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AGREEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF KARABAKH WILL WEAKEN THE REAL SOVEREIGNTY
Vahan Arzumanyan
KarabakhOpen
03-07-2007 11:49:34
The Armenian politicians are voicing the idea of territorial and
other concessions to Azerbaijan in return for the possibility of
recognition of Karabakh more often and more vigorously. They present
the recognition of independence, even though a promised one, as an
imperative which has no alternative, and is said to have an importance
that is equal to the concessions of Armenia. Is it so?
We know that the plan of resolution involves DELAYED AGREEMENT ON
STATUS (two uncertainties in one sentence, "delayed" and "agreement
on status") in return for quite definite: 1. return of 7 territories
except the "Lachin corridor" the size and status of which will be
agreed later; 2. return of Azerbaijani refugees (only Azerbaijani);
3. deployment of international peace keeping force at the line of
contact of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The mediators refer to the first two points as basic, the Armenian
politicians add "only in return for independence" and, in fact,
agree. Let us view the consequences of these concessions.
Military consequences
1. The front line becomes almost twice as longer. In addition, the new
positions will be vulnerable due to the lack of defense installations
and roads. More human, military and engineering resources will
be needed to enhance defense of the border. Army expenditure will
increase 3 to 4 times.
The extension of the front line will make the Karabakh force less
concentrated, which will weaken the defense of the front line.
2. If military actions start, it will be a major problem to defend the
narrow Lachin corridor from the enemy attacking from both sides. In
addition, the enemy need not seize it. It can use missiles, air
force and terror to block the Lachin corridor imposing a blockade
on Karabakh.
3. The return of Zangelan, Jebrail and Fizuli will shift the front
line to the Armenian region of Meghri, posing threat to this region
with vulnerable defense which has a 40 km width and the only road
is Meghri-Kapan.
4. The return of Karvachar will allow Azerbaijan to control the water
resources of Karabakh, threaten water supply of Karabakh, pose risk of
water terror. Besides, the region of Martakert will become vulnerable
to possible attacks from three directions. The road Martakert-Vartenis
will be blocked, which has a strategic importance.
5. Moving the front line closer to the heart of Karabakh will bring
Martakert, Askeran and Hadrut closer to the front line by 5 km,
Stepanakert by 18 km. Not only most areas of Artsakh but also the
Armenian region of Syunik (the cities of Goris and Kapan) will
appear within the range of Azerbaijani missiles. If a new war is
sparked, sudden shelling of populated areas will kill a huge number
of civilians, which will lead to migration, panic and demoralization.
6. Deployment of peacekeepers along the line of contact will allow the
mediators to impose their policy on the region instead of defending
the interests of the conflict sides. Besides, the peacekeepers will
block the conflict at the line of contact of NKR and Azerbaijan, the
border in the direction of Meghri and Karvachar will be "abeyant". In
case of a sudden attack of Azerbaijan on Meghri the peacekeepers may
easily prevent the Karabakh army from helping the Armenian force.
7. The creation of a demilitarized "buffer" along the line of contact
will be symbolic in reality. The Azerbaijani army can cross this area,
which is a plane area, within less than half an hour. Now 70 percent
of the armed force of Azerbaijan is at the front line.
8. Agreement on the international status of Karabakh will weaken the
real sovereignty (though it sounds as a paradox). Through various
agreements and conventions full control will be established on
everything in Karabakh, first of all the armed force. Technically, it
is not difficult to do: the "Lachin tap" can be turned off at any time.
Consequences for transportation
1. The railroad Horadiz-Meghri-Nakhidjevan will be highly lucrative
for Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan can import and export goods from
Nakhidjevan and Turkey in an unlimited amount and at a low cost. The
railroad between Nakhidjevan and Iran will enhance cooperation between
these countries.
2. Armenia will not benefit from this railroad, first because
it does not continue to Meghri and Kapan, second, no growth of
economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan is foreseen in the
visible future. The profit from transit cannot be compared with
the concessions.
3. Karabakh will not benefit from the operation of these railroads
at all because industries are far from these railroads.
4. Operation of Stepanakert-Aghdam-Yevlakh is unlikely because
Stepanakert is a deadlock, and Azerbaijan does not need it, Karabakh
does not produce anything Azerbaijanis would like to buy and transport
by rail, and they will not wish to sell anything to Karabakh. Even
if the rail functions, only those industries will develop which are
located around Stepanakert. There are limited resources for these
industries. Besides, this railroad needs repair. Even after the repair
the Azerbaijanis may block this line for an unlimited period.
5. Of the roads Martakert-Aghdam-Fizuli-Jebrail,
Jebrail-Zangelan- Kapan, Horadiz-Mijavan-Meghri-Nakhidjevan
and Martakert-Vardenis two will be operated:
Horadiz-Mijavan-Meghri-Nakhidjevan and Aghdam-Fizuli-Jebrail. Only
Azerbaijanis will benefit because they will control these roads. The
road Martakert-Vardenis, an artery for the north of Artsakh will
be blocked, which will have a major impact on the development of
North Artsakh.
Demographic consequences
1. The peacekeeping force will provide the return and security of
Azerbaijani refugees only. The return of the Armenian refugees is
not foreseen.
2. The delay of agreement on the status of NKR with the return
of territories will make the Armenian population migrate due to
uncertainty on future (the present state of things has potential for
development thanks to the controlled territories and communication,
Karabakh is not an enclave, free movement across the controlled
territories is possible, the favorable military positions guarantee
lasting peace).
3. The high rate of birth of Azerbaijanis combined with the policy
of settlement of the returned territories will change the ratio of
Azerbaijanis to Armenians.
Economic consequences
1. Karabakh will be connected with the outside world through the
only road - Goris-Berdzor-Shushi (the Lachin corridor). This will
automatically prevent development of industries (mining, production
of stone). Since the possibility of blocking of trade with Karabakh
in case of terror on the only road is 100 percent, hardly any major
investments in the economy of NKR are possible. Now the risk is
declarative, not real. After the return of territories it will be real.
2. The lack of control of water resources will not let boost energy
generation (which rules out development of industries), and develop
agriculture.
3. The lack of industries will make it impossible to get and use
financial influx (like in 1988 there will be no capacity for the use
of money).
4. The lack of sea and a developed travel infrastructure, and costly
transport will hinder the development of tourism. As a result,
Karabakh will become a site of pilgrimage for Armenians worldwide
who have "a bleeding heart" for Karabakh.
For Karabakh, it means returning the year 1988, the situation which
the people of Karabakh overcame through immense losses. Do we want the
same to repeat? Will the Armenian politicians again display suicidal
shortsightedness and criminal naivety?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Vahan Arzumanyan
KarabakhOpen
03-07-2007 11:49:34
The Armenian politicians are voicing the idea of territorial and
other concessions to Azerbaijan in return for the possibility of
recognition of Karabakh more often and more vigorously. They present
the recognition of independence, even though a promised one, as an
imperative which has no alternative, and is said to have an importance
that is equal to the concessions of Armenia. Is it so?
We know that the plan of resolution involves DELAYED AGREEMENT ON
STATUS (two uncertainties in one sentence, "delayed" and "agreement
on status") in return for quite definite: 1. return of 7 territories
except the "Lachin corridor" the size and status of which will be
agreed later; 2. return of Azerbaijani refugees (only Azerbaijani);
3. deployment of international peace keeping force at the line of
contact of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The mediators refer to the first two points as basic, the Armenian
politicians add "only in return for independence" and, in fact,
agree. Let us view the consequences of these concessions.
Military consequences
1. The front line becomes almost twice as longer. In addition, the new
positions will be vulnerable due to the lack of defense installations
and roads. More human, military and engineering resources will
be needed to enhance defense of the border. Army expenditure will
increase 3 to 4 times.
The extension of the front line will make the Karabakh force less
concentrated, which will weaken the defense of the front line.
2. If military actions start, it will be a major problem to defend the
narrow Lachin corridor from the enemy attacking from both sides. In
addition, the enemy need not seize it. It can use missiles, air
force and terror to block the Lachin corridor imposing a blockade
on Karabakh.
3. The return of Zangelan, Jebrail and Fizuli will shift the front
line to the Armenian region of Meghri, posing threat to this region
with vulnerable defense which has a 40 km width and the only road
is Meghri-Kapan.
4. The return of Karvachar will allow Azerbaijan to control the water
resources of Karabakh, threaten water supply of Karabakh, pose risk of
water terror. Besides, the region of Martakert will become vulnerable
to possible attacks from three directions. The road Martakert-Vartenis
will be blocked, which has a strategic importance.
5. Moving the front line closer to the heart of Karabakh will bring
Martakert, Askeran and Hadrut closer to the front line by 5 km,
Stepanakert by 18 km. Not only most areas of Artsakh but also the
Armenian region of Syunik (the cities of Goris and Kapan) will
appear within the range of Azerbaijani missiles. If a new war is
sparked, sudden shelling of populated areas will kill a huge number
of civilians, which will lead to migration, panic and demoralization.
6. Deployment of peacekeepers along the line of contact will allow the
mediators to impose their policy on the region instead of defending
the interests of the conflict sides. Besides, the peacekeepers will
block the conflict at the line of contact of NKR and Azerbaijan, the
border in the direction of Meghri and Karvachar will be "abeyant". In
case of a sudden attack of Azerbaijan on Meghri the peacekeepers may
easily prevent the Karabakh army from helping the Armenian force.
7. The creation of a demilitarized "buffer" along the line of contact
will be symbolic in reality. The Azerbaijani army can cross this area,
which is a plane area, within less than half an hour. Now 70 percent
of the armed force of Azerbaijan is at the front line.
8. Agreement on the international status of Karabakh will weaken the
real sovereignty (though it sounds as a paradox). Through various
agreements and conventions full control will be established on
everything in Karabakh, first of all the armed force. Technically, it
is not difficult to do: the "Lachin tap" can be turned off at any time.
Consequences for transportation
1. The railroad Horadiz-Meghri-Nakhidjevan will be highly lucrative
for Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan can import and export goods from
Nakhidjevan and Turkey in an unlimited amount and at a low cost. The
railroad between Nakhidjevan and Iran will enhance cooperation between
these countries.
2. Armenia will not benefit from this railroad, first because
it does not continue to Meghri and Kapan, second, no growth of
economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan is foreseen in the
visible future. The profit from transit cannot be compared with
the concessions.
3. Karabakh will not benefit from the operation of these railroads
at all because industries are far from these railroads.
4. Operation of Stepanakert-Aghdam-Yevlakh is unlikely because
Stepanakert is a deadlock, and Azerbaijan does not need it, Karabakh
does not produce anything Azerbaijanis would like to buy and transport
by rail, and they will not wish to sell anything to Karabakh. Even
if the rail functions, only those industries will develop which are
located around Stepanakert. There are limited resources for these
industries. Besides, this railroad needs repair. Even after the repair
the Azerbaijanis may block this line for an unlimited period.
5. Of the roads Martakert-Aghdam-Fizuli-Jebrail,
Jebrail-Zangelan- Kapan, Horadiz-Mijavan-Meghri-Nakhidjevan
and Martakert-Vardenis two will be operated:
Horadiz-Mijavan-Meghri-Nakhidjevan and Aghdam-Fizuli-Jebrail. Only
Azerbaijanis will benefit because they will control these roads. The
road Martakert-Vardenis, an artery for the north of Artsakh will
be blocked, which will have a major impact on the development of
North Artsakh.
Demographic consequences
1. The peacekeeping force will provide the return and security of
Azerbaijani refugees only. The return of the Armenian refugees is
not foreseen.
2. The delay of agreement on the status of NKR with the return
of territories will make the Armenian population migrate due to
uncertainty on future (the present state of things has potential for
development thanks to the controlled territories and communication,
Karabakh is not an enclave, free movement across the controlled
territories is possible, the favorable military positions guarantee
lasting peace).
3. The high rate of birth of Azerbaijanis combined with the policy
of settlement of the returned territories will change the ratio of
Azerbaijanis to Armenians.
Economic consequences
1. Karabakh will be connected with the outside world through the
only road - Goris-Berdzor-Shushi (the Lachin corridor). This will
automatically prevent development of industries (mining, production
of stone). Since the possibility of blocking of trade with Karabakh
in case of terror on the only road is 100 percent, hardly any major
investments in the economy of NKR are possible. Now the risk is
declarative, not real. After the return of territories it will be real.
2. The lack of control of water resources will not let boost energy
generation (which rules out development of industries), and develop
agriculture.
3. The lack of industries will make it impossible to get and use
financial influx (like in 1988 there will be no capacity for the use
of money).
4. The lack of sea and a developed travel infrastructure, and costly
transport will hinder the development of tourism. As a result,
Karabakh will become a site of pilgrimage for Armenians worldwide
who have "a bleeding heart" for Karabakh.
For Karabakh, it means returning the year 1988, the situation which
the people of Karabakh overcame through immense losses. Do we want the
same to repeat? Will the Armenian politicians again display suicidal
shortsightedness and criminal naivety?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress