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A MASTER PLAN TO FORCE ISLAMIST ERDOGAN OUT - ORHAN PAMUK FOR PRESIDENT
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
American Chronicle, CA
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewA rticle.asp?articleID=33248
July 25 2007
In an earlier article, we stressed that fundamental preliminary
conclusions as regards the July 22, 2007, elections in Turkey should
lead to the formation of a Multilateral Task Force, where all the
Turkish opposition parties, as well as secular democratic academia,
businessmen, diplomats and military will brainstorm about ways to
force Erdogan out.
We suggested that a Master Plan be devised evolving around 1)
across-the-board political considerations, 2) cultural - national -
historical considerations, 3) the formation of the necessary tools,
and 4) the elaboration of a list of target and activity priorities,
before embarking on a thunderous campaign to bring the disastrous
Islamist simulator down.
We identified the plans of the hidden Erdogan supporters, and we
clarified the need to deprive the marionette premier of two segments
of his supporters, namely the secular conservative voters, and the
honest, traditionalist Islamists who would never accept as Turkish
premier a miserable instrument of Islam's worst enemies, namely the
Apostate French Freemasonic Lodge.
In this article, we draw conclusions that the Secular Democratic
establishment of Turkey should reach after comprehensively developing
across-the-board political considerations.
Political Conclusions
1. MHP - DP cannot convince Conservative public opinion while separate.
This has mostly to do with the very low percentage that DP (emanating
out of the earlier Anavatan and Dogru Yol parties) got in the elections
(5.4%). The parties are not politically distant and have to find
common ground through lessening the nationalistic overtones of MHP,
and focusing on elaborating a convincing conservative statement and
proposal for today's Turkey. They should merge, and at the same time
invite and incorporate other political parties and formations like
Gentsh Parti (Youth Party) that managed to get 3% of the total vote.
In the light of the July 22, 2007, elections' results, merged all the
conservative formations would reach 25 - 26 % of the total vote, thus
becoming the main opposition party far ahead of Deniz Baykal's Social
- Democrats (CHP). This is certainly a mere quantitative approach to
the subject, as it is clear that the dynamics caused by a large scale
political merge of the conservative forces would attract a significant
number of conservative voters who finally opted for Erdogan in the
July 22 elections. One has to calculate that at least as many as 10 -
15% of conservative voters were transferred to Erdogan's AKP (pushing
it as high as 46% of the total).
If you imagine Turkey's Conservative Right unified at 25 - 26%, and
add to that number another 10 - 15% of voters, you have Turkish Right
totaling 40%, and Erdogan falling down to 30%. Arrivederci, Governo!
The unification of Turkey's Right is of the utmost urgency.
2. CHP revision of policies
The political party founded by Kemal Ataturk has undergone an
incredible number of Ovidian metamorphoses, having been even a
prohibited party name for some years. The party has undertaken for
five years the main opposition against Erdogan's gang. For Turkish
politics insiders and Turkish History connoisseurs, Deniz Baykal is a
kind of Ismet Inonu revivified. Against Erdogan, Baykal has experienced
the same odd situation Ismet Inonu did live through during the 50s,
the period of the erratic Adnan Menderes' electoral victories.
There are many reasons CHP and Deniz Baykal have to intensify efforts
to avoid a military coup like that of 1960, which put a definitely
well deserved end to Adnan Menderes's political career and physical
existence. History must not be repeated, and politically it may be easy
to plan and execute the destruction of Erdogan's gang. It simply takes
more than traditional party apparatchiks, and it definitively involves
a wider scope of activities than simple parliamentary maneuvering
in coordination with the military. Now, the masses of voters, the
Turkish society in its entirety, the intellectuals, the academia,
and the world of Finance must come to surface. Baykal as leader of
the opposition, because of the multi-division of Turkey's conservative
vote, must rather act as an orchestra conductor, a Kapellmeister, only
rarely engaged in personal confrontations and frontal political battle.
This should start within the party itself. New political leaders must
be promoted next to Baykal, and a new ideological profile should be
sought after. In addition to strict secularism, CHP has to support
a modern vision for Center - Left parties, determine what Ataturk's
party must be in 2007, and address a wide spectrum of issues from
environmental policies to liberalization, Turkey's re-orientation in
Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the rejection of the Islamic
fundamentalism and extremism, and the international stance and position
of Turkey. Whereas people around him should act as politicians, Deniz
Baykal should as statesman because of the obvious incapacity of the
Erdogan's gang. More than anything else, Baykal's CHP must promote
political activism, massive participation, and imminent response to
political issues.
It must become clear that the Turkish Left has become a minor
political force as the total support gathered during the recent
elections does not exceed 25%. This has to be drastically addressed,
and if concessions have to be made, the correct direction is the
erroneously disregarded world of ethnic, religious and cultural
minorities; traditional supporters of the Left, the Alevis - centered
in Sivas (Sebasteia) - did not vote for the CHP in 2007. Aramaeans
of Tur Abdin and Armenians must be chosen as partners, without being
alienated as before.
More importantly, the Zazas should become a matter of concern
and focus; with a massive support to this ethnic group that has
nothing in common with the 'Kurds', the CHP will demonstrate that it
understands clearly the multicultural dimension of today's world. At
the same time, it will gain the massive support of the Zazas who are
most upset because of the terrorist purposes of criminal gangsters
like Leyla Zana, the loathed Witch of Diyarbakir, and her French
Freemasonic backers, who want to assimilate the Zazas with the Kurds
and tyrannically disfigure them in order to achieve the monstrous
points of the inhuman French agenda.
The CHP must become the political Atelier where Islamism will be
ultimately killed. It is from CHP that the most dynamic denunciation
of Islamism, and the most resolute cancellation of Islamism promoting
measures taken by Erdogan's thugs must originate.
3. Common (CHP - MHP - DP) support for presidential candidate -
Orhan Pamuk
It is high time for the Turkish opposition to gain the upper hand in
terms of political impressions; this has little to do with personal
choices and pleasant suggestions. To get an undisputed advantage
over your rival, you must simply do what it takes, either you like
it or not.
To admit the truth, there is only one Turk who right now can claim
wider support, consideration and admiration among the average
people than the newly re-elected Islamist premier. Thank God, he is
a convinced Secular, Humanist, and Democrat; a man who can detect -
through his own way, but does it truly matter? - the average people
pulse, feelings, desires, and concerns. He may have his record of
erroneous or excessive statements, but who is the one to have avoided
this? Revered allover the world, renowned for his tough stance against
Islamism, a person who can re-assemble the Secular Turks and guarantee
the continuation of the Spirit - not the letter - of Ataturk.
As Erdogan already deprived himself of the advantage of surprise,
stating he would agree on a Compromise Candidate for Turkish President,
it would be tremendously beneficial for the entire opposition to
-present itself as one front, and
-propose a person Erdogan's islamists would not like but would not
be able to reject.
Orhan Pamuk for President
Orhan Pamuk, novelist and intellectual, made Turks truly proud of
themselves and of Turkish literature thanks to the Nobel Prize that
was awarded to this author last year. 'Orhan Pamuk for President' is
the first act and slogan of a thunderous, unconventional opposition
pre-destined to successfully terminate the career of the uneducated
Islamist Erdogan, and to effectively cancel the anti-Turkish conspiracy
of the Apostate French Freemasonic Lodge. In front of the impressions
gained, all related hesitations are baseless. Orhan Pamuk has the
intellectual stamina to sort a Modus Vivendi with the military.
4. Common (CHP - MHP - DP) approach to the Kurdish issue
All the Turks, who ascribe themselves to Secular, Democratic ideals and
principles, must realize the importance of adequately updating their
ideas, approaches and perceptions. All those who value Kemal Ataturk's
ideas and practices must come to terms with a reality of primordial
importance; political realism teaches that Kemal Ataturk's choices
were part of the Art of Possible. Certainly, virtues remain permanently
the same, but ideas hinge on time. The concept of nationalistic state
was quite pertinent a choice for the 20s and the 30s, but in a global
world it is not anymore the driving force of the progress.
Multicultural societies reflect today better the human effort for
improvement, the political struggle for Enlightenment and respect
of the 'Other'. It must be understood that Ataturk's ideological -
cultural system and practice were not a monolithic, peremptory policy
of linking Turks of Anatolia with some of their Central Asiatic Tukic
ancestors. The Search for the Hittite - Cappadocian and the Sumerian -
Mesopotamian Identity and origin was highly evaluated.
Closer to Kemal Ataturk's spirit is not the one who intends to
implement in 2007 a policy the founder of Turkey adopted in 1925.
Contrarily, the person who, devoted to Ataturk's principles, examines
what policy Ataturk would have implemented, if he had lived today,
and through parallels and equivalents reaches a conclusion is nearer
to the very spirit of the founder of Modern Turkey.
All this serves as an introduction to the point that Turkey -
as national conception of the country - will not be threatened,
abandoned or evaded in any way, if a multicultural model is chosen
within which the Zazas, the Aramaeans, the Armenians, the Kurds and
other ethnic groups of minor importance will find their existence
mentioned, respected and highlighted within the borders of Turkey as
Common heritage, Cultural Wealth, and Historical Treasure. This, if
implemented in the 1930s or 40s, would have led Turkey to disaster,
but today it will bring peace, re-conciliation, and concord. With so
many millions of mixed marriages, Turkey - opting for a multicultural
political model - would strengthen the bond among all ethnic and
religious groups and peoples, thus eliminating the chances of nefarious
Western infiltration, and averting the confusion the enemies of Turkey
want to propagate as regards the identity of various groups of people.
Because the greater danger is precisely this: if Turks and the
socioeconomic and political establishment of Turkey disregard and take
distance from the Zazas and the other smaller ethnic groups that the
French Freemasonic guidance keeps intentionally regrouping as one
ethnic group under the umbrella of the name 'Kurds', Turkey loses
ground and offers its enemies valuable political space and margin
of maneuver.
Contrarily, supporting the clearer - the most marked - identification
of the smaller ethnic groups against the Kurdish 'imperialism', Turkey
shapes a great alliance and gains the impressions, by transferring the
problem (the conflict is not anymore between Turkey and the 'Kurds' but
between the Zazas and another people that wants the Zazas assimilated)
and appearing as the ultimate resort and remedy for the 'problem'.
Further points of conclusions ensuing from across-the-board political
considerations that Turkey's political, academic, military and
financial establishment must elaborate as soon as possible we will
discuss in the next article.
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
American Chronicle, CA
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewA rticle.asp?articleID=33248
July 25 2007
In an earlier article, we stressed that fundamental preliminary
conclusions as regards the July 22, 2007, elections in Turkey should
lead to the formation of a Multilateral Task Force, where all the
Turkish opposition parties, as well as secular democratic academia,
businessmen, diplomats and military will brainstorm about ways to
force Erdogan out.
We suggested that a Master Plan be devised evolving around 1)
across-the-board political considerations, 2) cultural - national -
historical considerations, 3) the formation of the necessary tools,
and 4) the elaboration of a list of target and activity priorities,
before embarking on a thunderous campaign to bring the disastrous
Islamist simulator down.
We identified the plans of the hidden Erdogan supporters, and we
clarified the need to deprive the marionette premier of two segments
of his supporters, namely the secular conservative voters, and the
honest, traditionalist Islamists who would never accept as Turkish
premier a miserable instrument of Islam's worst enemies, namely the
Apostate French Freemasonic Lodge.
In this article, we draw conclusions that the Secular Democratic
establishment of Turkey should reach after comprehensively developing
across-the-board political considerations.
Political Conclusions
1. MHP - DP cannot convince Conservative public opinion while separate.
This has mostly to do with the very low percentage that DP (emanating
out of the earlier Anavatan and Dogru Yol parties) got in the elections
(5.4%). The parties are not politically distant and have to find
common ground through lessening the nationalistic overtones of MHP,
and focusing on elaborating a convincing conservative statement and
proposal for today's Turkey. They should merge, and at the same time
invite and incorporate other political parties and formations like
Gentsh Parti (Youth Party) that managed to get 3% of the total vote.
In the light of the July 22, 2007, elections' results, merged all the
conservative formations would reach 25 - 26 % of the total vote, thus
becoming the main opposition party far ahead of Deniz Baykal's Social
- Democrats (CHP). This is certainly a mere quantitative approach to
the subject, as it is clear that the dynamics caused by a large scale
political merge of the conservative forces would attract a significant
number of conservative voters who finally opted for Erdogan in the
July 22 elections. One has to calculate that at least as many as 10 -
15% of conservative voters were transferred to Erdogan's AKP (pushing
it as high as 46% of the total).
If you imagine Turkey's Conservative Right unified at 25 - 26%, and
add to that number another 10 - 15% of voters, you have Turkish Right
totaling 40%, and Erdogan falling down to 30%. Arrivederci, Governo!
The unification of Turkey's Right is of the utmost urgency.
2. CHP revision of policies
The political party founded by Kemal Ataturk has undergone an
incredible number of Ovidian metamorphoses, having been even a
prohibited party name for some years. The party has undertaken for
five years the main opposition against Erdogan's gang. For Turkish
politics insiders and Turkish History connoisseurs, Deniz Baykal is a
kind of Ismet Inonu revivified. Against Erdogan, Baykal has experienced
the same odd situation Ismet Inonu did live through during the 50s,
the period of the erratic Adnan Menderes' electoral victories.
There are many reasons CHP and Deniz Baykal have to intensify efforts
to avoid a military coup like that of 1960, which put a definitely
well deserved end to Adnan Menderes's political career and physical
existence. History must not be repeated, and politically it may be easy
to plan and execute the destruction of Erdogan's gang. It simply takes
more than traditional party apparatchiks, and it definitively involves
a wider scope of activities than simple parliamentary maneuvering
in coordination with the military. Now, the masses of voters, the
Turkish society in its entirety, the intellectuals, the academia,
and the world of Finance must come to surface. Baykal as leader of
the opposition, because of the multi-division of Turkey's conservative
vote, must rather act as an orchestra conductor, a Kapellmeister, only
rarely engaged in personal confrontations and frontal political battle.
This should start within the party itself. New political leaders must
be promoted next to Baykal, and a new ideological profile should be
sought after. In addition to strict secularism, CHP has to support
a modern vision for Center - Left parties, determine what Ataturk's
party must be in 2007, and address a wide spectrum of issues from
environmental policies to liberalization, Turkey's re-orientation in
Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the rejection of the Islamic
fundamentalism and extremism, and the international stance and position
of Turkey. Whereas people around him should act as politicians, Deniz
Baykal should as statesman because of the obvious incapacity of the
Erdogan's gang. More than anything else, Baykal's CHP must promote
political activism, massive participation, and imminent response to
political issues.
It must become clear that the Turkish Left has become a minor
political force as the total support gathered during the recent
elections does not exceed 25%. This has to be drastically addressed,
and if concessions have to be made, the correct direction is the
erroneously disregarded world of ethnic, religious and cultural
minorities; traditional supporters of the Left, the Alevis - centered
in Sivas (Sebasteia) - did not vote for the CHP in 2007. Aramaeans
of Tur Abdin and Armenians must be chosen as partners, without being
alienated as before.
More importantly, the Zazas should become a matter of concern
and focus; with a massive support to this ethnic group that has
nothing in common with the 'Kurds', the CHP will demonstrate that it
understands clearly the multicultural dimension of today's world. At
the same time, it will gain the massive support of the Zazas who are
most upset because of the terrorist purposes of criminal gangsters
like Leyla Zana, the loathed Witch of Diyarbakir, and her French
Freemasonic backers, who want to assimilate the Zazas with the Kurds
and tyrannically disfigure them in order to achieve the monstrous
points of the inhuman French agenda.
The CHP must become the political Atelier where Islamism will be
ultimately killed. It is from CHP that the most dynamic denunciation
of Islamism, and the most resolute cancellation of Islamism promoting
measures taken by Erdogan's thugs must originate.
3. Common (CHP - MHP - DP) support for presidential candidate -
Orhan Pamuk
It is high time for the Turkish opposition to gain the upper hand in
terms of political impressions; this has little to do with personal
choices and pleasant suggestions. To get an undisputed advantage
over your rival, you must simply do what it takes, either you like
it or not.
To admit the truth, there is only one Turk who right now can claim
wider support, consideration and admiration among the average
people than the newly re-elected Islamist premier. Thank God, he is
a convinced Secular, Humanist, and Democrat; a man who can detect -
through his own way, but does it truly matter? - the average people
pulse, feelings, desires, and concerns. He may have his record of
erroneous or excessive statements, but who is the one to have avoided
this? Revered allover the world, renowned for his tough stance against
Islamism, a person who can re-assemble the Secular Turks and guarantee
the continuation of the Spirit - not the letter - of Ataturk.
As Erdogan already deprived himself of the advantage of surprise,
stating he would agree on a Compromise Candidate for Turkish President,
it would be tremendously beneficial for the entire opposition to
-present itself as one front, and
-propose a person Erdogan's islamists would not like but would not
be able to reject.
Orhan Pamuk for President
Orhan Pamuk, novelist and intellectual, made Turks truly proud of
themselves and of Turkish literature thanks to the Nobel Prize that
was awarded to this author last year. 'Orhan Pamuk for President' is
the first act and slogan of a thunderous, unconventional opposition
pre-destined to successfully terminate the career of the uneducated
Islamist Erdogan, and to effectively cancel the anti-Turkish conspiracy
of the Apostate French Freemasonic Lodge. In front of the impressions
gained, all related hesitations are baseless. Orhan Pamuk has the
intellectual stamina to sort a Modus Vivendi with the military.
4. Common (CHP - MHP - DP) approach to the Kurdish issue
All the Turks, who ascribe themselves to Secular, Democratic ideals and
principles, must realize the importance of adequately updating their
ideas, approaches and perceptions. All those who value Kemal Ataturk's
ideas and practices must come to terms with a reality of primordial
importance; political realism teaches that Kemal Ataturk's choices
were part of the Art of Possible. Certainly, virtues remain permanently
the same, but ideas hinge on time. The concept of nationalistic state
was quite pertinent a choice for the 20s and the 30s, but in a global
world it is not anymore the driving force of the progress.
Multicultural societies reflect today better the human effort for
improvement, the political struggle for Enlightenment and respect
of the 'Other'. It must be understood that Ataturk's ideological -
cultural system and practice were not a monolithic, peremptory policy
of linking Turks of Anatolia with some of their Central Asiatic Tukic
ancestors. The Search for the Hittite - Cappadocian and the Sumerian -
Mesopotamian Identity and origin was highly evaluated.
Closer to Kemal Ataturk's spirit is not the one who intends to
implement in 2007 a policy the founder of Turkey adopted in 1925.
Contrarily, the person who, devoted to Ataturk's principles, examines
what policy Ataturk would have implemented, if he had lived today,
and through parallels and equivalents reaches a conclusion is nearer
to the very spirit of the founder of Modern Turkey.
All this serves as an introduction to the point that Turkey -
as national conception of the country - will not be threatened,
abandoned or evaded in any way, if a multicultural model is chosen
within which the Zazas, the Aramaeans, the Armenians, the Kurds and
other ethnic groups of minor importance will find their existence
mentioned, respected and highlighted within the borders of Turkey as
Common heritage, Cultural Wealth, and Historical Treasure. This, if
implemented in the 1930s or 40s, would have led Turkey to disaster,
but today it will bring peace, re-conciliation, and concord. With so
many millions of mixed marriages, Turkey - opting for a multicultural
political model - would strengthen the bond among all ethnic and
religious groups and peoples, thus eliminating the chances of nefarious
Western infiltration, and averting the confusion the enemies of Turkey
want to propagate as regards the identity of various groups of people.
Because the greater danger is precisely this: if Turks and the
socioeconomic and political establishment of Turkey disregard and take
distance from the Zazas and the other smaller ethnic groups that the
French Freemasonic guidance keeps intentionally regrouping as one
ethnic group under the umbrella of the name 'Kurds', Turkey loses
ground and offers its enemies valuable political space and margin
of maneuver.
Contrarily, supporting the clearer - the most marked - identification
of the smaller ethnic groups against the Kurdish 'imperialism', Turkey
shapes a great alliance and gains the impressions, by transferring the
problem (the conflict is not anymore between Turkey and the 'Kurds' but
between the Zazas and another people that wants the Zazas assimilated)
and appearing as the ultimate resort and remedy for the 'problem'.
Further points of conclusions ensuing from across-the-board political
considerations that Turkey's political, academic, military and
financial establishment must elaborate as soon as possible we will
discuss in the next article.