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Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Jan 24 2007
AZERBAIJAN AND EUROPE: TOWARD CLOSER INTEGRATION?
Fariz Ismailzade
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articl e.php?articleid=4681
Azerbaijan's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures is going
much slower than in Georgia's case, mainly due to fear of Russia
and Iran. Yet the Azerbaijani government seems to have decided the
opportunity has come to turn words into action and seriously knock
at Europe's doors. The time is perfect, considering the tensions
between Russia and Azerbaijan over gas prices. If Azerbaijan does
not shift its foreign policy, EU will not help, as it's interest
into Azerbaijan is determined exactly by the degree of the latter's
interest in the EU. Seeking and obtaining EU and NATO membership is
the only real chance for Azerbaijan to achieve political stability
and economic prosperity and resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The chance should not be missed.
BACKGROUND: In December, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
traveled to Brussels to meet with EU and NATO officials, and to
sign the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) agreement between the
EU and Azerbaijan. This agreement has started a new chapter and is
aimed at further deepening relations between Azerbaijan and the EU
and the integration of the country into European structures. Similar
agreements have been signed with Armenia and Georgia, and Azerbaijan's
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO is already under
implementation. President Aliyev also signed with EU officials an
agreement about the export of Azerbaijani gas from the Shah-Deniz
field to the European markets.
It seems that Azerbaijan is slowly but steadily moving towards closer
relations with EU structures, and is fully intending to deepen its
integration with the EU, even up to the level of seeking NATO and EU
membership down the road.
Yet experts in Baku, familiar with both IPAP and ENP, believe
that both documents contain only symbolical activities, that do
not in real practice deepen the integration of Azerbaijan into
European institutions. They explain this with the reluctance of
the Azerbaijani government to conduct the kind of real political
and economic reforms that are a requirement for any move toward the
prospect of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus delays in
Azerbaijani's integration with Europe is caused by a desire by strong
forces among the authorities to perpetuate the domestic status quo.
Azerbaijani government representatives, meanwhile, take a rather
careful approach to the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration, and claim
that Azerbaijan is making real steps towards it but within the frames
of the "balanced foreign policy" that Baku officially pursues. At
the moment, Azerbaijan indeed enjoys warm relations both with the
West and Russia and Iran, thus trying to satisfy the interests of
all regional powers. Unlike neighboring Georgia, Azerbaijan does not
make strong statements towards EU and NATO integration and tries not
to anger the Kremlin.
Yet lately, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have entered a difficult
period mainly due to competition on the gas markets and the eviction
of Azerbaijani labor migrants from Russia. Gazprom and RAO-EES
have increased export prices of Russian gas and electricity to
Azerbaijan, and sharply reduced volumes to be shipped. Baku responded
by threatening to stop the usage of the Russian pipeline for the
export of Azerbaijani crude oil, to increase the price for the Gabala
Radio Station, currently leased by the Russian Ministry of Defense,
and to shut down Russian TV stations in the country.
IMPLICATIONS: The consequences of the fallout in Russian-Azerbaijani
relations are likely to be a strong shift in Azerbaijan's foreign
policy, towards the EU. This is a unique opportunity, occurring at
an opportune moment, and which will test the skills and determination
of both Azerbaijani and European policy-makers.
As Azerbaijan starts extracting its own offshore natural gas fields in
2007, it will gradually grow much more independent from Russia than
has ever been the case. By supplying gas to Georgia, Baku will also
contribute to saving its neighbor and strategic partner from Russian
pressures. Together, they can pave a new path of integration towards
Euro-Atlantic structures.
Yet, in order for that to happen, Azerbaijani officials need to learn
from their Georgian counterparts on tactics to build solid and deep
relations with the EU and NATO, and alter their own course of action.
Slow, symbolic steps towards Europe do not produce real and effective
results for Azerbaijan's integration into the EU. The myth that the
EU needs Azerbaijan more than the other way around, which is present
in Baku, is neither helpful nor correct. The EU, preoccupied with
its internal problems and the digestion of already admitted members,
is certainly not considering another round of enlargement. Neither
does NATO. Azerbaijani officials and public are mistakenly thinking
that the integration of Georgia into EU and NATO will inevitably draw
both Azerbaijan and Armenia into the same path. Yet, the experience
of Cyprus shows the opposite: while the Greek part of the island
was admitted into EU, the Turkish part remained effectively outside
the club.
In order to put Azerbaijan into the radar screen of EU and NATO
officials, it is Baku that will have to take action and not the other
way. This entails passing through the same path that Poland, Hungary
and other East European countries took in 1990s -knocking at the EU's
doors, raising interest in Azerbaijan, actively seeking partnership
and cooperation, and more importantly, conducting genuine political
and economic reforms at home. The most important areas of reforms
include reform of police force, economic monopolies, and not least
the judicial system and the courts.
Words that are not followed with actions produce what one
Brussels-based analyst termed the "Kuchma effect", referring to a
situation where EU officials do not see real actions behind the words
of a government, thereby raising doubts regarding their interest in
integration into the EU.
In this context, another important strategic shift can be observed,
which lies in the sphere of marketing. The semantics of the EU
integration of the South Caucasus is gradually being changed from the
"South Caucasus' integration into EU" to "the Black Sea region's
integration into EU". To EU officials, the latter concept appears
much warmer, closer and more important than the former, associated
mainly with trouble in the form of conflict and corruption.
EU officials have repeatedly stated that their level of interest
and cooperation with Azerbaijan is determined and developed by the
policies of Azerbaijan itself. The more Azerbaijani authorities pursue
European integration, the closer and more realistic it will be.
Without greater commitment to reform, Azerbaijan will in spite of
its energy resources not be able to move closer to Europe. As such,
it would continue to persist in a position of limbo between competing
regional powers. Only European integration will in the long term
guarantee political stability at home, and economic development and
prosperity in the region. Moreover, it will drastically increase the
chances for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
CONCLUSIONS: The time seems ripe for the Azerbaijani government
to shift gears and take more active steps towards Euro-Atlantic
integration. As the government appears increasingly inclined to do so,
the opportunity is better than ever. President Aliyev and his party is
unchallenged in the country, and this foreign policy move is unlikely
to face domestic resistance. Internationally, Azerbaijan is becoming
more secure, and its independence and sovereignty are consolidated, in
spite of renewed Russian pressures. Finally, the Georgian experience
shows that in reality there is not much Russia can do to prevent the
integration of the South Caucasus into the EU.
It is now up to Azerbaijan's leaders to close the gap with Georgia.
Otherwise, Georgia is likely to move toward closer integration with
the EU and NATO, while Azerbaijan and Armenia could continue to remain
bogged down in domestic stagnation and ethnic-territorial conflict. In
this context, the renewed strong interest in Azerbaijan in Tbilisi is a
welcome development. President Saakashvili and his close advisors seem
increasingly aware of the need to embrace Azerbaijan and support its
efforts to develop ties with the West. In this context, the prospect
of stronger Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation vis-Ã -vis Europe could
turn into a major development of 2007.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a Baku-based freelance writer.
--Boundary_(ID_ZaVXiOe1AJ+/NoSoS51WeA)--
Jan 24 2007
AZERBAIJAN AND EUROPE: TOWARD CLOSER INTEGRATION?
Fariz Ismailzade
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articl e.php?articleid=4681
Azerbaijan's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures is going
much slower than in Georgia's case, mainly due to fear of Russia
and Iran. Yet the Azerbaijani government seems to have decided the
opportunity has come to turn words into action and seriously knock
at Europe's doors. The time is perfect, considering the tensions
between Russia and Azerbaijan over gas prices. If Azerbaijan does
not shift its foreign policy, EU will not help, as it's interest
into Azerbaijan is determined exactly by the degree of the latter's
interest in the EU. Seeking and obtaining EU and NATO membership is
the only real chance for Azerbaijan to achieve political stability
and economic prosperity and resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The chance should not be missed.
BACKGROUND: In December, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
traveled to Brussels to meet with EU and NATO officials, and to
sign the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) agreement between the
EU and Azerbaijan. This agreement has started a new chapter and is
aimed at further deepening relations between Azerbaijan and the EU
and the integration of the country into European structures. Similar
agreements have been signed with Armenia and Georgia, and Azerbaijan's
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO is already under
implementation. President Aliyev also signed with EU officials an
agreement about the export of Azerbaijani gas from the Shah-Deniz
field to the European markets.
It seems that Azerbaijan is slowly but steadily moving towards closer
relations with EU structures, and is fully intending to deepen its
integration with the EU, even up to the level of seeking NATO and EU
membership down the road.
Yet experts in Baku, familiar with both IPAP and ENP, believe
that both documents contain only symbolical activities, that do
not in real practice deepen the integration of Azerbaijan into
European institutions. They explain this with the reluctance of
the Azerbaijani government to conduct the kind of real political
and economic reforms that are a requirement for any move toward the
prospect of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus delays in
Azerbaijani's integration with Europe is caused by a desire by strong
forces among the authorities to perpetuate the domestic status quo.
Azerbaijani government representatives, meanwhile, take a rather
careful approach to the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration, and claim
that Azerbaijan is making real steps towards it but within the frames
of the "balanced foreign policy" that Baku officially pursues. At
the moment, Azerbaijan indeed enjoys warm relations both with the
West and Russia and Iran, thus trying to satisfy the interests of
all regional powers. Unlike neighboring Georgia, Azerbaijan does not
make strong statements towards EU and NATO integration and tries not
to anger the Kremlin.
Yet lately, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have entered a difficult
period mainly due to competition on the gas markets and the eviction
of Azerbaijani labor migrants from Russia. Gazprom and RAO-EES
have increased export prices of Russian gas and electricity to
Azerbaijan, and sharply reduced volumes to be shipped. Baku responded
by threatening to stop the usage of the Russian pipeline for the
export of Azerbaijani crude oil, to increase the price for the Gabala
Radio Station, currently leased by the Russian Ministry of Defense,
and to shut down Russian TV stations in the country.
IMPLICATIONS: The consequences of the fallout in Russian-Azerbaijani
relations are likely to be a strong shift in Azerbaijan's foreign
policy, towards the EU. This is a unique opportunity, occurring at
an opportune moment, and which will test the skills and determination
of both Azerbaijani and European policy-makers.
As Azerbaijan starts extracting its own offshore natural gas fields in
2007, it will gradually grow much more independent from Russia than
has ever been the case. By supplying gas to Georgia, Baku will also
contribute to saving its neighbor and strategic partner from Russian
pressures. Together, they can pave a new path of integration towards
Euro-Atlantic structures.
Yet, in order for that to happen, Azerbaijani officials need to learn
from their Georgian counterparts on tactics to build solid and deep
relations with the EU and NATO, and alter their own course of action.
Slow, symbolic steps towards Europe do not produce real and effective
results for Azerbaijan's integration into the EU. The myth that the
EU needs Azerbaijan more than the other way around, which is present
in Baku, is neither helpful nor correct. The EU, preoccupied with
its internal problems and the digestion of already admitted members,
is certainly not considering another round of enlargement. Neither
does NATO. Azerbaijani officials and public are mistakenly thinking
that the integration of Georgia into EU and NATO will inevitably draw
both Azerbaijan and Armenia into the same path. Yet, the experience
of Cyprus shows the opposite: while the Greek part of the island
was admitted into EU, the Turkish part remained effectively outside
the club.
In order to put Azerbaijan into the radar screen of EU and NATO
officials, it is Baku that will have to take action and not the other
way. This entails passing through the same path that Poland, Hungary
and other East European countries took in 1990s -knocking at the EU's
doors, raising interest in Azerbaijan, actively seeking partnership
and cooperation, and more importantly, conducting genuine political
and economic reforms at home. The most important areas of reforms
include reform of police force, economic monopolies, and not least
the judicial system and the courts.
Words that are not followed with actions produce what one
Brussels-based analyst termed the "Kuchma effect", referring to a
situation where EU officials do not see real actions behind the words
of a government, thereby raising doubts regarding their interest in
integration into the EU.
In this context, another important strategic shift can be observed,
which lies in the sphere of marketing. The semantics of the EU
integration of the South Caucasus is gradually being changed from the
"South Caucasus' integration into EU" to "the Black Sea region's
integration into EU". To EU officials, the latter concept appears
much warmer, closer and more important than the former, associated
mainly with trouble in the form of conflict and corruption.
EU officials have repeatedly stated that their level of interest
and cooperation with Azerbaijan is determined and developed by the
policies of Azerbaijan itself. The more Azerbaijani authorities pursue
European integration, the closer and more realistic it will be.
Without greater commitment to reform, Azerbaijan will in spite of
its energy resources not be able to move closer to Europe. As such,
it would continue to persist in a position of limbo between competing
regional powers. Only European integration will in the long term
guarantee political stability at home, and economic development and
prosperity in the region. Moreover, it will drastically increase the
chances for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
CONCLUSIONS: The time seems ripe for the Azerbaijani government
to shift gears and take more active steps towards Euro-Atlantic
integration. As the government appears increasingly inclined to do so,
the opportunity is better than ever. President Aliyev and his party is
unchallenged in the country, and this foreign policy move is unlikely
to face domestic resistance. Internationally, Azerbaijan is becoming
more secure, and its independence and sovereignty are consolidated, in
spite of renewed Russian pressures. Finally, the Georgian experience
shows that in reality there is not much Russia can do to prevent the
integration of the South Caucasus into the EU.
It is now up to Azerbaijan's leaders to close the gap with Georgia.
Otherwise, Georgia is likely to move toward closer integration with
the EU and NATO, while Azerbaijan and Armenia could continue to remain
bogged down in domestic stagnation and ethnic-territorial conflict. In
this context, the renewed strong interest in Azerbaijan in Tbilisi is a
welcome development. President Saakashvili and his close advisors seem
increasingly aware of the need to embrace Azerbaijan and support its
efforts to develop ties with the West. In this context, the prospect
of stronger Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation vis-Ã -vis Europe could
turn into a major development of 2007.
AUTHOR'S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a Baku-based freelance writer.
--Boundary_(ID_ZaVXiOe1AJ+/NoSoS51WeA)--