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WHAT THEY ARE AFRAID OF IN KARABAKH; SEPARATISTS ARE PANIC-STRICKEN
B. Safarov, N. Aliyev
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 13, 2007 Friday
AZERBAIJANI ANALYSTS REGISTER PANIC IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH; Azerbaijani
analysts perceive panic in the self-proclaimed Republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Separatist media outlets keep discussing the return of the
Armenian-occupied territories to Azerbaijan. They are clearly upset
by the lack of certainty concerning the future status of the so-called
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. These speculations strike the reader with
the unmistakable absence of the feeling of security, hopelessness,
fear, and panic caused by the shortage of personnel and finance and
by the grave economic crisis affecting Karabakh separatists.
This is the only conclusion that leaps to mind upon reading a piece
by analyst Vagan Arzumanjan posted on the pro-separatist Karabakh
Open website last night. Here are some experts from it with comments.
"It is common knowledge that the conflict settlement plan stipulates a
delay with definition of the status of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
in return for: 1) return of jurisdiction over seven districts apart
from the Lachin corridor whose size and status is to be discussed
separately; 2) Azerbaijani refugees' return to their homes; 3)
deployment of international peacekeepers on the Azerbaijani-Armenian
front-line." The first two conditions are viewed as fundamental and
Armenian politicians add "in return for sovereignty only" essentially
second them.
Let us consider the consequences of these concessions for the Armenian
side. The front-line will become almost twice as long as it currently
is. The new positions will be much more vulnerable. It will take much
more in terms of personnel and military and engineering resources to
fortify the extended "border" and the particularly exposed positions
on it. Renewal of the hostilities will make control over the Lachin
corridor, wide open to attacks on both sides, extremely difficult
to retain. The enemy in the meantime does not even need to retake
it. Using artillery pieces, aviation, and raiding parties, the
enemy may make the Lachin Corridor impassable and Karabakh will be
essentially in a siege. A sudden mass bombardment of settlements
will kill a lot of noncombatants causing panic, demoralization,
and undeniably a stampede of civilians. Foreign contingents along
the front-line will merely permit third world countries to promote
their own interests in the region instead of trying to resolve
the crisis. Any "buffer" zone along the front-line will be purely
symbolic. Located as it is on the plains, a forced march across it
will take the Azerbaijani regular army less than half an hour.
"Restoration of Azerbaijani jurisdiction over the Zangilan, Jebrail,
and Fizuli districts will move the front-line closer to the Megri
district. This district of Armenia only 40 kilometer wide will be made
extremely vulnerable by this development. The return of Kjalbajar
in the meantime will allow for Azerbaijani control over Karabakh's
water resources. The water supply of the enclave will be in jeopardy,
and the threat of acts of sabotage at water-flow control objects will
become imminent.
The railroad connecting Goradiz, Megri, and Nahchyvan enormously
benefits Azerbaijan and Turkey. Using it, Azerbaijan will be able to
bring whatever it needs from Nahchyvan and Turkey with insignificant
transportation costs. As for Armenia, it is not going to benefit much
and Nagorno-Karabakh not at all. The use of the railroad between
Hankendi, Agdam and Yevlah is unlikely for several reasons: being
a dead-end, Hankendi is not what Azerbaijan desperately needs. And
Nagorno-Karabakh does not produce anything the Azerbaijanis would
want to buy but flatcars and echelons."
The piece asserts as well that "Azerbaijanis alone will benefit from
the use of highways since they themselves will control them. Their
high birth rate, coupled with the deliberate policy of settlement in
new territories, will tip the Armenian-Azerbaijani population ratio
in favor of the latter."
Colonel (retired) Ildrym Mamedov, ex-commander of an army brigade,
is convinced in the meantime that the separatists are panic-stricken.
"Noncombatants have nothing to fear as long as their hands are not
smeared with the blood of peaceful Azerbaijanis from Shusha, Hojala,
and other cities and districts," Mamedov said. "It is Kocharjans,
Gukasjans, Sarkisjans, and other war-mongers who murdered Azerbaijani
who should be afraid. I reckon that there will be a special panel
one fine day, a structure established under the UN or a Council of
Europe aegis. Whoever broke the law will be brought to justice to
prevent something like that from happening again."
According to Mamedov, thousands of Armenians live beyond the
territories occupied by Armenia these days. "Everyone knows where
they live but has anyone harmed them in any way?" he said.
B. Safarov, N. Aliyev
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 13, 2007 Friday
AZERBAIJANI ANALYSTS REGISTER PANIC IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH; Azerbaijani
analysts perceive panic in the self-proclaimed Republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Separatist media outlets keep discussing the return of the
Armenian-occupied territories to Azerbaijan. They are clearly upset
by the lack of certainty concerning the future status of the so-called
Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. These speculations strike the reader with
the unmistakable absence of the feeling of security, hopelessness,
fear, and panic caused by the shortage of personnel and finance and
by the grave economic crisis affecting Karabakh separatists.
This is the only conclusion that leaps to mind upon reading a piece
by analyst Vagan Arzumanjan posted on the pro-separatist Karabakh
Open website last night. Here are some experts from it with comments.
"It is common knowledge that the conflict settlement plan stipulates a
delay with definition of the status of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
in return for: 1) return of jurisdiction over seven districts apart
from the Lachin corridor whose size and status is to be discussed
separately; 2) Azerbaijani refugees' return to their homes; 3)
deployment of international peacekeepers on the Azerbaijani-Armenian
front-line." The first two conditions are viewed as fundamental and
Armenian politicians add "in return for sovereignty only" essentially
second them.
Let us consider the consequences of these concessions for the Armenian
side. The front-line will become almost twice as long as it currently
is. The new positions will be much more vulnerable. It will take much
more in terms of personnel and military and engineering resources to
fortify the extended "border" and the particularly exposed positions
on it. Renewal of the hostilities will make control over the Lachin
corridor, wide open to attacks on both sides, extremely difficult
to retain. The enemy in the meantime does not even need to retake
it. Using artillery pieces, aviation, and raiding parties, the
enemy may make the Lachin Corridor impassable and Karabakh will be
essentially in a siege. A sudden mass bombardment of settlements
will kill a lot of noncombatants causing panic, demoralization,
and undeniably a stampede of civilians. Foreign contingents along
the front-line will merely permit third world countries to promote
their own interests in the region instead of trying to resolve
the crisis. Any "buffer" zone along the front-line will be purely
symbolic. Located as it is on the plains, a forced march across it
will take the Azerbaijani regular army less than half an hour.
"Restoration of Azerbaijani jurisdiction over the Zangilan, Jebrail,
and Fizuli districts will move the front-line closer to the Megri
district. This district of Armenia only 40 kilometer wide will be made
extremely vulnerable by this development. The return of Kjalbajar
in the meantime will allow for Azerbaijani control over Karabakh's
water resources. The water supply of the enclave will be in jeopardy,
and the threat of acts of sabotage at water-flow control objects will
become imminent.
The railroad connecting Goradiz, Megri, and Nahchyvan enormously
benefits Azerbaijan and Turkey. Using it, Azerbaijan will be able to
bring whatever it needs from Nahchyvan and Turkey with insignificant
transportation costs. As for Armenia, it is not going to benefit much
and Nagorno-Karabakh not at all. The use of the railroad between
Hankendi, Agdam and Yevlah is unlikely for several reasons: being
a dead-end, Hankendi is not what Azerbaijan desperately needs. And
Nagorno-Karabakh does not produce anything the Azerbaijanis would
want to buy but flatcars and echelons."
The piece asserts as well that "Azerbaijanis alone will benefit from
the use of highways since they themselves will control them. Their
high birth rate, coupled with the deliberate policy of settlement in
new territories, will tip the Armenian-Azerbaijani population ratio
in favor of the latter."
Colonel (retired) Ildrym Mamedov, ex-commander of an army brigade,
is convinced in the meantime that the separatists are panic-stricken.
"Noncombatants have nothing to fear as long as their hands are not
smeared with the blood of peaceful Azerbaijanis from Shusha, Hojala,
and other cities and districts," Mamedov said. "It is Kocharjans,
Gukasjans, Sarkisjans, and other war-mongers who murdered Azerbaijani
who should be afraid. I reckon that there will be a special panel
one fine day, a structure established under the UN or a Council of
Europe aegis. Whoever broke the law will be brought to justice to
prevent something like that from happening again."
According to Mamedov, thousands of Armenians live beyond the
territories occupied by Armenia these days. "Everyone knows where
they live but has anyone harmed them in any way?" he said.