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Brussels Journal, Belgium
Jan 19 2007
The Turkey Question: The EU and the Concept of Borders
>From the desk of Matthew Omolesky on Wed, 2007-01-17 08:47
The acceptance speech made last Sunday by Nicolas Sarkozy, France's
Interior Minister and now Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
presidential candidate, has attracted considerable attention for its
references to Turkey's European future. Sarkozy categorically stated
that `Turkey has no place in the European Union,' that Europe `must
give itself borders,' and that `not all countries have a vocation to
become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place
inside the European Union.'
According to Sarkozy, `enlarging Europe with no limit risks
destroying European political union, and that I do not accept.' The
presidential hopeful's hard-line position on Turkey's EU membership
bid stands in contrast to his opponent in the upcoming presidential
race, Socialist Segolene Royal, who is on record as saying that her
opinion with respect to Turkey is whatever `is that of the French
people' (to my mind rather empty populist waffle).
In any event it seems that Sarkozy's position is a widespread one,
and not only because of so-called `enlargement fatigue' stemming from
Central and Eastern European entries in recent years. Only around 20%
of the French population supports Turkish entry into the EU. On its
face this is an eminently sound position. The arguments against
Turkey's accession have been made again and again: Turkey has ongoing
or recent territorial or political disputes with Bulgaria, Armenia,
Cyprus, Greece, Syria, and Iraq; it has a massive population (70
million) and an equivalently massive military machine; its human
rights record as regards Kurds or intellectuals like Orhan Pamuk and
Elif Shafak has not been encouraging; and concerns about restive
Muslim minorities in European nations has certainly had an impact on
public opinion and political will. The very idea of the EU sharing a
border with Iraq is exceedingly unlikely.
If Sarkozy, and like-minded EU policymakers, is successful and
Turkey's EU bid falters (and Turkey itself turns to other potential
spheres of influence like Central Asia), we will begin to see some
sort of EU border solidifying. This is of interest for institutional
and philosophical reasons. First, EU external relations have been
consumed with the enlargement process, thanks in no small part to
countries like Britain and the Netherlands opting for political
breadth over depth. How often has the Ukraine, for instance, been
given the `enlargement wink,' only for Kyiv to have its European
ambitions doused with cold water? This constant enlargement
flirtation on the part of Brussels is a cheap way to retain
geopolitical relevancy. As enlargement fatigue, and even enlargement
animosity, sets in, it stands to reason that the institution as a
whole must either deepen or fade into obscurity.
The philosophical question of Europe's borders, alluded to in
Sarkozy's speech, reminds me of a passage in the Italian writer and
scholar Claudio Magris' masterpiece Danubio. In it, he describes the
Limes, or stone ramparts, now crumbling but once marking the border
of the Roman Empire. `On this side of the line was Empire, the idea
and the universal dominion of Rome; on the other were the barbarians,
whom the Empire was beginning to fear, and no longer aimed to conquer
and assimilate, but merely keep at bay.' Later, peasants began to
fear the Limes , seeing them as the work of the devil (`perhaps the
devil of imperialism,' Magris opines). `Our history, our culture, our
Europe,' Magris writes, `are the daughters of that Limes. Those
stones tell of the urge to frontiers, of the need and ability to give
oneself limits and form.' In this passage we see conflicting
impulses: the need to create clear international boundaries, but an
apprehension of imperialism; of the preternatural need for limits,
but the comprehension that barbarians seek to cross them. (Of course,
while on the subject of borders, Europe must also be mindful of
Russia, whose Catherine the Great is reported to have said that `I
have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.' Vladimir Putin,
an unabashedly imperialistic successor to Catherine, is also mindful
that Russia 's security often depends on its neighbor's insecurity.)
In sum, Europe's future may very well depend on the state of its
borders, national or transnational. Sarkozy's increasingly popular
stance with regard to Turkey speaks to a greater concern. Whether
Sarkozy's subsidiary goal of preserving and buttressing the political
union is in fact judicious is the subject of a different, broader,
but increasingly vital debate.
Jan 19 2007
The Turkey Question: The EU and the Concept of Borders
>From the desk of Matthew Omolesky on Wed, 2007-01-17 08:47
The acceptance speech made last Sunday by Nicolas Sarkozy, France's
Interior Minister and now Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
presidential candidate, has attracted considerable attention for its
references to Turkey's European future. Sarkozy categorically stated
that `Turkey has no place in the European Union,' that Europe `must
give itself borders,' and that `not all countries have a vocation to
become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place
inside the European Union.'
According to Sarkozy, `enlarging Europe with no limit risks
destroying European political union, and that I do not accept.' The
presidential hopeful's hard-line position on Turkey's EU membership
bid stands in contrast to his opponent in the upcoming presidential
race, Socialist Segolene Royal, who is on record as saying that her
opinion with respect to Turkey is whatever `is that of the French
people' (to my mind rather empty populist waffle).
In any event it seems that Sarkozy's position is a widespread one,
and not only because of so-called `enlargement fatigue' stemming from
Central and Eastern European entries in recent years. Only around 20%
of the French population supports Turkish entry into the EU. On its
face this is an eminently sound position. The arguments against
Turkey's accession have been made again and again: Turkey has ongoing
or recent territorial or political disputes with Bulgaria, Armenia,
Cyprus, Greece, Syria, and Iraq; it has a massive population (70
million) and an equivalently massive military machine; its human
rights record as regards Kurds or intellectuals like Orhan Pamuk and
Elif Shafak has not been encouraging; and concerns about restive
Muslim minorities in European nations has certainly had an impact on
public opinion and political will. The very idea of the EU sharing a
border with Iraq is exceedingly unlikely.
If Sarkozy, and like-minded EU policymakers, is successful and
Turkey's EU bid falters (and Turkey itself turns to other potential
spheres of influence like Central Asia), we will begin to see some
sort of EU border solidifying. This is of interest for institutional
and philosophical reasons. First, EU external relations have been
consumed with the enlargement process, thanks in no small part to
countries like Britain and the Netherlands opting for political
breadth over depth. How often has the Ukraine, for instance, been
given the `enlargement wink,' only for Kyiv to have its European
ambitions doused with cold water? This constant enlargement
flirtation on the part of Brussels is a cheap way to retain
geopolitical relevancy. As enlargement fatigue, and even enlargement
animosity, sets in, it stands to reason that the institution as a
whole must either deepen or fade into obscurity.
The philosophical question of Europe's borders, alluded to in
Sarkozy's speech, reminds me of a passage in the Italian writer and
scholar Claudio Magris' masterpiece Danubio. In it, he describes the
Limes, or stone ramparts, now crumbling but once marking the border
of the Roman Empire. `On this side of the line was Empire, the idea
and the universal dominion of Rome; on the other were the barbarians,
whom the Empire was beginning to fear, and no longer aimed to conquer
and assimilate, but merely keep at bay.' Later, peasants began to
fear the Limes , seeing them as the work of the devil (`perhaps the
devil of imperialism,' Magris opines). `Our history, our culture, our
Europe,' Magris writes, `are the daughters of that Limes. Those
stones tell of the urge to frontiers, of the need and ability to give
oneself limits and form.' In this passage we see conflicting
impulses: the need to create clear international boundaries, but an
apprehension of imperialism; of the preternatural need for limits,
but the comprehension that barbarians seek to cross them. (Of course,
while on the subject of borders, Europe must also be mindful of
Russia, whose Catherine the Great is reported to have said that `I
have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.' Vladimir Putin,
an unabashedly imperialistic successor to Catherine, is also mindful
that Russia 's security often depends on its neighbor's insecurity.)
In sum, Europe's future may very well depend on the state of its
borders, national or transnational. Sarkozy's increasingly popular
stance with regard to Turkey speaks to a greater concern. Whether
Sarkozy's subsidiary goal of preserving and buttressing the political
union is in fact judicious is the subject of a different, broader,
but increasingly vital debate.