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TURKISH MEMBERSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION; AN ADVANTAGEOUS TURNING POINT FOR THE EU OR AN ADVERSE DRAWBACK
Devyani Jagasia, 7/19/2007
Global Politician, NY
http://globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=3 121&cid=2&sid=3
July 18 2007
This article will attempt to explore the issues regarding Turkish
accession into the European Union. There are advantages and
disadvantages for the European Union (EU) if Turkey is to become
a member. Some setbacks for Turkey stand in the way of it becoming
a member, such as economic concerns and Turkey's previous problems
with human rights issues. If Turkey should even be considered part
of the European Union is also a concern, due to the fact that Turkey
is predominately a Muslim country. If Turkey becomes a member it will
be the first predominately Muslim country to ever join the EU.
Literature Review
The Turkish membership process to the European Union has been going on
ever since Turkey applied to the EU in 1959, but it has just recently
been seriously considered for full membership. There has been many
reports and information that has been flooding the news, explaining
and analyzing if Turkish membership will be advantageous for the EU
or not. Most of the literature found on this issue is unbiased and
states the current facts about EU and Turkey. The literature merely
explains the advantages and disadvantageous of membership and leaves
it up to the reader to come up with their own decisions. Some authors,
such as Katinka Barysch and Subidey Togan, seem more towards allowing
Turkish membership, while Arthur Bonner and Lucy Jones lean towards
being against Turkish membership. Lucy Jones of the European Press
Review stated that "Turkey could become a bottomless pit into which
billions will be poured without the economy getting on its feet." This
is a view that Turkey will never meet the criteria for accession and
if allowed can be a waste to EU's funds. A more brighter and favorable
view is of Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform stated
"Turkish integration has more economic benefits for the EU, than
costs. Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies...If the EU
fails to solve its problems, the Union in 2010 will be gridlocked,
slow-growing, an inward looking and unwelcoming there is no reason
why Turkey should want to join such a club." This issue is fairly
divided and ultimately it will be up to the European community to
decide about Turkish accession.
Social, Historic and Intellectual Context
Turkey has had a long association with the project of European
integration. It made its first application to join what was then the
European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. The EEC's response to
this first application was to propose the creation of an association
between the EEC and Turkey until a time came that circumstances
permitted Turkey's accession. This association came into being with
the signing of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963. This agreement
envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union which would
bring the two sides closer together in economic and trade matters. The
Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an additional protocol signed in
November 1970, which set out a timetable for the abolition of tariffs
and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC.
There was a temporary freeze in Turkish- EEC relations as a result of
the military intervention in government in 1980. However, following the
multiparty elections of 1983, relations were re-established and Turkey
applied for full membership in 1987. The European Commission's Opinion
on Turkish membership, endorsed by the European Council in February
1990, confirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership yet deferred an
in-depth analysis of its application until the emergence of a more
"favorable environment"(Flam).
Mutual trade between Turkey and the EU is a key factor in EU- Turkey
relations. The customs union between Turkey and the EU was established
in 1995. Since then, the European Community's (EU-25) share in Turkey's
foreign trade has continued to increase to the extent that Turkey is
now the EU's 7th biggest trading partner (up from 9th in 1990). It
is also now the 13th biggest exporter to the EU (up from 17th in
1990). In the first nine months of 2004, the proportion of Turkish
exports destined for the EU increased to 54.87%. At the same time,
the proportion of Turkey's imports that came from the EU climbed
to 50.62%. Turkey's share in total EU exports has climbed since the
financial crisis in 2001 to 3.95 % in 2004, while its share in total
EU imports was 3.01% (Flam).
At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 Turkey was
officially recognized as a candidate state on an equal footing with
other candidate states. This marked the beginning of a pre-accession
strategy for Turkey designed to stimulate and support its reform
process through financial assistance and other forms of cooperation.
Turkey also drew up a National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis,
which outlined the government's own strategy for the harmonization
of its legislation with that of the EU.
A revised Accession Partnership was adopted by the European Council in
May 2003. The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to assist the
Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria,
with particular emphasis on the political criteria. It covers in
detail the priorities for accession preparations, in particular
implementation of the acquis, and forms the basis for pre-accession
assistance from Community funds.
A revised National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis was adopted
in July 2003. Both the Accession Partnership and the National Program
for the Adoption of the Acquis are revised on regular basis to take
account of progress made and to allow for new priorities to be set.
On December 17, 2004, the European Council defined the perspective
for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Following
the opening of negotiations the European Commission is expected to
produce a revised accession partnership document, which will identify
priority areas in which Turkey needs to make progress.
The 44th session of the Turkey-EC Association Council was held in
Luxembourg on April 26, 2005. At this meeting, the two sides reviewed
the current status of EU-Turkey relations, with the EU summarizing
the state of play of preparations in view of the opening of accession
negotiations, while Turkey outlined its expectations regarding the
negotiation framework and the revised Accession Partnership (Bonner).
A Joint Parliamentary Committee comprising representatives of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament also
meets frequently to discuss matters related to EU-Turkey relations.
The most recent meeting of the Committee took place at the end of
February 2005. The last meeting took place in June 2005.
Research Question
This paper investigates the issue of Turkish membership into the
European Union. The research question addressing the issue is:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership to
the European Union?
Advantages and Disadvantages
Turkish accession will affect the EU economically and socially in
many ways. Migration, security, social standing, trade, budget, youth,
agriculture, human rights, and Islam are all factors that will affect
the European Union if Turkey becomes a member. The costs and benefits
for the EU vary, EU's growth will be marginal if Turkey is to join,
but for security and the migration potential is high. There are a
few obstacles in the way with Turkey being a predominately Islamic
country and problems with human rights issues.
The growth impulse for the EU as a result of Turkey's membership will
be marginal: From the Union's viewpoint, the entry of a country is
rational if it raises internal and external security or increases
overall economic benefit. Considering the relatively small size of
Turkey's economy and the limited trade volume, membership for Turkey
will have only marginal effects on growth in the current EU. This does
not mean that trade and investment cannot rapidly expand to bilateral
advantage as a Turkish growth process occurs. Such a development is
also possible in the context of current integration levels combined
with a solid national economic policy. An EU accession perspective
further supports this.
The migration potential and the financial costs will be high:
Potential economic effects only have real purchase when unified
rules are implemented in the same manner for all participants of a
defined economic group. In the case of Turkey this will require time
and considerable effort. Large economic disparities can also lead to
adaptation costs in EU core countries. The income gap would remain
an important motivation for traveling and a high - if also difficult
to quantify - migration potential is to be reckoned with (up to 4
million). Long-term transition periods before full free movement
of persons is introduced would then be unavoidable. The costs of
an accession to the EU by Turkey will be high: with full political
integration, around 21 billion euros (in 2014). By comparison the EU
Commission estimates 27.6 billion euros (in 2025). Welfare loss for
old and new member countries is to be expected if transfers to Turkey
are redirected from elsewhere or tax increases are imposed (Barysch).
It is unlikely that EU member states would be willing to pay such large
sums. Alternatives could be found by formulating special conditions for
Turkey, which could stimulate political tensions with Ankara. Extensive
reforms of agricultural and structural policies would be the other
option. However, they are very difficult to implement in a EU with
27 or more members.
Political-strategic arguments dominate: There are frequent assertions
that accession negotiations will have resulting positive effects on
European security; as a counter model to fundamentalist Islam.
Turkey's questionable status in the Arab Middle East, and tense
relations with many of its neighbors, means that any notion
of Turkey's functioning as some kind of model for other Muslim
countries to emulate is presently hard to support intellectually
if not politically (Khan). Beyond this, a European perspective for
Turkey could be developed without a necessary full EU membership.
Membership for Turkey will have far-reaching consequences for the
EU: The entry of the Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC)
has already changed the EU from a union of mainly rich industrial
countries to a heterogeneous club with a large number of transition
countries. Economic and monetary policies are therefore faced with
stern challenges to maintain internal coherence and a sharp focus
on goals (Jones). This affects the enforcement of internal market
regulations and coordination tasks. While the industrial core
countries are compelled to internationally secure and extend their
competitiveness in advanced technologies, the unified countries must
first induce a successful real convergence process. Additionally,
the question is raised as to whether in such a heterogeneous economic
space it is sensible that all adhere to a communal monetary policy.
One of the key properties of the Turkish economy is advanced trade
integration. Through its 1995 customs union agreement with the EU
economy Turkey already participates in the EU internal market for
goods (but not for labor services) and will adopt significant parts
of the acquis independent of the state of accession decisions. Thus,
the country has arrived at a higher degree of EU integration than the
CEEC's at a comparable stage before their accession (Barysch). As
indicated by the increasing share of overall exports to GDP and
the constant share of the EU in overall Turkish trade, the customs
union with the EU did not lead to trade diversion but mainly to
trade creation.
Turkey is endowed with a rather low degree of human capital. In
this respect, Turkey's scores in variables like total expenditure
on education as a percentage of GDP and the percentage of the adult
population with upper secondary education deserve a closer look. In
terms of investment in, and output of, education, Turkey's performance
is certainly much worse than in the EU. However, according to the same
criteria, the CEEC perform at about the EU average (Bonner). These
deficits appear even larger in view of the exceptionally high share
of the Turkish school age population and its great importance for
Turkey's future growth prospects.
Turkey is characterized by demographic dynamism. Turkey's labor force
will continue to experience grow rates of more than one percent. for
at least one more generation. In contrast, the labor force currently
tends to be shrinking in many CEEC. This huge discrepancy gives Turkey
potentially much more dynamism and leeway for growth.
Moreover, Turkey's working age population is currently increasing 1.5
percentage points faster than the total population (Barysch). This
implies ample room for redistribution, pension payments and the like
before Turkey experiences the same demographic transition to lower
demographic dynamics as that the EU will face soon. This will also
help the aging labor force of many of EU countries.
External debt and capital flight has been a key feature of Turkish
financial performance for decades now. Turkey's foreign debt burden
is higher than that of most other new EU entrants or EU candidate
countries. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures,
it amounts to around 80 to 100 billion euros. Most of it, around 70
percent, is government debt. Since cumulated current account deficits
since 1963 have been only slightly above 40 billion euros (Flam).
The agricultural sector is still a big player in the Turkish economy.
Turkey is strongly similar to other CEEC (above all Poland and
Romania) in that a large part of the workforce is officially employed
in agriculture. One third of the Turkish labor force is employed in
this sector but it accounts only for about 12% of GDR. As in other
EU countries, this indicates the low labor productivity performance
of this sector and - to a certain extent - also some potential
labor-shedding and emigration (Togan). However, a marked difference
to other candidate countries consists of the fact that Turkey runs a
significant trade surplus to the EU in agricultural goods. The main
reason is that Turkey - due to its favorable climate - is one of the
few countries which specialize in products for which the EU does
not significantly hamper imports. For example; fruits, vegetables
and nuts. In addition, in contrast to the CEEC case, some Turkish
agricultural products have been protected even more heavily than by
the EU. In the case of Turkish EU membership the protection of this
sector would be abolished and would, for instance, mean increasing
farm sizes. Hence, human capital problems in this sector will become
even fiercer in the future. A large amount of Turkish exports to
the EU come from a minor, progressive sub-sector. At the same time,
the remaining sub-sectors employ the vast majority of the labor force
but are not competitive (Flam).
The issue with human rights has been with the minorities in Turkey.
Most of the Turkish population consider themselves as Turks, except
for the large Kurdish minority based in the southeast of the country.
The Kurdish population is estimated to about thirteen million people,
roughly twenty percent of the total population. The Turkish majority
views expressions of Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the territorial
integrity of Turkey and due to that thousands of Kurds have been forced
from their villages to urban areas in Turkey or abroad. Until recently,
Turkey restricted publication, broadcasting and education in a number
of minority languages, particularly dialects of Kurdish. The Turkish
constitution of 1961 allowed Kurdish publications in principle, but
many were confiscated for inciting separatism. During the 1980s,
several laws were brought in to suppress the use of Kurdish in
public life as part of a heavy-handed military response to Kurdish
separatism. Under foreign pressures, the Turkish government has
legalized the use of Kurdish languages. There are private schools that
teach in Kurdish and Kurdish radio and TV broadcasting is allowed on
national media. In the most recent Accession Report by the European
Union Commission reports that rates of human rights violations are
on the decrease (Flam).
Another major issue before EU will allow for Turkey to become a member
is that it wants Turkey to admit to the mass genocide of Armenians
that occurred in 1915. The Armenian Genocide, the first genocide of
the twentieth century, occurred when two million Armenians living in
Turkey were eliminated from their historic homeland through forced
deportations and massacres. The genocide was the forced mass evacuation
and related deaths of hundreds of thousands or over a million
Armenians, during the government of Young Turks from 1915 to 1917 in
the Ottoman Empire. Several facts in connection with the genocide
are a matter of ongoing dispute between parts of the international
community and Turkey. Although it is generally agreed that events said
to comprise the Armenian Genocide did occur, the Turkish government
rejects that it was genocide, on the alleged basis that the deaths
among the Armenians, were not a result of a state-sponsored plan
of mass extermination, but from the result of inter-ethnic strife,
disease and famine during the turmoil of World War I. Ankara has
drawn criticism and accusations of historical revisionism for this
reason, especially inside the European Union. Despite this thesis,
most Armenian, Western, and an increasing number of Turkish scholars
believe that the massacres were a case of what is termed genocide. For
example, most Western sources point to the sheer scale of the death
toll. The event is also said to be the second-most studied case of
genocide, and often draws comparison with the Holocaust (Bonner). A
growing list of countries have officially recognized and accepted the
authenticity of the Armenian Genocide. If Turkey wants to become a
full member of the EU, it will have to admit to these massacres that
occurred or the EU will not see Turkey fit to join.
More recently, there have been problems with Turkey concerning
Cyprus. Turkey has had a long-festering problem of divided Cyprus, a
legacy of an invasion decades ago that stands as a problem for Turkey's
accession. The European Commission on November 8, 2006 threatened
to recommend freezing entry talks unless Turkey opens its ports and
airports to EU member Cyprus by mid-December. Turkey said Cyprus is
a political problem that has nothing to do with the technicalities of
the negotiation process. Turkey wants the self-declared state in the
north of Cyprus, which is only recognized by Ankara, to be allowed to
trade with the rest of the world in return for backing a U.N.-drafted
reunification plan that Greek Cypriots rejected in 2004. Greek Cypriot
leaders say that allowing direct trade with northern Cyprus would imply
recognition of the breakaway state. Turkey, in turn, insists that even
if it opens its doors to Greek Cypriot ships and planes, it would not
mean recognition of the Greek part of Cyprus. The European Commission
decided against recommending the immediate suspension of the year-old
entry talks despite this deadlock, and Turkey's foreign minister,
Abdullah Gul, said in Rome that Turkey would achieve "positive
results" despite the "obstacles and barriers." (Hacaoglu) Turkey is
under pressure to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot goods
before EU leaders meet at a Dec. 14-15 summit in Brussels.
The issue of cultural difference should not in principle exclude an
accession, though it should be dependent upon the agreement of the
European citizenry: EU membership for Turkey has a political-cultural
dimension that is of wide-ranging importance for both parties. It
cannot be determined a priority whether, against the background
of a largely Muslim society and a state whose secular character
is guaranteed by the military, European values can be anchored
and sustained in Turkey. If they can be, then this would certainly
have an important exemplar function. If this does not happen then
a culturally motivated backlash would cause enormous problems for
the EU (Yavuz). It would require the application of comprehensive
sanction measures in order to enforce basic values. For the EU, as
a union of citizens, the membership of Turkey is also a matter of
identity. European citizens should answer the question of whether the
cultural or geographic borders of Europe have been transcended. An
entry for Turkey would be justified if they gave a clear vote in
favor. They would then also be prepared to render the necessary
solidarity within the community framework. Turkey is one country
that straddles the geographic divide between Europe and Asia, and
the cultural divide between the Western and Islamic worlds. If this
accession is to take place, it would bring these two cultures together,
if that is what the European community wants.
Conclusion
Overall, it is estimated that even tough Turkey is a highly populated
country, which is below average compared to many other EU states,
there are benefits of Turkish accession. The migration, trade and
agriculture potential is high. With that, the youth will help most
of the EU nations' aging population and labor force. There will be
a security advantage for the EU, because Turkey borders most Middle
Eastern countries and can help fight terrorism and protect the EU
from security threats. Since EU will have a base very close to the
Mid East, EU's security will be high. Capital debt and human rights
issues may be a hindrance for Turkish accession, because the EU only
permits a country if certain criteria are met. Europe also has to
decide if Turkey, being predominately Muslim, will be a factor for
accession. The EU will have to determine if the "European Union"
will only embody European countries or if it wants to extend its
borders and allow Turkey to become a member.
Devyani Jagasia, 7/19/2007
Global Politician, NY
http://globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=3 121&cid=2&sid=3
July 18 2007
This article will attempt to explore the issues regarding Turkish
accession into the European Union. There are advantages and
disadvantages for the European Union (EU) if Turkey is to become
a member. Some setbacks for Turkey stand in the way of it becoming
a member, such as economic concerns and Turkey's previous problems
with human rights issues. If Turkey should even be considered part
of the European Union is also a concern, due to the fact that Turkey
is predominately a Muslim country. If Turkey becomes a member it will
be the first predominately Muslim country to ever join the EU.
Literature Review
The Turkish membership process to the European Union has been going on
ever since Turkey applied to the EU in 1959, but it has just recently
been seriously considered for full membership. There has been many
reports and information that has been flooding the news, explaining
and analyzing if Turkish membership will be advantageous for the EU
or not. Most of the literature found on this issue is unbiased and
states the current facts about EU and Turkey. The literature merely
explains the advantages and disadvantageous of membership and leaves
it up to the reader to come up with their own decisions. Some authors,
such as Katinka Barysch and Subidey Togan, seem more towards allowing
Turkish membership, while Arthur Bonner and Lucy Jones lean towards
being against Turkish membership. Lucy Jones of the European Press
Review stated that "Turkey could become a bottomless pit into which
billions will be poured without the economy getting on its feet." This
is a view that Turkey will never meet the criteria for accession and
if allowed can be a waste to EU's funds. A more brighter and favorable
view is of Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform stated
"Turkish integration has more economic benefits for the EU, than
costs. Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies...If the EU
fails to solve its problems, the Union in 2010 will be gridlocked,
slow-growing, an inward looking and unwelcoming there is no reason
why Turkey should want to join such a club." This issue is fairly
divided and ultimately it will be up to the European community to
decide about Turkish accession.
Social, Historic and Intellectual Context
Turkey has had a long association with the project of European
integration. It made its first application to join what was then the
European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. The EEC's response to
this first application was to propose the creation of an association
between the EEC and Turkey until a time came that circumstances
permitted Turkey's accession. This association came into being with
the signing of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963. This agreement
envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union which would
bring the two sides closer together in economic and trade matters. The
Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an additional protocol signed in
November 1970, which set out a timetable for the abolition of tariffs
and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC.
There was a temporary freeze in Turkish- EEC relations as a result of
the military intervention in government in 1980. However, following the
multiparty elections of 1983, relations were re-established and Turkey
applied for full membership in 1987. The European Commission's Opinion
on Turkish membership, endorsed by the European Council in February
1990, confirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership yet deferred an
in-depth analysis of its application until the emergence of a more
"favorable environment"(Flam).
Mutual trade between Turkey and the EU is a key factor in EU- Turkey
relations. The customs union between Turkey and the EU was established
in 1995. Since then, the European Community's (EU-25) share in Turkey's
foreign trade has continued to increase to the extent that Turkey is
now the EU's 7th biggest trading partner (up from 9th in 1990). It
is also now the 13th biggest exporter to the EU (up from 17th in
1990). In the first nine months of 2004, the proportion of Turkish
exports destined for the EU increased to 54.87%. At the same time,
the proportion of Turkey's imports that came from the EU climbed
to 50.62%. Turkey's share in total EU exports has climbed since the
financial crisis in 2001 to 3.95 % in 2004, while its share in total
EU imports was 3.01% (Flam).
At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 Turkey was
officially recognized as a candidate state on an equal footing with
other candidate states. This marked the beginning of a pre-accession
strategy for Turkey designed to stimulate and support its reform
process through financial assistance and other forms of cooperation.
Turkey also drew up a National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis,
which outlined the government's own strategy for the harmonization
of its legislation with that of the EU.
A revised Accession Partnership was adopted by the European Council in
May 2003. The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to assist the
Turkish authorities in their efforts to meet the accession criteria,
with particular emphasis on the political criteria. It covers in
detail the priorities for accession preparations, in particular
implementation of the acquis, and forms the basis for pre-accession
assistance from Community funds.
A revised National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis was adopted
in July 2003. Both the Accession Partnership and the National Program
for the Adoption of the Acquis are revised on regular basis to take
account of progress made and to allow for new priorities to be set.
On December 17, 2004, the European Council defined the perspective
for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Following
the opening of negotiations the European Commission is expected to
produce a revised accession partnership document, which will identify
priority areas in which Turkey needs to make progress.
The 44th session of the Turkey-EC Association Council was held in
Luxembourg on April 26, 2005. At this meeting, the two sides reviewed
the current status of EU-Turkey relations, with the EU summarizing
the state of play of preparations in view of the opening of accession
negotiations, while Turkey outlined its expectations regarding the
negotiation framework and the revised Accession Partnership (Bonner).
A Joint Parliamentary Committee comprising representatives of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament also
meets frequently to discuss matters related to EU-Turkey relations.
The most recent meeting of the Committee took place at the end of
February 2005. The last meeting took place in June 2005.
Research Question
This paper investigates the issue of Turkish membership into the
European Union. The research question addressing the issue is:
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership to
the European Union?
Advantages and Disadvantages
Turkish accession will affect the EU economically and socially in
many ways. Migration, security, social standing, trade, budget, youth,
agriculture, human rights, and Islam are all factors that will affect
the European Union if Turkey becomes a member. The costs and benefits
for the EU vary, EU's growth will be marginal if Turkey is to join,
but for security and the migration potential is high. There are a
few obstacles in the way with Turkey being a predominately Islamic
country and problems with human rights issues.
The growth impulse for the EU as a result of Turkey's membership will
be marginal: From the Union's viewpoint, the entry of a country is
rational if it raises internal and external security or increases
overall economic benefit. Considering the relatively small size of
Turkey's economy and the limited trade volume, membership for Turkey
will have only marginal effects on growth in the current EU. This does
not mean that trade and investment cannot rapidly expand to bilateral
advantage as a Turkish growth process occurs. Such a development is
also possible in the context of current integration levels combined
with a solid national economic policy. An EU accession perspective
further supports this.
The migration potential and the financial costs will be high:
Potential economic effects only have real purchase when unified
rules are implemented in the same manner for all participants of a
defined economic group. In the case of Turkey this will require time
and considerable effort. Large economic disparities can also lead to
adaptation costs in EU core countries. The income gap would remain
an important motivation for traveling and a high - if also difficult
to quantify - migration potential is to be reckoned with (up to 4
million). Long-term transition periods before full free movement
of persons is introduced would then be unavoidable. The costs of
an accession to the EU by Turkey will be high: with full political
integration, around 21 billion euros (in 2014). By comparison the EU
Commission estimates 27.6 billion euros (in 2025). Welfare loss for
old and new member countries is to be expected if transfers to Turkey
are redirected from elsewhere or tax increases are imposed (Barysch).
It is unlikely that EU member states would be willing to pay such large
sums. Alternatives could be found by formulating special conditions for
Turkey, which could stimulate political tensions with Ankara. Extensive
reforms of agricultural and structural policies would be the other
option. However, they are very difficult to implement in a EU with
27 or more members.
Political-strategic arguments dominate: There are frequent assertions
that accession negotiations will have resulting positive effects on
European security; as a counter model to fundamentalist Islam.
Turkey's questionable status in the Arab Middle East, and tense
relations with many of its neighbors, means that any notion
of Turkey's functioning as some kind of model for other Muslim
countries to emulate is presently hard to support intellectually
if not politically (Khan). Beyond this, a European perspective for
Turkey could be developed without a necessary full EU membership.
Membership for Turkey will have far-reaching consequences for the
EU: The entry of the Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC)
has already changed the EU from a union of mainly rich industrial
countries to a heterogeneous club with a large number of transition
countries. Economic and monetary policies are therefore faced with
stern challenges to maintain internal coherence and a sharp focus
on goals (Jones). This affects the enforcement of internal market
regulations and coordination tasks. While the industrial core
countries are compelled to internationally secure and extend their
competitiveness in advanced technologies, the unified countries must
first induce a successful real convergence process. Additionally,
the question is raised as to whether in such a heterogeneous economic
space it is sensible that all adhere to a communal monetary policy.
One of the key properties of the Turkish economy is advanced trade
integration. Through its 1995 customs union agreement with the EU
economy Turkey already participates in the EU internal market for
goods (but not for labor services) and will adopt significant parts
of the acquis independent of the state of accession decisions. Thus,
the country has arrived at a higher degree of EU integration than the
CEEC's at a comparable stage before their accession (Barysch). As
indicated by the increasing share of overall exports to GDP and
the constant share of the EU in overall Turkish trade, the customs
union with the EU did not lead to trade diversion but mainly to
trade creation.
Turkey is endowed with a rather low degree of human capital. In
this respect, Turkey's scores in variables like total expenditure
on education as a percentage of GDP and the percentage of the adult
population with upper secondary education deserve a closer look. In
terms of investment in, and output of, education, Turkey's performance
is certainly much worse than in the EU. However, according to the same
criteria, the CEEC perform at about the EU average (Bonner). These
deficits appear even larger in view of the exceptionally high share
of the Turkish school age population and its great importance for
Turkey's future growth prospects.
Turkey is characterized by demographic dynamism. Turkey's labor force
will continue to experience grow rates of more than one percent. for
at least one more generation. In contrast, the labor force currently
tends to be shrinking in many CEEC. This huge discrepancy gives Turkey
potentially much more dynamism and leeway for growth.
Moreover, Turkey's working age population is currently increasing 1.5
percentage points faster than the total population (Barysch). This
implies ample room for redistribution, pension payments and the like
before Turkey experiences the same demographic transition to lower
demographic dynamics as that the EU will face soon. This will also
help the aging labor force of many of EU countries.
External debt and capital flight has been a key feature of Turkish
financial performance for decades now. Turkey's foreign debt burden
is higher than that of most other new EU entrants or EU candidate
countries. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures,
it amounts to around 80 to 100 billion euros. Most of it, around 70
percent, is government debt. Since cumulated current account deficits
since 1963 have been only slightly above 40 billion euros (Flam).
The agricultural sector is still a big player in the Turkish economy.
Turkey is strongly similar to other CEEC (above all Poland and
Romania) in that a large part of the workforce is officially employed
in agriculture. One third of the Turkish labor force is employed in
this sector but it accounts only for about 12% of GDR. As in other
EU countries, this indicates the low labor productivity performance
of this sector and - to a certain extent - also some potential
labor-shedding and emigration (Togan). However, a marked difference
to other candidate countries consists of the fact that Turkey runs a
significant trade surplus to the EU in agricultural goods. The main
reason is that Turkey - due to its favorable climate - is one of the
few countries which specialize in products for which the EU does
not significantly hamper imports. For example; fruits, vegetables
and nuts. In addition, in contrast to the CEEC case, some Turkish
agricultural products have been protected even more heavily than by
the EU. In the case of Turkish EU membership the protection of this
sector would be abolished and would, for instance, mean increasing
farm sizes. Hence, human capital problems in this sector will become
even fiercer in the future. A large amount of Turkish exports to
the EU come from a minor, progressive sub-sector. At the same time,
the remaining sub-sectors employ the vast majority of the labor force
but are not competitive (Flam).
The issue with human rights has been with the minorities in Turkey.
Most of the Turkish population consider themselves as Turks, except
for the large Kurdish minority based in the southeast of the country.
The Kurdish population is estimated to about thirteen million people,
roughly twenty percent of the total population. The Turkish majority
views expressions of Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the territorial
integrity of Turkey and due to that thousands of Kurds have been forced
from their villages to urban areas in Turkey or abroad. Until recently,
Turkey restricted publication, broadcasting and education in a number
of minority languages, particularly dialects of Kurdish. The Turkish
constitution of 1961 allowed Kurdish publications in principle, but
many were confiscated for inciting separatism. During the 1980s,
several laws were brought in to suppress the use of Kurdish in
public life as part of a heavy-handed military response to Kurdish
separatism. Under foreign pressures, the Turkish government has
legalized the use of Kurdish languages. There are private schools that
teach in Kurdish and Kurdish radio and TV broadcasting is allowed on
national media. In the most recent Accession Report by the European
Union Commission reports that rates of human rights violations are
on the decrease (Flam).
Another major issue before EU will allow for Turkey to become a member
is that it wants Turkey to admit to the mass genocide of Armenians
that occurred in 1915. The Armenian Genocide, the first genocide of
the twentieth century, occurred when two million Armenians living in
Turkey were eliminated from their historic homeland through forced
deportations and massacres. The genocide was the forced mass evacuation
and related deaths of hundreds of thousands or over a million
Armenians, during the government of Young Turks from 1915 to 1917 in
the Ottoman Empire. Several facts in connection with the genocide
are a matter of ongoing dispute between parts of the international
community and Turkey. Although it is generally agreed that events said
to comprise the Armenian Genocide did occur, the Turkish government
rejects that it was genocide, on the alleged basis that the deaths
among the Armenians, were not a result of a state-sponsored plan
of mass extermination, but from the result of inter-ethnic strife,
disease and famine during the turmoil of World War I. Ankara has
drawn criticism and accusations of historical revisionism for this
reason, especially inside the European Union. Despite this thesis,
most Armenian, Western, and an increasing number of Turkish scholars
believe that the massacres were a case of what is termed genocide. For
example, most Western sources point to the sheer scale of the death
toll. The event is also said to be the second-most studied case of
genocide, and often draws comparison with the Holocaust (Bonner). A
growing list of countries have officially recognized and accepted the
authenticity of the Armenian Genocide. If Turkey wants to become a
full member of the EU, it will have to admit to these massacres that
occurred or the EU will not see Turkey fit to join.
More recently, there have been problems with Turkey concerning
Cyprus. Turkey has had a long-festering problem of divided Cyprus, a
legacy of an invasion decades ago that stands as a problem for Turkey's
accession. The European Commission on November 8, 2006 threatened
to recommend freezing entry talks unless Turkey opens its ports and
airports to EU member Cyprus by mid-December. Turkey said Cyprus is
a political problem that has nothing to do with the technicalities of
the negotiation process. Turkey wants the self-declared state in the
north of Cyprus, which is only recognized by Ankara, to be allowed to
trade with the rest of the world in return for backing a U.N.-drafted
reunification plan that Greek Cypriots rejected in 2004. Greek Cypriot
leaders say that allowing direct trade with northern Cyprus would imply
recognition of the breakaway state. Turkey, in turn, insists that even
if it opens its doors to Greek Cypriot ships and planes, it would not
mean recognition of the Greek part of Cyprus. The European Commission
decided against recommending the immediate suspension of the year-old
entry talks despite this deadlock, and Turkey's foreign minister,
Abdullah Gul, said in Rome that Turkey would achieve "positive
results" despite the "obstacles and barriers." (Hacaoglu) Turkey is
under pressure to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot goods
before EU leaders meet at a Dec. 14-15 summit in Brussels.
The issue of cultural difference should not in principle exclude an
accession, though it should be dependent upon the agreement of the
European citizenry: EU membership for Turkey has a political-cultural
dimension that is of wide-ranging importance for both parties. It
cannot be determined a priority whether, against the background
of a largely Muslim society and a state whose secular character
is guaranteed by the military, European values can be anchored
and sustained in Turkey. If they can be, then this would certainly
have an important exemplar function. If this does not happen then
a culturally motivated backlash would cause enormous problems for
the EU (Yavuz). It would require the application of comprehensive
sanction measures in order to enforce basic values. For the EU, as
a union of citizens, the membership of Turkey is also a matter of
identity. European citizens should answer the question of whether the
cultural or geographic borders of Europe have been transcended. An
entry for Turkey would be justified if they gave a clear vote in
favor. They would then also be prepared to render the necessary
solidarity within the community framework. Turkey is one country
that straddles the geographic divide between Europe and Asia, and
the cultural divide between the Western and Islamic worlds. If this
accession is to take place, it would bring these two cultures together,
if that is what the European community wants.
Conclusion
Overall, it is estimated that even tough Turkey is a highly populated
country, which is below average compared to many other EU states,
there are benefits of Turkish accession. The migration, trade and
agriculture potential is high. With that, the youth will help most
of the EU nations' aging population and labor force. There will be
a security advantage for the EU, because Turkey borders most Middle
Eastern countries and can help fight terrorism and protect the EU
from security threats. Since EU will have a base very close to the
Mid East, EU's security will be high. Capital debt and human rights
issues may be a hindrance for Turkish accession, because the EU only
permits a country if certain criteria are met. Europe also has to
decide if Turkey, being predominately Muslim, will be a factor for
accession. The EU will have to determine if the "European Union"
will only embody European countries or if it wants to extend its
borders and allow Turkey to become a member.