution. This
government under Erdogan was probably the first and last government
to be so close to a solution. It's become clear that the Greek
Cypriots aren't interested in a solution. This tactic, "no solution
is the solution," will continue.
The new members, Bulgaria and Romania, will enrich the EU but there
will be other problems in the further enlargement process. It would
be in Turkey's interest to support the enlargement of the EU to
include the remaining Balkan countries even if Turkey's membership
process takes longer. A more stable Balkans is in Turkey's interest.
In the final analysis, except for the Cyprus issue, Turkish-EU
relations were less fragile compared to the past. Turkey faces two
elections in 2007, after which we will see how the next government
handles Turkish-EU relations.
Another fact remains, however: the general orientation remains EU
membership and for the EU to anchor Turkey as much as possible to
Europe. In other words, there's nothing new in the West except for
some unwanted remarks from certain EU politicians.